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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND PRELIMINARY MATTERS 
This thesis is a comparative examination of the application of mandatory rules in the 
area of the private international law of contracts.] As will be seen during the course of 
this study, and as will be briefly noted in the following introductory remarks, this 
question arises in a number of situations. It prompts fundamental issues that have been 
debated for many years by academics allover the world. Some of the problems are still 
not fully settled. 
I The Problem: Application of mandatory rules in the conflict setting 
The overriding question that has to be addressed is under what circumstances are 
mandatory rules to be applied in the private international law of contracts. How do these 
rules relate to the ordinary choice of law process? Are the rules superseded by the 
forum's choice oflaw rules for contracts, or do they deserve special consideration? The 
relationship between the rules of private international law that provide for the 
application of the law of a specified legal system, and rules of a mandatory nature that 
claim application to the transaction is a controversial matter. 
The general rule in the private international law of contracts is that the 'proper law' 
governs most aspects of the contract. If the forum's choice of law rules lead to a foreign 
legal system, the foreign law is rendered applicable, within the scope of reference of the 
forum's conflict rules. This application of the foreign law includes application of its 
mandatory legislation to the exclusion of the ius dispositivum and the ius cogens of the 
forum and also to the exclusion of a potentially otherwise applicable law.2 This 
approach is generally true of all the countries that will be examined, whether the foreign 
law is determined by a choice oflaw of the contracting parties (subjective choice of 
law), or by the forum's choice oflaw rules, in the absence of a choice by the parties 
I The application of mandatory rules in other areas of private international law, eg law of torts or family 
law, will not be considered. For the application of mandatory rules as a means of stopping evasion in the 
area of family law, see Fawcett CLl (1990) 44 et seq. For corresponding problems in international 
commercial arbitration, see Schiffer Normen (1989); Ungeheuer Beachtung (1996). 
2 Compare Philip Recent Provisions 24 I, 242. 
2 
(objective choice oflaw).3 Thus a statute or a common law rule does not normally apply 
to a contract, unless it forms part of the proper law.4 
However, in respect of the application of mandatory rules, this is not the end of the 
matter. There are many circumstances in which the mandatory rules of a law other than 
the proper law should be applied, or at least considered or taken into account. The 
application can be based on special choice of law rules providing for the application of 
mandatory rules of a law other than the proper law.5 Alternatively, a mandatory rule can 
be applicable without a separate and prior choice of law rule indicating its applicability, 
because it determines its own scope of application. In this case, the mandatory rule has 
an implied or express unilateral conflict rule attached to it, which indicates its 
international scope. Furthermore, the courts have taken into account mandatory rules of 
a law other than the proper law, on the basis of policy considerations or the forum's 
ordre public. 
The application of the mandatory rules of a law other than the proper law therefore 
constitutes an exception to the general rule that the proper law of the contract governs 
most aspects of the contract. 
II Historical background: From Savigny and the 'liberal state' to the modern 
welfare state of the 20th century 
The application of the proper law was always subject to exceptions. The founder of 
today's traditional choice of law method,6 the German academic writer Savigny (1779-
1861) had already excluded rules ofa strictly mandatory, compelling nature from the 
3 Philip Contract Conflicts 81, 92, 93 ; id Recent Provisions 241, 242 states: 'If the application of 
mandatory rules of the law of the forum were always preserved one might well do without private 
international law' . However, with regard to the principle of party autonomy this result is not always 
accepted. For the difference between incorporation and party reference, see later in CHAPTER 2. In 
South Africa the legal situation is still unsettled, see Forsyth Private International law 278 et seq, 299 
and later under CHAPTER 2, VI, 1. 
4 Or unless it is a procedural one of the forum, see Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol I 21 - 22. 
5 Eg, arts 3 (3), 5 (2) and 6 (1) of the Rome Convention, which are discussed in CHAPTER 2, I, 1,2 
6 The choice of law rules of private international law of contracts in England, Germany and Switzerland, 
and in the Rome Convention are based on this traditional allocation technique, see Sonnenberger FS 
Rebmann 819; Kropholler IPR § 3 I; Lipstein Rec des Cours 135 (1972 I) 99,163,194, 195 et seq, 
Cheshire & North's Private International Law 21, et seq, 23, 38, 39. This is also true of South African 
Roman-Dutch private intemationallaw, see Forsyth Private International Law 5 et seq, 43, 44,57 et seq. 
3 
nonnal choice of law process: 'Gesetze von streng positiver, zwingender Natur, die 
wegen ihrer Natur zujener freien Behandlung ... nicht geeignet sind,.7 Savigny's 
'connecting system' or 'allocation technique' (Ankniipfungsmodell) consisted of 
multilateral conflict rules indicating the law applicable to the transaction.8 The system 
was based on the principle of the formal equality and interchangeability of legal 
systems, and was neutral in that the substantive law rules were not considered. Savigny 
contended that international uniformity of decision would be achieved by his method.9 
In respect of mandatory rules based on moral reasons, or the public well being (publica 
utilitas), that had a political, police or economic character, he held that the formal 
equality and interchangeability of legal systems was not given and that 'each state 
appears for itself as conclusive'.10 Savigny's approach was that these rules were of an 
abnonnal nature and would diminish with the natural legal development of nations. 11 
Savingny's forecast was incorrect: Contrary to his prediction, during the last 
century, modern states have increasingly regulated private relationships. 12 The so-called 
'liberal state' (Liberalstaat) that left its citizens to control their own legal relations has 
slowly but surely been replaced by the 'welfare state' or 'social state' (Sozialstaat), that 
aims to intervene actively in private relationships in the economic and social interests of 
the community.13 Alongside the growing amount of economic dirigisme, mandatory 
legislation based on socio-political intentions to protect groups of individuals has been 
7 'Laws of a strictly positive, mandatory nature that are due to their nature ... not suitable for such a liberal 
treatment': Friedrich Karl von Savigny System des heutigen romischen Rechts Vol VIII (1849) 33 et seq; 
cfKropholler IPR § 3 I; Anderegg Eingriffsnormen 1-2; Kreuzer Auslandisches Wirtschaftsrecht 8. 
8 In order to select the appropriate legal system Savigny examined the legal relationship and asked where 
its 'proper and natural seat' was to be found: the so called 'centre 0/ gravity approach', Savigny System 
des heutigen Romischen Rechts Vol VIII 108; Triebel ICLQ 37 (1988) 935; Forsyth Private International 
Law 6, 43-44; Kropholler IPR § 3 I. 
9 Savigny System des heutigen Romischen Rechts Vol VIII 23 et seq; Kropholler IPR § 3 I; Kreuzer 
Auslandisches Wirtschaftsrecht 7,8; Forsyth Private International Law 46,60,61. 
IO Savigny System des heutigen Romischen Rechts Vol VIII 36. Foreign mandatory rules of this kind 
remained therefore inapplicable; cfKreuzer Auslandisches Wirtschaftsrecht 8, 9. 
II Savigny System des heutigen Romischen Rechts Vol VIII 38. However this approach must be seen 
against the background of the legal reality of the liberal state in the 19 century. For an overview, see 
Basedow RabelsZ 52 (1988) 9, 13 et seq. 
12 Kreuzer Auslandisches Wirtschaftsrecht 9; also see Hartley Contract Conflicts III et seq; Lipstein 
Conflict a/Public Laws 357,360; Philip Recent Provisions 241,242. 
13 Basedow RabelsZ 52 (1988) 8,16 calls it 'mixed economy'; Sonnenberger FS Rebmann 819, 820; 
Voser 7 Am Rev Int'l Arb 319 Lexis-Nexis (3) of38; Kren ZVerglRWiss 88 (1989) 48,49; Keller FS 
Vischer 175, 176; Vischer Rec des Cours 142 (1974 II) 1,21; Hartley Contract Conflicts III et seq. 
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enacted to an ever greater degree. 14 Rules intended to protect or promote policies of the 
State based on social, economic or political considerations are, for example, rules on 
anti-trust practices, import and export prohibitions, exchange control regulations and 
price control regulations. Examples of mandatory legislation intended to protect 
individuals are rules protecting the weaker contracting parties, such as consumers or 
employees. 15 Trade restrictions are also examples of mandatory legislation. They do not 
serve protectionist goals of economic or social policy, but they do pursue interests of a 
security nature, or may exert political pressure on foreign countries, for example, by 
means of embargoes. Such restrictions may also endeavour to prevent the loss of 
cultural treasures or to protect the environment. 16 
The issue of mandatory rules in private international law is rendered important by 
the increase in the number of rules that intervene in the private relationship in order to 
advance the interests of the state. These rules may affect relationships between 
individuals either by requiring action, making a particular provision obligatory, or 
prohibiting certain conduct or a specific provision in a contract. I? All these rules are 
binding and do not permit any derogation. 18 Often the state interest in upholding these 
rules is of such importance that the provision is designed to apply irrespective of the law 
that governs the contract according to the 'normal' choice of law rules. They are 
therefore exceptions to the normal choice of law rules. 19 In England they are known as 
'overriding statutes' or 'directly applicable statutes'. 20 Elsewhere they are referred to as 
'lois de police' or 'lois d'application immediate' or 'EingrifJsnormen' .21 
Along with this trend of increasing state intervention in private relations, 
international trade between private parties has increased.22 But not only did international 
14 See Kreuzer Auslandisches Wirtschaftsrecht 9; Erauw International Contracts 71 et seq, Hartley 
Contract Conflicts III et seq. For example, see the recent directives of the EU in the branch of consumer 
protection, Junker IPRax 1998, 65 et seq. 
IS Also see Hartley (1979) 4 ELR 236, 238; id Contract Conflicts 111; Cheshire & North Private 
International Law 469; Philip Recent Provisions 241,242. 
16 Basedow RabelsZ 52 (1988) 9, 16. 
17 CfHartley (1979) 4 ELR, 236, 237. 
18 CfLipstein Offentliches Recht 39,42,43. 
19 Philip Recent Provisions 241, 242; Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vo112I, 23; cfthe published 
article of Hartley Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 345 et seq. 
20 Cheshire & North's Private International Law 497; Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol I 21-25. 
21 Compare Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol I 22; on further designations, CHAPTER 3. 
22 CfKreuzer Auslandisches Wirtschaftsrecht 9. 
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commercial agreements become more and more common, cross-border selling of goods 
and services to non-professionals expanded. In addition, the growth of multilateral 
corporations and free movement within the European Union, for example, has led to the 
international mobility ofworkers.23 An international contract may have connections not 
only with one country, but also with another, and the latter's mandatory legislation may 
also claim application. Hence, the parties are often faced with mandatory rules of the lex 
fori, the lex causae and a third country, with which the contract may have a certain 
connection. The third country may be, for example, the place of performance, the place 
where the contract was concluded, the habitual residence, or the place ofbusiness.24 
The crucial question is how these mandatory rules relate to the traditional 
multilateral choice of law rules in private international law. Are they subject to the 
ordinary choice oflaw process (and thus can only be applied if they form part of the 
applicable law) or do they deserve special treatment? It has often been argued that the 
applicability of these norms cannot be determined by means of the traditional allocation 
technique. Instead, these rules fall outside the scope of reference of the normal 
multilateral conflict rules and deserve special choice oflaw considerations.25 
While 'directly applicable statutes' of the lex fori are generally applied according to 
their own terms, despite a foreign proper law of the contract, problems arise with regard 
to foreign lois d'app/ication immediate. The treatment of these rules in the private 
international law of contracts has long been a subject of controversy amongst 
continental European lawyers. In fact, it is regarded as one of the most controversial 
issues in the modem international law of contracts world wide. 26 
In Germany and Switzerland the academic debate started over 50 years ago with the 
innovative approach of Wilhelm Wengler, who was the founder oftoday's Special 
Connection Theory (Sonderanknupfungstheorie).27 Since then, the controversy has 
23 See Morse Contract Conflicts 143, 144. 
24 Lipstein Conflict of Public Laws 357, 365 et seq. 
2S For the different approaches, see infra CHAPTER 4, I, and CHAPTER 5, I. 
26 Kreuzer Ausliindisches Wirtschaftsrecht 10. 
27 Wengler ZVerglRWiss 54 (1941) 168 et seq; see also Zweigert RabelsZ 14 (1942) 283 et seq. 
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continued unabated, and has led to an immense amount of academic contributions about 
this issue.28 
In the United Kingdom the discussion concerning the application of 'directly 
applicable rules' of foreign states started later, during the negotiations of the Rome 
Convention. This may be due to the fact that English law outside the Rome Convention 
does not distinguish between the application of mandatory rules and public policy. The 
principle of mandatory rules overriding the normal choice of law process has in fact 
been introduced by the Rome Convention into English conflict oflaws.29 However, the 
problem is well known in English law and is often referred to within the notion of 
public policy and the essential validity or illegality of a contract. 
III Party autonomy and mandatory rules 
The question of the application of mandatory rules has arisen in the context of party 
autonomy, alongside the issue of the application of lois d 'application immediate in 
private international law. The tendency to grant the contracting parties a nearly 
unlimited freedom to choose a law to govern their transaction (party autonomy) has 
increased the importance of mandatory rules in the private international law of 
contracts. 
The traditional requirements of a valid choice of law, such as an objective 
connection between the contract and the chosen law, or the reasonable or legitimate 
interest of the contracting parties in their choice, have been abandoned. The parties may 
choose a law that is completely unconnected with the transaction, and mandatory rules 
have therefore become a modem tool to restrict such freedom of choice.30 Particularly 
with a view to protecting the weaker contracting party, freedom of choice has been 
limited by the application of mandatory rules of the law otherwise applicable, had the 
28 This is true for many Continental European countries, such as France, Italy, Austria etc, for references, 
see MtinchKomm/Martiny Art 34 Schrifttum; Schurig RabelsZ 54 (190) 217, 218 Footnote *; id Lois 
Footnote 1; Sonnenberger FS Rebmann 819,821 N 8; Baum RabelsZ 53 (1989) 152 Footnotes *, 3,4; 
Schafer FG Sandrock 37 Footnote 2. 
29 Apart from a few legislative directions, cf Jackson Contract Conflicts 59, 70; Cheshire & North's 
Private International Law 137, 496. 
30 CfLorenz RlW 1987,569 et seq; Dicey & Morris Conflict o/Laws Vol II 1213,1215 et seq. 
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parties not made their choice. Policy considerations of the substantive law are thus 
extended into the field of conflict of laws. 31 
This approach indicates a change from the traditional choice of law method that 
was 'neutral' in determining the applicable law, in that it did not refer to values in 
substantive laws or to the result of its application.32 This trend is reflected in the Rome 
Convention, which deals with mandatory rules in a conceptually new manner. 
IV Recent legislative approaches 
The academic discussions have been stimulated by politically explosive court decisions, 
for example, the 'Pipeline-embargo' case/3 a decision of a Dutch court. This case 
concerned the much disputed embargo measures of the United States of America on the 
construction of a Russian gas-pipeline. These measures were intended by the United 
States government to apply extraterritorially, but were firmly rejected by the United 
Kingdom and the European Community.34 Academics were also challenged by recent 
statutory approaches that provide for the application of (internationally) mandatory rules 
in certain choice of law rules, particularly the Rome Convention of 19 June 1980.35 
The Rome Convention is of considerable interest because it contains a number of 
conflict rules that deal differently with the application of mandatory rules. Furthermore, 
the Convention was drafted by legal experts of many European countries and therefore 
reflects modern tendencies and approaches. The objective of the Rome Convention - the 
harmonisation of the conflict rules in the European member states - was ultimately 
31 For details, see CHAPTER 2. 
J2 See North Private International Law Problems 141, 142; Morse ICLQ 42 (1992) 1,2; Erauw 
International Contracts 71, 72. 
)3 Arr-Rechtsbank s' Gravenhage (Den Haag) 17.9.1982, RabelsZ 47 (1983) 141 et seq. For a useful 
discussion of this case, see Basedow RabelsZ 47 (1983) 147 et seq. 
34 The objections were so strong that the British Government invoked the 'Blocking' Protection of 
Trading Interests Act 1980, Chapter 11 and ordered the British companies concerned not to comply with 
the United States embargo, cf Lowe RabelsZ 52 (1988) 157, 179, 182; id GYBIL 27 (1984) 54, 67 et seq; 
see as well the articles ofVagts, Kuyper, Meessen and Basedow in GYBIL 27 (1984) 28 - 141. 
35 Other statutory approaches are the Convention on the Law Applicable to Agency of 1978; Act, Doc 
Law Haye 13 Sess 1976 142 (cf Art 16); the Trust Convention, Act, Doc Law Haye 15 Sess 1984 125 (cf 
art 16 (2»; the Bretton Woods Agreement (IMF) (cfart VIII (2) (b». 
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confined to contractual obligations.36 The Convention's conflict rules entered into legal 
force on 1 April 1991. They thus form the present basis of the private international law 
of contracts of its European member states.37 
The Rome Convention refers to mandatory rules in several provisions, four of 
which are relevant to this study: Articles 3 (3), 5 (2), 6 (1) and 7 (1) and (2).38 These 
four conflict rules result in an 'irregular' application of mandatory rules, despite the 
proper law of the contract.39 They are all somehow 'exceptions' to the general rule that 
the forum's conflict rules lead to the application of a foreign law including its rules of a 
declaratory nature and the mandatory rules under exclusion of the rules of the lex fori or 
another foreign law.40 However, although all of these conflict rules deal with mandatory 
rules, they differ substantially from each other in respect of their structure, the type of 
mandatory rule referred to, and the effect given to it. The four provisions will be 
discussed during the course of this study within different structural contexts, depending 
on how they affect mandatory rules. 
The parties' freedom of choice pursuant to art 3 (1) of the Convention is limited by 
arts 3 (3), 5 (2) and 6 (1) of the Convention, which provide for the application of the 
mandatory rules of the legal system that would govern in the absence of a choice of law 
of the parties.41 Article 3 (3) deals with the situation of a purely domestic contract, while 
arts 5 (2) and 6 (1) contain special conflict rules for consumer and employment 
contracts.42 With regard to consumer and employment contracts, the Rome Convention 
reflects the modem trend of extending the substantive law's protection of the weaker 
36 Compare a more detailed approach, Morse (1998) 2 YB Eur L 107; North Contract Conflicts 1,4 et 
seq; Williams ICLQ 35 (I986) 1 et seq. 
37 The Rome Convention opened for signature in Rome on 7 December 1981, after the deposit of the 
seventh instrument of ratification, art 29 Rome Convention. This requirement was eventually fulfilled by 
the United Kingdom, see BGBI II 1991 II 872. Currently the Rome Convention is in force in 15 Member 
States oftheEU, such as the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Derunark, 
Netherlands, Greece, Austria, Portugal, Sweden, Finland, Luxembourg, Ireland. . 
38 Art 9 (6) of the Rome Convention is also concerned with mandatory rules, but this provision falls 
beyond the scope of this study. 
39 Schurig RabelsZ 54 (1990) 217, 220; Masch Rechlswahlfreiheit 19,20; Morris Statutes 187,200, 201 
with regard to overriding statutes. 
40 See Schurig RabelsZ 54 (990) 217, 220; Philip Recent Provisions 241, 242. 
41 See Junker IPRax 1989, 69, 70; ReithmannlMartinylMartiny Internationa/es Vertragsrecht Rn 96. 
42 With regard to arts 5 and 6 of the Convention, Morse ICLQ 41 (1992) 1,6,14; with regard to the 
German arts 29 and 30 EGBGB, Schurig RabelsZ 54 (1990) 217,220; Junker IPRax 1989, 69, 71. 
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contracting party into the field of conflict of laws.43 In this context, party autonomy is 
limited by mandatory rules. 
The effect of art 7 (1) and (2) of the Convention is greater than that of the other 
provisions. These two provisions serve not only as a limitation of party autonomy; they 
also override the choice of law process in the absence of a choice of law, and thus limit 
the scope of the lex causae in genera1.44 Article 7 (2) allows for the application of the 
mandatory rules of the lex fori if they are internationally mandatory, i.e. applicable 
irrespective of the law applicable to the contract. Article 7 (1) is concerned with 
internationally mandatory rules of a third country that is neither the proper law of the 
contract nor the lex fori, but has a close connection with the situation. While arts 5 (2) 
and 6 (1) refer to the mandatory rules of the' otherwise applicable law' , art 7 (1) might 
refer to any foreign legal system with which the situation is closely connected. 
Article 3 (3) defines mandatory rules as rules 'which cannot be derogated from by 
contract', and thus refers to mandatory rules in a domestic or wider sense.45 This type of 
mandatory rule is also dealt with in arts 5 (2) and 6 (1). Article 7, however, refers to 
internationally or conflict mandatory rules; mandatory rules in a domestic sense do not 
fall within the scope of art 7. Internationally mandatory rules are rules that are not only 
mandatory in their domestic or national setting, but also apply to the case regardless of 
the proper law of the contract.46 Thus, art 7, on the one hand, and arts 5 (2),6 (1) and 3 
(3), on the other, are concerned with different types of mandatory rules. 
Furthermore, arts 5 and 6 are limited in their scope of application to mandatory 
rules that serve the protection of the consumer or worker,47 while art 7 is not limited to a 
43 See North Private International Law Problems 141, 142; Morse lCLQ 42 (1992) 1,2; Erauw 
International Contracts 71, 72. 
44 Cffor this distinction Cheshire & North's Private International Law 499; Schurig RabelsZ 54 (1990) 
217,220; Philip Contract Conflicts 81, 94 -108. 
45 Cheshire & North's Private International Law 498; other expressions used are: mandatory rules in a 
national sense or simple mandatory rules. 
46 CfLorenz RlW 1987,569,578; Jackson Contracl Conflicts 59, 66 'conflict mandatory rules'; Philip 
Contract Conflicts 81,100 'internationally mandatory'. 
47 Morse ICLQ 41 (1992) 1,8; Hartley Rec des Cours 226 (1997) 341,371; Junker IPRax 1989, 69, 71. 
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certain type ofrule.48 These differences are essential and will inform the basic structure 
of this study. 
Only on rare occasions has a national legislature regulated the issue of mandatory 
rules in private international law. The new Swiss Private International Law Act of 18 
December 1987 (hereafter referred to as the Swiss IPRG), which entered into legal force 
on 1 January 1989,49 is one of these rare enactments. It has attracted international 
attention and is therefore worth examining. 50 
The Swiss IPRG contains three provisions that are relevant to mandatory rules. 
Article 13 concerns the scope of reference of the conflict rules to the foreign legal 
system. 51 Article 18 enables the court to apply Swiss internationally mandatory rules, 
regardless of the proper law ofthe contract, and art 19 is concerned with internationally 
mandatory rules of a third country. 
Furthermore, Switzerland has enacted special conflict rules to protect the 
economically weaker party, particularly the consumer (art 120) and the employee (art 
121). These rules restrict freedom of choice by means of a technique that differs from 
that of the Rome Convention. The issue of which of these techniques would be more 
favourable for South Africa will be discussed. 
V Definition of different kinds of mandatory rules 
To lay the foundations for a discussion and analysis it is necessary to clarify first the 
meaning of the term 'mandatory rules'. In general it is clear that the expression refers to 
rules that do not permit any derogation by contract. Nevertheless, the expression 
48 Delimitation problems arise concerning the scope of applicability of the different provisions, see 
Martiny IPRax 1987,277,278; Junker IPRax 1989,69,73,74; Reithmannl Martiny/ Limmer 
Internationales Vertragsrecht Rn 395; Morse ICLQ 41 (1992) 1, 10 Footnote 45. 
49 'Bundesgesetz tiber das Internationale Privaterecht' (lPRG), (Swiss) BBI 1988 I 5; for a translated text 
of the Act, see Karrer and Arnold Switzerland's Private International Law Statute. 
50 Cfthe comparison of the provisions of the Rome Convention with those of the Swiss IPRG Philip 
Recent Provisions 241 et seq. 
51 The crucial question is whether art 13 of the IPRG determines that the internationally mandatory rules 
of public law of the lex causae are applicable for the sole reason that they belong to the proper law of the 
contract, cf Schnyder Das neue IP RG 29 et seq; Vischer RabelsZ 53 (1989) 438, 441 et seq. 
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deserves further scrutiny, since it includes different kinds of mandatory rule that have to 
be distinguished from each other.52 These rules differ in the following respects: 
(1) Their nature as mandatory rules in a domestic or international sense, 
(2) Their origin, viz. the enacting country, 
(3) Their classification as rules of a public or private law nature, and 
(4) Whether the rule is applied as a rule or considered as factum. 
All these distinctions will be dealt with during the course of this study.53 It is therefore 
useful to clarify their meaning in advance. 
1 Mandatory rules in a domestic sense or international sense 
Mandatory rules can be classified as mandatory on different levels. The first level or 
type is the mandatory rule in a domestic sense. 54 This type is also referred to as 
mandatory in a wide sense or simply mandatory. These rules are compulsory in a 
domestic setting, but are subject to the normal rules of private international law. The 
Rome Convention refers to this type of rule in art 3 (3) and defines mandatory rules as 
rules 'which cannot be derogated from by contract'. 
Mandatory rules in a domestic sense have to be distinguished from another type of 
rule that is internationally mandatory. The latter, in addition to the criterion that it 
'cannot be derogated from by contract', must claim application irrespective of the law 
governing the contract. Although these rules are generally called internationally 
mandatory rules (international zwingende Normen),5S they are also known as 
'interventionist rules' (Eingrijfsnormen),56 'conflicts' mandatory rules,S? mandatory 
52 The RC refers to mandatory rules in the following provisions: articles 3 (3), 5 (2), 6 (1), 7 (1), (2) and 9 
(6) . But even though the same expression 'mandatory rules' is used in these provision, the rules to which 
they refer are different in nature. 
53 A further distinction can be drawn based on the effect given to mandatory rules. This distinction 
follows also from. the nature of the mandatory rule as domestic or internationally mandatory and is 
considered in this study's choice of structure, cfCHAPTER 2 with CHAPTERS 3, 4,5,6. 
54 Cheshire & North's Private International Law 498. 
55 North Contract Conflicts 3,19. 
56 Schurig RabelsZ 54 (1990) 217, 220, 221; Vischer RabelsZ 53 (1989) 439 et seq . 
57 Jackson Contract Conflicts 59, 66. 
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rules in a 'narrower sense',58 'overriding statutes', lois d'app/ication immediate, or 
'directly applicable statutes'. 
These rules have been described as being 'more' mandatory than the mandatory 
rules in a domestic sense. 59 The parties cannot exclude them by contract in a domestic 
setting, nor can they exclude them by choosing another law as the proper law. These 
rules determine their own scope of application since they have an express or implied 
unilateral conflict rule attached to their substantive content.60 
2 The country of origin 
Another important distinction is a spatial criterion. Do the rules emanate from the 
forum, the proper law, or a third country, which is neither the forum nor the proper law? 
It is broadly accepted that the internationally mandatory rules of the lex fori override the 
normal choice of law rules, but there are differences in reasoning and methodology.61 
Difficulties arise with defining and determining whether the rule in question is 
internationally mandatory. The forum has to identify such rules and provide proof as to 
whether they have an overriding effect on the situation in question. Mandatory rules are 
not only contained in statutes, but also in the common law and international 
Conventions.62 
Mandatory rules in a domestic sense are in general applicable if they belong to the 
proper law.63 But different approaches exist with regard to the application of 
internationally mandatory rules.64 In this regard the continental distinction between 
public and private law must be mentioned, because internationally mandatory rules are 
often rules of a public law nature.65 It has been questioned whether public law rules fall 
58 Cheshire & North's Private International Law 498. 
59 Schurig RabelsZ 54 (1990) 217,220; Junker rPRax 1989,69, 73 ; De Boer RabelsZ 54 (1990) 24,57 
speaks of 'super-mandatory' rules . 
60 Hartley Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 345, 346. 
61 Cf Cheshire & North's Private International Law 499; Hartley Rec des Cours 266 (I 997) 345, 369. 
62 Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol 1 22-3; Lasok & Stone Conflict of Laws 374,375. 
63 Cf Becker RabelsZ 60 (1996) 691, 697 . 
64 Cf MtinchKomm/Sonnenberger Einl Rn 34. 
65 Cf Philip Recent Provisions 241,242. 
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within the scope of the ordinary conflict rules or whether they are excluded from the 
normal choice of law process and subjected to another system of conflict of laws.66 
The application of mandatory rules of a third country, which is neither the lex fori 
nor the proper law of the contract, is the real subject of dispute.67 The question is 
whether and how these rules can be applied or considered by the court of the forum. 
3 Private law or public law 
A distinction can be drawn between internationally mandatory rules belonging to private 
and public law. This distinction is relevant in Germany and Switzerland in determining 
the applicability of internationally mandatory rules. 
4 Application as law or consideration as fact 
A differentiation can be drawn between the application of mandatory rules as 'law', and 
the consideration of mandatory rules as 'facts' within the operative facts of the 
substantive law of the lex causae. This differentiation has been developed with regard to 
foreign internationally mandatory rules. In effect, the consideration takes place at 
different levels: at the conflict of law level and at the level of substantive law. It is held 
that the application of a foreign rule as law is possible, if rendered applicable by a 
choice of law rule. Otherwise a foreign rule can only be given effect by considering it as 
afact within the substantive rules of the lex causae. The provisions of the proper law 
taking cognisance of the apparently factual effects of the foreign mandatory rule may be 
those of illegality, public policy, bani mores, impossibility of performance, or the 
doctrine frustration. It will be seen during the course of this study that this distinction is 
of fundamental relevance for academic approaches and court decisions. However, the 
distinction is questionable, and the question of whether it is in fact justified in conflict 
of laws will be discussed. 
66 Schafer FG Sandrock 37, 48, 49; Philip Recent Provisions 241, 242, 243. 
67 CfSchafer FG Sandrock 37; Schurig Rabelsz 54 (1990) 217, 234; Dicey & Morris Conflict o/Laws Vol 
21242. 
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VI Determination and limitation of the scope of examination 
1 A comparative study 
The purpose of this study is to present, compare and critically analyse approaches to the 
application of mandatory rules, whether academic, case law or statutory. I will discuss 
England and Germany, as representatives ofthe two main legal traditions, common and 
civil law. Reference will also be made, however, to Switzerland and South Africa. 
Compared to other countries, where academics and courts could slowly adjust their 
private international law to the increase in international trade and the global economy, 
South African private international law is undeveloped. The law is ill prepared for the 
country's connections with the rest of the world, which have greatly increased since the 
political revolution of the 1990s. The modem South Africa, which now participates in 
the new global economy, presents its lawyers and courts with new problems in private 
international law of contracts, and some of these problems will necessarily concern the 
application of foreign and South African mandatory rules to international contracts. In 
particular, the question of the application of mandatory rules in the private international 
law of contracts is generally unexplored.68 
Parliament has done much to reform the Roman-Dutch rules of private international 
law -legislation has been passed to regulate family law, succession, domicile, and 
enforcement of judgements - the question of legislating in the area of contract has never 
been broached. Thus, South African private international law of contracts will, at least 
for the immediate future, consist of Roman-Dutch common law rules, apart from a few 
statutory exceptions for particular contractual contexts.69 
The comparison and critical analysis of the various approaches of the countries 
under investigation will show similarities and differences and reveal their advantages 
68 CfForsyth Private International Law 278 et seq and 298 et seq. 
69 See Forsyth Private International Law 274 et seq; Edwards Conflict of Laws para 472 refers to the Bills 
of Exchange Act 34 of 1964, s 70, the Insurance Act 27 of 1943, s 63 (1) and the Carriage of Goods by 
Sea Act I of 1986, s I as examples of statutes containing conflict rules in their particular contractual 
context. 
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and disadvantages according to general principles of choice of law and practical needs. 
The purpose of this analysis is to propose a suitable approach for South African private 
international law. The submitted approach attempts to provide guidelines to South 
African courts that are confronted with litigation concerning international contracts. 
Furthermore, the discussion and analysis of the differing approaches, and the proposed 
solution for South Africa, may contribute to the recently begun discussion amongst 
South African academics.70 
A comparative study on a broad topic such as the application of mandatory rules in 
international law of contracts needs to be limited. This can be done in two ways. The 
study could limit itself to a certain field in which the application of mandatory rules 
arises, for example, the role of mandatory rules as a restriction of party autonomy in the 
private international law of contracts, or the problem of the application of 
internationally mandatory rules of a third country despite the proper law of the contract. 
Alternatively, the study could focus on a smaller number oflegal systems. The present 
author has adopted the latter approach. Because of the uncertain legal situation in South 
Africa and because of the difficulty and scope of the topic (which addresses various and 
fundamental questions of private international law), it is believed to be preferable to 
concentrate on a detailed presentation and analysis of the approaches in a few 
representative legal systems. Most aspects and fields in which the question of 
application of mandatory rules arises can thus be addressed. 
Furthermore, rather than examining many approaches in a superficial manner, this 
thesis will analyse the academic approaches and the court decisions in detail. In order to 
evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of the various approaches and solutions of 
academics and the courts, the critical analysis will be based on certain criteria that are of 
fundamental value in orthodox conflict of laws: decisional harmony, comity of nations, 
the principle of unity of law relating to contracts, predictability and certainty in law, the 
need for choice of law considerations, multilateral conflict rules versus unilateralism, 
and so on. 
70 See Forsyth Private International Law 30 I et seq; Spiro XVII CILSA (1984) 197 et seq; Viejobueno 
XXII CILSA (1993) 172 et seq; Neels 1191 TSAR 694 et seq; Edwards Conflict of Laws para 469; but 
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2 The choice of countries 
The legal situation in Gennany has been chosen as representative of the civil law 
tradition because the academic writing in the relevant area is highly developed. It was 
the Gennan academic Wilhelm Wengler who in 1941 initiated the long standing debate 
about the application of internationally mandatory rules in the private international law 
of contracts.71 Since then many academics have made proposals about how to combine 
these rules with the ordinary choice of law process.72 It is submitted that these 
approaches deserve more attention in the English speaking world than they have been 
given in the past. The German courts have also found solutions that are of particular 
interest. 
England has been chosen as representative of the common law legal tradition 
because interesting cases have arisen since the 1920s regarding the application of 
mandatory rules, and the courts have developed relatively finn principles. Traditionally, 
in matters of private international law, South African authors and courts have referred to 
English case law.73 The English position, with its merits and demerits, is always highly 
relevant to South African private international law. 
The legal situation in the other major common-law jurisdiction, the United States of 
America is, however, of little use in developing a solution for the South African private 
international law of contracts.74 This is due to the following factors. Firstly, the different 
states do not necessarily have the same conflict rules. Not only may each state have its 
see the extensive study of Van Rooyen Die Kontrak (1972). 
71 Wengler ZVerglRWiss 54 (1941) 168 et seq. 
72 There has always been a lively exchange of academic approaches in Gennany, Switzerland and 
Austria, the three Gennan-speaking nations concerning private international law questions. The academic 
discussion in Switzerland and Austria is heavily influenced by Gennan approaches, cf for Switzerland: 
Voser Lois d'app/ication immediate (1993) and Erne Vertragsgiiltigkeit (1985); cffor Austria: Reichelt 
ZfR 29 (1988) 82 et seq; CzemichlHeiss EVa Art 7 Rn 2, 30, 50. However, similar approaches can also 
be found in other continental European countries, such as France, Italy or the Netherlands. For a short 
comparative survey of the question of application of internationally mandatory rules, see: HonseIlN ogtJ 
SchnyderlMachler-Erne art 13 Rn 25 et seq, art 18 Rn 24 et seq, art 19 Rn 34, Lehmann Zwingendes 
Recht 76 et seq (France), 103 et seq (Italy), 117 et seq (Netherlands), cf for the Netherlands Schultz 
RabelsZ 47 (1988) 267 et seq; De Boer Rabelsz 54 (1990) 24 et seq both with references. 
73 Compare the SA approaches and court decisions in CHAPTER 2, VI, 1 and CHAPTER 6, 1. 
74 Although SA authors sometimes refer to US solutions, they do so in a very general and restrictive 
manner, cf Spiro XVII CILSA (1984) 197 et seq referring to the basic provisions of the American Law 
Institute's Second Restatement of the Conflict of Laws. However, Forsyth Private International Law 5, 
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own particular conflict rules, but it may also follow different methods to solve the 
choice of law problem.75 There are interesting academic approaches, such as Cavers's 
'rules of preference' /6 Currie's 'governmental interest analysis',77 or Leflar's 'better 
rule of law-approach',78 reflecting the' American conflict revolution' .79 
However, the concern of these approaches is not exactly the concern of the present 
study.80 These approaches certainly do refer to the application of mandatory rules, but 
only indirectly.81 The crucial point, however, is that the American theories in general 
depart from Savigny's traditional allocation technique which consists of (multilateral) 
choice of law rules connecting a certain legal relationship with an appropriate legal 
system. American theories question the merits of the traditional choice of law process 
and the results obtained by mechanically connecting a private relationship to one 
54, 61 makes it clear: The American methods for solution of the choice of law problem are not for export 
to South African private international law. 
75 Courts rely on various methods: the 'centre of gravity', 'governmental interest', 'comparative 
impairment' method (refming Currie's doctrine), the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws and the 
'most significant relationship' or Leflar's 'better law approach'. Others refer to the 'vested rights' 
approach or simply apply the lexfori, cfKay Mercer L Rev 34 (1983) 521, Appendix 591- 592; Vischer 
Rec des Cours 232 (1992 I) 9,64; see as well Peterson Moderne amerikanische IPR Theorie 77,84. 
Furthermore, relevant cases for this study, particularly concerning the question of application of third 
countries' internationally mandatory rules, are few and not so significant. Most court decisions in the 
United States in the field of conflict of laws concern private international law of torts rather than contract, 
cfReese Am J Comp L 30 (1982) 135, 139. For some recent court decisions, see Vischer Rec des Cours 
232 (1992 I) 9, 66 et seq; also see Jayme IPRax 1986,46 et seq. 
76 Cavers The Choice of Law Process 114 et seq; id Harv L Rev 47 (1933 -1934) 173 et seq, 192 et seq; 
cf on Cavers' approach Forsyth Private International Law 55; Lipstein Rec des Cours 135 (1972 I) 99, 
157 et seq. 
77 Currie Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws; cf as well Lando Am J Comp L 30 (1982) 19, 24; 
Forsyth Private International Law 55 et seq; Lipstein Rec des Cours 135 (1972 I) 99, 154 et seq; Guedj 
Am J Comp L 39 (1991) 661, 681 et seq; Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992 1) 9, 48. 
78 Leflar American Conflicts Law 193 - 195, 205 - 219; id NY UL Rev 41 (1966) 267 et seq; see on 
Leflar's approach Siehr Am J Comp L 30 (1982) 37, 47 et seq. 
79 There are further important theories, such as Ehrenzweig's 'lex fori' approach. For these authors and a 
general representation of American theories, see Forsyth Private International Law 53 et seq; Lipstein 
Rec des Cours 135 (1972 I) 99, 143 et seq; Cheshire & North's Private International Law 31 et seq; 
Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992 I) 9, 44 et seq; Kegel FS Beitzke 551 et seq; Vitta Am J Comp L 30 
(1982) 1 et seq. The Second Restatement on the Conflict of Laws combines traditional conflict values 
with the modem American theories, Vischer ibid 57 et seq; Lando Am J Comp L 30 (1982) 19,28. 
80 For an interesting comparison of American theories and the doctrine of lois d'app/ication immediate or 
lois de police: Guedj Am J Comp L 39 (1991) 661 et seq. 
81 The purpose of these approaches is not to clarify the relationship between the ordinary choice of law 
process and the application of certain mandatory legislation, but rather to create a new choice of law 
process differing to the traditional allocation technique. Thereby, the limits of operation of particular 
rules to a particular case are determined by interpretation of the rules themselves, their policies, and 
governmental interests. Often this process will be predominantly based on mandatory rules because 
mandatory rules - more than rules of a declaratory nature - express policies and governmental interests 
and sometimes determine their spatial scope, cf Guedj Am J Comp L 39 (1991) 661; Lando Am J Comp 
L 30 (1982) 19, 22 et seq. 
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geographical area.82 They propose an alternative choice of law method which in general 
focuses 'on the substantive rules and their underlying policies in order to determine 
whether they apply to a specified issue. ,83 
As far as conflict of laws of contracts is concerned, the modem American solutions 
to the choice of law problem were not accepted in European countries. 84 Nor have the 
American theories had any impact on the South African private internationallaw.85 To 
the contrary, the American approaches were expressly rejected as methods for the 
choice of law process and were held to be not for export.86 Hence, the private 
international law of contracts in England, Germany, Switzerland, South Africa, and the 
provisions of the Rome Convention are based on the traditional allocation technique.8? 
The adherence to Savigny's traditional solution to the choice oflaw problem and 
the rejection of the 'modem' American theories (as choice of law method) does not 
mean that the traditional choice of law rules cannot and should not be refined, or that 
special choice of law considerations are sometimes required. The traditional process has 
already undergone notable refinement. 88 Particularly in the field of protecting the 
weaker contracting party, there is a trend towards new choice of law rules that take 
82 Compare Vitta Am J Comp L 30 (1982) 1; Peterson Moderne amerikanische IP R-Theorie 77, 81 et seq. 
83 Cf Guedj Am J Comp L 39 (1991) 661; also see Forsyth Private International Law 5,53 et seq; Vitta 
Am J Comp L 30 (1982) 1 'But all of the modem theories have in common a critical attitude towards 
mechanical choice of law rules and the desire to make conflict law more responsive to the demands of 
substantive policies'; Lando Am J Comp L 30 (1982) 19,22 et seq; Cheshire & North's Private 
International Law 31 . 
84 See Lando Am J Comp L 30 (1982) 19,25; Siehr Am J Comp L 30 (1982) 37, 40: 'To date however 
there is no "Americanization" of European private international law. My impression is that there are two 
main explanations. The ftrst pertains to general methodological divergences, the second reflects 
independent development in Europe similar to developments in the United States.' Also see ibid at page 
67 et seq; Cheshire & North's Private International Law 31,38 et seq. Only a few European academics, 
in Germany and the Netherlands, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, influenced by the American conflict 
of law system and theories, rejected the traditional choice of law system of Savigny as a whole. They 
proposed that the conflict issue should be resolved on the basis of social values, and policy interests 
should inftltrate the conflict rules. However, these approaches were not generally accepted, cf Junker 
IPRax 1998, 65, 67; Erauw International Contracts 71, 73; Keller FS Vischer 175, 179 et seq; Zweigert 
RabelsZ 37 (1973) 437, 443-445; Vischer Rec des Cours 142 (1974 II) 1,52 et seq. 
85 Forsyth Private International Law 5,53,54,61. 
86 See Forsyth Private International Law 5,53,54,61; Lipstein Rec des COUTS 135 (1972 I) 99,157,163; 
Lando Am J Comp L 30 (1982) 19,25; Siehr Am J Comp L 30 (1982) 37,67 et seq. 
87 Sonnen berger FS Rebmann 819; Kropholler IPR § 3 I; Lipstein Rec des Cours 135 (1972 I) 99,163, 
194,195 et seq, Cheshire & North's Private International Law 21, et seq, 23, 38, 39; Forsyth Private 
International Law 5 et seq, 43, 44, 57 et seq. 
88 Vischer Rec des COUTS 232 (1992 I) 9, 93 et seq; Vitta Am J Comp L 30 (1982) I, 9 et seq; De Boer 
RabelsZ 54 (1990) 24, 25 et seq; Guedj Am J Comp L 39 (1991) 661. 
19 
cognisance of substantive values and the applicable substantive law.89 In principle this 
refinement can be reached by the choice of law techniques of alternative or cumulative 
connecting factors, or even the so-called escape clauses.9o Thus, the traditional choice of 
law rules 'once rigid, blind and impartial, [are] now increasingly sensitive to 
preconceived material results and open to expectations. ,91 
Furthermore, the application of internationally mandatory rules in the private 
international law of contracts requires special choice of law considerations during the 
orthodox choice oflaw process.92 As will be seen during the course of this study, the 
traditional allocation technique needs to be supplemented by more result- and policy-
orientated choice of law criteria.93 Apart from this refinement (and supplementation) of 
Savigny's allocation technique, however, this thesis is based upon the traditional 
conflict method. 
The solution stipulated in the EEC Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Contractual Obligations on 19 June 1980 (Rome Convention) will be fully discussed. 
The reason for this is that the Convention reflects modem trends in conflict of laws and 
represents the present statutory conflict rules for contracts in many countries. 
Furthermore, the Convention is considered by South African academics as a useful 
persuasive source for the South African private international law of contracts. 94 
Finally, reference to the Rome Convention is required because this study 
concentrates to a large extent on the legal situation in Germany and England, and the 
conflict rules in the field of contractual obligations in both countries are now based on 
the provisions of the Rome Convention. On 1 September 1986 the Law of a Reform 
(New Enactment) of Private International Law of 25 July 1986 entered into force in 
Germany.95 The international law of contractual obligations is governed by arts 27 to 37 
89 See Erauw International Contracts 71, 72; De Boer RabelsZ 54 (1990) 24, 25 et seq; compare as well 
Vitta Am J Comp L 30 (1982) 1,9 et seq. 
90 De Boer ibid 24, 25 et seq; Guedj ibid 661; Vischer ibid 108, 116 et seq. 
91 De Boer ibid 26. 
92 Guedj ibid 661; Vischer ibid 73, 100, 155 et seq; Lando Am J Comp L 30 (1982) 19, 32. 
93 See later CHAPTERS 3, 4,5,6; cfthe article of Guedj ibid 661 et seq comparing American theories 
with the theory of the lois de police. 
94 CfEdwards Conflict o/Laws para 361 Footnote 15. 
95 'Gesetz zur Neuregelung des Intemationalen Privatrechts', BGBI I 1142. 
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of the introductory law ofthe Civil Code (Einfiihrungsgesetz zum Btirgerlichen 
Gesetzbuch, EGBGB amended) and is thereby statutorily regulated for the first time. 
The old private intemationallaw (EGBGB old version) contained no conflict rules 
about contract law; the rules were developed in a typical common law manner.96 
The new articles 27 to 37 are based on provisions of the Rome Convention that 
were incorporated in the EGBGB.97 The Convention thus entered into force in Germany 
before the Rome Convention itself came into legal force. 98 Germany has signed and 
ratified the agreement, subject to the proviso that the provisions of arts 1 to 21 of the 
Convention do not apply directly in German national law. Nevertheless, the principle of 
uniform interpretation applies (art 36 EGBGB, incorporating art 18 of the Convention). 
The provisions of the EGBGB originating from the Convention must therefore be 
interpreted in such a way that the goal of uniformity oflaw with other Contracting 
States remains protected.99 For the purposes of this study it will be sufficient to present 
and analyse the relevant mandatory rules in the context of the corresponding provisions 
of the Rome Convention. 100 
The United Kingdom ratified the Rome Convention and implemented it in the 
Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990 (1990 Act), in force from 1 April 1991. 101 The Act 
96 Triebel ICLQ 37 (1988) 935, 936; Soergel/von Hoffmann Rn 17 vor Art 27; Lorenz RJW 1987, 569. 
97 'Gesetz zu dem Obereinkommen vom 19.6.1980 tiber das auf vertragliche Schuldverhaltnisse 
anwendbare Recht' of29 July 1986, BGBI II 809. 
98 But rather then incorporating it as an statutory appendix to the Civil Code, Gennany incorporated the 
most important provisions of the Convention into the German national law. The mentioned articles were 
thus adjusted to German tenninology; Sandrock RIW 1986, 841, 842; Triebel ICLQ 37 (1988) 935, 936. 
For a text of the Convention provisions following their incorporation into the Gennan code (EGBGB), 
see RabelsZ 50 {I 986) 663, 673-678. This was strongly criticised by German writers and it is doubted 
whether Germany has fulfilled its obligation to incorporate the Convention properly because the 
provisions have been slightly modified and adapted to national legislation. Some provisions were thus 
even omitted and some of the provisions were separated and put in the general part (such as rules on 
formalities art 9 RC = art II EGBGB and public policy art 16 RC = art 6 EGBGB), cfMPI RabelsZ 47 
(1983) 595, 602 et seq, 665 et seq, 673 et seq; Lando CMLR 24 (1987)154, 162 et seq. 
99 cf Sandrock RlW 1986, 841, 842; Soergel/von Hoffmann Rn 16 vor art 27. For criticism, see Lando 
CMLR 24 (1987) 154, 162 with regard to the scope of art 36 which refers only to the chapter on 
contractual obligations, although some provisions of the Rome Convention, such as the rules on 
formalities and public policy, are transformed into rules in the general part of the EGBGB. Martiny ZEuP 
1995,67, 73 is also critical. The interpretation has to be autonomous and must consider the wording of 
the provisions of not only one contracting state, see for further details Martiny ibid 72; Kropholler IPR § 
52 I 2. 
100 Arts 27 (3), 29 (2), 30 (1) and 34 EGBGB. Furthennore, there is art 11 (4) EGBGB which is based on 
art 9 (6) Rome Convention. However, these provisions fall beyond the scope of this study. For these 
provisions, see ReithmanniMartinylLimmer Internationales Vertragsrecht Rn 564 et seq. 
101 S I 1991 No 707; see only Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol II 1187. 
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incorporates the text of the Rome Convention (subject to two reservations) in Schedule 
1. By incorporating the text of the Convention in a Schedule the Convention was given 
the force of law. 102 The 1990 Act applies to contracts concluded after 1 April 1990. 103 
Since then the common law rules on choice of law in contract have, for the most part, 
been substituted by the rules of the Rome Convention.104 This study directly refers to the 
relevant provisions of the 1990 Act dealing with mandatory rules are as the conflict 
rules of the Rome Convention. It ~lso investigates academic approaches and case law 
solutions prior to the Rome Convention. 
Finally, a few remarks need to be made about the author's decision to examine the 
legal situation in Switzerland. This was done because the Swiss national legislature has 
enacted special conflict rules dealing with the application of internationally mandatory 
rules. 105 This is indeed an unusual event. 106 The Swiss national solution therefore 
deserves attention and might well constitute a good foundation for South African private 
international law. 
The presentation of the South African legal situation needs no further explanation, 
since the purpose of this study is to propose a solution for the application of mandatory 
rules in South African private international law of contracts, which is sadly lacunose. 
3 The contexts of application of mandatory rules in the private international law 
of contracts 
This study addresses both contexts in which the question of application of mandatory 
rules in private international law of contracts arises: The relatively recent development 
of restricting party autonomy by the application of mandatory rules of the otherwise 
applicable legal system, and the problem of application of the so-called lois 
d'app/ication immediate, directly applicable statutes, or Eingriffsnormen. 
102 For other techniques to give this force of law to international conventions, see Morris Statutes 187, 
188. 
103 1990 Act, Sched 1, art 17. 
104 See only Dicey & Morris Conflict a/Laws VallI 1187. 
105 Switzerland is not a member of the EU and thus not a member of the Rome Convention. 
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With regard to the restriction of party autonomy, mainly the provisions of the Rome 
Convention will be discussed, since the issue is addressed by the Convention's conflict 
rules. However, other means of limiting party autonomy by, for example, the doctrine of 
evasion of law, will also be presented, and compared in order to propose a suitable 
approach for South African private international law. 
The question of the application of directly applicable rules is of a more general 
nature and broader in scope, since these rules do not only serve to restrict party 
autonomy. They may also claim application in situations where the proper law is 
objectively determined by the forum's choice oflaw rules, in the absence of a choice of 
law by the parties. These rules in effect limit the scope of the proper law. They may 
emanate from the proper law, or the lex fori, or a third legal system. New statutory 
conflict rules, academic approaches, and the court practice of the countries under 
investigation will be discussed. The solutions and approaches will be critically analysed 
and compared. Finally, a proposal will be submitted regarding how South Africa can 
combine these rules with the ordinary choice of law process. It is hoped that this 
proposal will not only constitute a solution for South African courts and lawyers dealing 
with this difficult and complex issue, but will also be a useful contribution to the South 
African academic discussion. 
In order to limit the scope of this study, choice of law rules concerning the formal 
validity of a contract, even though they may refer to mandatory rules, for instance, art 9 
(6) of the Rome Convention, are not discussed. Furthermore, the Bretton Woods 
Agreement is not discussed at length. This Agreement contains a special rule in art VIII 
(2) (b) that provides for the application ofthe foreign exchange control regulations of 
member states, despite the proper law of the exchange contract. This rule has its own 
peculiarities, and the discussion thereof is beyond the limits of this dissertation. 
106 Therefore, Switzerland was chosen instead of Austria, for instance, which incorporated the Rome 
Convention into its law on 1 December 1998, cf CzemichlHeiss EVa. 
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VII Structure of this study 
A comparison between different legal systems (the common-law system and the civil-
law system) does not easily lend itself to a unified structure. I07 This is because reference 
is necessary to statutory solutions, together with case law and academic approaches; in 
some countries the academic attempts to find a solution are almost endless, while in 
other countries the academic contributions concentrate on a discussion of the court 
decisions. Therefore, the representation of jurisprudence and academic approaches of 
the countries under investigation may differ in length and depth. 
Essential aspects of this study are the question of application of mandatory rules in 
different contexts, and the presentation and critical comparative analysis of the legal 
situation in the different countries. Therefore, the author has decided not to devote one 
chapter to each country. In order to avoid repetition, a representation according to the 
effect and use of mandatory rules and their structural context in private international law 
is preferable. There are two structural contexts: party autonomy and the problem of 
application of directly applicable statutes, in which the question of application of 
mandatory rules arises. The purpose and effect given to mandatory rules in these two 
contexts differ substantially. 
Based on this differentiation, the study commences with an examination of the 
application of mandatory rules serving to limit party autonomy, and a comparison of the 
different solutions of the countries under investigation (Chapter 2). Chapters 3, 4, and 5 
address the problem of application of internationally mandatory rules, which is broader 
in scope and effect. The application of internationally mandatory rules of the lex fori 
despite the proper law of the contract and foreign internationally mandatory rules will 
be discussed separately. The different solutions and approaches of case law, the 
legislature, and academic writers will be presented, critically analysed, and compared. A 
proposal for the application of internationally mandatory rules in South African private 
iriternationallaw of contracts is submitted in Chapter 6. 
107 It has therefore been argued that it is better to compare only closely related legal systems, for example, 
the continental civil-law systems. Nevertheless, it has also been argued that the differences between the 
common-law and the civil-law systems should be reconciled, cf Beitzke RabelsZ 48 (1984), 623, 626. 
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CHAPTER 2: PARTY AUTONOMY AND MANDATORY RULES 
Party autonomy in substantive private law is the freedom of the parties to choose the 
rules that will govern their contractual relationship. In private international law it is the 
freedom of the parties to choose the law of a country to govern their relationship. 1 
Although party autonomy in private international law is to some extent the counterpart 
to substantive party autonomy,2 there are nevertheless differences. 3 The latter is limited 
by the ius cogens of a national legal system, ie, the contracting parties are free only with 
regard to the dispositive rules.4 The fonner, however, displaces the dispositive rules and 
the ius cogens (mandatory rules) of the objective proper law, together with those of the 
lex fori, in favour of the mandatory provisions of the chosen law. 5 
This effect of party autonomy has, however, not always been accepted. In the past 
academic authors said that party autonomy in international contracts should be restricted 
to ius dispositivum.6 This so-called 'secondary choice oflaw' or 'incorporation of 
foreign law' (' materiellrechtliche Verweisung') means that the choice of law refers to 
the foreign ius dispositivum alone, and accordingly cannot replace the mandatory rules 
of the law that would be applicable in the absence of the parties' choice. Nowadays, 
however, the concept of party autonomy as 'primary choice' or 'party reference',? 
indicating the legal system that applies to the contract to the exclusion of the mandatory 
I Firschinglvon Hoffmann IPR 382; Rinze (1994) JBL 412; Leib1e JBJZRW 1995,245,246. 
2 See SandrockiSteinschulte Handbuch Rn A 5; Firschinglvon Hoffmann IPR 195; von Bar IPR Bd II 
308; Morse YB EurL (1982) 107, 116; Lando Rec des Cours 189 (1984 VI) 229, 301. 
3 Cf Junker IPRax 1993, 1, 2; von Bar IPR Bd II 309; De Boer RabelsZ 54 (1990) 24, 41; Rinze (1994) 
JBL 412,413; Siehr in FS Keller 485,486; Leible JBJZRW 1995,245,246. 
4 Firschinglvon Hoffmann IPR 382; Junker IPRax 1993, 1,2. 
S Firschinglvon Hoffmann IPR 382; Lando CMLR 24 (1987) 159, 170; De Boer RabelsZ 54 (1990) 24, 
41; Junker IPRax 1993, 1,2 states that 'had the choice of law of the parties not the effect of replacing the 
mandatory rules of the otherwise applicable law, it would not be interesting.' 
6 This was advocated in earlier times by German academics, but has been rejected by German courts; for 
references, see Lando CMLR 24 (1987) 159, 177 et seq; MilnchKomml Martiny Art 27 Rn 7. 
7 The expressions 'party reference' and 'incorporation of foreign law' are used by Lando CMLR 24 
(1987) 159, 169; id Contracts s 25; for the distinction, see Forsyth Private International Law 275, 276; 
De Boer RabelsZ 54 (1990) 24, 41, 42. 
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rules of the otherwise applicable legal system, is broadly accepted.8 Indeed, it fonns the 
primary connecting factor for choice of law in contract.9 
Despite its acceptance as 'primary choice', party autonomy has never been granted 
in an unlimited manner. Academics and courts have developed differing principles to 
limit the parties' choice of law, such as the doctrine of evasion of law, 10 the restriction 
of choice to a limited number of legal systems, II the requirement of an objective 
connection with the chosen legal system, in addition to a clause specifying the choice of 
law,12 and the restriction of the effect of the choice by the application of mandatory rules 
of the otherwise applicable law.13 Most of these limitations concern the question of 
whether certain mandatory rules should be applied despite the fact that the parties have 
chosen another law to govern their transaction. 
I Party autonomy and its limitations by the application of mandatory rules 
under the Rome Convention 
The freedom to choose the applicable law is statutorily laid down in art 3 (1) of the 
Rome Convention (art 27 (1) EGBGB).14 In terms of the Rome Convention party 
autonomy itself is at first sight unrestricted. IS In particular, the facts of the case do not 
need to have any connection with the chosen law. Thus, the choice of a 'neutral law' (ie 
one that has no objective connection with the contract) is pennitted. 16 Furthennore, a 
certain recognisable interest of a party in the application of the chosen law is not 
8 MUnchKommlMartiny Art 27 Rn 13, 14; Junker IPRax 1993, 1,2; for the English position, see the 
notorious decision in Vita Food Products Inc v Unus Shipping Co Ltd [1939] AC 277, [1939] 1 All ER 
513 (PC); Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws VollIl211 et seq. 
9 See Kropholler IPR 409; see also Junker IPRax 1993, I; Firschinglvon Hoffmann IPR 195; for details 
of the historical developments, see PUis Parteiautonomie (1995). 
10 See below CHAPTER 2, V. 
II See below CHAPTER 2, IlL 
12 This restriction means that the choice of a 'neutral' law is not permitted. It used to be very common, 
notably in Germany and Switzerland, as well as other countries. 
\3 See section I below. 
14 Art 3 (1) of the RC states that 'a contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties.' 
15 Party autonomy is neither prohibited nor restricted in the sense that only certain legal systems can be 
chosen. On these limitations, see Junker IPRax 1993, 1,4 and the solution of the Swiss legislative 
concerning consumer and employment contracts, infra section III. 
16 Morse YBEurL (1982) 107, 122; MilnchKommlMartiny Art 27 Rn 20; Rinze (1994) JBL 412,415, 
416; for the English position prior to the Rome Convention, see Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Volll 
1213 and the leading case Vita Food Products Inc v Unus Shipping Co Ltd [1939] AC 277, at 290. 
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presupposed. 17 Nevertheless, party autonomy is in fact not absolutely unlimited. 
Although the freedom to choose a foreign law may not be restricted in the sense that the 
choice is invalid,18 the effect of the choice or the scope of the chosen law may be 
restricted by the application of mandatory rules of a law other than the chosen law. 19 
1 Article 3 (3) of the Rome Convention: Purely domestic contracts 
Article 3 (3) of the Rome Convention limits party autonomy in purely domestic 
contracts by declaring the mandatory rules of this law applicable, despite the choice of 
the parties. The article provides as follows: 
The fact that the parties have chosen a foreign law, whether or not accompanied 
by the choice of a foreign tribunal, shall not, where all the other elements 
relevant to the situation at the time of the choice are connected with one country 
only, prejudice the application of rules of the law of that country which cannot 
be derogated from by contract, hereinafter called mandatory rules. 
Party autonomy itself is not excluded in purely domestic contracts, but the effect of the 
choice of law is limited in so far as the choice of law cannot preclude the application of 
the mandatory rules of the legal system with which the contract is solely connected.20 
This provision was the result of a compromise between differing opinions of the 
delegations. Some delegations, including that of Germany /1 insisted that the parties 
were not entitled to make a valid choice of law, whereas other delegations, notably that 
of the United Kingdom, were opposed to such a limitation.22 
17 Firsching/von Hoffmann IPR 382,383; Kropholler IPR 273. 
18 See Junker IPRax 1993, 1,4; Lorenz RlW 1987,569; Dicey & Morris Conflict o/Laws Vol II 1215; 
however, see below CHAPTER 2, V the doctrine of evasion according to which a choice of law is 
rendered invalid; also see below for the solution of Swiss private intemationallaw. 
19 Lorenz RlW 1987,569,570; Rinze (1994) JBL 412,419 et seq; see also Jackson Contract Conflicts 59, 
63 et seq; Philip Contract Conflicts 81, 94 et seq; Dicey & Morris Conflict o/Laws VollI1215 . 
20 MilnchKommIMartiny Art 27 Rn 71; ReithmannIMartinylMartiny lnternationales Vertragsrecht Rn 
96; Dicey & Morris Conflict 0/ Laws Vol II 1215 . 
21 According to many legal systems, including that of Germany, a choice of foreign law was permitted 
only for international contracts, cfLando CMLR 24 (1987) 159, 164, 181; id Rec des Cours 189 (1984 
VI) 229, 286; Junker IPRax 1989,69,70; Sandrock RlW 1987, 841, 846; MilnchKommIMartiny Art 27 
Rn 13 et seq. 
22 Report on the E.E.C. Convention by Giuliano/Lagarde in North Contract Conflicts 372; also see 
Hartley Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 341, 366. 
27 
a International contracts versus purely domestic contracts 
The rule that party autonomy is not excluded in purely domestic contracts follows 
indirectly from arts 1 (1) and 3 (3) of the Rome Convention. According to art 1 (1), the 
Convention applies' in any situation involving a choice between the laws of different 
countries'. Thus, in purely domestic contracts, the Convention is not applicable. 
However, it follows from art 3 (3) of the Convention that the choice oflaw of the parties 
is itself enough to render the contract' international' in the sense of art 1.23 
Article 3 (3) restricts the choice of law in purely domestic contracts, but at the same 
time presupposes a valid choice of law.24 Nevertheless, in Germany it is disputed 
whether the limitation of choice of law as laid down in art 3 (3) has the effect of making 
the choice of law to the foreign law an incorporation of foreign law?5 If it did, party 
autonomy in purely domestic contracts would be reduced to the choice of foreign 
dispositive rules, without any possibility of displacing the mandatory legislation of the 
country with which the contract is solely connected, except for the choice.26 According 
to this point of view, the freedom of choice of foreign law is limited to 'international 
contracts' .27 
This was, in fact, the traditional doctrine in German conflict of laws: The choice of 
law was restricted to international contracts or matters. In purely domestic contracts the 
parties' reference to another law was invalid. The parties were free, however, to 
incorporate foreign ius dispositivum into their contract.28 
23 MUnchKommlMartiny Art 27 Rn 17, 18; Hartley Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 341, 366, 367; Lando 
CMLR 24 (1987) 159,164,181; Philip Contract Conflicts 81, 94. 
24 MUnchKomm/Martiny Art 27 Rn 18,71 et seq; Masch Rechtswahlfreiheit 94. 
25 MUnchKommlMartiny Art 27 Rn 79; Junker IPRax 1989, 69, 70; Schurig RabelsZ 54 (1990) 217, 22 I 
et seq; Sandrock RlW 1986, 841, 846; Lorenz RlW 1987,569. 
26 MUnchKommIMartiny Art 27 Rn 13 et seq, 79; Sandrock RlW 1987,841,846. 
27 Junker IPRax 1989,69,70; Sandrock RlW 1987,841,846; for an interpretation from the Swiss point 
of view, see Von Overbeck Contract Conflicts 269, 271, 272. 
28 Junker IPRax 1989,69, 70; Sandrock RlW 1987,841,846; MilnchKommlMartiny Art 27 Rn 13 et seq; 
see Von Overbeck Contract Conflicts 269, 271, 272 for Switzerland. 
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The counter opinion argues that the choice of law itself is not invalidated by the 
provisions of the Rome Convention, not even in purely domestic contracts.29 Rather art 
3 (3) limits the effects ofthe choice.30 
The,advocates of both approaches justify their points of view by referring to a 
statement in the report of Giuliano/Lagarde that art 3 (3) is the result of a compromise 
between the delegations.3l In the present author's opinion, however, the fact that the 
provision is a result of a compromise clearly supports the latter point of view, namely, 
that the issue is not the validity of the choice of law in so far as only incorporation of 
foreign law is permitted, but that party autonomy is limited by modifying the effects of 
the choice. However, the dispute is of a more theoretical nature since the result of both 
opinions is identical.32 
b Requirements for purely domestic contracts 
A contract is a purely domestic contract when all relevant elements of the contract, 
despite the choice of a foreign law (and a foreign tribunal), are connected with one 
country only (art 3 (3)).33 The kinds of connections or circumstances that are sufficient 
to found an international contract are not defined in art 3 (3), and commentators on the 
Convention have unanimously held that any connection is not sufficient. Purely 
incidental connections with another state are disregarded and do not render art 3 (3) 
applicable, whereas any substantial connection with another country that is relevant to 
the legal transaction at issue does. 34 Examples of substantial connections are the place of 
performance, habitual residence, or the place of business of a party. 35 In general, 
substantive connections to another country are those which are of relevance for the 
29 Lorenz RlW 1987,569; Junker IPRax 1989,69, 70 with further references. 
30 Lorenz RIW 1987,569,575 calls it 'Inhaltskontrolle' instead of'AbschlufJkontrolle'. 
31 Junker IPRax, 1989,69,70; Lorenz RlW 1987,569. 
32 Schurig RabelsZ 54 (1990) 217,222; but see Lorenz RIW 1987,569,575; Junker IPRax 1989,69,70. 
33 MiinchKommlMartiny Art 27 Rn 77; Rinze (1994) JBL 412, 420. 
34 Schurig RabelsZ 54 (1990) 217, 223; Lorenz RIW 1987,569,575; Droste Begriff95; Masch 
Rechtswahlfreiheit 97, 98; MiinchKommlMartiny Art 27 Rn 78; Kaye The New Private International 
Law 166; Hartley Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 341, 366 et seq. 
3S MiinchKommJMartiny Art 27 Rn 78; SoergeVvon Hoffinann Art 27 Rn 91; Masch Rechtswahlfreiheit 
100; BGH 26.10.1993 RIW 1994, 154, 155. Whether the place of contracting can constitute such a 
substantial connection is debatable, cfLorenz RIW 1987,569,575; MtlnchKommIMartiny Art 27 Rn 78; 
Droste Begriff95; Jayme IPRax 1990,220,222; Masch Rechtswahlfreiheit 103 et seq. 
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objective connection in art 4 Rome Convention.36 In cases where no substantial 
connection to another country exists, the parties are bound to the mandatory legislation 
of the country with which the contract is solely connected, despite the choice of law. 
c Mandatory rules in the sense of article 3 (3) of the Rome Convention 
Article 3 (3) defines mandatory rules as 'rules which cannot be derogated from by 
contract'. The definition is based on whether, under the legal system of which it forms a 
part, the rule in question is mandatory in a domestic context.37 In principle, the 
Convention is referring to all mandatory rules of a national legal system: No distinction 
is made between statutory and common law rules, nor is the definition restricted to a 
certain kind of mandatory legislation.38 These rules are also defined as mandatory rules 
in a domestic or wider sense.39 Article 3 (3) refers to mandatory rules in the domestic 
sense, as well as internationally mandatory rules.40 
It has been disputed for some time whether mandatory EU legislation is applicable 
to contracts where the parties have chosen the law of a non-member state as the 
governing law, while the contract is substantially connected to EU member states 
alone.41 
36 MilnchKommlMartiny Art 27 Rn 78; see similar Lorenz RIW 1987,569,575 who advocates that all 
the connections used in the conflict rules of the Rome Convention (arts 27 - 37 EGBGB) are sufficient; 
Masch Rechtswahlfreiheit 104. 
37 Hartley Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 341, 368; Morse YB EurL (1982) 107, 123; Junker IPRax 1989,69, 
74; MtinchKommlMartiny Art 27 Rn 74, 75. 
38 In contrast to arts 5 (2) and 6 (1) Rome Convention where it is disputed whether they refer only to 
certain kinds of protective mandatory rules; MilnchKommlMartiny Art 27 Rn 73; Droste Begriffl39; for 
examples of mandatory rules of the UK and Germany, see Rinze (1994) JBL 412, 420. 
39 Cheshire & North's Private International Law 498; other expressions used are mandatory rules in a 
national sense or simply mandatory rules. 
40 ReithmannIMartinylLimmer Internationales Vertragsrecht Rn 456; Morse YB EurL (1982) 107, 123; 
Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol II 1240. In Germany it is questionable whether mandatory rules of 
public law that serve predominantly economic interests of the enacting country fall within the scope of art 
3 (3), see Droste Begriffl40; Lehmann ZWingendes Recht 219; MtinchKommlMartiny Art 27 Rn 74; 
ReithmannIMartiny/Limmer Internationales Vertragsrecht Rn 456; cf Philip in Contract Conflicts 81, 96, 
97. This general problem is dealt with in the context of the applicability of internationally mandatory 
rules CHAPTER 3, 4,5. 
4\ Some authors advocate an application of art 3 (3) Rome Convention by analogy, cf Lando CMLR 24 
(1987) 159, 181; Kropholler IPR 274; others argue that in respect of art 20 Rome Convention EU law 
cannot be treated as equivalent to national law; the mandatory EU law is superior and applies directly, if 
it claims application, cf MiinchKommlMartiny Art 27 Rn 76; see also Junker IPRax 1998,69, 70 et seq. 
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Finally, it should be noted that many authors submit that mandatory rules in the 
domestic sense are not mandatory within the context of art 3 (3), if they are restricted to 
domestic cases where no foreign law is chosen.42 
d Article 3 (3) Rome Convention as a multilateral conflict rule 
Article 3 (3) contains a multilateral conflict rule concerning the application of 
mandatory rules. Thus, the reference to mandatory legislation might result in application 
of the rules of the lex fori or those ofa foreign legal system.43 However, the reference is 
restricted to those mandatory rules emanating from the country with which the contract 
is solely connected, despite the choice of law. This would correspond with the 
objectively applicable law as determined by the conflict rules in the absence of a choice 
of law. Mandatory rules of yet another legal system cannot be rendered applicable on 
the basis of art 3 (3). 
2 Limitation of the parties' choice in order to protect the weaker contracting 
party 
Articles 5 and 6 of the Rome Convention lay down special choice of law rules 
applicable to certain consumer contracts, and to all individual employment contracts. 
Thus, with a view to protecting the socio-economically weaker party, arts 5 and 6 
derogate from art 3 (1), by making the mandatory rules of a law other than the chosen 
proper law applicable for the weaker parties' benefit. Articles 5 and 6 also derogate 
from art 4, by specifying a different rule for the ascertainment of the proper law in the 
absence of a choice.44 For this study the derogation from art 3 is relevant only when 
42 Morse YB EurL (1982) 107, 123, 124; Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol II 1216; Philip Contract 
Conflicts 81, 95; see, however, Jackson Contract Conflicts 59, 65, 66. 
43 MUnchKommIMartiny Art 27 Rn 75; ReithmannlMartinylLimmer Internationales Vertragsrecht Rn 
382; Rinze (1994) JBL 412, 420; Soergel/von Hoffmann Art 27 Rn 85. 
44 See the Report of GiulianolLagarde in Contract Conflicts 379 et seq; Morse YB EuL 2 (1982) 107, 
134; Lasok/Stone Conflict of Laws 380,384; Cheshire & North's Private International Law 495; von Bar 
IPR Bd II 313; Junker IPRax 1998,65,67,68; for consumer contracts, it is the law of the consumer's 
habitual residence, although it is generally not the consumer who must effect the performance which is 
characteristic of the contract; for contracts of employment, it is the law where the employee habitually 
performs his work or where the place of business in which he is engaged is situated. 
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party autonomy is restricted by the application of mandatory rules of a law other than 
the chosen law.45 
a Background and purpose of articles 5 and 6 of the Rome Convention 
Article 5 (2) of the Rome Convention (and the corresponding art 29 (2) EGBGB) 
concerning consumer contracts and art 6 (1) of the Rome Convention (art 30 (1) 
EGBGB) concerning employment contracts are designed to limit the effects of a choice 
of law made by the parties. Such a choice of law cannot deprive the consumer or the 
employee of the protection afforded to him by the mandatory rules of the law of the 
country that would be applicable in the absence of a choice.46 
These provisions allow for the protection of the weaker contracting party at the level 
of conflict of laws.47 Thus, the trend in domestic law of an ever increasing number of 
mandatory rules, that, through considerations of social policy, intervene in the private 
legal relationship, is extended into the field of intemationallaw.48 This is a relatively 
new development in the field of conflict of laws which, according to the traditional 
point of view, is 'neutral' in the sense that makes no reference to the values enshrined in 
potentially applicable rules of substantive law.49 According to the traditional point of 
view, the role of the national law is to decide whether certain groups of society are 
disadvantaged and in need of special protection. Such social policies should not intrude 
into the traditional choice of law process.50 
This is not the place to discuss in detail the conflict revolution that changed this 
approach. Influenced by American theories such as Currie's governmental interest 
45 For a general scrutiny of this conflict rule, see Morse ICLQ 41 (1992) 1 et seq; id YBEurL 2 (1982) 
107 et seq; id Contract Conflicts 143 et seq; Hartley Contract Conflicts III et seq; Schurig RabelsZ 54 
(1990) 217, 220; Junker IPRax 1989,69,71. 
46 Morse ICLQ 41 (1992) 1,6,14; Schurig RabelsZ 54 (1990) 217, 220; JW1ker IPRax 1989,69,71. 
47 Morse ICLQ 41 (1992) 1, 2; Erauw International Contracts 71, 72; North Private International Law 
Problems 142; Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol II 1286. 
48 Von Bar IP R Bd II 313; Keller in FS Vischer 175 et seq; Morse I CLQ 41 (1992) 1, 2; Erauw 
International Contracts 71, 72; Kropholler IPR § 52 V; North Private International Law Problems 130; 
details about this development in national and intemationallaw can be found in Junker IPRax 1998, 65, 
66; Kren ZVerglRWiss 88 (1989) 48 et seq; see already Vischer Rec des Cours 124 (1974 II) 1,21. 
49 See Erauw International Contracts 71, 72; Morse ICLQ 41 (1992) 1, 2; North Private International 
Law Problems 141 et seq; Junker IPRax 1998, 65, 66. 
50 Junker IPRax 1998,65,66; North Private International Law Problems 141 et seq. 
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analysis approach51 or Leflar's 'better law' approach, 52 pertinent questions have been 
raised about the values and merits of the traditional choice of law process. 53 According 
to several modem schools of thought, the conflict process should be resolved not only 
on basis of the traditional territorial locality , but also on the basis of social values. 54 
Based on these policy considerations, various solutions have been proposed to resolve 
the conflict between the weaker party's need for protection and the traditional conflict 
process. 55 
With regard to party autonomy it was argued that the protection granted by national 
mandatory legislation to the weaker contracting party would be frustrated if the parties 
(in particular the stronger contracting party) were permitted to circumvent those 
protective mandatory rules, simply by choosing another law to govern the contract. 56 
Additionally, it has been pointed out that the policies and interests in international trade 
differ from those in international employment and consumer contracts. Whereas 
unrestricted freedom to choose the law to govern a transaction in international trade has 
its merits, these are regarded as fictitious for employment and consumer contracts. The 
weaker party is faced with the alternative of adhering to the terms set by the stronger 
party or of not contracting at all. 57 In this context a Neuhaus' famous statement is 
relevant: 'Party autonomy loses - just like in domestic law - its sense, if it becomes the 
51 See the articles in Currie Selected Essays. 
52 Leflar American Conflicts Law 193 - 195, 205 - 219; id NY UL Rev 41 (1966) 267 et seq. 
53 And the results obtained by mechanically connecting the private relationship with one geographical 
area. For a representation of this development, see Keller FS Vischer 175, 178 et seq; Erauw 
International Contracts 71, 72; Junker IPRax 1998, 65, 67; also see North Private International Law 
Problems 141, 142; Vischer Rec des Cours 124 (1974 II) 1,67. 
54 Influenced by the American theories, few academics in some European countries, such as Gennany and 
the Netherlands, in the late 1960s and early 1970s rejected Savigny's choice of law system as a whole. 
They were not accepted in Europe, however; see Junker IPRax 1998,65,67; Erauw International 
Contracts 71, 73; Keller FS Vischer 175, 179 et seq; Zweigert RabelsZ 37 (1973) 437, 443-445; Vischer 
Rec des Cours 142 (197411) 1,52 et seq. American theories have had no impact on South African private 
international law; in fact, they have expressly been rejected as a choice of law method; see Forsyth 
Private International Law 53,54,61. 
55 See, for instance, von Hoffmann RabelsZ 38 (1974) 396, 407 et seq who proposed that rules based on 
socio-political considerations of protecting the weaker party of a contract should be interpreted as 
internationally mandatory and subjected to a special connection. Others were in favour of considering the 
social values already within the ordinary choice of law process by changing the connecting factors, see 
Kropholler RabelsZ 42 (1978) 634, 636; Keller FS Vischer 175, 179 et seq. Lando Rec des Cours 189 
(1984 VI) 229, 298 et seq proposes that party autonomy in weaker party contracts should be prohibited. 
56 Von Hoffmann RabelsZ 38 (1974),396,399 et seq; Vischer Rec des Cours 124 (1974 II) 1,28,40,42 
et seq; Kropholler RabelsZ 42 (1978) 634, 366, 656; Keller FS Vischer 175, 184 et seq; Hartley Contract 
Conflicts 111,112,113. 
57 Cf Lando Rec des Cours 189 (1984 VI) 229, 300; id Contracts ss 77 et seq. 
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rule of the stronger one over the weak.'58 Articles 5 and 6 serve to elevate the protection 
of the weaker party in the contractual relationship to the level of conflict of laws. 
b Article 5 (2) of the Rome Convention 
Article 5 (2) provides as follows: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of article 3, a choice of law made by the parties 
shall not have the result of depriving the consumer of protection afforded to him 
by the mandatory rules of the law of the country in which he has his habitual 
residence; 
if in that country the conclusion of the contract was preceded by a 
specific invitation addressed to him or by advertising, and he had taken 
in that country all the steps necessary on his part for the conclusion of 
the contract, or 
if the other party or his agent received the consumer's order in that 
country, or 
if the contract is for the sale of goods and the consumer travelled from 
that country to another country and there gave his order, provided that 
the consumer's journey was arranged by the seller for the purpose of 
inducing the consumer to buy. 59 
Article 5 (2) is designed to limit the effects of a law made by the parties, pursuant to 
art 3, where the contract is a consumer contract in the sense of art 5 (1). Therefore, art 5 
does not invalidate the choice of law in a consumer contract, but declares that if any of 
the three conditions set out in art 5 (2) are present, the choice of law will not result in 
the consumer being deprived of the protection afforded to him by the mandatory rules of 
his country of habitual residence. Thus, party autonomy is in principle permitted; it is 
58 Neuhaus Grundbegriffe 172 'Die Parteiautonomie verliert -wie auch im materiellen Recht- ihren Sinn, 
wenn sie zur Herrschaft des Starkeren tiber dem Schwachen wird'; a similar statement is: tWo im 
materiellen Recht die Privatautonomie zugunsten zwingender Vorschriftenten zum Schutze einer Partei 
eingeschrankt sei, verliere die Ankntipfung an den Parteiwillen im IPR ihre Berechtigung', for further 
references, see Junker IPRax 1998, 65, 67. 
59 The corresponding art 29 (1) EGBGB reads 'Bei Vertragen tiber die Lieferung beweglicher Sachen 
oder die Erbringung von Dienstleistungen zu einem Zweck, der nieht der beruflichen oder gewerblichen 
Tatigkeit des Berechtigten (Verbrauchers) zugerechnet werden kann, sowie bei Vertragen zur 
Finanzierung eines solchen Geschafts darf eine Rechtswahl der Parteien nicht dazu fiihren, daf3 dem 
Verbrauer der durch die zwingenden Bestimmungen des Rechts des Staates, in dem er seinen 
gewohnlichen Aufenthalt hat, gewahrte Schutz entzogen wird, (1) wenn dem Vertragsschlu/3 ein 
ausdriickliches Angebot oder eine Werbung in diesem Staat vorausgegangen ist und wenn der 
Verbraucher in diesem Staat die zum Abschlu/3 des Vertrages erforderlichen Rechtshand lungen 
vorgenommen hat, (2) wenn der Vertragspartner des Verbrauchers oder sein Vertreter die Bestellung des 
Verbrauchers in diesem Staat entgegengenommen hat oder (3) wenn der Vertrag den Verkaufvon Waren 
betrifft und der Verbraucher von diesem Staat in einen anderen Staat gereist ist und dort seine Bestellung 
aufgegeben hat, sofem diese Reise vom Verkaufer it dem Ziel herbeigefUhrt worden ist, den Verbraucher 
zum Vertragsschlufi zu veranlassen.' 
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only the effect of the choice oflaw ofthe parties that is limited by the application of 
mandatory rules of a law other than the chosen law.60 
(1) Conditions of article 5 (2) of the Rome Convention 
Article 5 is restricted in its scope of application and does not cover all consumer 
contracts. A contract falls within art 5 if it is 'a contract the object of which is the supply 
of goods or services to a person ("the consumer") for a purpose which can be regarded 
as being outside his trade or profession, or a contract for the provision of credit for that 
object' .61 Thus, art 5 is applicable only if the personal conditions of the contracting 
parties are fulfilled, viz. one party acts as consumer outside his trade or profession, 
while the seller or supplier acts in the course of his trade or profession.62 Article 5 
applies to contracts for the supply of services and goods, which includes the provision 
of credit in relation to contracts with these objects.63 
Additionally, the circumstances under which the contract was concluded must fulfil 
any of the three conditions set out in art 5 (2).64 Each condition serves to establish a 
sufficiently close connection (prior to or during the conclusion of the contract) to the 
country of the consumer's habitual residence to merit the application of the mandatory 
rules of that country.65 The conditions have been criticised for causing definition and 
distinction problems.66 In general, because of the conditions laid down in art 5 (2), the 
scope of application of the article is narrower than its heading' consumer contracts' 
60 MtinchKommlMartiny Art 29 Rn 33; North Private International Law Problems 131; Hartley Contract 
Conflicts Ill, 125. 
61 Art 5 (1) RC; for these and further conditions, see MtinchKommlMartiny Art 29 Rn 5 et seq; Morse 
ICLQ 41 (1992) 1, 3 et seq; id YBEurL 2 (1982) 1, 134 et seq; ReithmannlMartinylMartiny 
Internationales Vertragsrecht Rn 715 et seq. 
62 It is disputed whether art 5 applies to contracts where both parties act outside their professions, see 
Morse ICLQ 41 (1992) 1,3,4; Hartley Contract Conflicts Ill, 125; ReithmannlMartinylMartiny 
Internationales Vertragsrecht Rn 716; MtinchKommlMartiny Art 29 Rn 5 et seq; Rinze (1994) 412,422; 
Lorenz RlW 1987,569,576. 
63 Contracts of carriage and contracts for the supply of services where the services are to be supplied to 
the consumer exclusively in a country other than that in which he has his habitual residence, art 5 (4) RC; 
for details about the covered and excluded kind of contracts: MtinchKommlMartiny Art 29 Rn 5 et seq; 
Morse ICLQ 41 (1992) 1,3,4,5; ReithmannlMartinylMartiny Internationales Vertragsrecht Rn 733. 
64 For these conditions, see Morse ICLQ 41 (1992) I, 6, 7; id YBEurL 2 (1982) 1, 135. 
65 See von Hoffmann IPRax 1989,261,263; Morse YBEurL 2 (1982) 107, 135. 
66 These problems will not be discussed in the context of this study. For an account, see Morse ICLQ 41 
(1992) 1,3 et seq; Rinze (1994) JBL 412, 422 et seq; von Hoffmann IPRax 1989,261,267; 
MtinchKomml Martiny Art 29 Rn 3, 5 et seq. 
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would suggest.67 If none of the conditions of art 5 are met, party autonomy under art 3 
(1) remains unaffected.68 
(2) Mandatory rules in the sense of article 5 (2) of the Rome Convention 
Article 5 (2) is structured in an multilateral manner in that it refers not only to 
mandatory rules of the lex fori, but also to foreign mandatory rules, if the consumer's 
country of habitual residence is a foreign country.69 However, the (special) reference is 
restricted to the mandatory rules of the consumer's country of habitual residence, viz. 
the objective proper law. Mandatory rules in this provision are used in the definitional 
sense of art 3 (3), viz. mandatory rules in a domestic or wider sense. It is not required 
that the rule be internationally mandatory and applicable, regardless of which law is 
applicable to a contract.70 
However, within the context of art 5, only those mandatory rules that serve to 
protect the weaker contracting party, the consumer, are referred to.71 It is disputed 
whether the nature of these mandatory rules must therefore be delimited: Is reference 
being made to those rules expressly concerned with consumer protection, or to all 
mandatory rules that actually serve to protect the consumer in the specific situation?72 
The wording and the context of the provision favour a restrictive interpretation.73 It 
cannot be denied, however, that in a particular case other mandatory rules might also 
serve the interests and protection of the consumer. Furthermore, it is difficult to 
distinguish mandatory rules concerning consumer protection from those rules of a more 
general character. 74 
67 MtinchKommlMartiny Art 29 Rn 3; North Private International Law Problems 130, 131 . 
68 In the absence ofa choice, art 4 applies to detennine the proper law, cfMorse ICLQ 41 (1992) 1,9,10. 
69 MtinchKommIMartiny Art 29 Rn 36; Philip Contract Conflicts 81, 98; Rinze (1994) JBL 412, 422. 
70 Morse ICLQ 41 (1992) 1,8; Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vo1111290; Jackson Contract Conflicts 
59,65. 
71 ReithmanniMartinylMartiny Internationales Vertragsrecht Rn 739; Morse YBEurL 2 (1982) 107, 136. 
72 For a discussion Masch Rechtswahlfreiheit 44 et seq; Morse YB EurL 2 (1982) 107, 136; id ICLQ 41 
(1992) 1,8. 
7J See Morse Yb EurL 2 (1982) 107, 136; id ICLQ 41 (1992) 1, 8; Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol 
111290; Soergel/von Hoffmann Art 29 Rn 29; for further references, see Masch Rechtswahlfreiheit 43. 
74 CfMasch Rechtswahlfreiheit 44 et seq; von Bar IPR Bd 11324; MtinchKommlMartiny Art 29 Rn 35; 
Droste Begriff212 et seq. 
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Examples of mandatory rules in the field of consumer protection can be found 
particularly in law that has been harmonised by EC legislation. Examples include 
Directive 871102 on consumer credits,75 Directive 85/577 on consumer protection/6 
Directive 90/314 on package holiday tours/7 and Directive on Unfair Contract Terms,78 
that resulted in an alteration of § 12 of the General Terms and Conditions of Trade 
Act. 79 Other German examples are the provisions of the General Terms and Conditions 
of Trade Act80 and the provisions on travel contracts.81 Examples from English law 
include the provisions of the Consumer Credit Act 197782 and those of the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act 1977.83 
(3) The relationship between the chosen law and the mandatory rules of the law of 
the consumer's country of habitual residence 
The relationship between the chosen law and the mandatory rules of the law of the 
consumer's country of habitual residence is not entirely clear.84 In principle it is 
accepted that the mandatory protective rules of the consumer's country of habitual 
residence do not automatically displace the chosen law, whether they are more 
favourable than the chosen law or not. 85 The purpose of art 5 (2) is to prevent the 
consumer being deprived, by a choice of law, of the protection that the law of the 
country of his habitual residence would afford him. This law defines the minimum 
protection available, but it does not necessarily define the maximum protection, since 
the purpose of this provision is not to prevent the consumer from gaining greater 
75 [1987] 0 J L 42/48 as amended by Directive 90/88 [1990] 0 J L 61114; cfthe Gennan 
Verbraucherkreditgesetz; see MiinchKommlMartiny Art 29 Rn 4. 
76 See especially art 6 of the Directive oocontracts negotiated away from business premises [1985] 0 J L 
61131, which was implemented in Gennany by the Haustiirwiderrufsgesetz, see MiinchKommlMartiny 
Art 29 Rn 4; von Hoffmann IPRax 1989, 261,268. 
77 [1990] 0 J L 158/59. 
78 See art 6 (2) Directive 93113 [1993] 0 J L 95/29. 
79 AGBG 9.12.1976, BGBI 1,3317 as amended 19.7.1996, BGBI I, 10 13; however, since art 12 AGBG is 
an unilateral conflict rules it overlaps with art 5 (2) Rome Convention, see Junker IPRax 1989,65, 70 et 
seq; MiinchKommlMartiny Art 29 Rn 4, 48. 
80 MilnchKommlMartiny Art 29 Rn 36; Droste BegrifJ214; Masch Rechtswahlfreiheit 52. 
81 §§ 651 et seq BGB, for further examples, see MilnchKommlMartiny Art 29 Rn 36. 
82 About which see Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol II 1297, 1298; Hartley Contract Conflicts Ill, 
118; Rinze (1994) JBL 412, 420 for further examples. 
83 For a discussion, see Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol II 1296, 1297. 
84 About this, see Morse YBEurL 2 (1982) 107, 136 et seq; Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol II 1290, 
1291; Junker IPRax 1989,69,71; MiinchKommlMartiny Art 29 Rn 37. 
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protection under the chosen law.86 Consequently, this provision necessitates a 
comparison of the protective mandatory rules of the chosen law and those of the law of 
the consumer's country of residence; the law that is more favourable to the consumer 
prevails.87 
It can therefore be concluded that the chosen law will apply to the extent that it does 
not conflict with any relevant mandatory rules of the law of the country of habitual 
residence. Furthermore, art 5 (2) allows the consumer to rely on the mandatory rules of 
the law of his country of residence, if they are more favourable to him than the chosen 
law; or he may rely on the chosen law, if it is more favourable to him than the 
mandatory rules of the law of his country of habitual residence.88 
Difficulties arise in ascertaining which set of protective rules is most favourable to 
the consumer. Most authors agree that the consumer is not permitted to rely 
cumulatively on both the mandatory rules of his habitual residence and the rules of the 
chosen law.89 It is believed that selecting the best consumer protection rules from each 
law, on a 'pick and choose' basis, would be an incorrect course to follow (the so-called 
'Rosinentheorie). The policy of art 5 (2) is that the consumer should not be deprived of 
the minimum protection of the law of his habitual residence, but if the chosen law offers 
him greater protection it is reasonable to let him to rely on it. In this case, however, the 
law of his country of habitual residence has no further part to play, as there is no 
reasonable justification for giving the consumer' double protection' .90 
The problem of determining the object of the comparison remains, with most 
authors assuming that a comparison of the legal systems as a whole is inadequate to 
8S Morse YBEurL 2 (1982) 107, 137; Kaye The New Private InJernalional Law 213; Junker IPRax 1989, 
69, 71; MtinchKommlMartiny Art 29 Rn 37. 
86 Morse YBEurL 2 (1982) 107, 136; Dicey & Morris Conflict a/Laws Vol II 1291; Junker IPRax 1989, 
69, 71; MtinchKommIMartiny Art 29 Rn 37; Kropholler IPR § 52 VI; von Bar IPR Bd II 324. 
87 MtinchKommIMartiny Art 29 Rn 37, 38; Kropholler IPR § 52 VI; von Bar IPR Bd II 324; Dicey & 
Morris Conflict o/Laws Vol II 1291. 
88 Morse YBEurL 2 (1982) 107, 136, 137; Dicey & Morris Conflict o/Laws Vol II 1290,1291; 
MilnchKommlMartiny Art 29 Rn 37, 38. 
89 Morse YBEurL 2 (1982) 107, 136, 137; id ICLQ (1992) 1,8,9; Dicey & Morris Conflict o/Laws Vol 
II 1290, 1291; Kaye The New Private International Law 213; Junker IPRax 1998, 65, 67, 68; however, 
for a cumulative application, see Philipp Contracts Conflict 81, 99; Lorenz RIW 1987,569,577; Rinze 
(1994) JBL 412, 422. 
90Schurig RabelsZ 54 (1990) 217, 225; Junker IPRax 1989,69, 71; Dicey & Morris Conflict 0/ Laws Vol 
II 1290, 1291; Kaye The New Private International Law 213; MtinchKomm/Martiny Art 29 Rn 37, 38. 
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determine which one offers the consumer greater protection.91 Ultimately, a comparison 
of certain single rules or sets of rules will occur (the so called' Einzelvergleich'). The 
court's examination will have to show which set of rules is more favourable to the 
consumer in a particular case, taking his expectations into account. 92 
c Article 6 (1) of the Rome Convention 
In respect of employment contracts, art 6 (1) contains a provision that corresponds with 
art 5 (2) in its basic structure and purpose:93 
Notwithstanding the provision of article 3, in a contract of employment a choice of 
law made by the parties shall not have the result of depriving the employee of the 
protection afforded to him by the mandatory rules of the law which would be 
applicable under paragraph 2 in the absence of choice.94 
Thus, once again, the parties are in principle free to select any law to govern their 
contract, but, the effect of their choice is limited in that the mandatory rules of an 
otherwise applicable law protecting the employee may still be applied.95 
(1) Contracts subject to article 6 of the Rome Convention 
In contrast to art 5, art 6 covers all individual employment contracts and not merely 
those having a substantial connection with the country in which the employee lives.96 
Nevertheless, there is a problem concerning whether a contract is one of employment 
for the purpose of art 6. Commentators agree that the article covers only contracts 
entered into by individual employees, not collective agreements. 97 According to the 
Giuliano/Lagarde Report, art 6 applies to both valid individual employment contracts, 
91 Schurig RabelsZ 54 (1990) 27, 225; Junker IPRax 1989,69,72; Lorenz RIW 1987, 569, 577. 
92 Schurig RabelsZ 54 (1990) 217,225; Lorenz RIW 1987,569,577; Junker IPRax 1989,69,71,72. 
93 For a detailed discussion of art 6: Morse in Contract Conflicts 143 et seq; id YBEurL 2 (1982) 107, 138 
et seq; id ICLQ 41 (1992) 1, 11; Junker IPRax 1989, 69 et seq; MiinchKommIMartiny Art 30 Rn I et seq. 
94 Section (I) of art 30 EGBGB is identical in wording 'Bei Arbeitsvertragen und Arbeitsverhalt- nissen 
darf die Rechtswahl der Parteien nicht dazu fiihren, daB dem Arbeitnehmer der Schutz entzogen wird, der 
ibm durch die zwingenden Bestimmungen des Rechts gewabrt wird, das nach Abs. 2 mangels einer 
Rechtswahl anzuwenden ware.' 
95 MiinchKommIMartiny Art 30 Rn 10, 18; Junker IPRax 1993, 1,5; Morse YBEurL 2 (1982) 107, 139; 
idlCLQ41 (1992) I, 14; Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws VolIIl306;Rinze(l994)JBL412,424. 
96 Lasok/Stone Conflict of Laws 384; Junker IPRax 1993, 1,8. 
97 Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol JJ 1304; Morse ICLQ 41 (1992) 1, 13. 14. 
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as well as void contracts and de facto employment relationships, 'in particular those 
characterised by failure to respect the contract imposed by law for the protection of 
employees' .98 
Whereas German academic writers have accepted that the meaning of an 
'employment contract' in art 6 is to be determined with reference to art 18 of the Rome 
Convention,99 English writers tend to apply the private international law technique of 
characterisation. This latter approach, however, then leads to the problem of deciding 
which law must be applied to determine the classification of the particular contract. 100 
(2) Mandatory rules in the sense of article 6 of the Rome Convention 
Art 6 (1) is a multilateral conflict rule since it refers to mandatory rules of the law 
applicable to the contract under para (2). Thus, in the absence of a choice by the parties 
the lex fori or any foreign law can be the law applicable according to art 6 (2), and the 
mandatory rules of the designated law, be it the forum or a foreign law, are rendered 
applicable. 101 Mandatory rules in the sense of art 6 (1) appear to be the relevant rules of 
employment protection, defined in art 3 (3) as rules which cannot be derogated from by 
contract (mandatory rules in the wider or domestic sense). Such rules need not be 
internationally mandatory as well, although many of the relevant rules in the field of 
employment protection will be of this nature. 102 According to the Giuliano/Lagarde 
Report, mandatory rules in the sense of art 6 (1) are not only those relating to the 
contract of employment itself, but also rules 'concerning industrial safety and hygiene 
which are regarded in certain Member States as being provisions of public law' .103 
According to many authors the reference is not restricted to mandatory rules that 
are designed to protect the weaker contracting party, viz. the employee. 104 However, in 
Germany, because of the gen~ral dispute regarding the scope of reference of conflict 
98 GiulianolLagarde Report in Contract Conflicts 379, 380; the Gennan wording of art 30 EGBGB in fact 
refers expressly to 'employment relationships', see Mi1nchKommlMartiny Art 30 Rn 7, 8. 
99 Art 36 EGBGB, cfMi1nchKommlMartiny Art 30 Rn 7. 
100 Morse ICLQ 41 (1992) 1, 12, 13 who favours a classification according to the lex causae. 
101 Rinze (1994) JBL 412, 424. 
102 See Morse ICLQ 41 (1992) 1, 14; Junker IPRax 1993, 1,6,7. 
103 In Contract Conflicts 379, 380. 
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rules, there is a strong tendency to exclude mandatory rules serving general economic 
and social-political purposes, and thus public interests of the state, from the scope of the 
proper law. According to this point of view, these rules fall within the scope of art 7 of 
the Rome Convention. lOS Employee protection rules, however, will be covered by art 6 
irrespective oftheir private or public law nature. 106 
Examples of German mandatory protective rules can be found in the protection 
from unwarranted termination (Kiindigungsschutzgesetz).107 Examples of English 
mandatory rules can be found in the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 
(ss 141 (1), (2), 153 (5)), the Equal Pay Act 1970 and the Law Reform (Personal 
Injuries) Act 1948. 108 Whether a rule is mandatory depends ultimately on the national 
law of which it forms part. It is therefore submitted by many authors that a mandatory 
rule, despite its applicability according to the conflict reference, should not be applied if 
the particular rule is not applicable to the situation. l09 An often quoted justification for 
this proposition is found in section 141 of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) 
Act 1978, as amended, which declares that the British legislation forbidding unfair 
dismissal does not apply to work done by those ordinarily outside Great Britain. 110 
(3) The relationship between the chosen law and the mandatory rules of the 
otherwise applicable law according to paragraph (2) 
As in the case of art 5 (2), art 6 (1) does not result in the chosen law being automatically 
displaced by the mandatory rules of the law applicable in the absence of a choice. This 
\04 MUnchKommlMartiny Art 30 Rn 19; Droste BegrijJ203 et seq; see, however, Morse YB EurL (1982) 
107, 139; id ICLQ 41 (1992) 1, 16. 
105 Of course this will raise problems of distinction, cf MUnchKommlMartiny Art 30 Rn 19; Droste 
BegrijJ203; see also Kaye The New Private International Law 227. 
\06 Also see the Giuliano/Lagarde Report in Contract Conflicts 379; MUnchKommlMartiny Art 30 Rn 20; 
Droste BegrijJl28, 202; but see Philip Contract Conflicts 81, 98 et seq. 
\07 MUnchKomm/Martiny Art 30 Rn 22, 53 et seq for further examples. 
108 Although the Court of Appeal in Sayers v International Drilling Co NV [1971] 1 WLR 1176 did not 
apply this Act to a contract governed by Dutch law, this is not a contra dictio, since the question was not 
whether the Act was mandatory but whether it was internationally mandatory; for further examples, see 
Kaye The New Private International Law 225,226; Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol II 1317 et seq. 
109 Kaye The New Private International Law 229 et seq; Rinze (1994) JBL 412, 424; Morse YB EurL 
(1982) 107, 139, 140. 
110 Kaye The New Private International Law 229 et seq; Morse YB EurL (1982) 107, 139, 140; id ICLQ 
41 (1992) 1, 14, 15. 
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will only occur if the employee is afforded inferior protection by the chosen law. III This 
interpretation conforms with the wording of art 6: ' ... shall not have the result of 
depriving of ... . ' It would be out of step with the policy of employment protection that 
underlies art 6 (1) for the employee to be restricted solely to the level of protection 
offered by the mandatory rules of the otherwise applicable law, whether these are better 
or worse than those available under the chosen law. 112 
Therefore, art 6 (1) necessitates a comparison of the protection afforded to the 
employee by the mandatory legislation of the chosen law and the law applicable in the 
absence of a choice: The more favourable law for the employee is to be applied 
(Gunstigkeitsvergleich).113 The mandatory rules of the applicable law, in the absence of 
a choice, are applicable, according to para (1), if and to the extent that they are more 
favourable to the employee in the particular situation. Thus, the mandatory protection 
legislation of the otherwise applicable law constitutes the minimum protection 
standard. 114 
As with art 5 (2), the 'more-favourable principle' (Gunstigkeitsprinzip) creates 
difficulties in determining what is to be compared: Is it the whole legal system, or sets 
of protective rules, or only individual provisions? Most authors submit that art 6 (1) 
does not lead to a cumulative application of the mandatory rules of both the chosen law 
and the otherwise applicable law. lIS The employee is not permitted to pick and choose 
from the individual rules of each law, so as to enjoy maximum protection 
(,Rosinentheorie'). Accordingly, a mandatory rule of the otherwise applicable law that 
regulates the particular question at issue should either be applied in its entirety, if it is 
more favourable to the employee than the protection granted by the chosen law, or else 
not applied at all, if it offers less protection than the chosen law. Although there are also 
some authors who assume that the mandatory protective rules of both laws are to be 
III Morse in Contract Conflicts 143, 152; MtinchKommlMartiny Art 30 Rn 23. 
112 Kaye The New Private International Law 228 et seq. 
liJ MtinchKomm/Martiny Art 30 Rn 23 ; Junker IPRax 1989, 71 et seq; Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws 
Vol 11 1307 et seq. 
114 MtinchKommlMartiny Art 30 Rn 23; GiulianolLagarde Report in Contract Conflicts 379. 
115 Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol 11 1307 et seq; Kaye The New Private International Law 229; 
Morse YB EurL (1982) 107, 140; id ICLQ 41 (1992) I, 15 et seq; Junker IPRax 1989, 69, 71 et seq; 
MiinchKommlMartiny Art 30 Rn 23. 
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applied on a cumulative basis,116 the former view seems more acceptable: There is no 
justification for offering the employee more protection if the contracting parties did 
make a choice of law than if they had not made a choice. The policy underlying art 6 (1) 
is to protect the employee being deprived of the protection afforded to him by the 
mandatory rules of the art 6 (2) law, and not to grant him double protection. I 17 However, 
it is conceded that it is not an easy task for the judge to decide which set of mandatory 
rules is more favourable to the employee. I 18 
d Application of Articles 5 and 6 of the Rome Convention by analogy 
Articles 5 and 6 restrict party autonomy by reference to mandatory legislation for 
consumer and employment contracts alone. There are no special conflict rules in the 
Rome Convention or EGBGB to protect the weaker party in other contracts with a 
similar inequality of bargaining power. This position has been criticised and some 
academics have proposed that arts 5 and 6 should be applied by analogy to equivalent 
cases where there is an inequality of bargaining power. 119 
Additionally, with regard to consumer contracts, it has been held that article 5 is too 
restrictive. It does not apply if the conditions of paras (1) or (2) are not met, although 
there are situations where the consumer is in a position similar to that described in the 
article. It has therefore been proposed that art 5 should be applied by analogy to 
consumer contracts that are not by definition covered by the article, and to contractual 
circumstances that do not fulfil any of the three conditions of para (2).120 This solution is 
116 Philipp Contract Conflicts 81, 99 et seq; Lorenz RlW 1987,569,577. 
117 See the frequently quoted example of Gamillscheg ZfA 14 (1983) 307,338: Should a Gennan 
employee who works in an Muslim country be granted the Friday as local weekly (religious) holiday and 
also the Sunday as a weekly holiday according to Gennan employment law? 
118 Kaye The New Private International Law 228; Mi.lnchKommlMartiny Art 30 Rn 26; Morse ICLQ 41 
(1992) I, 16. 
119 With regard to arts 5 and 6, see Lando CMLR 24 (1987) 159, 185; id Rec des Cours 189 (1984 VI) 
229,298 et seq; Hartley Contract Conflicts 111, 112; for a discussion: Rinze (1994) JBL 412, 424 et seq; 
Martiny ZEuP 1995, 67, 70 with further references; for the corresponding Gennan provisions, see Lorenz 
RlW 1987,569,571,572; Kohte EuZW 1990, 150, 156. 
120 See ReithmannlMartinylMartiny Internationales Vertragsrecht Rn 724, 730; the so called 'Gran-
Canaria-cases' caused many disputes in Gennany. For a detailed discussion of academic and case law 
approaches, see Masch Rechtswahlfreiheit III et seq; the problem of the Gran-Canaria cases was that 
the contracts had been concluded in Spain, but payment and perfonnance was to take place in Gennany. 
The contracts included a choice of law clause which specified Spanish law as the applicable law. Spanish 
law at that time had not transfonned the EC-Directive 85/577 and thus there was no law giving the 
consumer the right of retraction in door-to-door selling (the legal situation in Spain changed in 199 I). In 
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based on the assumption that these articles establish a general principle of protection for 
the weaker party, and that arts 7 and 16 of the Convention do not provide sufficient 
protection for contracts falling outside the scope of arts 5 and 6. 121 
The counter-opinion rejects an application by analogy to other contracts. It is 
argued that arts 5 and 6 were deliberately intended to deal with two specific situations 
and that the signatories of the Convention did not regard it necessary to depart from the 
freedom of choice to protect the weaker party in other contracts. 122 
e Relationship of articles 5 and 6 to article 7 of the Rome Convention 
Some of the employee and consumer protection rules are not only mandatory in the 
national or domestic sense, but also apply irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to 
the contract. In the areas of employment and consumer protection, German examples 
include the special employee protection rules of unfair dismissal of severely disabled 
persons (Schwerbehindertengesetz, §§ 15 et seq SchwbG) or mothers 
(Mutterschutzgesetz, § 9 MuSchG).123 English examples are the Employment Protection 
(Consolidation) Act 1978 (ss 140, 153 (5))124 and the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (s 
27 (2)).125 
In this regard, two questions have arisen. Firstly, can mandatory rules that serve 
(predominantly) the protection of the weaker contracting party be regarded as 
internationally mandatory in the sense of art 7 of the Convention? This appears to be a 
continental European issue, since this highly controversial question is not disputed in 
Germany this right of retraction was offered in the Hausturwiderrufsgesetz. None of the three conditions 
in art 5 RC was fulfilled. The crucial question was how to protect the German consumer: Some courts 
applied art 3 (3), others applied art 5 by analogy, ultimately, art 7 (2) was held to be applicable. 
121 Lorenz RlW 1987,569,571,572; Kohte EuZW 1990,150,156. 
122 For further arguments and references, see Rinze JBL (1994) 412, 425 . 
123 As well as, for example, § 12 of the Standard Contract Act 1976 (AGBG). Cf MiinchKommlMartiny 
Art 30 Rn 61, 73, 73a et seq for further examples. 
124 Morse ICLQ 4 (1992) 1, 14 Footnote 56; Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol II 1316 et seq with 
further examples. 
125 Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol II 1296 et seq with further examples. 
44 
the United Kingdom. 126 This question is discussed in detail in the context of the 
application of internationally mandatory rules. 127 
Secondly, if one assumes that consumer and employee protection rules can fall 
within the scope of art 7, what is the relationship between arts 5, 6 and 7 of the 
Convention? Academic writers disagree about whether art 7 (in Germany and the United 
Kingdom only art 7 (2)) can be applied in fields which are generally covered by arts 5 
and 6. 128 
The relationship of these provisions is complicated by the fact that the norms are 
different in structure and content. While arts 5 and 6 are multilateral conflict rules for 
consumer and employment contracts and contain an alternative connection of mandatory 
rules through the 'more-favourable principle', art 7 (2) refers only to the rules of the 
forum state and concerns a special connection of internationally mandatory rules. 129 The 
relationship is relevant in cases where arts 5 and 6 refer to the applicability of foreign 
mandatory rules, while the internationally mandatory rules of the forum state that do 
exist are different and even less favourable than the other potentially applicable laws. 13o 
Some authors argue that arts 5 and 6 provide exclusive rules which balance the 
interests involved, and are thus lex special is to the general clauses of art 7. However, 
with regard to the kind of contract that is by definition not covered by arts 5 and 6, an 
application of the forum's internationally mandatory protection rules is possible.1 31 
Others maintain that art 7 has priority.132 This proposition is supported by the 
argument that the special connection by means of art 7 systematically prevails over the 
126 See Morse ICLQ 41 (1992) 1, 10, 16, 17; Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol II 1240, 1241. 
127 Infra under CHAPTER 3, II . 
128 Eg Junker IPRax 1998, 65, 69 et seq; Kaye The New Private International Law 214 et seq; Rinze JBL 
(1994) 412,428,429; Morse ICLQ 41 (1992) I, 10, 16, 17; LasoklStone Private International Law 385. 
129 Junker IPRax 1993, 1, 9; ReithmannlMartinylMartiny Internationales Vertragsrecht Rn 744. 
130 StaudingerlMagnus Art 34 Rn 30; Morse ICLQ 41 (1992) 1, 16, 17. 
131 BT-Drucks 10/504,83; BGH 26.10.1993 RIW 1994, 154,157; BGH RIW 1997,875; 878; von 
Hoffmann IPRax 1989, 261, 264, 266; ReithmannIMartinylLimmer Internationales Vertragsrecht Rn 
428; Lorenz IPRax 1994, 429, 431; LasoklStone Private International Law 383 et seq; Roth RIW 1994, 
275,277; id SchnyderlHeifJIRudisch 35, 48, 49; Leible JBJZRW (1995) 245, 263; similar Masch 
Rechtswahlfreiheit 163. 
i32 Morse ICLQ 41 (1992) I, 10, 16, 17; Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol II 1295; Rinze JBL (1994) 
412,429; Junker IPRax 1993, 1,7,9; Lorenz RIW 1987,569,580; Staudinger/Magnus Art 34 Rn 36; 
ReithmannIMartiny/ Martiny Internationales Vertragsrecht Rn 746; Droste Begriff218 with references. 
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nonnal choice of law rules and follows also from the wording of art 7 (2): 'Nothing in 
this Convention shall restrict ... ,133 The aforementioned differences in the structure of 
the provisions justifies the application of art 7 in fields incidentally covered by arts 5 
and 6. 134 Internationally mandatory rules under Art 7 (at least those of para (2)) take 
precedence over the mandatory rules under arts 5 and 6, whereas the mandatory rules 
under art 5 and 6 take precedence over the mandatory rules of the chosen law, if and to 
the extent that they are more favourable. 135 
Some advocates of this latter approach restrict their own result by proposing a 
consideration of the particular interests pursued by arts 5 and 6. Article 7 (2) should be 
interpreted in the light of the goal to protect weaker parties under arts 5 and 6. Hence, 
the international mandatory provisions are inapplicable if the foreign rules are more 
favourable. 136 
f Concluding remarks 
Articles 5 and 6 are innovative conflict rules that offer a high level of protection for the 
weaker party and have no direct counterpart in English and German conflict of laws 
prior to the Rome Convention. 137 These legal systems had no special multilateral choice 
of law rule designed to identify the law applicable to consumer or employment contracts 
and to achieve consumer and employee protection. 138 In the past, freedom of choice of 
law was recognised in principle, without any special limitations by means of a general 
conflict rule aimed at protecting the weaker party. 139 
Nevertheless, possible limitations of party autonomy could result from the principle 
of evasion of law (fraus legis) if the choice of a foreign law was intended to circumvent 
I3J See Junker IPRax 1993,1,9; Droste Begriff218; Rinze JBL (1994) 412, 429. 
134 Rinze JBL (1994) 412,429. 
135 Rinze JBL (1994) 412,429; Lorenz RlW 1987,569,580. 
136 StaudingerfMagnus Art 34 Rn 34, 36; Lorenz RlW 1987, 569 580; Kaye The New Private 
International law 214,215; Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol II 1297; for a parallel discussion with 
regard to the relationship between arts 3 (3), 5,6, see Rinze JBL (1994) 412, 421. 
137 Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol II 1286, 1302 et seq; Morse ICLQ 41 (1992) 1,2. 
138 Dicey & Morris Coriflict of Laws Vol II 1286, 1302 et seq; Anton Private International Law 344; 
Morse ICLQ 41 (1992) 1,2, II; Jackson Contract Conflicts 59, 70; Lando CMLR 24 (1987) 159, 172, 
178; Junker IPRax 1993, 1 et seq. 
139 Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol II 1286, 1302 et seq; MOnchKomm/Martiny Art 30 Rn 2; Morse 
Contract Conflicts 143, 150; Lando Contracts ss 32, 42, 43 . 
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important mandatory rules (of the forum).14o In addition, certain individual mandatory 
rules of the lex fori were held to be applicable, despite a foreign lex causae, on the basis 
of public policy or because oftheir internationally mandatory character. 141 However, 
these approaches were of a unilateral nature since they concerned only the rules of the 
forum and not those of another foreign country.142 In Germany, employee protection 
rules of a public law nature were subject to the principle of territoriality, and therefore 
applied irrespective of the proper law designated by the ordinary conflict rules. 143 
II Restriction of party autonomy under the Swiss IPRG 
Under the Swiss IPRG party autonomy is statutorily laid down in art 116 (1) of the 
IPRG. In principle, the parties have a wide freedom to choose any law without 
limitations, such as the need for a reasonable interest in or an objective connection with 
the chosen law. 144 However, party autonomy is restricted to international contracts, and 
is limited in respect of consumer and employment contracts (arts 120 (2), 121 (1), (2) 
IPRG). 
In contrast to the solution found by the drafters of the Rome Convention, where the 
effect of freedom of choice is limited by the application of mandatory provisions on the 
basis of the' more-favourable principle', the Swiss legislature adopted another approach 
to restricting party autonomy in order to protect the weaker contracting party: The 
choice is restricted to certain legal systems. 
140 Vita Food Products v Unus Shipping [1939] AC 277; North Private International Law Problems III 
et seq; Hartley Contract Conflicts Ill, 113 et seq with reference to the Australian case Golden Acres v 
Queensland Estates [1969] St R Qd 378; for Germany, see MilnchKommlMartiny Art 27 Rn 10 et seq. 
141 Hartley Contract Conflicts Ill, 113 et seq with references; Mi.lnchKommlMartiny Art 30 Rn 3; Lando 
Contracts ss 32, 43. 
142 For instance, art 27 (2) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. See also ss 141, 153 (5) of the 
Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978; the German Standard Contract Act of 1976; see Carter 
BYBIL 57 (1986) I, 10 et seq; Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol II 1286, 1302 et seq with further 
references; Morse ICLQ 41 (1992) 1, 11. See the Scottish case English v Donelly 1959 SL T 2, 6, 7 where 
the Court of Session held that, despite the choice of English law as the proper law of the agreement, the 
Scottish Hire Purchase Act was nonetheless applicable. 
143 See MiinchKommlMartiny Art 30 Rn 65, 66; Lando CMLR 24 (1987) 159, 178. 
144 Von Overbeck Contract Conflicts 269, 271; Heini FS Moser 67, 68; the former case law had already 
abandoned the necessity of a territorial connection to the chosen legal system, BGE 91 II, 44 et seq; BGE 
102 II 143, 145 et seq; for complete freedom of choice, see BGE III II 175, 180. However, a reasonable 
interest in the application of the chosen legal system was held to be necessary under pre-existing law; for 
a survey of pre-existing law, see Schwander FS Keller 473 et seq; Lando Contracts s 44. 
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1 Domestic contracts 
In contrast to the Rome Convention (art 3 (3)), the Swiss IPRG contains no special rule 
that limits party autonomy in situations where all other elements of the contract are 
connected with one country only, despite the choice of law. According to the 
predominant view in Switzerland, however, it follows indirectly from art 1 (1) of the 
Swiss IPRG that a choice of foreign law is possible only in international matters, viz. a 
contract or relationship that has connections with more than one legal system. 145 Hence, 
in purely domestic contracts the parties' freedom to choose the law applicable to their 
transaction is reduced to the ius dispositivum (incorporation), and the parties are not 
entitled to contract out of the ius cogens of the legal system in which the contract is 
wholly situated. 146 
2 Consumer Contracts 
Article 120 (1) and (2) of the IPRG provides as follows : 
(1 ) Contracts relating to the provision of ordinary goods and services intended for 
the personal or family use of the consumer and which are not associated with the 
professional or commercial activities of the consumer shall be governed by the 
law of the State in which the consumer is habitually resident: 
(a) lithe supplier received the order in that State; or 
(b) If the conclusion of the contract was preceded in that State by an offer or 
an advertisement and the consumer performed there the necessary act to 
conclude the contract; or 
(c) If the consumer was induced by the supplier to go abroad to place his 
order there. 
(2) A choice of law by the parties is precluded. 
Thus, party autonomy is excluded in respect of consumer contracts,147 provided that 
there is an additional territorial factor connecting the transaction with the state in which 
the consumer habitually resides (conditions in para (1), (a) to (c)). The parties to a 
145 According to art I (I), the Swiss IPRG is applicable to international relationships or matters only; see 
Schnyder Das neue IPR-G 106; Vischer/von Platna IPR 175; von Overbeck Contract Conflicts 269,272; 
critically Schwander FS Keller 473,476 et seq; 
146 Schwander FS Keller 473,478; von Overbeck Contract Conflicts 269, 272. 
147 Kren ZverglRWiss 87 (1988) 48,55,56; von Hoffmann J Cons Policy 15 (1992) 365, 369; 
HonselllVogtiSchneiderlBrunner Art 120 Rn 52; additionally, art 120 contains the choice of law rule that, 
in the absence of a choice of the contracting parties, the consumer contract is governed necessarily by the 
law of the consumer's habitual residence, see Kren ZverglRWiss 87 (1988) 48,61. 
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consumer contract are free to choose the law to govern their agreement if none of the 
conditions set out in para 1 of art 120 is fulfilled. 148 
3 Employment Contracts 
Article 121 constitutes a special choice of law rule for employment contracts. In para (3) 
it provides as follows: 
The parties of the contract can chose the law of the state where the employee has 
his habitual place of residence, or where his employer has his place of business, 
habitual residence or domicile. 
Art 121 (3) limits party autonomy by restricting the possible choice to four legal 
systems: the residence of the employee, the employer's place of business, the 
employer's place of residence, or the employer's domicile. 149 The choice of law of other 
legal systems is thus excluded. 150 
III The Swiss solution of restricting party autonomy versus the favour principle of 
the Rome Convention 
The Swiss solution of limiting party autonomy to protect the weaker party differs 
substantially from the solution adopted by the Rome Convention. Whereas the Swiss 
legislature has completely excluded party autonomy in respect of consumer contracts, 
the Rome Convention has maintained party autonomy, but restricted the effect of the 
choice of law by providing for the application of certain mandatory rules of the law 
where the consumer is habitually resident. 151 The exclusion of party autonomy under 
Swiss private international law is based on the principle that the consumer should be 
able to rely on the application of the legal system with which he is familiar. 152 The Swiss 
IPRG does not necessitate a comparison of the protection offered to the consumer by the 
148 For the detailed conditions, see HonsellNogtiSchnyder/Brunner Art 120 Rn 27 et seq. 
149 Kren ZverglR Wiss 87 (1988) 48, 56; HonsellN ogtiSchnyderlBrunner Art 121 Rn 42; Junker IPRax 
1993,1,4. 
150 HonsellNogtiSchnyderlBrunner Art 121 Rn 42. 
151 Kren ZVerglRWiss 87 (1988) 48,57; von Hoffmann JConsPolicy 15 (1992) 365,369; Junker IPRax 
1993, 1,7. 
152 Junker IPRax 1993, 1, 7. 
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chosen legal system and the otherwise applicable law, as is required by the favour 
principle. ls3 
The radical solution of the Swiss legislature has been strongly criticised by 
academic writers. 154 It has been argued that the exclusion of party autonomy goes 
beyond its protective purpose, as the law of the habitual residence of the consumer may 
provide less protection than the law of another country. 155 It has also been suggested that 
completely excluding the freedom of the contracting parties to choose the proper law of 
their contract creates the impression that the contracting parties are minors.ls6 
However, the Swiss solution has the advantage of constituting a relatively clear rule 
that can be easily applied by judges, since it does not require a complex comparison of 
different domestic laws. 157 Furthermore, it is not necessary to determine which domestic 
consumer-protection mandatory laws have to be compared. ls8 
Despite the aforementioned differences, there are similarities between the Swiss 
IPRG and the Rome Convention with regard to the circumstances under which a 
limitation of party autonomy is reasonable. The sole fact that the consumer is habitually 
resident in a country does not justify the application of the law or the mandatory 
provisions of the relevant country. There must be a further contact between the 
transaction and that country. 159 
With regard to employment contracts, the Swiss solution does not exclude party 
autonomy totally but limits the choice to four legal systems. In contrast, art 6 (1) of the 
Rome Convention only limits the effect of party autonomy by means of the favour 
principle, and thus ensures, as a minimum protection, the application of mandatory rules 
of the law of the country in which the employee habitually carries out his work. 
153 Kren ZverglRWiss 87 (1988) 48,57; Erauw International Contracts 71,84. 
154 See von Hoffmann J Con Policy 15 (1992) 365, 369; Kren ZverglRWiss 87 (1988) 48, 69; positive 
von Overbeck Contract Conflicts 269, 272 et seq. 
ISS Cfvon Hoffmann J Con Policy 15 (1992) 365, 369, Schnyder SchnyderlRudischiHeiss 57, 61; Heini 
FS Moser 67, 75. 
156 Lorenz RlW 1987,569,571; Kren ZverglRWiss 87 (1988) 48,69. 
157 Schnyder Schnyder/HeisslRudisch 57, 61. 
158 Schnyder SchnyderlHeisslRudisch 57,61 . 
159 Von Hoffmann J Con Policy 15 (1992) 365, 372; Erauw International Contracts 71,84. 
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The Swiss solution was criticised for granting the employer the right to determine 
the law, by choosing the law of his domicile to the disadvantage of the employee. 160 
Once a legal system has been chosen in accordance with art 121 (3) of the IPRG, no 
further protection is offered. It has been argued that the intention of protecting the 
weaker party cannot be fulfilled by limiting the legal systems that can be chosen, 
without a consideration of the material content of the domestic rules and the result of 
their application. It might well be that another law, which cannot be chosen according to 
art 121 (3) of the IPRG, offers the employee more protection. 161 On the other hand, in 
contrast to the Rome Convention, there is no need to determine and compare the 
protective mandatory provisions of different legal systems. 
IV Internationally mandatory rules 
Party autonomy under the Rome Convention and under the Swiss IPRG is limited by 
the internationally mandatory provisions of the forum, which are applicable regardless 
ofthe chosen proper law of the contract (art 7 (2) of the Rome Convention, art 18 of the 
IPRG). Party autonomy is also limited by the application or consideration of mandatory 
laws oflegal systems other than the lex causae and the lex fori (art 7 (1) of the Rome 
Convention, art 19 ofthe IPRG).162 Finally, the parties' choice of law is limited by the 
courts' refusal to apply certain rules of the chosen law because of their public law nature 
(at least in Germany and Switzerland)163 and ofthe public policy of the forum. 
However, the application of internationally mandatory rules does not mainly serve 
to limit party autonomy, but rather limits the scope of the proper law in general. Thus, 
these rules may' intervene' in the domain of proper law in cases where the proper law 
has been determined by the parties' choice, as well as where the proper law has been 
160 Junker IPRax 1993, 1,5; von Overbeck Contract Conflicts 269,274. 
161 Heini FS Moser 67, 75 with examples and references. 
162 Morse YB EurL (1982) 107,124; Dicey & Morris Conflict a/Laws Vol II 1216,1217; 
MilnchKommlMartiny Art 27 Rn 8; Lorenz RlW 987,569,572; Heini FS Moser 67,73 et seq; Siehr FS 
Keller 485, 505 et seq. 
163 See infra CHAPTER 5, I, 2, II, I. 
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indicated objectively by the conflict rules of the forum in the absence of a choice. 164 
These provisions are dealt with separately in later chapters. 165 
V Evasion of Law (Fraus Legis) 
The principle of evasion of law needs to be examined in the context of limitation of 
freedom of choice and the application of mandatory rules.166 
1 The doctrine of/raus legis 
The doctrine ofJraude a fa [oi in the field of conflict of laws was developed in French 
family law. 167 Whereas it has found acceptance in the Latin countries in particular, 
elsewhere 'the fraus legis doctrine is applied only rarely and with certain reluctance' .168 
In Germany the doctrine is known in substantive and private international law and is 
accepted, subject to strict conditions. 169 In South African private international law the 
doctrine is also well known and in principle accepted,170 but cases in point are rare. 171 
Although it has often been stated that English private international law has no doctrine 
of evasion of law, it has nevertheless been recognised as a problem in some areas of 
law, and has lead to a number of anti-evasion measures.172 
The general principle of evasion of law covers situations where persons, in order to 
avoid the jus cogens of the normally applicable legal system, 'act ... to create artificial 
164 Its strongest effect is still the limitation of the scope of the chosen law, since party autonomy is the 
primary connecting factor in intemationallaw of contracts, cf Lorenz RlW 1987, 569, 572; Coester 
ZVerglRWiss 82 (1983) 1,9,27. 
165 See CHAPTERS 3 and 4 infra. 
166 Cf Lando CMLR 24 (1987) 159, 182; id Rec des Cours 189 (1984 VI) 229, 290 et seq; Forsyth Private 
International Law 282; MtinchKommlMartiny art 27 Rn 10, 11; Kntippel Zwingendes Recht 39 et seq. 
167 See Vischer Connecting Factors s 90. 
168 Vischer Connecting Factors s 92 with references; see also Forsyth Private International Law 108. 
169 See Firschinglvon Hoffmann IPR 243; Raape/Sturm IPR Bd 1326 et seq. 
170 The principle is widely accepted by the old authorities, Huber De Conflictu Legum 8, 13; Voet De 
Statutis 9.2.9 excipe 3; Van der Keessel Praelectiones 125 - 127; as well as academic writers, Van 
Rooyen Die Kontrak 172 et seq; Forsyth Private International Law 107 et seq, 248 et seq, 282. 
171 See the famous case concerning a marriage, Pretorius v Pretorius 1948 (4) SA 144 (0), and more 
recently, Kassim v Ghumran & another 1981 Zimbabwe LR 227; for further references, see Forsyth 
Private International Law 248 et seq. It appears that there is no case in the law of contract. 
172 See Fawcett 49 CLl [1990] 44 et seq; for instance, the enactment of the anti-evasion provision: sec 27 
(2) (a) of the Unfair Contracts Terms Act; also see the dictum of Lord Wright in the leading case Vita 
Food Products v Unus Shipping [1939] AC 277, at page 290 that the intention of the contracting parties 
must be 'bona fide and legal' . 
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connecting factors which attract to them or their transaction some other system as 
governing law' .173 This manipulation of connecting factors can occur in many ways. For 
example, the parties may change their nationality, habitual residence or domicile, or 
place of contracting, thus changing the aJfplicable law, and avoiding certain mandatory 
rules. The abuse of freedom of choice may indeed be regarded as fraudulent evasion. 174 
If the manipulation of connecting factors has been in fraudem legis, the 
manipulated connecting factor will not operate and the normally (ie without the 
fraudulent manipulation of a connecting factor) applicable legal system will apply. With 
regard to mandatory rules, the principle of evasion can thus lead to an application of 
mandatory rules of the normally applicable law instead of those of the law that the 
parties intended to apply. 175 The conditions for fraudulent evasion are, firstly, that the 
change through manipUlation of a connecting factor must be effective, and, secondly, 
the change must be effected with the intention to avoid the application of mandatory 
rules of the otherwise applicable law. 176 Thirdly, the intention to avoid a law must be 
viewed as reprehensible by the forum.177 Such disfavour may result from either the 
content and importance of the evaded rule, or from the motives for or circumstances of 
the avoidance. 178 This criterion, based on value considerations, is essential since it 
distinguishes avoidance of the law from evasion of the law. 179 
173 Forsyth Private International Law 107; also see Raape/Stunn IPR Bd 1326: ' ... arglistig eine 
Anknilpfung zu verwirklichen, urn die unerwilnschten Nonnen des an sich maI3geblichen Rechts 
auszuschalten und statt ihrer die gilnstigeren eines anderen Rechts zum Zuge kommen zu lassen ... '; 
Firschinglvon Hoffmann IPR 243; Vischer Connectingfactors ss 90 et seq. 
174 See Firschinglvon Hoffmann IPR 243, 246 - if the parties to a purely domestic contract conclude the 
contract abroad for the sole purpose of creating an international contract, thus allowing them to choose 
the applicable law in order to avoid the jus cogens of the sole connection country; MilnchKomml Martiny 
Art 27 Rn 10; Fawcett 49 CLl [1990] 44, 48 et seq; Lando Rec des Cours 189 (1984 VI) 229, 290 et seq 
with regard to weaker party contracts; Forsyth Private International Law 282. 
175 See Vischer Connecting factors s 91; Raape/Stunn IPR Bd /331; Forsyth Private International Law 
107. There is some disagreement about whether the doctrine ofJraus legis is to be regarded as a special 
aspect of public policy, or an independent ground for nullifying the contract. In the latter case, it would 
be a concrete example of abuse of rights, or justified by the defence of the authority of the law. 
According to Vischer Connectingfactors s 91 it is due to this legal basis ofJraus legis that only 
fraudulent evasion of the lex fori and not of the law of a foreign country is usually sanctioned. 
176 According to Raape/Strum IPR Bd 1328 the intention must also be malicious; Firschinglvon 
Hoffmann IPR 243; Vischer Connecting Factors s 91. 
177 Raape/Strum IPR Bd 1330; Firschinglvon Hoffmann IPR 243; see similar North Private International 
Law Problems 112 concerning a fraudulent choice. 
178 Firsching/von Hoffmann IPR 243; Schurig FS Ferid 375,400 et seq; see similar North Private 
International Law Problems 112 concerning a fraudulent choice. 
179 See on this criterion Schurig FS Ferid375, 400 et seq. 
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2 Evasion of law as limitation of party autonomy? 
With regard to freedom of choice and the application of mandatory rules in the 
international law of contracts, the crucial question about evasion of law is whether a 
choice of law that was intended to evade the ius cogens of the otherwise applicable law 
may be invalidated by the doctrine ofjraus legis. 180 
In the leading English case Vita Food Products v Unus Shipping,181 the parties to a 
shipping contract had chosen English law as proper law. This choice was upheld by the 
Privy Council despite the fact that the contract had no connection to England. Lord 
Wright indicated that such a connection was not essential and stated that: 
Where there is an express statement by the parties of their intention to select the law 
of the contract, it is difficult to see what qualifications are possible, provided the 
intention expressed is bona fide and legal, and provided there is no reason for 
avoiding the choice on the ground of public policy.' 182 
This dictum could theoretically prevent all cases of evasion of the law,183 but, disputes 
have arisen as to the content of these limitations, since the dictum itself does not 
indicate under what conditions a choice is male fide and not legal. 184 Lord Wright's 
limitations did not apply to the facts of the case and the parties were thus permitted to 
evade the Hague Rules. Furthermore, as far as the present author is aware, the choice of 
contracting parties has never been invalidated by an English court because it was male 
fide and not legal. 185 
180 Lando CMLR 24 (1987) 159, 182; id Rec des Cours 189 (1984 VI) 229,290 et seq; Forsyth Private 
International Law 282. 
181 [1939] AC 277, for the facts of the case, see North Private International Law Problems Ill. 
182 At page 290. 
183 Fawcett 49 CLl [1990] 44, 48; similar Lando Rec des Cours 189 (1984 VI) 229, 290. 
184 For the problem of defming the content, see North Private International Law Problems 112 et seq; 
Kaye The New Private International Law 52; Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Voll/ llth ed 1172; 
Cheshire & North's Private International Law 11th ed. 453, 454; Collier Conflict of Laws 147. 
185 See Fawcett 49 CLl [1990] 44, 48; Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol II II .h ed. 1172; in general 
the Australian case Golden Acres Ltd v Queensland Estates Pty Ltd [1969] Qd R 378,384 is referred to in 
this context; where a choice of law was struck down on the basis that it 'was made for the specific 
purpose of avoiding consequences of illegality which would or might have followed if Queensland law 
applied'. The Court of Appeal applied the Queensland legislation as an overriding statute of the forum. 
Cf Hartley Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 341, 404; North Private International Law Problems 113, 114. 
54 
The problem of evasion of law as a limitation on freedom of choice is that in 
principle there can be no doubt that any choice of law clause will always have the effect 
of avoiding the otherwise applicable law. 186 It is contradictory to give the parties 
unrestricted freedom to choose the applicable law (and to avoid mandatory legislation of 
the otherwise applicable legal system) and at the same time to strike down a choice of 
law because it is evasive. 187 The crucial question is therefore determining when the 
accepted intention of the parties to avoid a law becomes an unacceptable evasion. 188 No 
clear guidance is given, apart from the very general statement that 'avoidance only 
becomes evasion where the reason for, or the circumstances of, the choice are not 
acceptable in the eyes of the forum' .189 It is broadly accepted that the mere intention of 
the parties to avoid mandatory legislation is not sufficient to disregard the choice of law 
on the basis ofJraus legis. 190 
In Germany and Switzerland, it is held that the choice of law cannot itself be 
evasive, subject, however, to the condition that the contract is an international one, viz. 
apart from the choice of law, it is not wholly located within only one country. 191 The 
choice of a law unconnected with the contract (neutral law) is held to be acceptable, 
since the parties may have legitimate reasons for submitting their contract to a neutral 
legal system, provided that the contract has connections with more than one legal 
system. 192 
Prior to the Rome Convention (art 3 (3)), it was a matter of debate in English law 
whether a connection to the chosen law was needed and whether a choice of law in 
purely domestic contracts was permitted. Statements indicate that the common law 
would have regarded a choice of an unconnected legal system as valid, even in purely 
186 If the chosen law does not correspond with the objectively detennined proper law. 
187 See Kniippel Zwingendes Recht 41; Raape/Stunn IPR Bd 1332; similar Fawcett 49 CLl [1990] 44, 51; 
KellerlSiehr IPR 383 et seq. 
188 See similar North Private International Law Problems 112; Fawcett 49 CLl [1990] 44, 50. 
189 North Private International Law Problems 112; Schurig FS Ferid 375,399 et seq. 
190 MiinchKommIMartiny Art 27 Rn 10; Lando Rec des Cours 189 (1984 VI) 229, 293. 
191 See Kniippe\ Zwingendes Recht 41; Raape/Stunn IPR Bd I 332 with references; this was not the case 
in RG 21.9.1899 RGZ 44,300; KellerlSiehr IPR 383; MUnchKomml Sonnenberger Einl Rn 689; 
MiinchKomrnlMartiny Art 27 Rn 10 states thatfraus legis might apply in extreme situations without 
giving any guidance. 
192 MilnchKommIMartiny Art 27 Rn 10, 11; Lando Rec des Cours 189 (194 VI) 229,286 et seq; id 
Contracts ss 43, 44 with references. The parties may want to submit their contract to the law of the 
country that dominates the market, or to a legal system which is well developed or well suited to the type 
of contract, or they may wish to refer to a law which they have used in earlier transactions. 
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domestic contracts, based on the assumption that the parties might have reasonable 
grounds for their choice of another law. 193 
However, it has been submitted that a choice of law may be struck down as evasive 
if it leads to unfairness or is against national interests. 194 In this case, the doctrine of 
evasion cannot be based upon the fraudulent manipulation or creation of a connecting 
factor (eg changing the place of residence, or going abroad to change the place of 
concluding a purely domestic contract, so that an international contract is created), but 
upon the fraudulent abuse of party autonomy. 195 In a case where avoidance leads to 
unfairness it is typically only one party to the contract who seeks to evade the law. 
Where one party is in the stronger economic position there is a risk of no 'genuine' 
agreement on the choice ofthe applicable law, since there is often no real freedom of 
choice for the weaker party. 196 In these cases evasion of law may be objectionable and 
the doctrine offraus legis may operate as a justified restriction of the parties' freedom to 
choose the applicable law. 197 Where evasion operates against the national interest, it is 
held to be objectionable because the content of the law and its underlying policy are 
being thwarted.198 
3 Evasion of law under the Rome Convention 
Another question arises about the extent to which the doctrine ofJraus legis can 
possibly be applied under the Rome Convention regime. 199 As was seen above, the 
Convention does not contain afraus legis limitation on the parties' freedom of choice, 
but uses another concept to limit party autonomy: The effect of choice of law is limited 
193 See Dicey & Morris Conflict o/Laws Vol II 1213, 1214, 1215; more cautious North Private 
International Law Problems 114 and Carter BYBIL 57 (1986) 1, 10 et seq; critically Cheshire &.North's 
Private International Law 11th ed. 453, 454. 
194 Cf Fawcett 49 CLl [1990] 44, 51 et seq; similar North Private International Law Problems 112 et seq; 
Lando Rec des Cours 189 (1984 VI) 229, 293 with regard to weaker party contracts. 
195 On this distinction, see Coester-Waltjen FS Lorenz 297, 316 et seq; Schurig FS Ferid 375, 402 et seq; 
MUnchKommlSonnenberger Einl IPR Rn 697. 
196 Lando Rec des Cours 189 (1986 VI) 229, 294; Fawcett 49 CLl [1990] 44,52. 
197 Fawcett 49 CLl [1990] 44, 51, 52. According to Lando an application of the /raus legis rule may be 
justified in weaker party contracts if and to the extent that 'the choice of law by the parties would violate 
a strong public policy of the otherwise applicable law, and ... the choice is not supported by legitimate 
interests of international trade', cf id Rec des Cours 189 (1984 VI) 229,293. 
198 Fawcett 49 CLl [1990] 44, 53 refers to recent anti-evasion provisions such as sec 27 (2) (a) Unfair 
Contract Terms 1977 or the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971, implementing the Hague-Visby Rules, 
compare The Hollandia [1983] AC 565, 572, 573. 
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by the application of mandatory rules of a law other than the chosen law. In contrast to 
the doctrine offraus legis, the Convention uses objective criteria to determine under 
what circumstances and conditions a choice of law is restricted, such as in consumer, 
employment or purely domestic contracts, or through the application of internationally 
mandatory rules. 20o The intention of the contracting parties to avoid certain mandatory 
rules is irrelevant. 
Nevertheless, the issue was considered by the drafters, as evidenced by arts 3 (3), 5 
(2) and 6 (1) of the Convention which prevent the evasion of mandatory rules of the 
otherwise applicable law.201 Party autonomy is to be restricted predominantly on the 
basis of these statutory conflict rules.202 There will be little room for invoking thefraus 
legis doctrine under these circumstances. Particularly because the Convention provides 
for a nearly unfettered freedom of choice, no local connection is required nor is a 
legitimate interest of the contracting parties necessary. However, the Convention does 
not eliminate evasion. 
The Convention has been criticised for not providing adequate protection to some 
groups of weak parties. Thus, it might be possible to restrict party autonomy in extreme 
situations on the basis of the evasion doctrine, if the weaker party is not granted 
protection under the rules of the Convention.203 However, the strict conditions of the 
principle of evasion must be fulfilled. In particular, the manipulation or fraudulent use 
of a connecting factor must be made with the intention to avoid mandatory rules of the 
otherwise applicable legal system, and the motives of at least one contracting party and 
the circumstances of the evasion must be reprehensible in the eyes of the forum. 204 
199 CfLando CMLR 24 (1987) 159, 182 et seq; id Rec des Cours 189 (1984 VI) 229, 292. 
200 Lando CMLR 24 (1987) 159,182 et seq; id Rec des Cours 189 (1984 VI) 229, 292; 
MlinchKomm/Sonnenberger Einl IPR Rn 695. 
201 See Lando CMLR 24 (1987) 159,182 et seq. 
202 See only MlinchKomrnlMartiny Art 27 Rn 10, 11. 
20) Lando CMLR 24 (1987) 159, 183; id Rec des Cours 189 (1984 VI) 229, 293; MilnchKommlMartiny 
Art 27 Rn 10; Coester-Waltjen FS Lorenz 297,315 et seq. 
204 For details about consumer contracts falling outside the scope of art 5, see Coester-Waitjen FS Lorenz 
297,317 et seq. 
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4 Conclusion and remarks 
In conclusion, it can be stated that the doctrine of evasion of law as a limitation of party 
autonomy has a fairly minor role to play in the private international law of contracts.20S 
In general the doctrine of evasion cannot apply if the parties enjoy unfettered freedom of 
choice of law. It would be contradictory to allow unrestricted party autonomy and at the 
same time to invalidate a choice of law as evasive. Thus, where a local connection with 
the chosen legal system or a legitimate interest is not necessary for a valid choice, the 
intention of the contracting parties to evade thereby the ius cogens of the otherwise 
applicable legal system should not render their choice fraudulent. 
However, where the contracting parties manipulate or create a connecting factor, 
the doctrine of evasion applies and may invalidate a choice of law. An example of such 
manipulation is going abroad to change the place of concluding a purely domestic 
contract, so that an international contract is created, which permits the choice of a 
foreign legal system as the proper law. For the choice of law to be invalidated, the 
choice must also have been made for the sole purpose of avoiding otherwise applicable 
mandatory legislation.206 
Besides this example, the application of the Jraus legis doctrine to the parties' 
choice of law is extremely vague, and no clear guidance is given. It might apply to 
situations where the stronger contracting party' dictates' to the weaker party the 
application of a certain law, thereby intending to circumvent restrictive mandatory 
protection rules. But, the difficulties of determining whether the contracting parties 
intend to evade the ius cogens of the otherwise applicable legal system remain. 
Additionally, the doctrine bristles with difficulties of definition: Under what 
circumstances is such an evasion reprehensible and accordingly not acceptable? Such 
20S MUnchKomm/Sonnenberger Einl Rn 689, 708, 709; KnUppel Zwingendes Recht 41 et seq. 
206 Under the Rome Convention the intention of the parties might be to avoid the application of art 3 (3) 
and thus the application of mandatory niles of the sole connection country. 
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value considerations will largely depend on the importance of the policies pursued by 
the evaded law.207 
It is the present author's opinion that in the interests of certainty the scope of the 
fraus legis doctrine should be limited to extreme and obvious cases.208 The doctrine is 
too uncertain in scope and definition.209 In addition,fraus legis depends on the motives 
or intentions of the parties, not objective criteria.2Io Finally, it should be mentioned that 
the small number of reported cases where the doctrine was considered were concerned 
with evasion or avoidance of the forum's law. To the knowledge ofthe present author 
there are no reported cases where a choice of law was invalidated as being fraudem legis 
because of an intention to evade a foreign law.2lI 
It is submitted that restriction of party autonomy through the application of 
mandatory rules under certain conditions is preferable. The use of objective criteria and 
the development of firm conflict rules promote certainty in law, uphold the expectations 
of the contracting parties, and are independent of the motives of the parties. 
Nevertheless, there might be extreme cases where the fraus legis doctrine is reasonable. 
Furthermore, in countries where a system of choice of law rules limiting party 
autonomy does not exist, the principle might serve as a useful means of pursuing certain 
substantive law policies, such as protection of the weaker contracting parties, or even 
state interests, as expressed in mandatory statutes, provided that the fraudulent motives 
of the contracting parties can be proved. 
207 CfSchurig FS Ferid 375,399 et seq. Evasion of law has to be distinguished from the application of 
internationally mandatory rules, which are applicable irrespective of the law governing the contract and 
independent of the intentions of the contracting parties, although their application is in the interest of the 
enacting state, cf Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol II 11 th ed. 1172; MiinchKommlSonnenberger Ein! 
IPR Rn 695; the Australian case Golden Acres Ltd v Queensland Estates Pty Ltd [1969] Qd R 378,384. 
208 Forsyth Private International Law 282; Coester-Waltjen FS Lorenz 297,318; Schurig FS Ferid 372, 
403 . 
209 Forsyth Private International Law 282; detailed Fawcett 49 CLJ [1990] 44, 54, 58 et seq. 
2\0 Fawcett 49 CLJ [1990] 44, 58, 59. 
211 See North Private International Law Problems 113; Vischer Connecting Factors s 91; for references 
of decided cases, Raape/Sturm IPR Bd 1331 et seq; in Golden Acres Ltd v Queensland Estates Pty Ltd 
[1969] Qd R 378 the evaded law was both the otherwise applicable legal system and the lex fori. 
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VI Proposal for South African private international law of contracts on the 
limitation of party autonomy by the application of mandatory rules 
In this section it will be discussed whether the South African private international law of 
contracts should adopt a relatively wide concept of party autonomy, whereby the 
application of mandatory rules of the otherwise applicable legal system limits the effect 
of a choice of law, as in the Rome Convention, or whether another means of limiting 
party autonomy is preferable. The present legal situation in South Africa concerning 
party autonomy and its limitations in international contracts will be discussed, followed 
by a proposal that the concept of limiting the freedom of choice by application of 
mandatory rules should be adopted. 
1 Party autonomy and its limitations under present South African private 
international law of contracts 
The legal position of party autonomy and its limitations in South African private 
international law of contracts is to some extent unci ear. 212 In particular, it is uncertain 
whether a choice of law by the parties can appoint an entire body of foreign law to 
govern the contract, thereby excluding even the ius cogens of the otherwise applicable 
legal system, or whether the choice of law can replace only to a certain degree the ius 
dispositivum (incorporation).213 
The Roman Dutch authorities, J Voet and Vander Keessel, restricted the freedom 
of the parties to choose the law applicable to their transaction to the ius dispositivum 
alone.214 Court judgments, however, indicate an affinity for the acceptance of unlimited 
party autonomy.215 One such example is the case of Guggenheim v Rosenbaum216 where 
212 For details about this, see Forsyth Private International Law 278 et seq; Edwards Conflict of Laws par 
461; Van Rooyen Die Kontrak 67 et seq. 
213 See Forsyth Private International Law 278 et seq; Edwards Conflict of Laws para 461. 
214 J Voet Commentarius 1.4 App 18 - 22; Van der Keessel Praelectiones 143 - 145; see Forsyth Private 
International Law 278. 
215 See Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Efroiken and Newman 1924 AD 171 at 185-6; Berman v Winrow 1943 
TPD 213 at 216; Guggenheim v Rosenbaum (2) 1961 (4) SA 21 (W) at 31 A; Pretorious & another v 
Natal South Sea Investment Trust Ltd 1965 (3) SA 410 (W) at 417C-H; Improvair (Cape) v 
Establissements Neu 1983 (2) SA 138 (C) at 145 B; Laconian Maritime Enterprise Ltd v Agromar Lineas 
Ltd 1986 3 SA 509 (D) at 525 G. 
216 1961 (4)SA21 (W)at31 A . 
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the court held that in 'our law the proper law of the contract is the law of the country 
which the parties have agreed or intended ... shall govern it' . A further example is 
Improvair (Cape) v Establissements Neu217 where the court stated that if there is an 
express choice, 'there is usually no difficulty in finding that the agreed system 
constitutes the proper law of the contract'. Finally, in Laconian Maritime Enterprises 
Ltd v Agromar Lineas Ltd, 218 Booysen J stated' [the fact] that our law recognises party 
autonomy in respect of the proper law of a contract seems clear. Thus where the parties 
have expressly or impliedly (or tacitly) agreed upon a governing law our courts would 
give effect to the intention of the parties' .219 
However, it has been shown by Van Rooyen,220 and is stressed by other South 
African academics,221 that the courts have never actually had to rule on the limits of the 
freedom of the parties, in particular whether a rule of the ius cogens of the otherwise 
applicable law can be replaced by a foreign law chosen by the parties. It is noted by 
these authors that most cases have either centred on rules of the ius dispositivum, or the 
chosen law was also the law which would be applicable in the absence of the parties' 
choice.222 
It has been suggested that one of the clearest cases where the ius cogens has been at 
issue was Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Estate Greenacre. 223 The case concerned 
the application of the South African Death Duties Act 29 of 1922 to a marriage 
agreement. The settlement in question was made by a South African domiciliary, since 
deceased, in favour of English domiciliaries, and English law had expressly been 
chosen. The issue before the court was whether the statute's scope of application 
extended to the settlement even though another law applied by virtue of the chosen 
proper law of the contract. The court held that the essence of the settlement was English 
law, in other words, the proper law, and the otherwise applicable law was South African 
law, but ruled that the settlement did not constitute a donatio inter vivos and therefore 
2I7 1983 (2) SA 138 (C) at 145 B. 
m 1986 (3) SA 509 (D). 
219 At 525 . 
220 Van Rooyen Die Kontrak 67 et seq. 
221 Forsyth Private International Law 279, 280; Edwards Conflict of Laws para 361; id 'Proper Law ' 
Doctrine 38,52,53. 
222 Forsyth Private International Law 279,280; Van Rooyen Die Kontrak 67 et seq. 
223 1936 NPD 225; see Forsyth Private International Law 279,280; Van Rooyen Die Kontrak 69 et seq. 
no death duties were payable?24 Although the case does not deal explicitly with the ius 
cogens, Mathews AlP stated that:225 
The parties could not by contract declare that no provision thereof should render 
any party thereto liable to obligations ... imposed by any union Statute .... But the 
court is entitled to examine the deed to ascertain what were the obligations ... and 
the court can only do that by ascertaining the English law: If the trustees (under the 
settlement) had ... to enforce the covenants this Court would have had to interpret 
the contract according to the law of England. For example, if interested parties had 
taken proceedings in Natal to have the deceased's covenant on any ground, this 
Court would have determined such a matter by the law of England .... 
In other words, the judge maintains that the parties have chosen English law to govern 
the contract regardless of whether it is challenged 'on any ground'. Therefore, the South 
African law is not available as a means of challenging the contract. Consequently, the 
case provides obiter support for the concept of party autonomy in the sense that the 
otherwise applicable mandatory rules are excluded.226 
Thus, one can agree with Forsyth that, de lege lata, it is not clear as to whether the 
parties can avoid the ius cogens of the otherwise applicable legal system by means of a 
choice of law. Dicta in case law, however, seem to suggest that the parties' choice may 
have that effect. 227 
Most academic writers in South Africa seem to favour a wide concept of party 
autonomy that excludes the ius cogens of the otherwise applicable legal system. In other 
words, the parties' freedom to choose the legal system that will apply to their 
transaction should not be reduced to an incorporation of facultative norms.228 This 
approach is justified by the following considerations: It promotes certainty, lowers 
transaction costs, avoids the sometimes difficult task of determining the law applicable 
by reference to various factors, protects justified expectations, and ensures predictability 
224 Forsyth stresses that the case is in fact concerned with an interpretation of the South African Act as 
internationally mandatory legislation which is applicable regardless of the proper law of the contract, id 
Private international Law 280. 
225 At 229. 
226 See Forsyth Private International Law 280. 
221 Forsyth Private International Law 280; see also Edwards Conflict of Laws para 361. 
228 Forsyth Private International Law 280; Edwards Conflict of Laws para 361; Van Rooyen Die Kontrak 
72, 73; Viejobueno XXVI CILSA (1993) 172, 190; critically Spiro XVII CILSA (1984) 197 et seq. It 
seems, however, that Spiro refers to application of (internationally mandatory) public laws of other laws 
to show that the choice of foreign law does not automatically exclude the ius cogens of other laws. 
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of results and convenience. Furthermore, it serves the parties' need for freedom of 
contract. The parties might have a reasonable interest in choosing a legal system that has 
no connection to the contract. The reasons for parties choosing a 'neutral' law could be 
that the law does not favour either party, it is well developed or dominant in their 
business field, or the parties are familiar with the law as they have used it before.229 
However, with regard to the limits on the contracting parties' freedom of choice, the 
academics' approach becomes carefully vague. 
Edwards states that the ius cogens may allow for the application of mandatory rules 
to the particular contract. In theory, the degree to which party autonomy and the 
applicable choice of law may depart from the ius cogens of the otherwise applicable 
legal system is dependent on the 'common law or statute or international Convention 
prevailing in the rechtskring under consideration,.230 He refers to the dictum of Lord 
Wright in the Vita Food case: Contractors are free to select a system with which their 
contract has no factual connection, provided that the choice is bonafide, legal and not 
contrary to public policy. He argues that this approach will be authoritative in the 
domestic courts. However, with regard to South African private international law, he 
seems to favour the adoption of the civil law doctrine of evasion to combat attempts to 
evade ius cogens, where the evasion reflects unfairness in the bargaining position of the 
contracting parties or is opposed to the national interest. 231 With regard to 'statutes' he 
refers in particular to mandatory provisions that apply irrespective ofthe'proper law,m 
and with regard to international conventions he refers to the imperative provisions of the 
Bretton Woods Agreement or the Rome Convention. 233 
Van Rooyen proposes that the effect of party autonomy should be limited by the 
application of mandatory rules of other legal systems if and to the extent that the ius 
cogensrules claim applicability ('aanspraak maak op gelding'). He maintains that the 
229 See Forsyth Private International Law 278,280; Edwards Conflict of Laws para 361 Footnote 12. 
230 Edwards Conflict of Laws para 361. 
231 Edwards Conflict of Laws para 361 Footnote 13. 
232 Edwards Conflict of Laws para 361 Footnote 14: for instance, he confmns s 1 (1) (a) of the Carriage of 
Goods by Sea Act of 1986 that provides that the Hague Visby rules have a mandatory effect in SA. 
m Edwards Conflict of Laws para 361 Footnote 15. The Rome Convention is held to be a fruitful 
persuasive source for SA private international Jaw. 
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loss of certainty does not outweigh the disadvantage of not applying the rule.234 He 
appears to be referring to internationally mandatory rules that claim application 
regardless of the proper law of the contract.235 
Forsyth does not support Van Rooyen's view. He favours a limitation on the 
doctrine of party autonomy based upon distinctions such as that between 'international 
or local contracts'. He also favours a limitation of party autonomy in 'weak party' 
contracts, where the choice of law dictated by the economically stronger part would 
frustrate the purpose of national mandatory provisions enacted for the protection of the 
weaker party.236 It is, however, not quite clear whether party autonomy would be 
excluded in these contracts, or whether only the effect of the choice would be limited in 
the sense that parties cannot contract out of the protective ius cogens of the otherwise 
applicable legal system. A further limitation of party autonomy can result from the 
application of public policy and internationally mandatory rules of the forum and, in 
very limited cases, the rules of a third legal system.237 Furthermore, Forsyth refers to the 
doctrine ofJraus legis as a limitation on the parties' freedom of choice. However, since 
the scope of the doctrine is uncertain, he advocates the limitation of its application to 
exceptional cases, to allow for considerations of certainty in law.238 
To summarise: It can be stated that although South African courts have never had to 
rule on the limits of the freedom of choice, obiter dicta in court decisions indicate that 
South African courts will in principle allow the parties to choose a law to govern their 
transaction, thereby replacing not only ius dispositivum but also the ius cogens of the 
forum state and of the otherwise applicable law. South African academics do not restrict 
party autonomy to an incorporation of foreign law but favour the acceptance thereof as 
primary choice. However, there is uncertainty about the limitations on freedom of 
choice. 
234 Van Rooyen Die Kontrak 40 et seq, 72, 73, 232; according to Van Rooyen the doctrine of evasion 
should be limited to formalities, ibid 172 et seq; Forsyth Private International Law 281. 
235 See also Forsyth Private International Law 281,300 Footnote 162. 
236 Forsyth Private International Law 281. 
237 The difference towards Van Rooyens' approach seems to lye in the willingness to take into account ius 
cogens of legal systems other than the lex fori or lex causae. 
238 Forsyth Private International Law 282; see also Van Rooyen Die Kontrak 172 et seq who restricts the 
doctrine to formalities. 
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2 Proposal for South African private international law of contracts 
The different solutions proposed by South African authors to restrict party autonomy, 
and the conflict rules limiting party autonomy in the countries under investigation, as 
discussed above, are the result of very similar policy considerations. These include the 
protection of the weaker party in contractual issues, and the need to favour the national 
interest. As was discussed above,239 these considerations emanate from a trend during 
the last century in the domestic law of many countries to intervene increasingly in the 
private relationship, and to limit party autonomy by enacting mandatory provisions to 
protect the weaker contracting parties from abuse.240 All the provisions discussed on the 
limitation of choice of law in contracts purport to extend this policy to the level of 
conflict of laws. It is submitted, that for considerations of certainty and predictability 
South Africa should also develop statutory or common law conflict rules in this area. 
This can be achieved either by excluding party autonomy completely in respect of 
certain contracts, as Switzerland has done with regard to consumer contracts, or by 
limiting party autonomy to certain legal systems, as Switzerland has done with regard to 
employment contracts, or by limiting the effect of the choice by providing mandatory 
rules of the law which would have been applicable in absence of a choice, as provided 
in the Rome Convention.241 The crucial question in this study is the examination of 
whether the restriction of party autonomy by means of mandatory rules242 offers an 
appropriate solution for South African private intemationallaw. 
With regard to the limitation of party autonomy in order to protect the weaker 
contracting party, the problem of restricting the effect of the choice oflaw by the 
application of certain mandatory rules of the otherwise applicable law is the difficulty of 
239 See supra CHAPTER 2, I, 2, a; for SA, see Forsyth Private International Law 280, 281; Edwards 
Conflict o/Laws para 361 Footnotes 13 and 14. 
240 Or to protect national social or economic interests, such as restrictions on the import and export of 
goods, exchange control regulations, laws for the protection of cultural heritage, etc. Whereas these rules 
are in general held to be directly applicable statutes of the forum states, and are thus applied regardless of 
the proper law of the transaction, whether chosen by the parties or objectively determined, the category of 
rules that protects the weaker party does not necessarily fulfil these criteria. The applicability of 
mandatory rules of the forum, the lex causae, or even another legal system which claims application 
regardless of the proper law is dealt with in the following chapter. 
241 Junker IPRax 1993, 1,4; Kren ZverglRWiss 87 (1988) 48, 55; Hartley Contract Conflicts Ill, 113; 
see arts 5 (2), 6 (l) RC, arts 120, 121 IPRG. 
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detennining and delimiting the mandatory protection rules of the legal systems, both 
those of the chosen law and those of the otherwise applicable legal system. In addition, 
comparing the protective rules of the legal systems is a difficult task. Articles 5 and 6 of 
the Rome Convention do not indicate whether the comparison should be concerned with 
particular provisions, or with a group of norms, or with the legal system as a whole; in 
other words, whether the comparison should be concrete or abstract. 
The original aim of the 'more-favourable principle' was to guarantee minimum 
protection to the weaker party. According to arts 5 (2) and 6 (1) of the Rome 
Convention, the minimum protection standard was that granted by the law which is 
applicable in the absence of a choice. However, applying the most protective rules of the 
chosen law and the otherwise applicable law to a consumer contract on a 'pick and 
choose' basis can lead to the undesirable result of the consumer in international 
contracts being afforded greater protection than in a domestic contract, where only one 
system of law is applicable. This problem does not arise where the freedom to choose 
the applicable law is completely excluded or is restricted to particular legal systems for 
certain contracts. In these cases, either the parties cannot contract out of the otherwise 
applicable legal system, or they can freely choose between a small number of legal 
systems. 
However, the advantage of limiting only the effect of the choice of the parties by 
providing for the application of mandatory laws of other legal systems is that party 
autonomy itself is not restricted. Party autonomy, with all its merits, is thereby 
preserved as a connecting factor in the international law of contracts. Furthennore, the 
favour principle provides far-reaching protection for the consumer and the employee, 
because he is not restricted to the law of his habitual residence (that might offer him 
even less protection than the chosen law). Lastly, it offers a broader freedom to the 
contracting parties to detennine the applicable legal system and allows them to predict 
their obligations and rights. 
The major disadvantages of the restriction on the freedom of choice itself are as 
follows: Either the parties cannot contract out of the otherwise applicable legal system, 
242 Arts 3 (3), 5 (2) and 6 (1) RC. 
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even though the chosen law might offer greater protection for the weaker party, or the 
stronger contracting party may be permitted to choose at least the less protective law of 
the enumerated legal systems. This runs counter to the policy on which the limitation of 
free choice is based. Therefore, the limitation of the effect of the choice, rather than the 
limitation of the choice itself, or the restriction of the choice to a small number of legal 
systems, is the preferable option in restricting party autonomy. 
In contrast to the 'more-favourable principle', the doctrine ofJraus legis does not 
offer sufficient protection for the weaker party. It has been shown that the doctrine is of 
doubtful value in the international law of contracts - which is the true domain of party 
autonomy. Apart from its vagueness and the difficulties that arise because of its 
dependence on the subjective intention of the contracting parties, it is of minor 
relevance in areas where party autonomy and not only incorporation of foreign law is 
permitted. This is because one of the major effects of party autonomy is that the contract 
is subjected to the chosen law, including its ius cogens, with the exclusion of those rules 
of the otherwise applicable law. 
To apply the doctrine of evasion to cases where 'unfairness' is alleged, it would 
have to be shown that (1) certain mandatory rules of the otherwise applicable law are 
evaded by the choice of law; (2) the choice was made with the intention to circumvent 
these rules; and (3) the intention to avoid the ius cogens, and the circumstances and 
effect of the choice are reprehensible in the eyes of the forum. This process of 
evaluation is extremely vague and it has been shown above that no clear guidance is 
provided. The doctrine of evasion thus leads to uncertainty, and also cannot offer 
sufficient protection to the weaker party in international law, since it depends on vague 
and SUbjective criteria. 
For these reasons, it is submitted that South Africa should adopt the 'favour 
principle' as a means of limiting the parties' freedom to choose the applicable law in 
weaker party contracts. For this purpose the choice oflaw rules in arts 5 and 6 of the 
Rome Convention could be adopted. They are well established in European countries 
and they offer appropriate protection to consumers and employees. 
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Nevertheless, it must be conceded that the favour principle also has disadvantages: 
Difficulties arise in determining which sets of rules are to be compared and in deciding 
which law offers the greater protection. It will be necessary for the judge to examine 
both the rules of the law of the consumer's habitual residence and the rules of the 
chosen law in order to decide which law is more favourable. 
The Rome Convention has been criticised for offering only partial protection for 
certain contracts. It is argued that there are other kinds of contract, where one party is 
typically in a weaker bargaining position, that are not afforded special protection under 
the Convention.243 To protect the weaker party from abuse by the stronger party it is 
possible to create special statutory or common law conflict rules for other contracts 
where one party is typically in the weaker bargaining position so that the stronger party 
cannot avoid the national protection afforded to the weaker party via a favourable choice 
of law. Such special choice of law rules should take into account and balance the 
interests of the contracting parties of the special type of contract and find appropriate 
connecting factors. 
Alternatively, it is also possible to create a general, broad choice of law rule that 
ensures the protection of the weaker party. Such a choice of law rule might read as 
follows: 
A choice of law made by the parties in contracts where one party is typically in the 
weaker bargaining position shall not have the result of depriving the weaker party 
of the protection afforded to him by the mandatory rules of the otherwise applicable 
law. 
It must be remembered, however, that special protection on the level of conflict of laws 
is not always justified in 'weaker party' contracts, nor is a restriction of party autonomy 
in any situation in an international setting reasonable.244 For each international contract, 
the protection of the weaker party has to be carefully balanced with the need for the 
contracting parties' freedom of choice. Special protection for the weaker party should be 
provided only where strong social and political policy considerations demand such 
24] Lando Rec des Cours 189 (1984 VI) 229, 292, 293; id CMLR 24 (1987) 159, 183. 
244 See for instance art 5 (2) RC where party autonomy is limited when there is a special connection to the 
country of the consumer's habitual residence. 
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protection, even at the level of conflict of laws, and where these policy considerations 
were frustrated by allowing the parties the freedom to choose another law to govern 
their contract. 
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CHAPTER 3: INTERNA TIONALL Y MANDATORY RULES 
The previous chapter dealt with the limitation of party autonomy by the application of 
mandatory provisions. It has thus been seen that, in various contexts, mandatory rules 
playa major role when applying the principle of party autonomy. The examination, 
however, focused on a relatively new trend in the private international law of contracts: 
While the parties' freedom to choose the applicable law is unlimited, special conflict 
rules have been created that limit the effect of the choice of law by the application of 
mandatory rules ofthe objectively applicable law. Mandatory rules have thus become a 
modem tool to limit party autonomy. Although, as was seen these special conflict rules 
reflect a change from the traditional allocation technique, which was neutral and blind, 
towards a more result-selecting process, they still operate within traditional choice of 
law techniques. The technique of 'alternative connection' or 'optional connection' to a 
legal system (or to certain rules) based on the so-called 'more-favourable principle', is 
well known to conflict lawyers. I 
The following chapters, by contrast, are concerned with the question of when 
'internationally mandatory rules' are applied in the international law of contracts by the 
court of the forum state: In what circumstances and on what juristic basis? This is an 
issue that is older in origin, broader in scope, and has a stronger effect on the choice of 
law process than the one discussed in the previous chapter. 
In probably all legal systems there are certain rules of substantive law that, in view 
of their special nature and purpose, claim application regardless of the law applicable 
according to the normal choice of law rules, and are thus exceptions to the nonnal 
choice of law rules. 2 As has already been noted in the Introduction, Savigny, founder of 
today's traditional allocation technique, became aware ofthis phenomenon and 
excluded certain mandatory rules from his multilateral choice of law system. He held 
that due to their special nature and substantive content these rules are opposed to the 
I CfVischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992 I) 13, 116 et seq. 
2 See also Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992 I) 13, 153, 162; Philip Recent Provisions 241, 242; Dicey & 
Morris Conflict of Laws Vol 121,23; Hartley Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 341, 346, 347; Schwander IPR 
AT329. 
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principle of interchangeability of laws, which is the very basis of his multilateral choice 
of law system.3 
Conflict lawyers and judges in many countries maintain that the application of 
internationally mandatory rules deserves special treatment in private intemationallaw.4 
Some have held that these rules fall outside the scope of private international law, or at 
least outside the scope of the reference of the ordinary conflict rules, and are thus 
exceptions to the ordinary choice of law process. Others have advocated the 
development of a separate, additional choice of law system that will indicate under what 
circumstances internationally mandatory rules are to be applied. Yet others restrict 
themselves to the application of the ordinary conflict rules, thus submitting 
internationally mandatory rules to the ordinary choice of law process, with the proviso 
that internationally mandatory rules of another law may still be applied or taken into 
account, regardless of the proper law. 
Furthermore, the application of these rules creates problems not only with regard to 
party autonomy and its limitations, but also in cases where the applicable law has been 
determined by the forum's conflict rules, in the absence of a choice of law. These rules 
are intended to override the ordinary choice of law process and may consequently limit 
the scope of the proper law in general. 5 Thus, it is evident that the application of 
internationally mandatory rules touches on the most basic methodical foundations of 
private internationallaw.6 
) Savigny System des heutigen Romischen Rechts Vol VJII32; for criticism of this argument, see Schurig 
RabelsZ 54 (1990) 217, 229; see more detailed CHAPTER 1. 
4 See, for instance, Schurig RabelsZ 54 (1990) 217, 220, 226, 229; Lorenz RIW 1987, 569, 579; Drobnig 
RabelsZ 52 (1988) 1, 3; Basedow RabelsZ 52 (1988) 8 et seq; MiinchKomml Sonnenberger Einl Rn 34 et 
seq; Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992 I) 13, 153 et seq; Hartley Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 341,346; 
most of the approaches will be dealt with in CHAPTER 5, I. 
5 Schurig RabelsZ 54 (1990) 217, 220; Lorenz RIW 1987,569,572; Fawcett 49 CLl [1990] 44, 58; 
Cheshire & North's Private International Law 499. 
6 Drobnig FS Neumayer 159, who states that the 'special connection' of 'interventionist norms' affects 
the methodical foundations of private international law; Vischer also states that 'the dichotomy between 
the normally applicable law and "lois d'application immediate" is a fact', cf id Rec des Cours 232 (1992 
I) 13, 162, 166; Voser Lois d'app/ication immediate 1 et seq, 50 et seq; De Boer RabelsZ 54 (1990) 24, 
61; in contrast, see Schurig RabelsZ 54 (1990) 217 et seq. According to him this results from a 
misunderstanding of the choice of law system of private intemationallaw, which he holds is necessarily 
open to new developments, and may be altered or broadened by the creation of new choice of law rules, 
taking into account the different interests involved. 
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How to treat these norms in the private international law of contracts, and how to 
integrate them with the ordinary rules on choice of law, is an extremely controversial 
and difficult task, one that has been disputed in Continental Europe for more than 60 
years.7 The problem has therefore been labelled the' darling of the topics' ,8 the' last 
frontier of Conflicts Law',9 and the 'battleground of the opinions' . 10 
As far as English law was concerned the principle of mandatory rules overriding the 
choice of law process was introduced by the Rome Convention. Under the pre-existing 
case law, no distinction was made between the application of mandatory rules and 
public policy. II Nevertheless, the problems surrounding the application of 
internationally mandatory rules were well known and were dealt with under the notions 
of public policy, illegality, essential validity, or with reference to certain English 
statutory rules ( overriding statutes). 12 
As a result, there is a large body of academic writing about this issue. Particularly 
in the 1980s, during and after the Rome Convention negotiations, large numbers of 
academic studies were generated.13 Despite the debates and the fact that at least in 
7 See the early approaches of Wengler ZVerglRWiss 54 (1941) 168 et seq; Zweigert RabelsZ 14(1942) 
283 et seq; for the parallel tendency in the Netherlands at that time, see Schultzs RabelsZ 47 (1983) 267 
et seq with references; Lipstein Rec des Cours 135 (1972 I) 99, 204 describes it as the 'interplay between 
ordinary rules of Private International law and unilateral self-limiting rules of domestic law' . 
8 Lorenz RIW 1987,569,578. 
9 Junker JZ 1991,699. 
10 Schurig RabelsZ 54 (1990) 217, 234. 
II See, for instance, Hartley Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 341, 346 Footnote 4; Jackson Contract Conflicts 
59, 70; Cheshire & North Private International Law 137,496. 
12 See the cases of Grell v Lery (1864) 10 CB (NS)73; Boissevain v Wei! [1950] AC 327; [1950] I All 
ER 728; Foster v Driscoll [1929] 1 KB 470 (CA); Regazzoni v KC Sethia [1958] AC 301; also see 
Lipstein ICLQ 26 (1977) 884 et seq; id Rec des Cours 135 (19721) 99, 195,204 et seq; Collins ICLQ 25 
(1976) 35, 49; Fawcett 49 CLl [1990] 44, 57; Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Voll/11th ed 1170 et seq; 
Jackson Contract Conflicts 59, 62. 
13 See amongst others Anderegg Auslandische Eingriffinormen (1989); Basedow RabelsZ 47 (1983) 147 
et seq; id RabelsZ 52 (1988) 8 et seq; id GYB lnt L 27 (1984) 109 et seq; Baum RabelsZ 53 (1989) 152 
et seq; Coester ZverglRWiss 82 (1983) 1 et seq; Coing WM 1981,810 et seq; Drobnig FS Neumayer 159 
et seq; id RabelsZ 52 (1988) 159 et seq; Erne Vertragsgiiltigkeit (1985); Forsyth The role of public law 
94 et seq; Gamillscheg ZfA 14 (1983) 307 et seq; Hartley Foreign Public Laws 13 et seq; id (1979) 4 
ELR 236 et seq; Heini ZSR 100 I (1981 ).65 et seq; Hentzen RIW 1988, 508; Jackson Contract Conflicts 
59; Jurtker IPRax 1989, 69 et seq; Kegel FS Seidl-Hohenveldern 243 et seq; id The Role of Public Law 29 
et seq; Kleinschmidt Anwendbarkeit (1985); KnUppel Zwingendes Recht (1988); Kratz Auslandische 
Eingriffinorm (1986); Kreuzer SchlechtriemlLeser 89 et seq; id Auslandisches Wirtschaflsrecht (1986); 
Lehmann Zwingendes Recht (1986); id ZRP 1987,319 et seq; Lipstein Rec des Cours 135 (1972 I) 99 et 
seq; id Conflict of Public Laws 357; id Conflict of laws and public law 38 et seq; id Offentfiches Recht 39 
et seq; id ICLQ26 (1977)884 et seq; Lorenz RIW 1987,569 et seq; Mann FS Beitzke 607; id FS Wahl 
139; id Rec des Cours 132 (1971 I) 107 et seq; Martiny IPRax 1987,277 et seq; Miilbert IPRax 1986, 
142; Philip Contract Conflicts 81 et seq; id Recent Provisions 241; Radtke ZVerglR Wiss 84 (1985) 325 
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Germany and Switzerland 'the "claims" are marked out and the drafts are presented' ,14 
the issue is still controversial and unsettled. 15 Decided cases on the topic are relatively 
rare. Nevertheless, cases will arise, especially, given the tendency of the modern welfare 
state to intervene to an ever increasing extent into private relationships and judges will 
have to solve the dichotomy between the normal choice of law process and mandatory 
rules claiming application to the transaction. 16 
Over time, rules claiming application regardless of the governing law have been 
variously labelled by academic authors. In Germany and Switzerland they have usually 
been discussed under the term 'Eingriffsnorm' (,interventionist rule'), which was 
created by Neuhaus.17 Even today this is the predominant designation,18 along with the 
characterisation as 'internationally mandatory rules' (international zwingende 
Bestimmungen). The expressions 'lois d'application immediate' ('rules of immediate 
application') and' lois de police', developed by French scholars,19 are well known in 
most countries. Other scholars have labelled the norms 'selbstbegrenzte' ('self-limited') 
or 'selbstgerechte Sachnormen' ('self-righteous rules of substantive law,).2o Some 
authors use the term 'politische und wirtschaftspolitische Gesetze' ('political and 
politico-economic laws') or simply 'offentliche rechtliche Normen' ('public law 
rules,).21 Others allocated the internationally mandatory rules to the so-called 
'internationale offentfiche Recht' (,Public Conflict of Laws' or 'International Public 
et seq; Schubert RlW 1987, 729; Schurig Lois 55 et seq; Siehr RabelsZ 52 (1988) 41 et seq; Schwander 
Lois (1975); Sonnenberger FS Rebmann (1989) 819 et seq; Vischer RabelsZ 53 (1989) 438 et seq. 
14 See Junker JZ 1991,699,700. 
15 Recent publications include Becker Theorie (1991); Becker RabelsZ 60 (1996) 691 et seq; Busse 
ZVerglRWiss 95 (1996) 386 et seq; Droste Begriff(l99l); Hartley Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 341 et seq; 
Leible JBJZR W 1995, 245 et seq; Masch Rechtswahlfreiheit (1993); Mentzel Sonderankniipfung (1993); 
Morscher RechtssetzungsakJe (1992); Schafer FG Sandrock 37 et seq; Schiffer ZVerglRWiss 90 (1991) 
390 et seq; Schurig RabelsZ 54 (1990) 217 et seq; Remien RabelsZ 54 (1990) 431et seq; Zimmer IPRax • 
1993, 65 et seq; Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992 I) 13, 150 et seq; Voser Lois d'app/ication immediate 
(1993); Ungeheuer Beachtung (1995). 
16 In the field of international arbitration, too, the arbitrator is increasingly confronted with the application 
of internationally mandatory rules, see Voser 7 Am Rev Int'I Arb 319 (1996), LEXIS NEXIS p 3 of38. 
17 Die Grundbegriffe des IPR (1962) 58; but see Siehr RabelsZ 52 (1988) 41, 42 who mentions that the 
term Eingriffsnorm emanates from Neumayer Internationales Verwaltungsrecht IV (1936) 244 et seq. 
18 Kreuzer SchlechtriemlLeser 89,90; Coester ZVerglRWiss 82 (1983) 1,4; MUnchKomml Martiny Art 
34 Rn 9; Siehr RabelsZ 52 (1988) 41 et seq; Schurig RabelsZ 54 (1990) 217,228; Busse ZVerglRWiss, 
95 (1996) 386, 388; Droste Begriff4; Lorenz RlW 1987,569,578; KrophollerIPR § 3 II 1; Schubert 
RlW 1987, 729 et seq; Erne Verlragsgiiltigkeit 4; Ungeheuer Beachlung 5. 
19 They originate from Phocion Francescakis La tMorie du renvoi 4; id Rev dir int priv proc 3 (1967) 
691,695, see Voser Lois d'app/ication immediate I; also see Lipstein ICLQ 16 (1977) 884, 896. 
20 Kegel Die selbstgerechte Sachnorm 51, 53 . . 
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Law,)22 or to the' internationale Verwaltungsrecht' (,International Administrative 
Law,).23 More recently, these nonns were discussed as part of a new branch oflaw, the 
'Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht' (,International Commercial Law').24 In the United 
Kingdom, they are dealt with under the designation 'public laws' ,25 'overriding 
statutes' ,26 or mandatory provisions in a conflict sense, in contrast to mandatory rules in 
a domestic sense.27 As a result of the wide-ranging negotiations that led to the Rome 
Convention, the tenn 'internationally mandatory rules' became more common among 
signatories to the Rome Convention.28 
Article 7 (1) and (2) of the Rome Convention contains provisions dealing with the 
application of internationally mandatory rules, despite the proper law of the contract. 
Similar provisions can be found in arts 18 and 19 of the Swiss IPRG. Article 7 (2) ofthe 
Rome Convention and article 18 of the Swiss IPRG enable the forum state to apply its 
own lois d'application immediate. Article 7 (1) of the Rome Convention and article 19 
of the Swiss IPRG concern the application or consideration of internationally mandatory 
rules of third countries, despite the proper law of the contract. In addition, art 13 (3) of 
the Swiss IPRG provides for the scope of application of the proper law, as indicated by 
the normal choice of law rules, and thus to some extent regulates the question of the 
applicability of internationally mandatory rules arising from the proper law of the 
contract, an issue that is not expressly regulated in the Rome Convention. 
Both these approaches will be explained, compared and discussed. 
21 Schiffer Normen 28; Morscher Rechtssetzungsakte 3; see for further designations Kreuzer 
SchlechtriemlLeser 89, 91; Schurig Lois 55, 56 et seq. 
22 BGH 17.12.959 BGHZ 31, 367, 370 etseq; BOH 18.2.1965 BGHZ43, 162,165; BGH 16.4.1975 
BGHZ 64, 183, 188 et seq; Kegel The Role of Public Law 29 et seq; Mann Rec des Cours (1971-1) 115, 
1I8,119. 
23 Kegel IPR § I VII I. B), § 2 IV, § 23; MiinchKommJSonnenberger Einl Rn 5, 38, 355 et seq; Mann 
Rec des Cours (1971-1) 115, 120. 
24 Schubert RlW 1987,729, 731; Schnyder Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht (1990); see Drobnig, Basedow, 
Siehr RabelsZ 52 (1988) I et seq, 8 et seq; 41 et seq. 
25 Cf Lipstein Conflict of laws and public law 38,40 et seq; Forsyth The role of public law 94 et seq. 
26 Morris Statutes 187 et seq; Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol I 21 et seq; Cheshire & North' s 
Private International Law 497. 
27 Jackson Contract Conflicts 59 et seq; also see Kaye The New Private International Law 242 et seq who 
distinguishes between contract-mandatory rules, half- and full-conflict-mandatory rules. For a distinction 
between mandatory rules in a wider and narrower sense, or internationally and domestically mandatory, 
cfHartley Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 341, 345; Cheshire & North's Private International Law 498. 
28 See Droste BegrijJ 143; StaudingerlMagnus Art 34 Rn 55; MiinchKommJMartiny Art 34 Rn 7, 9; 
ReithmannIMartinylMartiny Internationales Vertragsrecht Rn 387; Hartley Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 
341, 346; North Contract Conflicts 3, 19; Philip Contract Conflicts 81, 82. 
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I The application of internationally mandatory rules: Three issues 
The general proposition in conflict of laws is that the nonnal choice of law rules (be 
they the subjective choice of law of the parties or the objective conflict rules) refer to 
the applicable legal system, including its mandatory legislation, thereby replacing -
within the scope of the relevant conflict rule - the ius dispositivum and the ius cogens 
law of the forum state and the otherwise applicable law. 29 
There are exceptions to this general rule. Depending upon the country in which the 
rules originate three issues must be examined when considering internationally 
mandatory rules:30 
(1) Do the internationally mandatory rules of the forum state intrude into the foreign lex 
causae and override the nonnal choice of law process? 
(2) Are all mandatory rules belonging to the proper law applicable, for the sole reason 
that they belong to the proper law? In other words, the scope of reference of the nonnal 
conflict rules to the proper law of the contract is at issue. The applicability of 
internationally mandatory rules of a public law nature or rules that serve the public 
interests of the foreign enacting state, has been heavily debated in Switzerland and 
Gennany, as well as in other continental Europe countries. 
(3) The main subject of controversy is whether internationally mandatory rules of a 
third legal system, which is neither the lex causae nor the lex fori, can and should be 
considered or applied: the situation envisaged in art 7 (1) of the Rome Convention and 
art 19 of the Swiss IPRG. 
These three issues will be examined as follows: The application of internationally 
mandatory rules of the forum state will be discussed in Chapter 4, and the application or 
consideration of foreign internationally mandatory rules in Chapter 5. 
The following section describes the characteristics of internationally mandatory 
rules and the problems of identifying and distinguishing them. 
29 Amongst others MiinchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 24; Dicey & Morris Conflict o/Laws Vol 121; Philip 
Recent Provisions 241, 242, 244; id Contract Conflicts 81, 92, 93 . 
)0 For this differentiation, see MilnchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 2,3, 19 et seq; StaudingerlMagnus Art 34 
Rn 1, 13 et seq; Anderegg Eingriffsnormen 7 et seq; Radtke ZVerglRWiss 84 (1985) 325, 332; Busse 
ZVerglRWiss 95 (1996) 386,390 et seq. 
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II Characterising, identifying and distinguishing internationally mandatory rules 
One of the major difficulties with internationally mandatory rules is identifying them 
distinguishing them from rules that are mandatory only in a domestic setting.31 Two 
aspects can be identified: aformal aspect meaning the peculiarity of the rules overriding 
the choice of law process by claiming application (whatever the proper law according to 
the normal conflict rules) and a material aspect meaning their content. The material 
aspect is of particular interest where the statute does not expressly indicate the 
international reach of a mandatory rule. If this meaning has to be deduced from an 
interpretation of the statute, then the material aspect becomes all important as the formal 
aspect does not assist with identifying the rule as internationa1.32 
Generally speaking English academics do not set out to distinguish internationally 
mandatory rules from those that are mandatory only in a domestic setting. They usually 
restrict themselves to a statement that the former are not so much concerned with 
settling disputes between the parties, but rather represent the interests and policies of the 
state, ie seek to protect either groups or the national economic system.33 Examples 
provided are rules designed to protect the weaker party of a contract, such as consumers 
or employees, or rules that are based on socio- or economic-political considerations, 
such as exchange control regulations, price control regulations, rules on antitrust 
practices, or import and export restrictions.34 Hartley suggests that this approach may be 
because the distinction between mandatory rules that are applicable only as part of the 
proper law and those that apply regardless of the applicable law is 'fairly new in the 
private international law systems of the English speaking world' .35 
31 Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992) 13, 154, 157 et seq; De Boer RabelsZ 54 (1990) 24,61; 
MtinchKomrnlSonnenberger Einl35 et seq; see also Fawcett 49 CLl [1990] 44, 60. 
32 MtinchKomm/Sonnenberger Einl Rn 45, 46; MUnchKomrnlMartiny Art 34 Rn 92; StaudingerlMagnus 
Art 34 Rn 54; Cheshire & North's Private International Law 499 et seq. 
33 See Hartley ELR 4 (1979) 236, 238 et seq; Fawcett 49 [1990] 44, 60; Jackson Contract Conflicts 59, 
60,65,66; Morris Statutes 187 et seq describes simply the term overriding statute (at 194) and gives 
examples (200 et seq); also see Forsyth The Role o/public law 94 et seq; Cheshire & North's Private 
International Law 496 et seq; Plender Contracts Convention 9.11 et seq; for a critical approach, see 
Masch Rechtswahlfreiheit 142 Footnote 83; see, however, Lipstein ICLQ 26 (1977) 884, 897, 898 and id 
Conflict 0/ Laws and public law 38, 40 et seq for an attempt to identify these rules as 'public law rules' . 
34 Hartley (1979) 4 ELR 236,238; Cheshire & North's Private International Law 496,499 et seq; 
Fawcett 49 CLl [1990] 44, 46; Dicey & Morris Conflict o/Laws Vol 121 et seq. 
35 Hartley Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 341, 346 Footnote 4; Hartley himself states that these rules 'serve 
purposes outside the traditional ambit of contract law'. 
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In contrast, Gennan and Swiss academics have tried for a long time to define those 
mandatory rules that claim application regardless of the proper law of the contract (thus 
requiring special consideration during the choice of law process).36 Unlike England, 
where it is broadly accepted that the mandatory rules of the proper law are applicable no 
matter whether international or domestic, and no matter whether of a private or public 
law nature, many German and Swiss authors have assumed that certain rules do not fall 
within the scope of reference to the foreign law. They therefore have had to define 
which rules these are . 
Finding a unifonn all-embracing definition has, however, proved to be an extremely 
difficult task, because a universal definition is expected to cover many different kinds of 
rules. 37 Furthennore, the whole discussion lacks clarity since terms appear to have 
different meanings: On the one hand, too many tenns have been used for the same 
phenomenon, and, on the other, the same tenn has been chosen for different meanings. 
A good example is the Gennan and Swiss designation 'Eingriffsnorm' ('interventionist 
norm'). Some authors restrict this designation to rules that serve interests that go beyond 
those of the parties, others use the tenn in a broader sense, including the socio-
politically motivated rules that serve the interests of the contracting parties.38 
It has been proposed that interventionist nonns should be discussed in the original 
sense and in a wider sense.39 This distinction has its merits because it differentiates on 
the basis of the meaning of the tenn 'interventionist nonn' . Nevertheless, the creation of 
new designations for the same phenomenon and the imprecise treatment of settled 
definitions are unfortunate. It leads to uncertainty in an area of law that is already 
necessarily vague and indefinite. 
36 See the representation of the different German approaches in MUnchKommJMartiny Art 34 Rn 9 et seq; 
Schurig RabelsZ 54 (1990) 217, 226 et seq; Masch Rechtswahlfreiheit 135 et seq; for Switzerland Voser 
Lois d'application immediate 58 et seq. 
37 ReithmannIMartinylLimmer Internationales Vertragsrecht Rn 389. 
38 Voser Lois d'app/ication immediate 63; MUnchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 13; von Hoffmann IPRax 
1989,261 et seq; StaudingerlMagnus Art 34 Rn 60. 
39 Voser Lois d'app/ication immediate 64; Vischer RabelsZ 53 (1989) 438, 440, 445; Anderegg 
Auslandische Eingrifftnormen 3 et seq, 143 et seq. 
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Lastly, it must be borne in mind that a general definition must cover rules that have 
their origins in different legal systems - the lex jori, the lex causae and a third country -
and that the interest of the forum in applying these rules differs according to their origin. 
This differences, however, should not be allowed to obstruct the development of a 
general and uniform definition. Such an achievement would serve the choice of law 
objective of uniformity of result and decisional harmony.40 Therefore, the question of a 
universal criterion for definition or classification has to be separated from the question 
of whether and how a certain statutory or common law rule is applied by the court of the 
forum state. The latter question remains one that is to be settled by the forum's conflict 
rules.41 
1 Theformal criterion: Internationally mandatory rules as unilateral conflict 
rules 
Article 7 (1) and (2) of the Rome Convention and arts 18 and 19 of the Swiss IPRG 
refer to internationally mandatory rules by providing that the rule of the enacting 
country must be applied regardless of the law applicable to the contract.42 From a choice 
of law perspective, these rules claim application irrespective of the proper law. Some 
authors state that these rules contain a so-called' conflict legal application or 
interventionist order or command' (' Kollisionsrechtlicher Eingriffsbefehl oder 
Anwendungsbefehl') forapplication. 43 However, this does not mean that these rules 
apply without any prior choice of law rule indicating their application, as the 
designation lois d'app/ication immediate would suggest.44 The 'application order' is a 
unilateral conflict rule that is attached to the substantive law rule determining its scope 
or reach. In other words, the substantive law rule has to be intellectually complemented 
40 StaudingerlMagnus Art 34 Rn 55. 
41 StaudingerlMagnus Art 34 Rn 55, 114; MUnchKommlSonnenberger Einl Rn 58. The question of when 
and under what circumstances foreign internationally mandatory rules are applied or given effect to will 
be investigated in CHAPTER 5. 
42 MUnchKonun/Martiny Art 34 Rn 6, 7; ReithmannIMartiny/Limmer lnternationales Vertragsrecht Rn 
390; Soergellvon Hoffmann Art 34 Rn 12; Jackson Contract Conflicts 59,66; North Contract Conflicts 3, 
19; Schwander IPR AT252; Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992) 13,154, 168, 169. 
43 CfLorenz RIW 1987,569,578; Junker IPRax 1989,69,73; Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992) 13, 
156, 157. 
44 See Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992) 13, 156; Schurig Lois 55,63; for a contrasting opinion, see 
Morse Public Policy England - 17. 
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by a unilateral conflict rule, which then detennines under what conditions the rule is 
applicable.45 
The specific feature of this kind of attached unilateral conflict rule is that it indicates 
under what circumstances a particular substantive law rule is applicable, rather than 
specifying when the legal system of which it fonns part is applicable to a certain legal 
question.46 The attached unilateral conflict rule can arise from an express tenn of the 
substantive rule or, alternatively, if the rule does not express a spatial ambit, from an 
interpretation of the rule. The substantive rule then has an implied unilateral conflict 
rule.47 Thus, generally speaking, internationally mandatory rules are not subject to the 
ordinary conflict rules. Their scope of application is detennined by means of their 
special unilateral choice of law rule, irrespective of the law applicable according to the 
nonnal rules of private internationallaw.48 
However, the fonnal classification does not assist in identifying what kinds of rules 
override the choice of law rules if the rule does not contain an express tenn indicating 
its scope of application and the spatial ambit therefore has to be detennined by 
considering the purpose of the statute.49 Detennining the scope by interpreting a statute 
is extremely difficult and is described as being akin to the process of creating new 
legislation. 50 
45 See Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992) 13, 156; for details, see Schurig Kollisionsnorm 57 et seq; id 
Lois 55,63 et seq; see also Hartley Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 341, 347, 348; this in fact corresponds with 
the English description of overriding statutes, see Morris Statutes 187, 194, 200 et seq; Forsyth The Role 
of Public law 94,96 et seq; Lipstein ICLQ 26 (1977) 884 et seq, 900; Cheshire & North's Private 
International Law 497. 
46 Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992) 13, 156; Hartley Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 341, 347; Forsyth The 
role of public law 94, 97. According to Schurig this distinction is a false one: Any choice of law refers to 
rules of law, some to a bound set of rules, some to singular provisions, id Lois 55, 61 et seq. 
47 Amongst others Hartley Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 341, 348. 
48 Hartley Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 341, 348. 
49 Schurig RabelsZ 54 (1990) 217, 228; StaudingerlMagnus Art 34 Rn 56; also see the examination by 
Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992) 13, 157 et seq. 
50 Coester ZVerglRWiss 82 (1983) 1, 17; Lorenz RlW 1987,569,578; also see Vischer Rec des Cours 
232 (1992) 13, 155 and Forsyth The role of public law 94, 96. 
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2 The material criterion: The purpose of the rule 
In general, internationally mandatory rules are rules that intervene into private 
relationships, either by requiring action, by making a particular provision obligatory, or 
by prohibiting specified conduct. They thus serve the economic or socio-political 
interests of the enacting state, which are interests that go beyond the private interest of 
settling a dispute between the contracting parties.51 In Germany and Switzerland, 
different solutions have been proposed to distinguish internationally mandatory rules 
from mandatory rules that are subject to the proper law ofthe contract. 52 
Before discussing the approaches, it must be noted that it is primarily the 
legislature's responsibility to attach a unilateral conflict rule to a rule or set of rules 
determining their territorial scope. Accordingly, all rules containing an express term 
indicating their territorial scope are internationally mandatory, if the conditions under 
which they claim application are fulfilled. 53 
a Time of enactment of the rule 
Whether the rule existed already at the time the contract was concluded or whether it 
was enacted afterwards is irrelevant to the classification of a rule as internationally 
mandatory. 54 
b The distinction between public law and private law 
It has been convincingly argued that the classification of a rule as being of a public or 
private law nature is unhelpful for distinguishing internationally mandatory rules. 55 The 
51 For instance, the definitions of Erne Vertragsgiiltigkeit 4, 12; Radtke ZverglRWiss 84 (1985) 325, 328; 
Hartley ELR 4 (1979) 236, 237; id Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 341, 346 rules that 'serve purposes outside 
the traditional ambit of contract law'; Schulte Eingriffinormen 13 et seq, 18; Schiffer Normen 30, 31; 
Fawcett 49 CLl [1990] 44, 60; Schafer FG Sandrock 37,39; for further references, see MUnchKomml 
Sonnenberger Einl Rn 39. 
52 MUnchKomrnlMartiny Art 34 Rn 11; MtinchKommlSonnenberger Einl Rn 35, 39 et seq; Voser Lois 
d'app/ication immediate 58 et seq. 
53 See MtinchKomrnlSonnenberger Einl Rn 45; StaudingerlMagnus Art 34 Rn 52; Vischer Rec des Cours 
232 (1992) 13, 155. 
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public / private distinction emanates from the domestic law distinction in continental 
Europe, where public law is concerned with rules regulating the legal relationship 
between the state and the individual, while private law is concerned with the 
relationship between individuals. 56 This distinction has been transported by German and 
Swiss case law and by some academics into the realm of private international law. As a 
result, it has been generally held that private international law refers only to rules of 
private law. Public law rules fall out of the scope of the usual conflict rules and are 
subject to a different choice of law process, viz. they have to be cOlmected separately.57 
The result of this approach is that the public law rules of the forum state will be always 
preserved whereas those of a foreign legal system, whether of the proper law or of a 
third legal system are in principle inapplicable.58 
As will be seen in a later stage of this study, this approach has been rejected by most 
authors, and has been partly rejected or at least functionally modified by Swiss and 
German courts. 59 Although it is true that many internationally mandatory rules are 
public law rules, the distinction between public and private law is of no use in 
classifying internationally mandatory rules. The distinction has generally been rejected 
because the boundaries between public and private law are permeable and result from 
specific historical circumstances.6o The distinction has already resulted in many 
difficulties in substantive law.61 Moreover, the dichotomy between public and private 
law is based on the continental European peculiarity of a divided jurisdiction for 
54 This was proposed by Wengler RabelsZ 47 (1983) 248; but see Radtke ZVerglRWiss 84 (1985) 325, 
328; MtinchKomm/Martiny Art 34 Rn 17; Kreuzer Ausldndisches Wirtschaftsrecht 10. 
55 See MtinchKomrnlSonnenberger Einl Rn 38; detailed von Bar IPR Bd 1 Rn 252 et seq; Siehr RabelsZ 
52 (1988) 41, 75, 76, 91; MiinchKomm/Martiny Art 34 Rn II; Staudinger/Magnus Art 34 Rn 65. 
56 In Germany, Switzerland and France this is a basic distinction in law, eg von Bar IPR Bd 1 Rn 252; the 
public / private law distinction is also well known in South Africa, see Cockrell 1993 Acta Juridica 227 
et seq; for a comparison of this distinction in various countries, see Lipstein Conflict of Laws and public 
law 38 et seq; also see Philip Contract Conflicts 81, 88, 89. 
57 Kegel Die Rolle des Offentlichen Rechts 243 et seq; for Switzerland see Honsell!Vogt/ 
SchnyderlMachler-Eme Art \3 Rn 12; also see Philip Contract Conflicts 81,85,89. 
58 Philip Contract Conflicts 81,85. 
59 See Voser Lois d'application immediate 66; 68; MtinchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 11; for a 
differentiation, see the German Federal Supreme Court BGHZ 31, 367, 370; BGHZ 64, 183, 189 and the 
Swiss Federal Tribunal Court in BGE 80 II 53, 62. 
60 MtinchKomrnlMartiny Art 34 Rn 11; StaudingerlMagnus Art 34 Rn 65; Lorenz RIW 1987,569,578; 
Radtke ZVerglRWiss 82 (1984) 325, 328; Busse ZVerglRWiss 95 (1996) 385, 388 et seq; also see Masch 
Rechtswahlfreiheit 135. 
61 Busse ZverglRWiss 95 (1996) 385, 389. 
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administrative and civil disputes that is not found in other legal systems.62 
Internationally mandatory rules are of both a public and private law nature.63 
Furthermore, such a distinction is not supported by the GiulianolLargarde Report or 
by the German legislative reasons for art 34 EGBGB, the German equivalent of art 7 (2) 
of the Rome Convention.64 In Switzerland the legislature has expressly rejected a 
differentiation based on the public or private law character of a rule by enacting art 13 
(3) of the Swiss IPRG: The application of a foreign rule is not excluded by the mere fact 
that it is supposed to be of a public law character.65 
c Interests and purposes pursued by the rule 
Nevertheless, the distinction between public and private law has constituted the starting 
point of German and Swiss judgments. As a second step, however, the distinction has 
been refined to a more jUnctional approach: Those public law rules that serve primarily 
the realisation of the economic and political interests of the state have to be 
distinguished from rules that predominantly serve the fair reconciliation of the interests 
of individuals. 66 The latter rules are applicable according to the principles of private 
international law, while the former are subject to public international law. If the former 
rules belong to the lex fori, they are in principle applicable, but if they emanate from a 
foreign legal system, they are inapplicable.67 
62 Radtke ZVerglRWiss 82 (1984) 325, 328; Busse ZVerglRWiss 95 (1996) 385,389; 
MUnchKomm/Sonnenberger Einl Rn 5; Drobnig RabelsZ 52 (1988) 1,3; Jackson Contract Conflicts 59, 
Forsyth The role of public law 94. 
63 For examples, see CHAPTER 4, III. 
64 BT-Drucks 10/504,83; Lorenz RdA 1989,220,222; Kegel's opposing opinion (see in Schlechtrieml 
Leser 111 and FS Seidl-Hohenveldern 243, 275) that art 7 refers only to mandatory rules of a private law 
nature does not go conform with the wording of art 7 nor with the Report of Giuliano/Lagarde in 
Contract Conflicts, who give examples of both private and public law rules, such as rules on cartels, 
competition and restrictive practices, consumer protection and certain rules concerning carriage (on page 
382); on this point of view, see MUnchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn II. 
65 For a full explanation of art 13 of the Swiss IPRG, see CHAPTER 5, IV, 4. 
66 Federal Supreme Court BGHZ 31, 367, 370 et seq; BGHZ 43, 162, 165; IPRespr 1962/63 Nr 163 
(525); IzRspr 1964/65 Nr 56 (231); BGHZ 64, 183, 189; BGHZ 128,41, 52; Federal Tribunal Court BGE 
80 II 53, 61, 62; BGE 82 1196,197 et seq; BGE 95 II 109, 114; BGE 107 II 489, 492. 
67 According to the German Federal Supreme Court the public law rules fall out of the scope of reference 
of the proper law; however, it has to be noted that with regard to those rules that serve private interests 
this conclusion is an interpretation of German academics. As will be seen later, one may easily interpret 
the German case law as stating that those rules serving the private interests of a third legal system are 
applicable. 
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The predominant academic opinion advocates, in accordance with the German and 
Swiss case law,68 a demarcation that follows the purpose and interest pursued by a 
specific regulation. However, the pre-condition that the rule must be of a public law 
nature is abandoned. A mandatory rule can be classified as an 'interventionist norm' 
(viz. internationally mandatory) if the rule intervenes in a private relationship in the 
public interest, in particular, in the state's economic and political interest. If the 
regulation predominantly serves to reconcile the interests of the contracting parties, it is 
subject to the general conflict rules and the proper law of the contract.69 Thus, the 
'private' or 'public' nature of a rule is not relevant to its classification as internationally 
mandatory, but its purposes and the interests pursued.70 Some authors therefore classify 
these rules asfunctionally public law rules.7I 
Other authors attempt to distinguish interventionist norms from domestic mandatory 
rules by using the vague criterion of the rule's 'relevance to ordering society' 
(,Ordnungsrelevanz').72 A rule is an interventionist norm if the legislature's intention in 
enacting the rule was to regulate the general economy and society.73 In contrast, a 
'neutral law' serves the interests of the contracting parties in settling the dispute.74 
68 See the previous footnotes. 
69 MilnchKommIMartiny Art 34 Rn 12; Kropholler IPR § 3 II, § 52 VIII I; Radtke ZVerglRWiss 84 
(1985) 325, 328; Staudinger Magnus Art 34 Rn 57; Schiffer Normen 30, 31; Anderegg Auslandische 
Eingriffsnorm 88; Schubert RlW 1987, 729, 731; Kratz Auslandische Eingriffsnormen I; Sandrock! 
Steinschulte Handbuch A Rn 88, 89; Vischer RabelsZ 53 (1989) 438,440,445; cf also the recent cases 
BAG 24.8.1989 IPRax 1991,407,41 I; BAG 29.10.1992 IPRax 1994, 123, 128; for criticism, see Schurig 
RabelsZ (1990) 217, 228; Masch Rechtswahlfreiheit 136; Lorenz RlW 1987,569,579. 
70 Direction of the impact of law (Sto/3richtung des Gesetzes), cfMilnchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 12. 
71 Voser Lois d'app/ication immediate 63; Schiffer Normen 30,3 I. 
72 Rehbinder JZ 1973, 151, 156 'social, economic- and company order private law'; Sonnenberger FS 
Rebmann 819, 823 et seq; MilnchKomm/Sonnenberger Einl Rn 34, 39 et seq; Drobnig RabelsZ 52 (1988) 
1,3; Basedow RabelsZ 52 (1988) 8,12,18 et seq; Voser Lois d'app/ication immediate 58, 62 et seq. 
73 See Basedow RabelsZ 52 (1988) 8, 18; for criticism, see Masch Rechtswahlfreiheit 142. 
74 Voser Lois d'app/ication immediate 58 et seq; MilnchKommlSonnenberger Einl Rn36. 
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d Concluding remarks 
In general it can be stated that there is unanimity that rules pursuing economic and state-
political interests, such as import and export controls, exchange control and currency 
regulations, and antitrust law, are internationally mandatory rules. 75 However, a 'grey 
zone' of rules has a 'double/unction' and serves both the interests of the contracting 
parties and those ofthe state.76 In particular, the socio-politically motivated rules of a 
private law nature - for example, rules that protect tenants, consumers and employees -
are problematic.77 One opinion is that these socio-politically motivated rules are 
internationally mandatory rules in the sense of art 7 of the Rome Convention and of arts 
18 and 19 of the Swiss IPRG.78 Others exclude these rules from the category of 
internationally mandatory rules, since they predominantly serve the fair reconciliation of 
the interests of the parties.79 
The existence of this 'grey zone' illustrates the weakness of the approaches 
discussed above. Frequently, from either starting point (distinction with reference to the 
purpose and interests pursued by the rule or with reference to its Orndungsrelevanz) the 
same rule is either considered as a rule that exclusively serves the reconciliation of the 
parties' interests or as a rule that also serves the public interest. 80 
Under present law, the question of definition is connected with the need to 
distinguish the scope of art 7 of the Rome Convention and arts 18 and 19 of the IPRG 
75 Amongst all MUnchKommlSonnenberger Einl Rn 47; MUnchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 10; Vischer 
Rec des Cours 232 (1992) 13, 157 et seq; Schubert RlW 1987,729,730 et seq; Voser Lois d'app/ication 
immediate 58 et seq; Soergellvon Hoffmann Art 34 Rn 3. 
76 Masch Rechtswahlfreiheit 135 et seq; MUnchKomm/Sonnenberger Einl Rn 8 et seq; Voser Lois 
d'application immediate 62,63. . 
77 For details CHAPTER 4, III, 2, a; MUnchKomm/Sonnenberger Einl Rn 48; Kropholler IPR § 3 II 3. 
78 Von Hoffmann RabelsZ 38 (1974) 407 et seq; Soergellvon Hoffmann Art 34 Rn 4; Firschinglvon 
Hoffmann IPR 414 et seq; Busse ZverglRWiss 95 (1996) 385,388,392 N 22; Siehr RabelsZ 52 (1988) 
42,48; Schnyder Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht 10, 13; Erne Verlragsgiiltigkeit 6. 
79 Radtke ZVerglRWiss 84 (1985) 325, 328, 329; Schubert RlW 1987, 729, 731; Schiffer Normen 30, 31; 
MUnchKomm/Sonnenberger Einl Rn 48, 54, who distinguishes between those rules that serve 
predominantly or only the interests of the parties and those that also serve public interests; also see 
Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992) 13, 157 et seq; id RabelsZ 53 (1989) 438, 440, 445, Voser Lois 
d'app/ication immediate 58 et seq. 
80 With regard to consumer and lessee protection, see Schubert RlW 1987, 729, 731 (only mandatory in a 
domestic sense) and, on the other hand, Anderegg Eingriffinormen 94. 
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from special conflict rules dealing with employment and consumer contracts.81 This is 
~videnced by the fact that the protection of tenants is frequently regarded as 
internationally mandatory, while consumer protection is held to be nationally 
mandatory, despite the fact that both types of protective rules pursue private interests-
the protection of the weaker contracting party- and national interests.82 
The general conclusion to be drawn from these difficulties is that no universal 
criterion can be found to delimit internationally mandatory rules from those that are 
mandatory in a domestic sense.83 The current approaches simply provide guidelines. If a 
rule serves both public and private interests, it is a matter of degree as to which interests 
are predominantly served. The judge will have to interpret every provision with 
reference to its content, policy and the predominant interests. In addition, he will have to 
decide whether the interests pursued by the rule are of such importance that it must be 
applied regardless of the proper law of the transaction. 
Recent statements omit a general definition of the content of the rule since it has 
been realised that a universal definition is not possible.84 In order to determine whether a 
rule is internationally mandatory or mandatory in a domestic sense, authors refer to the 
formal criterion laid down in art 7 of the Rome Convention: the claim to apply 
irrespective of the law governing the contract. Internationally mandatory are therefore 
rules that contain a 'conflict legal interventionist order' or an attached (implied or 
express) unilateral conflict rule indicating their territorial scope. 8S It is submitted, 
however, that this definition describes the phenomenon, rather than providing useful 
criteria that indicate under what conditions a mandatory rule is internationally 
applicable.86 
81 With regard to arts 5 and 6 RC, see Junker IPRax 1998,65,69; id IPRax 1993, 1 et seq; Martiny ZEuP 
1995,67,84; for arts 120 and 121 Swiss IPRG, cfVischer RabelsZ 53 (1989) 438, 449, 450, 458; id Rec 
des Cours 232 (1992) 13, 159; Schwander IPR AT246; Voser Lois d'application immediate 58 et seq. 
82 CfMasch Rechtswahlfreiheit 135 et seq; MtinchKomm/Sonnenberger Einl Rn 49; MtinchKomml 
Martiny Art 34 Rn 16; Sonnenberger FS Rebmann 819, 823; Voser Lois d'app/ication immediate 58 et 
seq. 
83 Also see De Boer RabelsZ 54 (1990) 24, 61; MilnchKomm/Sonnenberger Ein] Rn 36. 
84 Lorenz RlW 1987,569,578; id RdA 1989,220,222,227; Busse ZVerglRWiss 95 (1996) 387, 389; 
Becker RabelsZ 60 (1996) 691,693; Junker IPRax 1989,69; 73; id JZ 1991,699,700 N 3; Taupitz BB 
1990,642,649; von Bar IPR Bd 1230. 
85 Junker IPRax 198969,73; Lorenz RlW 1987,569,578; Taupitz BB 1990,642,649. 
86 For criticism see Schurig RabelsZ 54 (1990) 217,228; Masch Rechtswahlfreiheit 143. 
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CHAPTER 4 - INTERNATIONALLY MANDATORY RULES OF THE 
LEX FORI 
It is a well established rule in the private international law of all the countries under 
investigation that the internationally mandatory rules of the lex fori apply, regardless of 
the legal system that governs the transaction according to the normal conflict rules. I It 
has also been accepted that the application of directly applicable or overriding statutes is 
an exception to the general rule that a statute does not normally apply unless it is a 
procedural rule of the lex fori or unless it forms part of the proper law.2 The reason for 
the application of the directly applicable rules of the forum state is the simple fact that a 
judge cannot, by relying upon party autonomy or the objective choice of law rules, 
disregard mandatory rules that are applicable to the situation in question and are 
intended to override the normal choice of law rules. The judge is bound by his 
sovereign.3 
The reservation of the internationally mandatory rules of the forum is embodied in 
art 7 (2) of the Rome Convention and art 18 ofthe Swiss IPRG, provisions that no more 
than accept the pre-existing law. Under pre-existing law, however, the applicability of 
these internationally mandatory rules was based upon different structural or 
methodological reasoning. A discussion of these approaches follows. 
I Methodological approaches 
Under pre-existing law the application of the forum's internationally mandatory rules, 
despite a foreign proper law, was based either upon the forum's ordre public, or 
alternatively upon the overriding nature of a certain substantive law rule, or sometimes 
simply upon its nature as a public law rule.4 
I Lipstein Conflict of Law and public law 38,46; id Conflict of Public Laws 357,361,364; Forsyth The 
role ofpublic law 94,95 et seq; Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992) 13, 155 et seq; id RabelsZ 53 (1989) 
438,445; MtinchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 89; Zweigert ZVerglRWiss 54 (1941) 173 et seq. 
2 MtinchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 24; Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vo/121; Philip Recent 
Provisions 241, 242, 244; Morris Statutes 187,200,201. 
J See art 20 (3) Grundgesetz (Constitutional Law of the Federal Republic of Germany); MtinchKomml 
Martiny Art 34 Rn 89; Anderegg Auslandische EingrijJsnormen 3; Forsyth The role a/public law 94,95. 
4 See in this regard Jaffey ICLQ 23 (1974) 1, 3, 15 et seq; Kntippel Zwingendes Recht 43 et seq; Schulte 
EingrijJsnormen 49 et seq; MilnchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 89; Hartley Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 341, 
351,388; HonselllVogtiSchnyderlMachler-Eme Art 18 Rn 4; Mann Rec des Cours 132 (1971 I) 109, 123 
et seq. 
86 
1 Positive function of ordre public 
One possible reason for allowing a mandatory rule of the forum to intrude into a foreign 
lex causae is the ordre public.s This approach is based on the understanding that the 
ordre public has not only a broadly accepted negative function, viz. the refusal to apply 
foreign law in so far as the result of such application would be repugnant to the 
fundamental principles of the forum state, but also a so-called 'positive function'. The 
positive function leads to application of the forum's mandatory rules despite a foreign 
lex causae.6 
According to some academic authors internationally mandatory rules are special 
statutory expressions of the ordre public.? Similarly, in England overriding statutes have 
often been called crystallised rules of public policy. 8 However, it is not clear whether 
these authors are saying that the application is a result of the positive function of public 
policy, or whether they simply want to stress that in order to classify a certain rule as 
having an overriding effect the rules must pursue fundamental policies of the forum 
state. Forsyth states that 'the same wariness that attends the application of that principle 
[public policy] should attend the classification of a statute as overriding' .9 
The designation as crystallised rules of public policy may also result from the fact 
that English law, outside the Rome Convention, did not distinguish between the public 
policy refusal and the application of mandatory rules. 10 Additionally, it seems that at 
least in the situation where a contract, valid under its proper law, violates English public 
policy, the application of the English public policy rule leads to the application of 
English law. Thus, even in situations where the negative function of public policy is 
5 Radtke ZVerglR Wiss 84 (1985) 325, 330; MiinchKomm/Martiny Art 34 Rn 89; Knilppel Zwingendes 
Recht 43 et seq; Raape/Stunn IPR 1200; Hartley Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 341,351; Vischer Rec des 
Cours 232 (1992) 13, 165. 
6 Firschinglvon Hoffmann IPR 250; Kropholler IPR § 36 I; Knilppel Zwingendes Recht 43 et seq; Hartley 
Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 341, 351; Raape/Stunn IPR 1200 N 13; for details Schwander Lois 41 et seq. 
7 See Raape/Stunn IP R 1212, 213; in particular Mann advocates to apply mandatory rules of the forum 
on the basis of the positive ordre public, id FS Beitzke 607,611,615. Cffor references MilnchKomml 
Martiny Art 34 Rn 89; HonsellNogt/SchnyderlMiichler-Eme Art 18 Rn 4; Schwander Lois 41 et seq. 
8 Forsyth The role of public law 94, 100; Morris Statutes 187, 203; Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol 1 
24. 
9 Forsyth The role of public law 94, 100. 
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applied to exclude foreign law that is repugnant to some fundamental policies of the 
forum state, the lex fori is applied because the foreign law is declared inapplicable. II 
The public policy doctrine has been used to ensure the application of English 
mandatory common law rules regardless ofa foreign proper law. 12 Accordingly, English 
courts have by reference to the doctrine of public policy refused to enforce contracts, 
although valid under their foreign proper law, on basis ofthe common law rules that 
champertous contracts,13 contracts in restraint oftradel4 or contracts involving trading 
with the enemyl5 are illegal. One may also refer in this context to a certain group of 
decisions which have held, by reference to the notion of English public policy, that 
contracts that prejudice the good relations of the United Kingdom with foreign and 
friendly countries are illegal. 16 
The English attitude contrasts with German and Swiss law, where at least lip 
service is paid to the notion that the only consequence of applying the forum's ordre 
public is that the foreign law is not applied to the extent that it violates the notion of 
ordre public. The 'gap' resulting from the partial exclusion of the foreign law does not 
lead to application of the rules of the lex fori. Instead, it must be closed primarily by the 
means offered by the applicable foreign legal system or the choice of law technique of 
'adaptation' ('Anpassung' or 'Angleichung'). The latter is in Germany and Switzerland 
to solve the problem whatlaw to apply to cases where at least two different legal rules 
10 Hartley Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 341, 346 Footnote 4; Jackson Contract Conflicts 59, 70; Cheshire & 
North Private International Law 137, 496. 
II Morse Public Policy England-IO and 17; also see Hartley Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 341,387,388. 
This conclusion is often not expressly drawn, but it seems that it is too obvious to English authors to be 
stated. See the representation of the English public policy rule in Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol I 
88 et seq and id Vol II 1277 et seq; Cheshire & North's Private International law 128 et seq. 
12 See Jaffey ICLQ 23 (1974) 1, 15 et seq; 18; see also, although less explicit, Morris Statutes 187,201; 
Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol I 23; Hartley Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 341, 351. 
13 Grell v Levy (I 864) 10 CB (NS) 73; for details about this decision, see Morse Public Policy England-
64, 65; Hartley Rec des Cours 26 (1997) 341, 399 et seq. 
14 Rousillon v Rousillon (1880) 14 Ch D 351; see on this case Morse Public Policy England-64; Jaffey 
ICLQ 23 (1974) 1, 16. 
15 Dynamit AlG v Rio Tinto Co [1918] AC 260, at 292,294, see Morse Public Policy England-64; 
Cheshire & North's Private International Law 132; Mann Rec des Cours 132 (1971 I) 109, 125. 
16 See Cheshire & North' Private international Law 131,132 with reference to Foster v Driscoll [1929] 1 
KB 470; Regazzoni v KC Sethia (1944) Ltd [1958] AC 301; see on this case CHAPTER 5, III, 2. 
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apply simultaneously to the same issue (,cumulation') or to cases where no law is 
applicable ('gap').I? 
Nevertheless, the positive function of public policy has been supported by some 
academics and has been occasionally invoked by judges to apply German mandatory 
legislation. 18 The Supreme Court of the German Reich for instance applied the German 
'Hire Purchase Act' (Abzahlungsgesetz, AbzG, as now replaced by the 'Consumer 
Credit Act', VerbrKrG) as a result of the positive function of the ordre public, despite 
the proper law of the hire purchase contract being that of the Netherlands. 19 The Federal 
Supreme Court of Germany has also occasionally applied mandatory rules of the forum 
by means ofthe positive ordre public.20 
2 'Special connection', 'lois d'application immediate', 'overriding statutes' 
Alternatively, the forum's internationally mandatory rules have been applied despite a 
foreign proper law, on the basis of the characterisation of a rule as an overriding statute, 
as lois d 'application immediate or as an interventionist norm (Eingriffsnorm) by means 
of a 'special connection' (Sonderankniipfung). 
This methodological approach has been referred to above in the context of 
identifying internationally mandatory rules and distinguishing them from the domestic 
17 KnUppel Zwingendes Recht 44 with further references to case law and literature; SandrockiSteinschulte 
Handbuch Rn A 181; MUnchKomm/Martiny Art 34 Rn 31; Kropholler IPR § 36 V; Schulte 
Eingriffsnormen 49,51; sceptically, however, Firschinglvon Hoffmann IPR 251; KellerlSiehr IPR 546, 
457; Schwander Lois 43. In general, adaptation means that in cases of cumulation or gap, in order to 
avoid contradictions, the judge is permitted to (I) either alter or 'adapt' the substantive law rules 
(materiellrechtliche Losung) or, (2) shift or alter the scope of application of certain conflict rules or create 
a new conflict rule for the situation in question (internationalprivatrechtliche Losung). On the problem of 
adaptation, its content and possible solutions, see in general KegeilPR 7th ed § 8; also see Bennett 105 
III (1988) SALJ 444 et seq. 
18 See footnote 7. 
19 RG 28.3.1930 JW 1932,591; Raape/Sturm IPR 1213. This decision has been criticised as extreme and 
it was seriously doubted that the non-application of the AbzG would infringe substantial principles of the 
German law, cfDroste Begriff20; even Mann FS Beitzke 607, 612. 
20 See the case law with regard to §§ 764, 762 German Civil Code (BGB) in terms of which certain 
wagering transactions are not binding; the BGH applied §§ 764, 762 despite the proper law of the 
contract on grounds of the ordre public BGH 25 .5.1981 NJW 1981, 1898; but the BGH overruled 
precedents and would not apply the ordre public with regard to this norm BGH 26.2.1991 WM 1991, 
576, for details Droste Begriff 18, 19; for references SandrockiSteinschlute Handbuch Rn A 142; 
MUnchKomml Martiny Art 34 Rn 31. 
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mandatory rules.21 It is based on an assumption that every state has enacted certain rules 
that cannot be subordinated to the ordinary choice of law rules, but are applicable 
regardless of the proper law of a transaction.22 When a rule does not expressly specify 
its territorial scope, the statute has to be interpreted to determine whether it was the 
intention of the legislature that the rule should be applied regardless of a foreign proper 
law. 
This approach differs in method from the former solution, as the application of the 
mandatory rule in question is based upon its own express or implied claim to apply. It is 
called an overriding statute, lois d'app/ication immediate, or - with regard to the choice 
of law process - special connection, because these rules apply independently of the 
normal conflict rules; they are leges specialis. 
Nevertheless, and importantly, according to this approach these rules form, at least 
in theory, part of the choice of law process for determining the applicable legal system, 
whereas the ordre public applies only after the choice of law process has been followed 
and the proper law has been determined. 23 
It needs to be reiterated at this point that, in theory, this approach does not result in 
the existence of a different, third, kind of rule, alongside the internal substantive law 
rules and the standard choice oflaw rules. It is no more than a synthesis of both rules: a 
rule of substantive law to which a unilateral choice of law rule is expressly or impliedly 
attached.24 It is therefore not correct, as is sometimes maintained, that the lois 
d'application immediate are immediately applicable, without any prior choice of law 
rule leading to their application.25 They are applicable because they contain an 
'interventionist-' or 'application-order' (Eingriffs- or Anwedungsbefehl), viz. an express 
21 Supra under CHAPTER 3, II. 
22 See Wengler ZVerglRWiss 54 (1941) 168 et seq. This approach is called 'SonderanknUpfungstheorie', 
and was first developed with regard to the application of mandatory rules of the forum, but was later -
initiated by Wengler - extended to foreign rules. See CHAPTER 5 1,3. With regard to the rules of the 
forum, see SandrockiSteinschulte Handbuch Rn A 142; Schwander IP RAT 239; Morris Statutes 187, 200 
et seq; Lipstein ICLQ 26 (1977) 884, 887; Jaffey ICLQ 23 (1974) I, 18 et seq. 
23 Radtke ZverglR Wiss 84 (1985) 325, 330 et seq; Schwander IPR AT 246. 
24 Kropholler IP R § 12 V; but see also for a classification of statutes in three classes Forsyth Private 
International Law 11 et seq. One can do so but should keep in mind that this is simply a combination of a 
substantive rule and a choice of law rule. 
25 Kropholler JPR § 12 V and Schurig Lois 55, 63 et seq. are very lucid in this sense. 
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or implied unilateral choice of law rule which overrides the standard choice of law 
rules.26 
In England, Germany and Switzerland, courts have applied their own 
internationally mandatory rules on the basis of their claim to apply to the situation 
despite a foreign proper law.27 Examples of internationally mandatory rules and relevant 
court decisions will be dealt with later in this chapter, since these internationally 
mandatory rules are under present law covered by art 7 (2) of the Rome Convention and 
art 18 of the Swiss IPRG. 
Finally, it can be mentioned that rules of public law were occasionally applied in 
Switzerland and Germany, despite a foreign proper law, due simply to their mandatory 
public law nature.28 The principle of territoriality of public law and the so-called 
international public law, according to which foreign public law rules are in principle 
inapplicable, will be dealt with later in this study.29 With regard to the public law rules 
of the forum state claiming application to the private relationship in question, it is 
sufficient to state, very broadly, that this approach assumes that public law rules in 
general fall out of the scope of private international law and determine their own scope 
of application unilaterally.30 At least methodologically, the application of a public law 
rule of the forum state conforms to the concept of a special connection or of the lois 
d'application immediate, because the forum's rule is applied independently of the 
26 Schurig Lois 55, 74; Masch Rechtswahlfreiheit 134; Coing WM 1981, 810, 812 N 9; Radtke 
ZVerglRWiss 84 (1985) 325, 329, 331; Vischer Rec des Cours 142 (1974 II) 1, 19,22; Siehr RabelsZ 46 
(1982) 357 et seq; HonselVVogtiSchnyderlMachler-Erne Art 18 Rn 4. 
27 See SandrockiSteinschulte Handbuch Rn AI42 et seq; Droste Begriffll et seq; Dicey & Morris 
Conflict a/Laws Voll21 et seq; id Vol II 1240 et seq; Jaffey ICLQ 23 (1974) I, 18 et seq; for references 
to Swiss court decisions, see Schwander Lois 251 et seq; id IPR AT239 et seq; 
HonselVVogtiSchnyderlMachler-Erne Art 18 Rn17. 
28 With regard to the External Economic Relations Act (A WG) and the corresponding ministerial order 
(A WV) BGH 23.10.1980 RIW 1981, 194, 195. The provisions of the A WV were held to be public law 
and thus rendered a contract void despite its Swiss proper law. See Droste Begriffl5 et seq and KnUppel 
ZWingendes Recht 60,61 for examples of the decisions of lower courts concerning the §§ 20 et seq of the 
Transport of Goods by Road Act (GtiKG) and the underlying principle of territoriality and for decisions 
of the Federal Labour Court concerning the Employees' Representation Act (Betriebsverfassungrecht). 
29 Cf CHAPTER 5, I, 2, II. 
30 Kegel IPR71h ed § 23; id Die Rolle des offentlichen Rechts 243, 244 et seq; MtinchKomm/Sonnenberger 
Einl Rn 355, 356. 
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normal conflict rule, on the basis of its own unilateral claim to apply. This is based, 
however, upon the troublesome distinction between public and private law.3! 
3 Critical remarks 
The approach of a special cOImection or lois d'application immediate, according to 
which certain rules claim application regardless of the proper law and are applied 
according to their own terms, became established in art 7 (2) of the Rome Convention 
and art 18 of the Swiss IPRG.32 This approach also results from the official Report of 
GiulianolLagarde that expressly refers to the theory of 'lois d'application immediate,.33 
The application of internationally mandatory rules on the basis of their own express 
or implied claim to apply, in accordance with the theory of lois d'app/ication 
immediate, is to be preferred to the doctrine of a positive operation of the forum's ordre 
public. It may be true that the doctrine of the positive ordre public is the source of the 
concept of lois d'applicalion immediale.34 However, the ordre public approach has been 
criticised, particularly because the doctrine has undergone a fundamental change and is 
held to be reserved primarily for the negative function: the exclusion of foreign law that 
would be repugnant to fundamental values and principles of the forum state.35 Under 
present law the ordre public is expressly restricted to its negative function.36 The 
application of mandatory rules ofthe forum is reserved by art 7 (2) of the Rome 
Convention and art 18 of the Swiss IPRG.37 
Furthermore, internationally mandatory rules do not necessarily express such 
fundamentally ethical policies ofthe state that they can be characterised as rules of the 
31 For references, see KnUppel Zwingendes Recht 35 et seq; Morscher Rechtssetzungsakte 48, 50 et seq; 
Schulte Eingriffsnormen 26 et seq; see the discussion of MUnchKomm/Sonnenberger Einl Rn 355 et seq; 
von Bar IP R Bd I 243 et seq; id Bd II 452. 
32 MtinchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 4; Schurig Lois 55, 58; Vischer RabelsZ 53 (1989) 438, 445 et seq; 
Schwander IPR AT239 et seq; Siehr FS Keller 485,505 . 
33 GiulianolLargarde Report in Contract Conflicts 382. 
34 CfVischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992) 13,165; HonselllVogt/Schnyderl Machler-Eme Art 18 Rn 4. 
35 KnUppel Zwingendes Recht 44; SandrockiSteinschulte Handbuch Rn A 181 ; MUnchKommlMartiny Art 
34 Rn 31 ; 96; Firsching/von Hoffmann IPR 250; Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992) 13, 165; for 
international commercial arbitration, also see Voser 7 Am Rev Int' Arb 319, LEXIS-NEXIS, 4 of 38. 
36 See art 16 RC and art 17 Swiss IPRG; MGnchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 31, 96; Vischer Rec des Cours 
232 (1992) 13, 165. 
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ordre public. They often have a broader content, or are the consequence of economic 
dirigisme.38 
II Article 7 (2) of the Rome Convention, article 18 of the Swiss IPRG 
The reservation of the forum's internationally mandatory rules is statutorily laid down 
in art 7 (2) of the Rome Convention and art 18 of the Swiss IPRG. Article 7 (2) of the 
Rome Convention provides that: 
Nothing in this Convention shall restrict the application of the rulesofthe law of 
the forum in a situation where they are mandatory irrespective of the law applicable 
to the contract. 39 
Similarly, art 18 of the Swiss IPRG provides that: 
Provisions of Swiss law which, in view of their special objective, must be applied 
without regard to the law designated by this statute remain reserved.40 
As was already stated, both provisions are based on the doctrine of lois 
d'app/ication immediate or the concept that certain mandatory rules claim application 
regardless of the proper law. These provisions simply stipulate statutorily what was well 
established under pre-existing law. As many authors have stated, even without such a 
statutory provision in the Convention or in the Swiss IPRG, the courts of the forum state 
would most probably have continued to apply their own mandatory rules to the extent 
that these rules claimed application.41 
37 It is unfortunate that art 18 of the Swiss IPRG uses the expression 'is reserved'. However, despite this 
wording, it is generally held that art 18 refers to the lois d'application immediate which claim application 
irrespective of the proper law; see Schnyder Das neue IPR 34, 35; Schwander IPR AT239 et seq. 
38 CfMilnchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 96; Voser 7 Am Rev Int'l Arb 319, LEXIS-NEXIS, 4 of38; 
Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992) 13, 165; Basedow RabelsZ 52 (1988) 8, 21, 22. 
39 There is an awkward change in the wording in the German equivalent, art 34 EGBG. Instead of 'the 
rules of the law of the forum' it reads 'the rules of German law', 'Dieser Unterabschnitt (Art(s) 27 -37 
EGBGB) beruhrt nicht die Anwendung der Bestimmungen des deutschen Rechts, die ohne Rticksicht auf 
das auf den Vertrag anzuwendende Recht den Sachverhalt zwingend regeln' . For an interpretation in the 
multilateral sense of art 7 (2), see Droste Begriff 112 et seq. 
40 'Vorbehalten bleiben Bestimmungen des schweizerischen Rechts, die wegen ihres besonderen 
Zweckes, unabhiingig von dem durch dieses Gesetz bezeichneten Recht, zwingend anzuwenden sind.' 
41 See Morse YB Eur L 2 (1982) 107, 144; Schwander IPR AT239; North Contract Conflicts 3,18, 19; 
Morse Public Policy England-72; Cheshire & North's Private International Law 499; Dicey & Morris 
Conflict of Laws Vol 121 et seq; id Vol II 1240, 1241; Sandrock RlW 1986,841,852; HonsellNogt! 
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Neither provision stipulates any requirements for an application ofthe forum's 
mandatory rules, except that the rule in question must be 'mandatory irrespective of the 
law applicable to the contract' or 'in view of its special objective, must be applied 
without regard to the law designated by this statute'. Instead of providing a means of 
characterising internationally mandatory rules and stipulating the circumstances under 
which an application is reasonable, these rules proposing simply the existence of 
mandatory rules that override the ordinary conflict rules.42 Both articles therefore have a 
declaratory character and have been called a 'blanket provision of the law' 
(Blankettnormt3 or 'opening clause' (Offnungsklausel).44 It is said that the application of 
these rules is not based upon art 7 (2) or art 18, but rather on the specific statute that 
contains an attached unilateral conflict rule determining its international scope.45 
1 Domestic Contact 
It is disputed whether, in addition to the characterisation of a rule as internationally 
mandatory, there must be a certain connection with theforum.46 Many authors maintain 
that such a connection is necessary, because art 7 (1) of the Rome Convention and art 19 
of the Swiss IPRG provide for a close connection, and even the invocation of the 
forum's ordre public requires a local connection with the forum. 47 However, this 
condition is not stipulated in art 7 (2) of the Rome Convention or in art 18 of the Swiss 
IPRG. It is for the internationally mandatory rule of the forum state to determine the 
spatial or territorial conditions under which it applies.48 
SchnyderlMachler-Eme Art 18 Rn 3; Heini FS Moser 67,73; MtinchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 89; 
Kropholler IP R § 52 VIII 1; von Bar IP R 1232; Soergel/von Hoffmann Art 34 Rn 13. 
42 MtinchKommIMartiny Art 34 Rn 93; Masch Rechtswahlfreiheit 134 et seq; Coester ZVerglRWiss 82 
(1983) 1, 11 et seq; also see the report of GiulianolLagarde in North Contract Conflicts 382 which refers 
to the lois d'app/ication immediate. 
43 MtinchKomm/Sonnenberger Einl Rn 56; Sonnenberger FS Rebmann 819, 825; also see HonselllVogt/ 
SchnyderlMachler-Eme Art 18 Rn 8; for criticism in this regard, see De Boer RabelsZ 54 (1990) 24,58. 
44 MtinchKommIMartiny Art 34 Rn 93; Roth RlW 1994,273,278. 
45 MtinchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 91; Roth RlW 1994,275,277,278. 
46 KrophoUer IPR § 52 VIII 1; ReithmannIMartinylLimmer Internationales Vertragsrecht Rn 393; 
MtinchKommIMartiny Art 34 Rn 94, 100; Soergel/von Hoffmann Art 34 Rn 95; see HonselllVogt/ 
SchnyderlMachler-Eme Art 18 Rn 14. 
47 Kropholler IPR § 52 VIII 1; Lorenz RdA 1989,220,227; MtinchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 100 with 
further references; StaudingerlMagnus Art 34 Rn 77. 
48 CfMtinchKomm/Sonnenberger Einl Rn 56; Radtke ZVerglRWiss 84 (1985) 325, 331; also see Hartley 
4 ELR (1979) 236, 241. 
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Generally, however, mandatory provisions will not be applicable to the factual 
situation ifthere is no domestic connection.49 Especially in cases where the international 
scope of a rule results only from judicial interpretation of a statute, the courts should not 
extend the scope of a mandatory rule extra-territorially where there is no connection 
with the forum state. 
2 Internationally mandatory rules 
Neither article refers to mandatory rules in a domestic sense or simply mandatory rules. 
They refer only to internationally mandatory rules, viz. rules that must be upheld 
irrespective of the law applicable to the contract.50 The peculiarities of these rules have 
been described above and what was said there is equally valid in respect of art 7 (2) and 
art 18. It is generally held that rules of both private and public law can be internationally 
mandatory rules,51 and that statutory provisions as well as judge-made rules can be 
internationally mandatory. 52 In contrast to arts 5 and 6, art 7 of the Rome Convention 
and art 18 of the Swiss IPRG are general clauses and are therefore not limited to a 
certain kind of mandatory rule or to certain types of contracts. 53 
Still, the major difficulty is how to identify a rule as being internationally mandatory 
if the rule does not contain an express term indicating its territorial scope. It was seen 
above that, thus far, no universal criterion has been found to delimit these rules from 
mandatory rules in a domestic sense. The interest approach, according to which a rule is 
internationally mandatory if it predominantly serves public as opposed to private 
interests, is of no use with regard to protective rules that serve both public and private 
interests. The same is true for the Ordnungsrelevanz approach. 
49 Radtke ZverglRWiss 84 (1985) 325, 331; HonselllVogt/SchnyderlMachler-Erne Art 18 Rn 14; Kaye 
The new Private International Law 262. 
50 Amongst all ReitIunannlMartinylLimmer Internationales Vertragsrecht Rn 387; MilnchKomml 
Martiny Art 34 Rn 7 et seq; HonselllVogt/SchnyderlMachler-Erne Art 18 Rn 10; Vischer RabelsZ 53 
(1989) 438, 445; North Contract Conflicts 3, 19; Philip Contract Conflicts 81, 82, 100; Morse YB Eur L 
2 (1982) 107, 143. 
51 StaudingerlMagnus Art 34 Rn 65; MilnchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 11; Jackson Contract Conflict 59, 
60; Vischer RabelsZ 53 (1989) 438,445,446; Siehr RabelsZ 52 (1988) 41,44; HonselllVogt/Schnyderl 
Machler-Erne Art 18 Rn 13; Morscher Rechtssetzungsakte 89. 
52 Lasok/Stone Conflict of Laws 374; Morse Public Policy England-17, 18; Schwander IPR AT240; cffor 
examples Kaye The new Private International Law 242; et seq Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vo1123. 
53 For the differences; see Martiny IPRax 1987,277,278; Junker IPRax 1989, 73, 74. 
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The judge is therefore still faced with the difficult task of identifying particular rules 
and determining their overriding effect. He has to establish whether the meaning and 
purpose of the law demand application to the situation in question, despite a foreign 
proper law. One indication may be that the intention of the legislature would be 
frustrated ifthe rule were not applied to the situation,54 another may be that the rule 
must be applied without exception if its purpose is to be met.55 
Notwithstanding the weaknesses of the above-mentioned approaches, they have 
nevertheless led to the development of useful guidelines for identifying internationally 
mandatory rules. It seems to be established that rules that intervene in private 
relationships and whose legislative purpose would be frustrated if they were not applied, 
can be classified as internationally mandatory if they also pursue the economic and 
political interests of the enacting country (interests beyond the private interests of the 
contracting parties). On the other hand, rules that serve exclusively the fair 
reconciliation of the contracting parties and their interest in settling the dispute are 
mandatory only in a domestic sense. 
In general, most authors stress that an extensive application of the forum's 
mandatory rules, despite a foreign proper law, runs counter to the aim of decisional 
harmony, a fundamental principle in private international law and the major objective of 
the Rome Convention. Such application also runs counter to a bilateral system of 
conflict of laws. 56 Furthermore, an extensive application of mandatory rules jeopardises 
the principle of freedom of choice in private internationallaw.57 Bearing these issues in 
mind, the forum should interpret its rules restrictively, and apply its mandatory 
provisions with restraint. 
S4 With regard to the restriction to a choice of law of the contracting parties, see Irish Shipping Ltd v 
Commercial Union Assurance Co pic [1991] 2 QB 206, 220, 221 (CA); also see Dicey & Morris Conflict 
of Laws Vo1I22. 
ss Schwander IPR AT243, 244; Schwander Lois 291. 
S6 Vischer states, that besides the content and purpose of the rule, the decision whether a rule is 
internationally mandatory should also include' considerations proper to conflict of laws' and that in view 
of the international situation a 'restriction or modification of the scope' of the internationally mandatory 
rule may be necessary; see id Rec des Cours 232 (1992) 13, 158, 162 et seq; also see Schwander IPR AT 
243,244,247; see generally for a restrictive application ReithmannIMartiny/Limmer Internationales 
Vertragsrecht Rn 387; Staudinger/Magnus Art 34 Rn 45; Morse YB Eur L 2 (1982) 107, 144; Philip 
Contract Conflicts 81, 102; Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992) 13, 158 et seq; Morscher 
Rechtssetzungsakte 54,55; Vischer RabelsZ 53 (1989) 438, 446. 
S7 MlinchKommIMartiny Art 34 Rn 13 a; Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992) 13, 159. 
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3 Legal consequences 
The legal consequence of art 7 (2) of the Rome Convention and art 18 of the Swiss 
IPRG is application of the internationally mandatory rule. In the choice of law process, 
this is a special reference or connection. 58 If the judge has identified a mandatory 
provision of the forum state that is applicable to the situation in question, he has to 
apply the rule, despite the foreign proper law. 
Article 7 (2) and art 18 are obligatory, and do not grant the judge discretion in 
deciding whether effect is to be given to the forum's internationally mandatory rules. 59 
However, the legal consequences will depend on the mandatory rule itself. For example, 
if the internationally mandatory rule sanctions an infringement that results in the 
transaction being null and void, the legal consequences flow directly from the rule. If on 
the other hand, the rule simply states a prohibition, without specifying the legal 
consequences of a violation, the consequences will flow indirectly from the substantive 
rules of the lex causae.60 
58 Clearly Schwander IPR AT 532; HonsellNogt/SchnyderlMachler-Eme Art 18 Rn 23; KnUppel 
ZWingendes Recht 198,205; StaudingerlMagnus Art 34 Rn 48,82. 
59 MUnchKomm/M:artiny Art 34 Rn 54, 55, 58; Schwander IPR AT245; Kaye The new Private 
International Law 262; StaudingerlMagnus Art 34 Rn 82. 
60 MUnchKommIMartiny Art 34 Rn 58; HonsellNogtiSchnyderlMachler-Eme Art 18 Rn 23; 
StaudingerlMagnus Art 34 Rn 82; contra Morscher Rechtssetzungsakte 93; ReithmannIMartinylLimmer 
Internationales Vertragsrecht Rn 399. 
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III Examples of internationally mandatory rules of English, German and Swiss 
law 
Some examples of internationally mandatory rules in German, English and Swiss law 
will be described in this section. The examples include references to those rules that 
include an express term indicating their territorial scope, as well as those rules where the 
claim to apply irrespective of the proper law has been determined by interpretation of 
the rule. With regard to the latter category, those rules that have not been characterised 
as internationally mandatory will also be examined. 
1 Rules serving the state's economic and political goals 
Internationally mandatory rules that serve the state's economic and political goals and 
intervene in private relationships include import and export restrictions, foreign 
exchange control regulations, currency regulations, and anti-trust law (although the 
latter clearly also protects the private interest of freedom of competition).61 The 
identification of these rules as internationally mandatory does not unduly burden the 
judge. In general, these rules are intended to override the ordinary choice of law rule and 
- within their territorial scope - claim application regardless of the proper law of the 
contract. These rules serve fundamental economic and political interests of the enacting 
state, and the intention of the legislature - be it only self-interested or political - would 
most probably be frustrated if they were not applied within their ambit. 
a Foreign exchange control and currency regulations 
Foreign exchange control regulations and currency regulations serve the economic and 
political interests of the enacting state and are generally held to be internationally 
mandatory and thus applied by the forum despite a foreign proper law.62 These rules 
may stipulate that permission must be obtained from the relevant authority or may 
61 See Kegel Role of Public Law 29, 49; also see the enumeration of ReithmannIMartinylLimmer 
Internationales Vertragsrecht Rn 405 et seq; MiinchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 63 et seq; Vischer Rec des 
Cours 232 (1992) 13, 157; HonselllVogt/SclmyderlMlichler-Eme Rn 16; Lipstein Conflict of Laws and 
Public Law 45,46; Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol I21 et seq. 
62 See ReithmannIMartinylLimmer Internationales Vertragsrecht Rn 420; MiinchKommlMartiny Nach 
Art 34 Anh II Rn 6 'versteckte Kollisionsnorm'; Morscher Rechtssetzungsakte 90, 91; Hartley Rec des 
Cours 266 (1997) 341,420. 
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impose an obligation to notify in respect of contracts involving payment in a foreign 
currency or the borrowing of foreign currency. Without such permission contracts are 
usually illegal or at least provisionally invalid and unenforceable, irrespective of the 
proper law of the contract.63 
In the notorious English case, Boissevain v Weil,64 the House of Lords applied the 
Defence Regulations 1939, declared in terms of sec 3 (1) of the Emergency Powers 
(Defence) Act 1939, to a loan agreement between a British subject and a Dutch subject, 
both resident in Monaco during the war. The former subject borrowed a sum of French 
francs from the latter. It was agreed that the British subject would repay the loan after 
the war in pounds sterling. After the war the British subject failed to repay the money. 
The Dutch subject sued the British subject in England, but was unable to recover his 
money, because the House of Lords held that the British Defence Regulations, in terms 
of which it was an offence for any British subject to borrow foreign currency without 
the consent of Treasury commission, applied to all British subjects, irrespective of the 
place of contracting and of the proper law of the agreement.65 
In Germany the Federal Supreme Court ruled that a loan agreement between a 
German subject and a Swiss subject, governed by the law of Switzerland, was invalid 
because it infringed German foreign trade provisions. The parties had deliberately not 
requested the necessary permission from the German National Bank authority. The court 
applied the German provisions, due to their public law nature, despite the Swiss proper 
law.66 
b Competition and Anti-Trust Law 
Anti-trust law is another area where regulations are often internationally mandatory and 
apply regardless of the proper law of private agreements.67 These rules intervene in 
private relationships in order to safeguard the public interest in freedom of competition 
63 ReithmannlMartinylLimmer Internationales Vertragsrecht Rn 419, 421; MilnchKommlMartiny Nach 
Art 34 Anh II Rn 6; Hartley Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 341, 420. Art VIII (2) (b) of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) contains a special choice of law rule for the app lication of mandatory rules of 
foreign currency regulations, but it is not applicable in respect of regulations of the forum . 
64 [1950] AC 327; [1950] 1 All ER 728 (HL). 
6S For the facts of the case, see Hartley Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 341,420,42 I. 
66 BGH 23.10.1980 RIW 1981,194,195. 
67 For the United Kingdom, see Dicey & Morris Conflict a/Laws Vol II 1241. 
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as an institution. They also, however, serve to protect the individual's freedom of 
competition.68 
In Germany the territorial scope ofthe Anti Trust Law is statutorily laid down in 
paragraph 98 (2) of the Anti Cartel Act (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen, 
GWB.)69 Paragraph 98 of the GWB reads as follows: 
Dieses Gesetz findet Anwendung auf aIle Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen, die sich im 
Geltungsbereich dieses Gesetzes auswirken, auch wenn sie auBerhalb dieses 
Geltungsbereichs veranlaBt werden. 70 
Paragraph 98 (2) contains an unilateral choice of law rule that requires, under certain 
circumstances, a special connection of the provisions of the GWB and thus determines 
under what circumstances the German anti-trust law is internationally mandatory.7l The 
relevant criterion for the applicability of the GWB is thereafter the effect of restraints of 
competition on the domestic market, wherever they were instigated - the effect principle 
('Auswirkungsprinzip').72 Thus, if a cartel agreement affects the German market, the 
German anti-trust law is applicable, even where foreign restraint of competition is 
evident and governed by another law.73 
It has been proposed that the unilateral conflict rule in § 98 (2) of the GWB should 
be converted into a multilateral conflict rule. This would result in a foreign anti-trust 
law being applied irrespective of the proper law if the foreign law forbids a certain 
68 MtinchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 75; SandrocklSteinschulte Handbuch Rn A 154. It is situated in the 
border area between private and public law, see Kegel Role of Public Law 29,49; Vischer Rec des COUfS 
232 (1992) 13, 184, 185. 
69 Gesetz vom 27.7.1952 as amended on 24.9.1980, BGBI. 11761, II 703-\. 
70 'This law applies to all restraints of competition that have an effect in the territory where this law is 
applicable, even if they are instigated outside of that territory'. 
71 MtinchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 75, 113; ReithmanniMartinylLimmer lnternationales Vertragsrecht 
Rn 412; Basedow RabelsZ 52 (1988) 8, 21; id NJW 1989,627,628; SandrocklSteinschulte Handbuch Rn 
A 154; but see Mann FS Beitzke 607,614 et seq who argues in accordance with his point of view (see 
CHAPTER 4, I, 1) that § 98 (2) GWB is simply a special rule of the ordre public. 
72 The effect principle as used in § 98 (2)GWB is too broad and has to be concretised; the notion of 
domestic effect has to be 'delimited and put into specific terms' by means of the 'protective purpose of 
the GWB and of the special provisions that are to be considered in each case'; BGH 17.7.1973 NJW 
1973, 1609, 1610 Gljeldrohre-decision and BGH 29.5.1979 NJW 1979,2613 Organische Pigmente; for 
further reference to case law and the effects principle, see ReithmannlMartinylLimmer lnternationales 
Vertragsrecht Rn 412; SandrocklSteinschulte Handbuch Rn A 154; Basedow NJW 1989,627,628; Kegel 
Role of Public Law 29, 51. 
73 See Kegel Role of Public Law 29, 50, 52 et seq. 
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performance by the debtor (restraint of competition) and this performance has an effect 
on the foreign market.74 
In Rousillon v Rousillon75 the agreement at issue had been concluded between a 
Swiss and a French party, both domiciled in France. In the agreement, which was 
governed by French law, the Swiss party had agreed not to compete with the French 
party in England. The contract was declared void since it violated the English common 
law rule on restraint of trade. The court regarded the English rule as a matter of public 
policy, and therefore applied the rule, despite the fact that the agreement was valid in 
terms of the foreign proper law. 
In the European Union national anti-trust regulations are in most cases replaced by 
arts 81 and 82 (previously arts 85 and 86) of the Treaty of the European Community. 
These cartel provisions are not express conflict rules as in para 98 of the GWB. 
Nevertheless, because of the purpose and wording of the provisions, they are applicable, 
regardless of the proper law, to the extent that the cartel agreement in question has a 
competition-limiting effect on the Common Market.76 
In contrast to other countries where anti-trust law is generally applied on the basis 
of implied or express unilateral conflict rules of the forum state, Switzerland has enacted 
a multilateral conflict rule. Article 137 (1) ofthe Swiss IPRG provides that: 
Ansprtiche aus Wettbewebsbehinderung unterstehen dem Recht des Staates, auf 
dessen Markt der Geschadigte von der Behinderung unmittelbar beroffen ist.77 
This conflict rule leads to a 'special connection' of domestic as well as foreign 
mandatory anti-trust law. It was based on the assumption that competition serves the 
74 This is disputed in MUnchKommIMartiny Art 34 Rn 75; MOnchKomm/Sonnenberger Einl Rn 68; 
Basedow NJW 1989,627,632,633; Kropholler IPR § 12 v. 
75 (1880) 14 Ch D 35 I. 
76 For details, see Reithmannl MartinylLimmer lnternationales Vertragsrecht Rn 413 and Sandrock! 
Steinschulte Handbuch Rn A 156 et seq; Basedow NJW 1989,627,633 et seq; also see Dicey & Morris 
Conflict o/Laws Vol II 1241. 
77 'Claims on restraint of competition are governed by the law of the state in whose market the restraint 
directly effects the "damaged person".' 
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national market of each country and that restraint of competition must therefore be 
governed by the law of the state in whose market the claimant is directly affected.78 
c Import and Export Restrictions and Embargoes 
Foreign trade restrictions, such as import and export control regulations, are further 
examples of internationally mandatory rules.79 Restrictions are imposed whenever 
national political aims cannot be otherwise fulfilled. 80 Usually, contracts concerning the 
import or export of certain goods are void or provisionally invalid, unless the 
contractors have obtained official permission.8t These restrictions on foreign trade can 
serve quite different policies: economic, health, military-strategic or foreign policy 
purposes, or the protection of threatened animal species or the cultural property of a 
country. 82 
Apart from import and export restrictions, there are also measures that are designed 
to impose specific disadvantages on particular states, such as trade embargoes.83 An 
embargo is a prohibition imposed by a state on those persons subject to its sovereignty 
that forbids the conclusion of certain legal transactions with persons in another state.84 
Such prohibitions lead to the invalidity of contracts, and override a foreign lex causae 
because they are internationally mandatory.85 The English common law rule that 
contracts involving trade with an enemy are illegal may also fall within this category. In 
78 Voser Lois d'app/ication immediate 40, 41; Schnyder Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht Rn 8 Footnote 33; Rn 
56; Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992) 13, 184, 185; id RabelsZ 53 (1989) 438, 457. 
79 Morscher Rechtssetzungsakte 90; Remien RabelZ 52 (1988) 431, 442; Lipstein Conflict of laws and 
public law 38, 46. 
80 SoergeVvon Hoffmann Art 34 Rn 18; Remien RabelsZ 52 (1988) 431,442; see § 1(1) of the German 
A WG (External Economic Relations Act, 28.4.1961 BGBI 1961 1481 as amended on 11.12.1996 BGBl I 
1850); for Switzerland, see Morscher Rechtssetzungsakte 90, 91 Footnote 30, art 1 BG fur aussenwirt-
schaftliche MaI3nahmen 25.7.1982 SR 946.201. 
81 SoergeVvon Hoffmann Art 34 Rn 23 et seq. 
82 Remien RabelsZ 52 (1988) 431, 434 et seq; MtinchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 63; SoergeVvon 
Hoffmann Art 34 Rn 19-53; see the examples given by Basedow GYBIL 27 (1984) 109, 112 et seq. 
83 MUnchKommIMartiny Art 34 Rn 63; ReithmannlMartinylLimmer Internationales Vertragsrecht 417. 
84 MtinchKommIMartiny Art 34 Rn 63; ReithmannlMartinyl Limmer Internationales Vertragsrecht Rn 
416 et seq; in general Remien RabelsZ 52 (1988) 431 et seq. 
85 MUnchKommIMartiny Art 34 Rn 66; Remien RabelsZ 52 (1988) 431,463,464; ReithmannIMartinyl 
Limmer Internationales Vertragsrecht Rn 417; SandrockiSteinschulte Handbuch Rn A 169; Morscher 
Rechtssetzungsakte 90, 91. 
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Dynamit AG v Rio Tinto C086 this rule was applied, based on English public policy, 
despite a foreign proper law. 87 
The national foreign trade law of European countries is to a large extent displaced 
in respect of third states by the foreign trade regulations of the European Union Law.88 
Protective provisions enacted by the European Community ate connected independently 
of the lex causae, ie they apply regardless of the proper law of the contract.89 
International Conventions may also contain internationally mandatory trade re-
strictions.9O 
Examples of internationally mandatory rules may also be found in measures that 
serve to protect human health or animal and plant life. Examples include the import 
restrictions of paragraph 47 (1) of the German Act regulating the transport of food and 
implements,91 and the measures imposed for the protection of national treasures of 
artistic, historic or archaeological value.92 
d Protection of landed property 
Certain mandatory rules, particularly in Switzerland, focus on the protection of land.93 
For instance, arts 2 and 26 of the Acquisition of Landed Property by Foreigners Act 
(Bundesgesetz tiber den Erwerb von Grundstticken durch Personen im Ausland)94 
stipulate that the acquisition of landed property by foreigners is subject to the 
86 [1918] AC 292. 
87 For similar cases, see Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol II 1279 Footnote 29. 
88 The competence to regulate this matter results from art 113 EC-Treaty, ReithmannlMartinylLimmer 
Internationales Vertragsrecht Rn 418; MtinchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 65 et seq. 
89 SandrockiSteinschulte Handbuch Rn A 170. 
90 The cornerstone of the world trade order is the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GAIT) 30.10. 
1947, now World Trade Organisation (WTO) 15.4.1994, in legal force in Germany and England. 
Although freedom of trade is established as basic principle, several exceptions exist which are the legal 
basis of many export and import restrictions, eg, the CoCom, cfBasedow GYBIL 27 (1984) 109, 113. 
91 Lebensmittel- und Bedarfsgegenstandegesetz, LMBG, 15.8.1974 BGB!. I 1945 with later amendments. 
§ 47 (1) reads 'The "transfer" of food that does not comply with the German provisions into the territory 
of the Federal Republic of Germany is forbidden'; cf also Obereinkommen tiber den internationalen 
Handel mit gefahrdeten Arten freilebender Tiere und Pflanzen, 3.3.1973 in force in Germany since 
20.6.1976, BGBll976 II 1237. 
92 See Gesetz zum Schutz deutschen Kulturgutes gegen Abwanderung, 6.8.1955, as amended on 
31.8.1990, BGBl II 889; for further examples: MtinchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 66 et seq, 86; 
SoergeVvon Hoffmann Art 34 Rn 24-32, 51, 52. 
93 Morscher Rechtssetzungsakte 90; HonseIVVogt/SchnyderlMachler-Erne Art 18 Rn 16. 
9416.12.1983 SR211.412.41. 
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pennission of the relevant authority. Contracts concluded without such pennission are 
illegal regardless of their proper law.95 
2 Protection of the weaker contracting party 
Vischer states that '[i]t is debatable whether protective private law rules whose objective 
is the safeguarding of a party's position in a contract or other relationship may enter into 
the category ofnonns which are to be applied irrespective of the bilateral conflict rules 
,96 
In England, however, it seems generally accepted by case law and academic authors 
that mandatory legislation that serves the socio-economic policy of protecting the 
weaker party of a contract can be characterised as internationally mandatory rule, even 
if the rule does not specify its territorial scope by an express tenn.97 Conversely in 
Gennany and Switzerland, it is disputed whether rules that serve to protect the weaker 
contracting party can be classified as internationally mandatory.98 It is not an easy task 
to determine whether the rule in question pursues public interests, in particular state 
economic and political interests (and are therefore internationally mandatory), or 
whether the rule serves the fair reconciliation of interests of the contracting parties. (In 
the latter case, there is no 'special connection', and applicability depends on whether the 
rule belongs to the proper law or possibly on the 'favour principle'.) This distinction is 
much simpler in respect of regulations that are mainly of a public law nature and pursue 
interests beyond those of the private parties.99 
The difficulties emanate from the fact that these rules usually serve both the interests 
of the contracting parties and the social-political interests of the state. 100 The protection 
of tenants, consumer protection and employee protection fall within this category 
95 Morscher Rechtssetzungsakie 90. 
96 Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992) 13, 157, 158. 
9? See Dicey & Morris Conflict of laws Vol124; id Vol II 1241, 1300, 1317 et seq. 
98 See CHAPTER 3, II, 2; ReithmanniMartinylLimmer Internationales Vertragsrecht Rn 395 et seq; 
Staudinger/Magnus Art 34 Rn 29 et seq, 55 et seq. 
99 In section I above. 
100 Mentzel Sonderankniipfung 13,212; ReithmanniMartinylLimmer Internationales Vertragsrecht Rn 
397. 
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(which is also called 'Sonderprivatrecht', 'special private law') 101 In contrast to other 
mandatory rules, their applicability depends on an assumed inequality of bargaining 
power; they do not apply in cases of contract parity. 102 
Special conflict rules (arts 5 and 6 of the Rome Convention and arts 120 and 121 of 
the Swiss IPRG) exist in the areas of consumer and employee protection. The 
controversy about the internationally mandatory nature of protective rules is therefore 
confused with the demarcation of the scope of the special conflict rules. 103 This 
unfortunate situation leads to a lack of clarity in discussion. It is often not clear whether 
and under what conditions protective rules are regarded as internationally mandatory, 
because it is not specified whether the rules are excluded in principle or simply because 
they are covered by special conflict rules. 104 
Consumer protection is the main subject of controversy in Germany. In contrast to 
the comprehensive regulation in art 6 of the Rome Convention, the consumer protection 
in art 5 of the Convention is restricted to certain types of contracts and to limited 
circumstances.IOj This has led to an urgent search for an alternative method of protecting 
the consumer in international contracts. 106 If the legislature decides that the protective 
rule must be applied regardless of the proper law of the contract, the judge is bound by 
the will of his sovereign. The dispute can thus be reduced to a consideration of 
protective rules that do not contain an express term determining their international scope 
of application. The issue then is whether these rules can be internationally mandatory at 
all. 107 This question has become one of the most debated issues in the German law of 
international contracts. The main arguments will be presented in the following excursus. 
101 See especially Firschinglvon Hoffmann IPR 414,415; Soergel/von Hoffmann Art 34 Rn 54; v. 
Hoffmann IPRax 1989,261,266; Leible JBJZRW (1995) 245, 261. But this list is not exhaustive, the 
protection of capital investors as well as insurance contracts can be added. 
102 Soergel/von Hoffmann Art 34 Rn 54. 
\03 See for instance Kropholler IPR § 52 V 1 a; W Lorenz IPRax 1994,429,431 ; Vischer Rec des Cours 
RabelsZ 53 (I989) 13, 159; for a clear distinction, see Junker IPRax 1998,65, 70. 
104 See eg MtinchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 16 who states that 'it principally can be assumed that 
protective rules are mandatory private law which need not, but can fall in the category of the 
interventionist norms. ' 
105 ReithmanniMartinylLimmer lnternationales Vertragsrecht Rn 395; Kropholler IPR § 3 II 3; 
MtinchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 16; StaudingerlMagnus Art 34 Rn 7 I; Junker IPRax 1993, I, 8; Masch 
Rechtswahlfreiheit 126. 
106 Roth SchnyderlHeij3IRudisch 35, 38, 39; Junker IPRax 1993, 1,8. 
107 Sonnenberger FS Rebmann 819, 823; Schubert RIW 1987, 729, 731 Footnote 29,30; see also Voser 
Lois d'app/ication immediate 60; Roth SchnyderlHeij3IRudisch 35, 42. 
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a Excursus: Dispute about characterising protective private laws as 
internationally mandatory rules 
According to one point of view, rules that protect the weaker contracting party cannot 
be classified as internationally mandatory rules in the sense of art 7 (2) of the Rome 
Convention and art 18 of the Swiss IPRG. Internationally mandatory rules are rules that 
serve only public interests, in particular state economic and socio-political interests that 
are situated outside the contractual relationship. Protective rules serve primarily the fair 
reconciliation of the interests of the contracting parties, when there is an inequality of 
power, and are thus subject to the ordinary conflict rules (and possibly also to the 
special conflict rules for consumer and employment contracts). They are thus applicable 
only if they belong to the proper law, or they may be applicable on the basis of the 
favour principle. 108 
The internationally mandatory character of a rule does not automatically follow 
from the fact that it protects the weaker contracting party, since the socio-political 
objective of consumer protection is pursued, as is the fair reconciliation of interests of 
the parties. 109 The ordinary conflict rules are based on private interests and thus also 
cover protective laws: It is a matter for the legislator of the proper law to grant adequate 
protection to the weaker party. 110 
Some of the advocates of this approach exclude all 'special private law rules', III 
while others demand that the rule in question pursues an additional public interest (a 
'plus'), 112 or at least that it serves 'mainly' public interests. I 13 Such an additional interest 
108 Mankowsky RlW 1993,453,461; id IPRax 1994, 88, 94; id RlW 1995, 364, 368; Sonnenberger FS 
Rebmann 819, 822, 823; Radtke ZVerglRWiss 84 (1985) 325, 328; Schubert RlW 1987, 729, 731; 
Kleinschmidt Anwendbarkeit 278 et seq; similar BAG 24.8.1989 BAGE 63, 17,32; BAG 29.10.1992 
IPRax 1994, 123,128; Voser Lois d'app/ication immediate 59. 
109 MiinchKommlSonnenberger Einl Rn 49; Anderegg Auslandische Eingriffsnorm 87; Schubert RlW 
1987,729,731; Radtke ZVerglRWiss 84 (1985) 324,328. 
110 Sonnenberger FS Rebmann 819,822,823; Mankowsky IPRax 1994,88,94; Anderegg Auslandische 
Eingriffsnorm 80, 92: (1) the interest of the contracting parties to enforce their contract and (2) the fair 
reconciliation of their aims and (3) interests oflegal security. 
III Schubert RlW 1987,729,731; Kleinschmidt Anwendbarkeit 278 et seq; similar Radtke ZVerglRWiss 
84 (1985) 325, 328. 
112 MUnchKomm/Sonnenberger Einl Rn 50. 
113 Anderegg Auslandische Eingriffsnorm 93 et seq. 
106 
is affinned especially with regard to lessee protection, while with regard to consumer 
protection it is rejected. 114 
According to this approach a rule that is internationally mandatory cannot fall under 
arts 5 and 6 of the Rome Convention, and, conversely, a protective rule that falls within 
the scope of arts 5 and 6 cannot be internationally mandatory. In other words, a rule 
cannot simultaneously serve interests that are predominantly private and interests that 
are predominantly public. One or other interest must prevail. The object of the nonnal 
connection cannot be the object of a special connection, since both connections are 
based on and pursue different and incompatible goalS. 115 
The counter-opinion espouses an extension of the group of rules that can qualify as 
internationally mandatory rules. 116 The reason for this approach is the' double function' 
of these nonns, since socio-political mandatory provisions that protect the weaker 
contracting party also pursue socio-political interests, and have a market-adjusting 
effect, which serves interests beyond those of the contracting parties. ll7 It is accurately 
not possible to fix the boundaries between economic-political interests or the interests of 
the contracting parties. I 18 The existence of arts 5 and 6 of the Rome Convention and arts 
120 and 121 of the Swiss IPRG does not exclude the applicability of internationally 
mandatory rules of the forum state protecting consumers or employees by means of art 7 
of the Rome Convention and art 18 Swiss of the IPRG, respectively. I 19 
114 Anderegg Ausldndische Eingriffsnorm 93,94; MiinchKomm/Sonnenberger Einl Rn 49,50; Voser Lois 
d 'application immediate 59, 61; for criticism, see Masch Rechtswahlfreiheit 139. 
115 Mankowsky RlW 1993, 453, 460; id IPRax 1994, 88, 94, 95; id RIW 1996, 8; id RIW 1995, 364, 368; 
Voser Lois d'application immediate 51et seq; Sonnenberger FS Rebmann 819, 823. 
116 Von Hoffmann IPRax 1989,261,263,266; SoergeVvon Hoffmann, Art. 34 Rn 4,54 et seq; id J Cons 
Policy 15 (1992) 365, 377; Roth RIW 1994,275,277; id SchnyderlHeij3IRudisch 35, 43; Lorenz RIW 
1987,569,578,580; Erne Vertragsgtiltigkeit 6; Lorenz IPRax 1994,429,431; Leible JbJZRW (1995) 
245,261; Siehr RabelsZ 52 (1988) 41,48; Jayme IPRax 1995,234,236. This approach corresponds with 
a proposal made by von Hoffmann 1974 where he suggested a 'special connection' of these protective 
norms. The starting point of the special connection of the social protective norms is whether the rule 
demands application. No matter how strong the state's intention, application of the rule is restricted by 
the 'international policy' which consists of (1) the degree of contact the legal relationship has with the 
enacting state and (2) the material reconcilability with international common understanding, id RabelsZ 
38 (1974) 415 et seq. 
117 ReithmannIMartinylLirnmer Internationales Vertragsrecht Rn 398; Mentzel Sonderankniipfung 13; 
Leible JBJZR W (1995) 245, 261. 
118 Masch Rechtswahlfreiheit 138; MiinchKommlMartiny Art. 34 Rn 79; Reithmannl MartinylLimmer 
Internationales Vertragsrecht Rn 397; Leible JBJZRW (1995) 245, 261. 
119 SoergeVvon Hoffmann Art 34 Rn 54; Roth SchnyderlHeij3IRudisch 35, 41, 42; HonselVVogt! 
SchnyderlMachler-Erne Art 18 Rn 12, 16; Schwander IPR AT246. 
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Most of the academic statements do not exclude the 'special private law rules' per 
se from the scope of art 7 of the Rome Convention and art 18 of the Swiss IPRG. 120 
They do, however, restrict the possibility of a rule having an international mandatory 
character to situations where the international scope is either expressly determined or 
the purpose and the legislative policy behind a rule justifies such a conclusion. 121 If there 
is any doubt, the rule is not internationally mandatory.122 Particularly in the 
controversial field of consumer protection, a clear determination of whether a rule is 
internationally mandatory remains elusive. 123 
As a result of these latter approaches the relationship of arts 5 and 6 of the Rome 
Convention to art 7 (2) has to be clarified. On this 'second level' it is disputed whether 
arts 5 and 6 are lex specialis to art 7 (2) with regard to the types of contract they 
concern,124 or whether art 7 (2) prevails over arts 5 and 6. 125 In Switzerland this question 
is certainly not as puzzling, since party autonomy is excluded with regard to consumer 
and employment contracts. 
German case law is ambivalent about both questions: whether the protective rule 
can be internationally mandatory at all, and the relationship of arts 5 and 6 of the 
Convention to art 7 (2). Two leading cases of the Federal Labour Court seem to support 
the view that a rule can only be qualified as internationally mandatory rules in the sense 
of art 7 (2) if it pursues predominantly interests beyond those of the contracting parties. 
The Court held that certain rules protecting employees were not internationally 
mandatory, because the rules served mainly the fair reconciliation of the contracting 
parties. 126 However, in 1993 the Federal Supreme Court held,127 with reference to the 
GiulianolLagarde Report, that it is in principle possible for consumer protection rules to 
120 MilnchKommIMartiny Art 34 Rn 16, 79a, Art 29 Rn 44; Art 30 Rn 70a; Lorenz RIW 1987, 560, 580; 
ReithmannIMartinylMartiny Internationales Vertragsrecht Rn 744; idILimmer Rn 397; Leible JBJZRW 
(1995) 245,261; Junker IPRax 1993, 1,9,10; StaudingerlMagnus Art 34 Rn 36, 37; Lehmann 
Zwingendes Recht 219,220; Kropholler IPR § 52 Via. 
121 StaudingerlMagnus Art 34 Rn 71; KropholJer IPR § 3 II 3, § 52 V la; Junker IPRax 1993, 1,9, 10 
'elementary protective norms'. 
122 Leible JBJZRW (1995) 245, 261; StaudingerlMagnus Art 34 Rn 71. 
123 For criticism, see Masch Rechtswahlfreiheit 127. 
124 BT-Drucks 10/504, 83; BGH 26.10.1993 RIW 1994, 154, 157; Lorenz IPRax 1994,429,431; also see 
Roth RIW 1994, 275, 277; id SchnyderiHeifJIRudisch 35, 38, 48. 
125 Junker IPRax 1993, 1,9; Lorenz RIW 1987, 569, 580; Droste BegrifJ218, 219. 
126 BAG 24.8.1989 BAG 63,17,32 (Kanalfahren); BAG 29.10.1992 IPRax 1994,123,128 (Pi/oten). 
127 BGH 26.10.1993 RIW 1994, 154, 157; see Lorenz IPRax 1994,429, 431. 
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be internationally mandatory. The Court did, however, not refer to the distinction 
proposed by the Federal Labour COurt.128 According to the Federal Supreme Court art 5 
of the Rome Convention is lex specialis, with the result that mandatory consumer 
protection may be applicable to consumer contracts that fall outside the scope of art 5, 
despite the proper law of the contract. 129 
In conclusion, it can be stated that the dispute as to whether the' special private law 
rules' can be internationally mandatory in the sense of art 7 (2) of the Rome Convention 
and art 18 of the Swiss IPRG is complicated by the existence of special choice of law 
rules in arts 5 and 6 of the Convention. 13o However, this question should be separated 
from the general question about whether protective private law rules can be classified as 
internationally mandatory rules. 
According to the GiulianolLagarde Report an exclusion of these protective rules is 
not justified, because consumer protection and transport law are expressly mentioned. 131 
The same is true for the official reasoning of the German legislature. 132 In addition, there 
are a number of protective rules that include an express unilateral conflict rule that 
determines their international scope. In principle, it is therefore possible that protective 
rules are internationally mandatory. 
In England it seems that authors are too willing to interpret a statute as an 
overriding statute for the sole reason that its policy is to protect the weaker party. 133 
Nevertheless, rules that do not expressly determine their international scope should be 
only restrictively interpreted as overriding the choice of law rules. And, in the view of 
the present author the mere fact that these rules intend to protect the weaker party is 
insufficient to express a fundamental state policy that they must apply regardless of the 
proper law. 
128 Roth RlW 1994,275,277; StaudingerlMagnus Art 34 Rn 66. 
129 BOH RlW 1997,875,878; BOH 26.10.1993 RlW 1994,154,157. 
130 Junker IPRax 1998, 65, 69; id IPRax 1993, I, 8, 9; id IPRax 1989, 69, 72 et seq; Masch 
Rechtswahlfreiheit 126, 129 et seq. 
131 Report in Contract Conflicts 382; Roth SchnyderlHeifJIRudisch 35, 43, 44 . 
132 BT-Drucks 10/504, 83 et seq; von Hoffmann IPRax 1989, 261,264. 
133 For instance Morse Public Policy England-76 et seq with examples, such as the Consumer Credit Act 
1974; concerning the Scottish Hire-Purchase Act, also see English v Donelly 1958 SC 494. 
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Hence, a protective rule should only be classified as internationally mandatory if it 
also serves public interests. Given the increasing tendency of modem welfare states to 
enact mandatory laws to protect the weaker party, an extensive application of these rules 
can disturb the bilateral system of conflict of laws and will run counter to fundamental 
principles, such as the principle of party autonomy. 134 In short, the concept of 
internationally mandatory rules has always been a rare exception to the ordinary conflict 
rules. 
b Examples 
The following examples of overriding statutes are from the fields of employment 
protection, consumer protection, lessee protection. 135 
(1) Employment protection 
One well-known mandatory law that is explicitly international is the Employment 
Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 which provides in sec 153 (5) that 'for the purpose 
of the Act it is immaterial whether the law governing the contract is the law of part of 
the United Kingdom or not'. Thus, the rules of the Act are internationally mandatory if 
the person ordinarily works in Great Britain, regardless of the proper law of the 
employment contract. 136 
134 Also see Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992) 13, 158 et seq~ 
135 Other examples may stem from the protection of investors, such as The German Stock Exchange Act 
(BorsenG), 22.6.1896, as amended 1989, BGBI I 1989, 1412, that restricts the enforceability of claims 
under futures deals in certain circumstances; s 61 of the BorsenG is interpreted as internationally 
mandatory rules; cf MiinchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 76a; or the English Financial Services Act 1986, 
that in certain circumstances renders investment agreements unenforceable, Ss 5, 56 of the Act, cf Dicey 
& Morris Conflict of Laws Vol II 1241. Another example is the law of transport: Cf The Hollandia [1983] 
AC 565. The case concerned a contract - expressly governed by Dutch law - to transport a machine from 
Scotland to the Dutch West Indies. The machine was damaged in a port in the Dutch West Indies. Under 
Dutch law, the Hague Rules would have been applicable, in terms of which the carrier's liability would 
have been much lower than under the Hague-Visby Rules. The House of Lords held that the Hague-
Visby Rules (contained in a schedule to the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971) have the force of law in 
the United Kingdom and are applicable irrespective of the governing law. This had previously been 
controversial, for references, see Morse Public Policy England- 87 Footnote 2; for details, see Dicey & 
Morris Conflict of Laws Vol II 1217,1240 et seq; also see The Antares (Nos 1 and 2) [1987] 1 Lloyd's 
Rep 424, 428 et seq; for further examples of English internationally mandatory rules in the field of 
international transport law, see Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol I 24 et seq. 
136 See Cheshire & North's Private International Law 500. 
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Another well-known example is the Law Reform (personal Injuries) Act 1948. 
Section 1 (3) of the Act protects injured employees from clauses that exempt the 
employee from liability. However, the Act is not expressly internationally mandatory 
and was not given overriding effect by the Court of Appeal in Sayers v International 
Drilling CO. 137 By contrast, in the Scottish case Brodin v Seljan,138 the same provision 
was applied to an exemption clause contained in an employment contract, the proper 
law of which was Norway. The main difference in this case was that the accident took 
place in a Scottish port, and the employee sued the company for damages in Scotland. 139 
Many authors, therefore, conclude that the provision on exemption clauses is 
internationally mandatory, provided that the injury occurs in England. 140 
Other examples of express and implied internationally mandatory rules can be 
found in the Equal Pay Act 1970, the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and the Race 
Relations Act 1976.141 
In its leading case 'Kanalfdhren' (1989)142 and the 'Pi/olen-decision' (1992)143 the 
Federal Labour Court (BAG) dealt with the application of German employee protection 
rules to contracts governed by a foreign law and thus developed principles according to 
which a mandatory rule can be classified as internationally mandatory.144 The BAG 
held l45 that rules pursuing economic policy interests of the state, as well as social-
political rules intended to protect the weaker party may be internationally mandatory 
irrespective whether they have a public or private law nature and stated that: 
IJ7 [1971] 3 All ER 163 (CA). This case concerned a contract of employment between a Dutch company 
and an English employee on an oil rig in Nigerian waters. The contract contained an exemption clause 
restricting the employer's liability in the event of injury. Although this clause was void under the British 
Act, the court did not apply the Act. The objective proper law of the contract was held to be Dutch law, 
according to which the agreement was valid. Thus, the statute was held to be mandatory in only a 
domestic sense. For a detailed discussion, see Hartley Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 341, 413, 414. 
138 1973 SC 213 (Outer House, Court of Session). 
139 The Court held that sec 1 (3) of the Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act 1948 was mandatory 
irrespective of the proper law of the contract, because the accident took place in Scotland. 
140 Hartley Rec des Cours 266 (1992) 341, 415; Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws VoI1l1317 . 
141 For details, see Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vo11l1317 . 
142 BAG 24.8.1989 IPRax 1991,407 et seq ('Kanalflihren'). 
143BAG 26.10.1992 IPRax 1994, 123 et seq (Pilotenentscheidung); cf BAG 24.3 .1992 NZA 1992, 1129. 
144 In both cases a foreign Jaw was the proper law of the contract by the choice of the parties, and in both 
cases the dismissal notice given to the employee was completely valid under the proper law, although 
invalid according to German law. The employees instituted an action against the terminations, relying on 
German provisions that offered protection from unwarranted termination. On these decisions, see 
Mankowsky IPRax 1994, 88 et seq; Roth RIW 1994, 275, 277 et seq; Magnus IPRax 1991 , 382 et seq. 
III 
For the classification it is crucial that the rule was enacted at least also in the public 
interest and not only in the interest of the contracting parties .... A public interest is 
indicated by aligned adjusting interference into private legal relations of economic 
and working life by prohibitions or permission reservations ..... 146 
The BAG decided on basis of these principles that the general German dismissal 
protection regulations (§§ 1-14 Ktindigungsschutzgesetz) and § 613 a of the German 
Civil Code (BGB) were not internationally mandatory, because they served mainly the 
fair reconciliation of the conflicting interests of employees and employers. 147 
However, in the field of labour law many mandatory provisions pursue public 
interests and are thus held to be internationally mandatory. 148 Examples include the 
protection of mothers and severely disabled persons from unwarranted dismissal, and 
the protection of minors in employment. 149 The Swiss public labour law provisions in 
the 'Bundesgesetz tiber die Arbeit in Industrie, Gewerbe und Handel' are likewise 
internationally mandatory.15o 
(2) Consumer protection 
Another well-known example of an English overriding statute is the Unfair Contract 
Terms Act 1977. The Act contains mandatory regulations that protect the consumer in 
many types of contracts. 151 Section 27 (2) stipulates that the provisions of the Act have 
effect notwithstanding any contract term that applies or purports to apply the law of 
145 The court referred to the policy underlying the legislation of art 34 of the EGBGB (the Gennan 
equivalent to art 7 (2) of the Rome Convention). 
146 The court went on to state that 'they contrast to mandatory rules which serve above all the 
reconciliation of conflicting interests of the contracting parties ... they are subject to the proper law of the 
contract....'; BAG 24.8.1989 IPRax 1991,407,410,411; BAG 29.10.1992 IPRax 1994, 123, 128; cf 
Mankowsky IPRax 1994, 88, 94; but also Roth RlW 1994, 275, 278 who follows these principles in the 
field of labour law, but rejects them as general defmition. 
147 BAG 29.10.1992 IPRax 1994, 123, 128, 129; BAG 24.8.1989 IPRax 1991,407,411, § 613 a BGB 
protects the employee in cases where the business as a whole is transferred. The Gennan provisions were 
also not be applied on basis of the 'more-favourable principle', because the law that would have 
governed the contract without a choice of the parties (art 5 (2) RC), was the law chosen by the parties. 
148 ReithmannlMartinylMartiny Internationales Vertragsrecht Rn 1365; idiLimmer Rn 427, Junker IPRax 
1993,1,6, 7; BAG 24.8.1989 IPRax 1991,407,41l. 
149 Schwerbehindertengesetz; Mutterschutzgesetz, ReithmannlMartinylMartiny Internalionales 
Vertragsrecht Rn 1365, 1380, 1384, 1385; Kropholler IPR § 52 V 2 a; Junker IPRax 1993, 1,6,7. 
150 From 13.3.1964 SR 822.11; Morscher Rechtssetzungsakte 91. 
lSI For further details, see Morse Public Policy England-77; Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol I 24 
and id Vol II 1296 et seq; Cheshire & North's Private International Law 500. 
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some country outside the United Kingdom, provided that one of the conditions in the 
subsection is satisfied. 152 In Scotlandl53 it has been held that the Hire Purchase and Small 
Debt (Scotland) Act 1932 applied to all contracts concluded in Scotland 
notwithstanding the fact that the contracting parties in this case had chosen the law of 
England to govern the hire-purchase agreement. 
As has been explained, the question whether mandatory consumer protective rules 
without an express term indicating their international scope can qualify as 
internationally mandatory is disputed in Germany. Nevertheless, some consumer 
protective rules are expressly internationally mandatory. Most of them arise from 
unified EC law that has been transferred into national law. Some of the EC Directives 
contain' annex conflict rules' that unilaterally determine their scope of application in 
relation to 'third countries' .154 In general these' annex conflict rules' contain a given 
standard that consumer protection is to be granted irrespective of the proper law 
provided the contract has a close connection with the countries of the member states. 155 
One example is art 6 (2) of the Directive on Unfair Contract Terms (Richtlinie tiber 
miBbrauchliche Klauseln in Verbauchervertragen 5.4.1993).156 Paragraph 12 of the 
General Terms and Conditions of Trade Act (AGBG)157 transfers the given standard of 
art 6 (2) of the Directive into German national law and leads to the applicability of the 
provisions of the AGBG despite the foreign proper law of the contract if 'the contract 
152 These conditions are: (a) that the term appears to have been imposed wholly or mainly for the purpose 
of enabling the party imposing it to evade the application of the Act, or (b) that in the making of the 
contract one party contracted as consumer and was then habitually resident in the UK, and the essential 
steps necessary for the making of the contract were taken there. 
153 English v Donelly 1958 SC 494, the statute's overriding nature was defined by interpretation. The 
court stated that 'the Act is a piece of social legislation designed for the protection of certain persons, i.e. 
members of the public who hire articles through companies ... Hence it follows that the test for the 
applicability of the Act, which under section 11 extends only to Scotland, is whether or not the contract 
was entered into in Scotland ... , irrespective of where the contract is ultimately completed or is to be 
executed .... '; also see the Australian decision Kay's Leasing Corp Pty Ltd v Fletcher (1964) 116 CLR 
124; on which see Morse Public Policy England-76; Hartley Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 341, 411 et seq. 
154 MilnchKommlMartiny Art 29 Rn 4; Junker IPRax 1998,65, 70, 71. According to art 189 (3) EGY 
these 'annex conflict rules' are not choice of law rules, but contain the order to the Member states to 
adjust their own conflict rules to the standard of the Directive. 
155 For the relationship to art 5 RC, see Junker IPRax 1989, 65, 70; MilnchKommlMartiny Art 29 Rn 4. 
156 Directive 93113 [1993] OJ L 95/29; printed in NJW 1993, 1838 et seq. 
157 Gesetz zur Regelung des Rechts der Allgemeinen Geschaftsbedingungen 9.12.1976, BGBI I, 3317 as 
amended 19.7.1996, BGBI. 1,1013. 
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has a close connection to the territory of Gennany'. 158 Thus, the rules of the Act are 
internationally mandatory, if the conditions of paragraph 12 are fulfilled. 159 
There is considerable dispute about whether the Act on the Right to Cancel Front 
Door Transactions (HaustUrwiderrufsgesetz, HtWiG) and the Consumer Credit Act 
(Verbraucherkreditgesetz, VerbrKrG) can be interpreted as having an overriding 
effect. 160 
(3) Protection for tenants 
In Germany and Switzerland, rules protecting tenants and tenant farmers are held to be 
mandatory regardless of the proper law, if the apartment or property is situated within 
Gennany or Switzerland. Although the legal protection of tenants pursues both public 
interests and the fair reconciliation of the contracting parties,161 the prevailing academic 
opinion and case law holds that these rules are internationally mandatory. This is 
because the legal protection of tenants is interwoven with public law provisions -
regulation of the housing market. 162 
158 Section 2 detennines a close connection '(1) if the contract was concluded because ofa public offer or 
advertising or ... in the territory of the imposer and (2) the contract party has had his habitual residence in 
this territory while he expressed his will and the expression of will was given within the territory.' For 
delimitation problems, see Junker IPRax 1998,65, 71; MtinchKomm/ Martiny Art 29 Rn 48. 
159 Also see the unilateral conflict rule § 8 of the Time-Sharing Act (TzWrG 20.12.1996 BGBI 1996 I, 
2154-2175 which transfers the Directive from 26.10.1994 for the Protection of the Acquiring Party with 
regard to certain Aspects of Acquisition Contracts of Time Sharing of Property, art. 9 Directive 94/47 
[1994] OJ L 280/83. Paragraph 8 TzWrG provides that Gennan law is applicable if the property is 
situated in Gennany even if the contract is governed by a foreign law. 
160 16. l.l986, BGBlI, 122 as amended 20.12.1996, BGBI 12154, § I of the HtWiG contains a power of 
revocation; pro von Hoffmann IPRax 1989,261,268; Kohte EuZW 1990, 150, 153 Jayme IPRax 1990, 
220, 222; contra Junker IPRax 1998, I, 9; Mankowsky RIW 1995, 364, 368; Droste Begriff 169 et seq; 
MtinchKommlSonnenberger Ein\ Rn 50; VerbrKrG 17.12.1990, BGB!. I 1990,2840 as amended 
20.12.1996, BGBI 1,2154; pro von Hoffmann, IPRax 1989,271; Soergellvon Hoffmann Art 34 Rn 61; 
Kohte EuZW 1990, 150, 153; contra MtinchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 80; Droste Begriff171 et seq. 
161 Schubert RIW 1987, 729, 73 ~argues therefore that these mandatory rules, and those which protect the 
consumer or employee, are not internationally mandatory. 
162 Anderegg Auslandische Eingriffinorm 94; MiinchKomm/Sonnenberger Einl Rn 50; Vischer RabelsZ 
53 (1989) 438, 446; ReithmannlMartinylLimmer internationales Vertragsrecht Rn 406; BAG 24.8.1989 
IPRax 1991,407,411; Voser Lois d 'app/ication immediate 61. 
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CHAPTER 5: FOREIGN INTERNATIONALLY MANDATORY RULES 
The application of the forum's internationally mandatory rules despite the existence of a 
foreign proper law is well established. Whether foreign internationally mandatory rules 
are to be applied by the forum, however, is still problematic and WlSettled. The forum's 
interests in applying foreign rules differ substantially from its interests in applying its 
own law. A judge is generally not bound by the rules of a foreign sovereign,l unless his 
own has directed him to do so by means of a statutory conflict rule,2 an international 
Convention/ or the common law.4 
Therefore, the question is whether de lege lata conflict rules referring to foreign 
internationally mandatory rules exist, or whether de lege ferenda it is possible and 
reasonable to develop special conflict rules regulating the applicability of internationally 
mandatory rules. Or whether, in the alternative, these foreign rules can justifiably be 
applied according to their own determined scope without any prior choice of law rule of 
the forum indicating their application? 
In any event, it is clear that foreign internationally mandatory rules may affect 
private relationships. Contracts often have connections with a number of legal systems, 
in which mandatory legislation is enacted with marked effects on the contracts. 
Violation of the legislation may constitute a criminal offence and result in heavy 
penalties. It cannot be denied that these mandatory rules have afactual impact on 
parties' relationship. The question remains, however, whether the forum shall take 
account of the rules and their effects, which is a matter to be decided by the conflict of 
laws of the forum state. 
As has already been noted, from the forum's point of view, foreign rules include 
those of the lex causae, as well as those of another foreign law, ie a third country. 
Where the conflict rules of the forum indicate that a foreign law is to govern the 
transaction, the question is whether all the mandatory rules of the proper law are 
I The judge is bound only by his sovereign, see Lehmann Zwingendes Recht 18; Anderegg 
Eingriffsnormen 3; MUnchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 89. 
2 Morscher Rechtssetzungsakte 49; Schubert RlW 1987, 729, 738. 
3 For example, Art VIII (2) (b) of the Bretton Woods Agreement (lMF). 
4 Schubert RlW 1987,729,738,739. 
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automatically rendered applicable: both internationally and domestically mandatory 
rules, as well as the rules of private and public law. Do the conflict rules refer to private 
law only and not to rules that intervene in the private relationship in the public interest, 
or do they refer to the lex causae in its entirety, including all its rules? The issue can be 
restated thus: Once the conflict rules have selected the relevant foreign legal system, 
what is their scope of reference within that system?5 
With regard to the internationally mandatory rules of a third country that is neither 
the lex fori nor the lex causae, the question is whether these rules are to be applied and 
thus permitted to intrude into the contract, possibly rendering it illegal or 
unenforceable.6 It is submitted that in this situation a further division needs to be made. 
As will be seen, in most decided cases, the contract was governed by the law of the 
forum state and the question was whether a foreign rule should be applied.7 This is a 
'false third country case " since there are in fact only two legal systems involved: the 
forum and a foreign law. In the 'true third country case ',8 the proper law is a foreign 
law and the internationally mandatory rule that intervenes in the legal relationship is of 
yet another foreign legal system: the third country. 
Art 7 (1) of the Rome Convention allows a judge to give effect to third countries' 
internationally mandatory rules, under certain conditions and on a discretionary basis. 
However, this novel provision has been the subject of so much criticism that Germany 
and the United Kingdom entered a reservation (as they are entitled to do in terms of art 
22).9 Therefore, art 7 (1) is not in force in the United Kingdom and Germany. 
Switzerland, in contrast, has enacted a specific conflict of law provision permitting the 
consideration of third countries' internationally mandatory rules (art 19 of the Swiss 
IPRG). 
5Remien RabelsZ 54 (1990) 431, 461 et seq; Staudinger/Magnus Art 34 Rn 19 et seq; 
MiinchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 22, 24, 39 et seq. 
6 Among others Lehmann ZRP 1987, 319, 320; Erne Vertragsgiiltigkeit I et seq. 
7 MilnchKomm/Martiny Art 34 Rn 23, 49; Drobnig FS Neumayer 159, 177; Dicey & Morris Conflict of 
Laws Vol 11 1246, 1247; Morse Public Policy England-70. 
S Lehmann Zwingendes Recht 12; MiinchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 23. 
9 For England, see sec 2 (2) of the Contract (Applicable) Law Act 1990 which provides that art 7 (1) RC 
shall not have the force of law in England. Germany has not incorporated this article into its private 
international law Act, the EGBGB. 
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The following examination of the application of foreign internationally mandatory 
rules in the countries under investigation commences with an exposition of the 
approaches of academic writers (section I), followed by case law solutions in Germany 
(section II) and the common law approach of the United Kingdom (section III). The 
solution of art 7 (1) ofthe Rome Convention and the impact of this rule on the pre-
existing law in the United Kingdom and Germany is then examined (section IV). The 
investigation will be supplemented by consideration of the Swiss solution and a short 
survey of other legislative approaches. 
I Approaches of academic writers 
There are various approaches to the interplay between foreign internationally mandatory 
rules and the normal conflict rules. In Germany and Switzerland (as well as in other 
continental European countries, such as France, Italy, Netherlands) authors debate 
whether and how those rules can be taken into account. In Germany there is a 
discrepancy between academic and case law solutions. The same was true of Swiss law 
prior to the IPR Reform 1989. 10 On the other hand, in England, most authors concentrate 
more pragmatically on an analysis of the case law. II 
The following approaches are based on different basic understandings of the scope 
of reference of the normal conflict rules, and even of the function of private 
international law in general. 12 The academic proposals are concerned with the 
mandatory laws of both the lex causae and a third country, and usually the rules are 
examined in relation to each other. 
10 Busse ZverglRWiss 95 (1996) 386, 390, 394; Schurig RabelsZ 54 (1990) 217,240 et seq; for 
Switzerland Erne Vertragsgiiltigkeit 12 et seq, 112 et seq; Morscher Rechtssetzungsakte 57 et seq. 
II However, some authors have expressed their opinions, and these will be referred to in this section. Eg, 
Lipstein Conflict o/laws and publiclaw 357; Mann Rec des Cours 132 (1971 I) 107, 157, 190. 
12 See also Voser Lois d'application immediate 50 et seq, 56. 
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1 'Schuldstatutstheorie' or 'Proper law doctrine' 
The advocates of the so-called 'Schuldstatutstheorie' ('proper law doctrine' or 
'Schuldstatuts-theory') or 'Einheitsankniipfung,13 ('unity connection'), including Mann 
and the Swiss academic Heini, submit that the normal conflict rules refer to the lex 
causae in its entirety.14 Private international law is understood as a 'comprehensive' 
choice oflaw system whose normal choice oflaw rules refer to all the rules of the lex 
causae that are relevant to the issue, irrespective of their public or private law nature. 15 
Thus, the validity of a contract is governed exclusively and always by the proper law, 
and the proper law is applied 'as a whole, in its entirety, as it is in force' .16 
They reject the 'principle of the non-applicability of foreign public law', pointing 
out that public laws will not be 'directly' applied in the sense that the forum would 
enforce a foreign state's exercise of sovereign power against citizens, in which case 'the 
state's jurisdiction to enforce its law iure imperii is in fact territorially limited,.17 Rather, 
the concern in private international law is the' indirect' application of public 
prohibitions, with reference to their 'reflex effect' or 'consequence' in private law and 
the private relationship. IS Naturally, internationally mandatory rules, whether of private 
or public law, are subject to the forum's ordre public and, additionally, they will be 
inapplicable if the rule does not claim application in the concrete situation. 19 The self-
limitation of these rules is thus respected. Internationally mandatory rules of a public or 
private law nature are thus always applicable if and to the extent that they belong to the 
13 For example, Kreuzer Ausldndisches Wirtschaftsrecht 55; MUnchKommIMartiny Art 34 Rn 26. 
14 Mann Rec des Cours 132 (1971-I) 107, 157 et seq; id FS Wahl 139 et seq; id FS Beitzke 607 et seq; cf 
recently Busse ZverglRWiss 95 (1996) 390, 414 et seq; for Switzerland Heini ZSR 100 (1981) 65 et seq; 
id BerGesVR 22 (1982) 37 et seq; in the past also Vischer FG Gerwig 167, 170, 171. However, Vischer 
abandoned his former point of view, and in 1974 proposed that the lex causae be applied in its entirety, as 
well as the rules ofa third country by means ofa special connection, id Rec des Cours 142 (1974 II) I, 
24. Today he supports the special connection theory id Rec des Cours 232 (1992 I) 13, 165 et seq, 178 et 
seq; for references Erne Vertragsgilltigkeit 112 et seq. 
15 Mann Rec des Cours 132 (1971-1) 107, 157, 190; id FS Wahl 139, 146 et seq; Busse ZverglRWiss 95 
(1996) 414, cffor a discussion Schafer FG Sandrock 37,41 et seq; KnUppeJ Zwingendes Recht 33 et seq. 
16 Mann FS Wahl 139, 146; id Rec des Cours (19741) 107, 192. 
17 Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992 I) 13, 151; Mann FS Wahl 139, 142. 
18 Mann FS Wahl 139, 142 et seq; id Rec des Cours (1974-1) 107, 182, 192 et seq; cfalso Vischer Rec des 
Cours (1992 I) 13, 150 et seq, Vischer, however, does not support the Schuldstatuts-theory any longer but 
favours the Special Connection Theory. 
19 Mann FS Wahl 139, 141, 153, according to Mann this is a matter of substantive law and not for conflict 
of laws, critically Radtke ZverglRWiss 84 (1985) 325, 343 Footnote 71 since the will to apply is not a 
material element of the rule but conflict of laws element. 
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proper law of the contract, and are rendered applicable by the choice of law rules of the 
forum, provided that they do not violate the forum's ordre public. 
In tenns of this theory, a third country's internationally mandatory rules are 
generally inapplicable, when the forum's conflict rules have referred to another law to 
govern the contract. Then the third country's rules have not been rendered applicable.20 
The only exception is where a conflict rule expressly orders the application of the law of 
a third country, such as Art VIn (2) (b) of the Bretton Woods Agreement (IMF).21 
However, a third country's internationally mandatory rules can be considered as 'facts' 
within the domestic law rules of the lex causae.22 As 'fact' the violated foreign rule may 
be considered within the notion of boni morel3 and can thus lead to invalidity of the 
contract if the latter is considered immoral, or may constitute the reason for 
impossibility of perfonnance. 24 
Thus the crucial criterion for the question of whether (and how) foreign 
internationally mandatory rules are to be applied is whether the rule belongs to the 
proper law of the contract. A third country's rule is never applied but may be considered 
as 'fact' within the substantive law of the lex causae.25 
As will be seen later in this study, the 'Schuldstatuts-theory' was dominant in 
Gennan case law until the 1950s. It was then abandoned by the Federal Supreme Court, 
at least with regard to the question of the applicability of internationally mandatory rules 
of a public law nature emanating from the proper law.26 Swiss case law does not follow 
the proper law doctrine: Certain public law rules are in principle excluded from the 
scope of reference of the conflict rules and are thus inapplicable despite their belonging 
to the proper law of the contract.27 Gennan and Swiss courts have rejected -like the 
advocates of the proper law doctrine - a direct application of third countries' 
20 Mann FS Beitzke 607,609 et seq; id FS Wahl 139, 159,160; id Rec des Cours (1974 I) 107, 157 et seq. 
21 Mann FS Beitzke 607, 615. 
22 On the differentiation between application as rule and consideration as fact, see supra in CHAPTER 
l,V, 4 and for criticism, see infra section 7, b. 
23 The corresponding English rule would be English public policy. 
24 Mann FS Beitzke 607,608 et seq; id FS Wahl 139, 149; Heini ZSR 100 (1981) 65, 71; id BerDGesVR 
22 (1982) 37, 46 et seq. 
25 Mann FS Wahl 139, 160; Heini ZSR 100 (1981) 65,83; cfRadtke ZverglRWiss 84 (1985) 332, 342. 
26Cf since 1959 BGH 21.12.1959 BGHZ 31, 367 et seq. 
27 See the leading case BG 2.2.1954 BGE 80 II 53 et seq. 
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internationally mandatory rules on several grounds, but have taken these rules into 
account as 'facts' .28 
In England the dominant academic opinion and the courts' solution seem to 
correspond with the solution proposed by the advocates of the proper law doctrine: 
internationally mandatory rules are applicable as part of the lex causae. With regard to 
third countries' internationally mandatory rules the English position is more complex, as 
will be shown later. English courts have developed certain guidelines for taking these 
rules into account, but their juristic basis is uncertain.29 
In contrast to England, where the proper law doctrine has found much academic 
support,30 the approach is not generally accepted by German and Swiss academic 
writers. 31 However, it is partly supported in an altered form by advocates ofthe 
'Combination Theory' (' Kombinationstheorie ,).32 
28 This will be discussed in detail later, see CHAPTER 5, II, 2, c. 
29 The predominant point of view is that these rules are rules of English substantive law: Dicey & Morris 
Conflict of Laws Vol II 1241, 1243 et seq, 1247; Cheshire & North's Private International Law 518,519; 
Morse Public Policy England-69 et seq, see CHAPTER 5, III, 2. 
30 Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol II 1241, 1243 et seq, 1247; Forsyth The role of public law 94, 
105; Collier Conflict of Laws 206; Cheshire & North's Private International Law 518 et seq; Schafer FG 
Sandrock 37,41 Footnote 21. 
31 Nowadays Piehl RIW 1988,841 et seq; PalandtlHeldrich Art 34 Rn 4 - 6; Busse ZverglRWiss 95 
(1996) 414 et seq; Heini ZSR 100 (1981) 65 et seq; id BerDGesVR 22 (1982) 37 et seq. 
32 Cf infra section 4; Siehr RabelsZ 52 (1988) 41 et seq; KnUppel Zwingendes Recht 84 et seq. 
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2 'International Administrative Law', 'Public Conflict of Laws,33 
The theory of' International Public Law' (Internationales offentliches Recht) or 
'International Administrative Law' (Internationales Verwaltungsrecht) exists in direct 
opposition to the proper law doctrine. It was developed by Kegel34 and has been 
accepted in Gennan35 and Swiss COurtS.36 
The philosophy underlying this approach is that international private law refers to 
private law alone, not public law.37 Public law rules do not promote justice between 
individuals, they promote the interests of the state, and are therefore subject to 
'International Administrative Law,38 or 'Public Conflict 0/ Laws'. 39 The latter is 
understood as to consist of the national conflict rules that indicate which public law is to 
be applied.40 Public conflict of laws is based on the 'principle o/territoriality' 
(Territorialittitsgrundsatz), namely, that public law in principle has no effect outside the 
territory of its legislating country. It follows that foreign public law is necessarily 
inapplicable in the forum state, regardless of whether the public law fonns part of the 
proper law or a third country's law.41 With regard to state intervention into private 
contracts, the principle o/territoriality means that 'each state may encroach upon 
private rights in its territory and only there'.42 Thus internationally mandatory public 
law rules of the proper law are not rendered applicable by the conflict rules of private 
33 Or 'conflict of public laws' (Offentiiches Kollisionsrecht) which is by no means the same as 'public 
international law' , see Mann Rec des Cours (1974-1) 107, 118. Some authors distinguish the principle of 
territoriality from the so called Power Theory as separate approaches, MUnchKommIMartiny Art 34 Rn 
28,29; StaudingerlMagnus Art 34 Rn 132, 136. In the present study, however, it is believed that the 
Power Theory is one aspect of the doctrine of international administrative law. 
)4 SoergeVKegelJ IIh ed vor Art 7 Rn 395 et seq; Kegel/Seidl-Hohenfeldern FS Ferid 233, 236 et seq; Kegel 
IPRSthed § 2 IV, § 23; Kegel FS Seidl-Hohenveldern 243, 250 et seq. 
3S For the German case law see CHAPTER 5, II; cf on the similarities between this approach and the 
Germanjurisdiction, cfLehmann Zwingendes Recht 73; Coester ZVerglRWiss 82 (1983) 1,2. Other 
academic writers who endorse Kegel's approach are SandrocklSteinschulte Handbuch A Rn 184 et seq; 
Schafer FG Sandrock 37,48 et seq. 
36 See Erne Vertragsgiiltigkeit 15, 16; BGE 80 II 53, 63; BGE 95 II 109, 114; BGE 107 II 489, 492. 
37 SoergeVKegel JJthed vor Art 7 Rn 395; BGHZ 31,370 et seq; BGHZ 64, 183, 188 et seq. 
38 SandrocklSteinschulte Handbuch A Rn 185; Kegel Role of Public Law 29,31. 
39 Kegel FS Seidl-Hohenveldern 243, 244. 
40 Kegel Role of Public Law 29,36. 
4J Kegel FS Seidl-Hohenveldern 243, 246; SandrocklSteinschulte Handbuch A Rn 184, 185; Schafer FG 
Sandrock 37,49; for the principle of territoriality, also see BGHZ 31,370 et seq; BGHZ 64, 188 et seq. 
42 Kegel Role of Public Law 29, 32. 
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international law, but are subject to the International Public Law, and accordingly do 
not have effect outside the territory of the enacting country.43 
There are, however, exceptions to this general principle. Firstly, foreign public law 
is applicable if the foreign enacting state has the power to implement it or if the 
provision has de facto already affected the relationship.44 The applicability of this 
exception will depend on the individual circumstances. Examples of the foreign state 
having the power to implement its mandatory rules are where a debtor resides within the 
enacting state, or where relevant property is situated within the foreign state.45 
Secondly, Kegel holds that' equality of interests' may form an exception to the 
general inapplicability of foreign public law. If the foreign rule pursues interests that are 
equally protected in the forum state, foreign public law should be applied even though it 
serves foreign interests.46 Examples can be found in bilateral treaties and international 
Conventions, such as art VIII (2) (b) of the IMF.47 Having regard to equality of interests 
may well lead to a consideration of the foreign provision as fact within the substantive 
law rules, and render the contract void because of its immoral content or purpose. 
Alternatively, it is argued that the factual effects of the provision on a private 
relationship may be considered if they result in impossibility of performance or 
frustration ofthe contract.48 This process is not an application of the foreign law, but 
simply its consideration as 'factum': a so-called 'factual circumstance abroad' 
(Auslandsachverhalt).49 
43 Cf SoergeVvon Hoffmann Art 34 Rn 3; Schafer FG Sandrock 37,49. 
44 SandrockiSteinschulte Handbuch A Rn 187-190; Schafer FG Sandrock 37, 49; BGHZ 31, 367, 371. 
45 SoergellKegel11lhed vor Art 7 Rn 396 et seq; Schafer FG Sandrock 37,49. 
46 German and Swiss courts have formulated a further exception to the dogma of non-applicability of 
foreign public law. If the foreign rule serves private and not economic state interests, it may be applied, 
BGHZ31, 367, 371; 64, 183, 190; BGE 80 II 53 , 61 etseq;95 II 109, 114;cfSandrockiSteinschulte 
Handbuch A Rn 193; Schafer FG Sandrock 37, 49. 
47 Kegel Role of Public Law 29, 36; SandrockiSteinschulte Handbuch A Rn 191; Schafer FG Sandrock 
37,49. 
48 Schafer FG Sandrock 37,50; Kegel FS SeidllHohenveldern 243, 258, 273; id Role of Public Law 29, 
55 et seq. 
49 Kegel Role of Public Law 29,46,55 et seq; Schafer FG Sandrock 37,50 et seq. 
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3 'Special Connection Theory' or 'Theory of Special Point of Contact' 
At the outset it must be emphasised that there is no uniform Special Connection Theory 
(Sonderankniipfungslehre). On the contrary, the theory is debated from different 
positions and given different nuances of meaning. 50 It is beyond the scope ofthis thesis 
to deal with all the manifestations of this theory in detail. Nevertheless, the Special 
Connection Theory seems to be relatively unexplored in the common law world, and the 
structural foundations ofthis theory and the main approaches need to be explained.51 
The theory is similar to the theory of International Public Law in that it excludes all 
internationally mandatory rules, whether of the lex causae or of a third country, from the 
scope of reference of the normal choice oflaw rules. Internationally mandatory rules are 
therefore subjected to special conflict rules that are independent of the normal choice of 
law rules. 52 In contrast, however, to the theory of International Public Law, this result is 
not based on the principle that normal conflict rules cannot refer to public law, but 
rather on the notion that the connecting factors of the normal conflict rules for contracts 
are not suited to choosing foreign internationally mandatory rules/3 and therefore 
cannot render these rules applicable. 54 
50 Similarly Lelunann Zwingendes Recht 66; Radtke ZVergJRWiss 84 (1985) 325,335. Authors who 
favour a Sonderankniipfung include Wengler ZVerglRWiss54 (1941) 168 et seq; Zweigert RabelsZ 14 
(1942) 183 et seq; Neumayer RabelsZ 25 (1960) 653, 654; Drobnig FS Neymayer 159 et seq; 
Sonnenberger FS Rebmann 819 et seq; MilnchKommlSonnenberger Einl Rn 34 et seq, 58 et seq, 379 et 
seq; MiinchKomml Martiny Art 34 Rn 33 et seq; von Hoffmann RabelsZ 38 (1974) 396, 413 et seq; 
Soergel/von Hoffmann Art 34 Rn 86 et seq; Kreuzer Ausliindisches Wirtschaftsrecht 81 et seq; 
Kropholler IPR § 52 IX; Schiffer Normen 173 et seq; GroJ3feldJRogers ICLQ 32 (1983) 931 et seq; 
Schurig RabelsZ 54 (1990) 217 et seq; id Lois 55 et seq, ReithmannlMartinylLimmer lnternationales 
Vertragsrecht Rn 458 et seq; Mentzel Sonderankniipfung 224 et seq; for Switzerland Vischer RabelsZ 53 
(1989),439 et seq; id Rec des Cours 232 (1992 I) 13,265,278 et seq; Erne Vertragsgiiltigkeit 147 et seq; 
Voser Lois d 'application immediate 69 et seq; Morscher Rechtssetzungsakte 55,56,88,89; Schnyder 
Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht 30 et seq. 
51 For details, see Mentzel Sonderankniipfung 16 et seq; KnUppel ZWingendes Recht 52 et seq. 
52 See Kreuzer SchlechtriemlLeser 89,98; id Ausliindisches Wirtschaftsrecht 59 et seq; Radtke 
ZVerglRWiss 84 (1985) 325,334; for criticism, see Schiffer Normen 103 et seq. 
5) As well as those rules of the forum! 
54 See Radtke ZVerglRWiss 84 (1985)325, 334, 338 et seq; Kreuzer Auslandisches Wirt schaftsrecht 82 et 
seq; id SchlechtriemlLeser 106 et seq; MUnchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 34; MtinchKomm/Sonnenberger 
Ein! Rn 34; Vischer RabelsZ 53 (1989) 438, 441 ; Voser Lois d 'application immediate 50 et seq; 
Morscher Rechtssetzungsakte 55, 56, 88, 89. 
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a 'Conflict of Economic Laws' (Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht) 
The special connection theories assume that the normal multilateral conflict rules of 
private international law are not appropriate as a means of reference to mandatory rules 
that pursue the economic and political interests of a foreign country. The traditional 
conflict rules have the purpose of identifying the spatially most suitable legal system.55 
The latter is determined by connecting factors, which are mainly about settling the 
parties' conflicting interests. These connecting factors include, in particular, an 
(express) choice oflaw but they also include such objective connecting factors as 
residence, domicile and place of performance. 
Internationally mandatory rules serve state economic and political goals and the 
interests of the enacting country, which are not taken into account by the connecting 
factors of the general choice oflaw rules for contracts. 56 It is also argued that the 
multilateral conflict rules are based on the principle of equality and therefore the 
interchangeability of legal systems.57 This equality and interchangeability, however, is 
no longer relevant and justified where a rule serves a state's economic and social-
political interests. 58 
It is therefore argued that the question of when these state interests are to be taken 
into account by the application of international mandatory rules cannot be answered by 
the ordinary choice of law rules. Instead, the application of internationally mandatory 
rules that uphold state interests requires different conflict rules, taking into account the 
particular interests at stake. 59 
An independent and new system of conflict of laws concerning the applicability of 
internationally mandatory rules intervening in private contracts has to be created: the 
55 MilnchKommlSonnenberger Einl Rn 34. 
56 Mentzel Sonderankniipfung 39; Kreuzer Ausltindisches Wirtschaftsrecht 81 et seq; Vischer RabelsZ 53 
(1989) 438, 440 et seq; id Rec des Cours 232 (1992 I) 13, 179 et seq. 
57 This principle is also well known in South African PIL, see Forsyth Private International Law 6. 
58 Kreuzer SchlechtriemlLeser 89, 108; Schnyder Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht Rn 11; Basedow RabelsZ 52 
(1988) 8, 9, 22; for criticism of this argument, see Siehr RabelsZ 52 (1988) 41, 88 ; Schurig RabelsZ 54 
(1990) 217,230; Schubert RIW 1987,729,738 et seq. 
59 Sonnen berger FS Rebmann 819, 827; Kreuzer SchlechtriemlLeser 107, 108 et seq; id Ausltindisches 
Wirtschaftsrecht 82; MilnchKomm/Sonnenberger Einl Rn 34; Basedow RabelsZ 52 (1988) 8, 9; 
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'Conflict of Economic Laws' .60 It consists of unilateral mandatory rules of different legal 
systems, and an attempt at systematising their application and conditions for 
application.61 However, this choice of law system is not a new branch of law, nor is it in 
itself conclusive. Rather, it is a systematisation of mandatory rules gathered from 
several areas of law that are important in international commerce. This quasi 'second' 
conflict of laws system does not replace the traditional private international law, but 
supplements it and applies cumulatively. Its existence and growing importance is 
justified by increasing state interference in private relationships, a consequence of the 
change from the liberal state to the modem welfare state.62 It is not yet conclusively 
established how the conflict rules have to be formulated, and under what conditions 
mandatory rules are applicable. In other words, what is the relevant connecting factor 
and are there other conditions that must be fulfilled? 
b Does the special connection imply a return to unilateralism? 
Does the 'special connection' of internationally mandatory rules imply a return to the 
unilateral approach of the statute theory and thus a change ofmethod?63 In debating this 
question, the following two questions are often not clearly separated from each other. 
One question is whether the foreign internationally mandatory rule is applied by the 
forum for the sole reason that it claims application, and the forum must establish which 
foreign law claims application to the transaction.64 This approach would in fact imply a 
return to the unilateral approach. But this is by no means the dominant opinion amongst 
scholars. As will be seen later, the reason for taking foreign internationally mandatory 
rules into account is, according to most scholars, the existence of statutory or judge-
Kropholler IPR § 52 IX; Hentzen RIW 1988, 508, 509; Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992 I) 13, 179 et 
seq; Radtke ZVerglRWiss 84 (1985) 325, 338. 
60 Drobnig, Basedow and Siehr in RabelsZ 52 (1988) 1 et seq, 8 et seq; 41et seq; Remien RabelsZ 54 
(1990) 431 et seq; Schnyder Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht (1990); Schubert RlW 1987, 729 et seq. 
61 See Schnyder Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht (1990) and the articles of Drobnig, Basedow and Siehr in 
RabelsZ 52 (1988) 1 et seq. 
62 Cf CHAPTER 1; Basedow RabelsZ 52 (1988) 8, 13 et seq; Schnyder Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht Rn 29. 
63 For a short survey of the statute theory and the differences between it and the multilateral choice of law 
system as developed by Savigny, see Forsyth Private International Law 31 et seq, 41 et seq, 44. 
64 Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992 I) 13, 168; also see Mentzel Sonderanknilpfong 58. 
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made conflict rules of the forum state, ie the forum decides autonomously which foreign 
rules are to applied.65 
A separate question is whether there are parallels with the statute theory because the 
ordinary multilateral conflict rules consist of a category and a connecting factor that 
indicate the applicable legal system. In contrast to the normal conflict rules, the category 
of the 'new' conflict rules of economic law is not a legal relationship or a legal question, 
but certain mandatory rules. The statute theory also took groups of norms, rather than a 
legal relationship, as the starting point of the choice of law process.66 
c Origins of the Special Connection Theory 
The Special Connection Theory was founded by Wengler. He considered the scope of 
applicability of foreign mandatory laws independently of the proper law,67 and 
suggested that mandatory laws should not only be applied if they belonged to the proper 
law of the contract. In addition, mandatory legislation of a third legal system should be 
applicable under certain conditions and after consideration of its own scope of 
applicability.68 Wengler established the following conditions for the applicability of 
foreign mandatory rules: 69 
• The spatial scope of the rule must demand application (ortlicher Geltungswille). 
• There must be a 'really close connection' between the legal relationship and the 
enacting country. An example is the ability of the enacting country to implement its 
rule because it is the country where a contract is to be performed. A state acts 'ultra 
vires' and cannot expect an application of its mandatory rules by another state if it 
declares its provisions to be extraterritorially applicable, even if there is no or only a 
minor link. 
• The provision must not violate the ordre public of the forum. 70 
65 See Siehr RabelsZ 52 (1988) 41, 84; StaudingerlMagnus Art 34 Rn 12; MtinchKomml Martiny Art 34 
Rn 99; Schubert RIW 1987, 729, 734 et seq. 
66 Siehr RabelsZ 52 (1988) 41, 71, 72; Mentzel Sonderankniipfung 56 et seq; for criticism, see Schurig 
RabelsZ 54 (1990) 217, 230. 
67 Wengler ZVerglRWiss 54 (1941) 168 et seq. 
68 ibid 168, 182. 
69 ibid 168, 183, 185, 187. 
70 ibid 168, 197. Wengler later completed his approach with the criterion of mutuality or reciprocity, viz a 
state that has enacted mandatory rules that it wants to be applied regardless of the proper law of the 
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Zweigert adopted Wengler's approach and concretised it to prohibitive regulations 
that render performance illegal. 71 He amplified the criterion of the 'close connection' to 
consideration of the' international typical interests' of states where the rules shall be 
applied.72 Mandatory provisions that render performance illegal do not infringe typical 
international interests and are thus applicable by means of a special connection if the 
movement of assets leading to performance occurs either wholly or in part within the 
territory of the country that has enacted them.73 
Both Wengler and Zweigert argue that the 'special connection' process is based on 
the overall objective in conflict of laws of achieving an internationally uniform result, ie 
decisional harmony.74 As was previously explained, each state on its own determines the 
scope of applicability of certain mandatory provisions that pursue important state 
interests. Consequently, in order to reach the same result wherever litigation takes place, 
the forum has to apply the internationally mandatory rules of a foreign enacting state. 
Furthermore, Wengler and Zweigert emphasise the need to respect the interests of 
foreign states.75 However, neither author explains why these norms require a special 
connection, nor do they explain the nature of the difference between a special 
connection and the traditional allocation technique. 
d Further developments 
Various other attempts have been made to develop criteria for a special connection of 
foreign mandatory provisions.76 The different approaches can be classified in four 
groups: 
contract should mutually apply those of another country. CfRabelsZ 47 (1983) 215, 248; Lehmann 
Zwingendes Recht 68 . 
71 Zweigert RabelsZ 14 (1942) 283 et seq; Lehmann Zwingendes Recht 69; Radtke ZVerglRWiss 84 
(1985) 325, 335. 
72 Zweigert RabelsZ 14 (1942) 283, 291. 
73 Zweigert RabelsZ 14 (1942) 283, 290 - 295; Zweigert distinguishes' regles sympathiques' and 'reg/es 
heterogenes'; cf also Schulte Eingriffsnormen 123, 127; Radtke ZVerglRWiss 84 (1985), 325, 336. 
74 About this principle in South African PIL, see Forsyth Private International Law 60. 
75 Wengler ZVerglRWiss 54 (1941) 168, 181; Zweigert RabelsZ 14 (1942) 283, 287-290; with regard to 
comity in South African PIL, see Forsyth Private International Law 38 et seq, 58, 59. 
76 For the following classification, see Kreuzer Auslandisches Wirtschaftsrecht 62 et seq; Reithmann/ 
Martiny/Limmer Internationales Vertragsrecht Rn 459. 
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(1) One applies foreign internationally mandatory rules according to their claim of 
application (Unilateralisation). The advocates of this approach, however, stress that it is 
still for the forum to decide whether foreign mandatory rules will be applied, and 
excessive claims of applicability are restricted by controlling the content of the foreign 
mandatory rules.77 
(2) Others propose that foreign internationally mandatory rules should be applied if 
corresponding mandatory provisions of the forum state are applicable despite the proper 
law of the contract (Bilateralisation).78 
(3) Most academic authors argue that the spatial criterion of a close connection 
between the situation and the enacting state is the real reason for a special connection.79 
(4) Recent statements emphasise that the reason for a special connection is the interest 
of the forum in the application of the foreign rule. Thus some authors refer exclusively 
to the forum's interest in the application of the foreign rule while others combine this 
criterion with the spatial criterion of a close connection.80 
Generally, the above conditions and reasons for a special connection are combined 
in some form. This makes it extremely difficult to identify a clear division between the 
different 'approaches', and each may therefore be interpreted as a separate attempt to 
specify the conditions of a special connection.81 Disagreement about the concrete 
formulation of the conflict rules, the relevant connecting factors, and the conditions 
under which foreign internationally mandatory rules should be applied by means of a 
77 Von Hoffmann RabelsZ 38 (1974) 396, 413 et seq; SoergeUvon Hoffmann Art 34 Rn 89 et seq; 
Vischer Rec des COUTS 232 (1990 I) 13, 168 et seq. 
78 For references,see Kreuzer Auslandisches Wirtschaftsrecht 62 Footnote 206. 
79 Wengler ZVerglRWiss 54 (1941) 168, 185 et seq; MilnchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 99 et seq; also 
GroBfeldIRogers ICLQ 32 (1983) 931, 944. 
80 See especially Kreuzer Auslandisches Wirtschaftsrecht 92 et seq; but also MilnchKomm/Sonnenberger 
Einl Rn 58 et seq, 379 et seq; Sonnenberger FS Rebmann 819,833; the shared values approach of 
GroBfeldIRogers ICLQ 32 (1983) 931, 939, 943 et seq; Erne Vertragsgultigkeit 206. 
81 Similar ReithrnanniMartinylLimmer Internationales Vertragsrecht Rn 458. 
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special connection is a result of two factors: the absence of normative guides and the 
variety of possibly relevant mandatory provisions.82 
In general, instead of using general conflict rules (with necessarily vague and 
indefinite conditions) for all types of internationally mandatory rules, there is a trend 
towards a greater differentiation in conflict rules and connecting factors for 
internationally mandatory rules. The differentiation depends on the legal field to which 
the internationally mandatory rule belongs, for example, a special connection for anti-
trust law or foreign trade law.83 
Alongside this trend, the debate has led over the past years to a fruitful conclusion 
that the elements of a (general) conflict rule are to be interpreted more specifically, 
making differentiation possible. The Special Connection Theory has also been given a 
principled base, which it lacked in the early approaches of Wengler and Zweigert 84 
e Double functionality of contracts 
The dogmatic foundation of the need for a special connection is the fact that states 
intervene increasingly in private relationships, which has consequences for the conflict 
oflaws process. As elaborated by some academics, one of whom is Kreuzer,85 the basis 
of the special connection is an understanding that a contract does not exclusively 
concern the interests of the contracting parties. In the modem welfare state, contracts are 
simultaneously objects and instruments of the governmentally guided economy, a 
phenomenon that is referred to as the' double functionality' of contracts in economic 
law.86 Kreuzer eg speaks of the 'micro-function' of a contract (the fair reconciliation of 
82 MlinchKommlSonnenberger Einl Rn 35; MlichKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 25; Kreuzer 
SchlechtriemlLeser 89, 98; id Auslandisches Wirtschaftsrecht 62; Sonnenberger FS Rebmann 819, 831. 
83 Radtke ZVerglR Wiss 84 (1985) 325, 338; Sonnenberger FS Rebmann 819, 831; Kreuzer 
SchlechtriemiLeser 89,110. 
84 See Kreuzer SchlechtriemlLeser 89, 108 et seq; Mentzel Sonderanknupfung 31,38; Schiffer Normen 
151 et seq. 
8S Kreuzer Auslandisches Wirtschaftsrecht 82 et seq; id SchlechtriemiLeser 89, 106; Rehbinder JZ 1973, 
152 et seq. 
86 Kreuzer Auslandisches Wirtschaftsrecht 82 et seq; id SchlechtriemiLeser 89, 106; Rehbinder JZ 1973, 
152 et seq; Mentzel Sonderanknupfung 38 et seq; Voser Lois d'application immediate 51 et seq; 
Schnyder Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht Rn 29. 
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the interests of the contracting parties) and its 'macro-function' (the economic system of 
a state).87 
As has been noted, the ordinary conflict rules for contracts are based on a concept 
that considers the contract to be an instrument for the fair reconciliation of the interests 
of the contracting parties. The relevant connecting factors (party autonomy and 
objective factors, such as the characteristic performance) focus only on private interests 
(micro-function) and do not take into account the interests of states in regulating their 
economic and social system (macro-Junction). A disparity between the double 
functionality of contracts in substantive law and the intemationallaw of contracts 
becomes evident if one assumes that the normal conflict rules refer to one legal system 
entirely and exclusively.88 
The strict adherence to the notion of the normal conflict rules covering all rules of 
the designated legal systems leads to skewed results. The objective connecting factor of 
the closest connection, which is presumed to be the law of the country where the party 
who is to effect the characteristic performance resides, would, for instance, exclude the 
exchange control regulations of the country of the pecuniary debtor. 89 A further example 
is that it could lead to the application of an export ban enacted by the state of the seller, 
but could ignore an import ban enacted by the state of the buyer.90 
The same is true for the subjective connecting factor: the freedom of choice of law. 
In most countries parties are allowed to choose a neutral law, one with which the 
transaction might not have any connection apart from the choice of law itself. Is it 
reasonable to apply this legal system in its entirety, including its economic and state-
political legislation, and to ignore those rules of the legal system with which the 
contract is objectively most closely connected? It seems difficult to justify the 
application of the economic legislation of the neutral law and at the same time to 
exclude the latter country's law, although this country might have a strong interest in the 
matter. 
87 Kreuzer SchlechtriemiLeser 89, 106 et seq; id Auslandisches Wirtschaftsrecht 83. 
88 Kreuzer SchlechtriemiLeser 89, 107; id Auslandisches Wirtschaftsrecht 82; Mentzel Sonderankniipfung 
39; Voser Lois d'application immediate 52. 
89 Cf Kreuzer A uslandisches Wirtschaftsrecht 83. 
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For the reasons given, internationally mandatory rules that pursue the state's 
economic and social-political interests and serve the functioning of an economic and 
social system do not fall within the scope of reference of the normal conflict rules, but 
have to be connected separately. It is argued, in relation to third countries' 
internationally mandatory rules, there is no justification for preferential treatment of the 
rules of the proper law simply because the normal conflict rules refer to the legal system 
from which they emanate.91 
f Elements of a conflict rule for a special connection 
Despite the many aspects of disagreement, the different approaches to a special 
connection have four propositions in common:92 
• The provision referred to must be internationally mandatory. 
• All the conditions for the application of the provision must be fulfilled. 
• There must be a sufficiently close connection between the enacting country and the 
factual situation or legal relationship. 
• The content of the provision and its legal consequence must be compatible with the 
legal system of the forum. 
These four conditions are more or less comprehensively referred to as essential 
conditions for a special connection, although the sequence of the criteria and their 
content may differ slightly. They will be examined more extensively below. 
g Internationally mandatory rule 
The first condition for a special connection is that the foreign mandatory rule must 
claim application regardless of the proper law of the contract. The difficulties with the 
90 CfVischer Rec des Cours 232 (1990 l) 13, 160. 
91 Voser Lois d'app/ication immediate 53; Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992 I) 13, 184. 
92 For instance Lorenz RIW 1987,569,581 et seq; MiinchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 98 et seq; Kreuzer 
SchlechtriemlLeser 89, 98; Schubert RIW 1987, 729, 734; for further references, see Schafer FG 
Sandrock 39,45; Radtke ZVerglRWiss 84 (1985) 325,335. 
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definition of rules that are internationally mandatory, and thus subject to a special 
connection, have already been scrutinised.93 This issue became one ofthe most 
problematic tasks of the Special Connection Theory. 
It is not quite clear whether the internationally mandatory character of a rule is to be 
determined by the foreign enacting state or by the forum.94 It should at least be for the 
enacting state to determine under what conditions the rule claims application. However, 
with regard to the general definition as to what type of rule falls outside the scope of 
reference of the normal conflict rules, and has to be connected separately, it might be 
unrealistic to expect a forum state to adopt a foreign definition of an internationally 
mandatory rule, although this clearly would promote decisional harmony. 
It has to be reiterated at this point that, according to the predominant opinion, the 
claim of a foreign rule to apply is not the only condition for a special connection nor a 
sufficient reason for a special connection.95 In short, foreign internationally mandatory 
rules are not applied simply because they claim application. There is no principle in 
public international law that requires the forum state to apply the law of a foreign 
country. On the contrary, the application of foreign law is exclusively a matter for each 
legal system to determine on its own. Therefore, foreign internationally mandatory laws 
are applied or considered by the forum only to the extent that the conflict of laws of the 
forum so requires. 96 
Some of the academic authors, however, tend towards a unilateral approach and 
allow the foreign law to determine its own sphere of application.97 But these authors 
also require that further criteria be fulfilled, such as an interest of the forum, 
international interests, and/or a close connection, and these criteria serve as limitations 
93 See supra, CHAPTER 3, II. 
94 Foreign state Lorenz RIW 1987,569,581; Magnus/Staudinger Art 34 Rn 12;forum MUnchKomm/ 
Martiny Art 34 Rn 9; MilnchKomm/Sonnenberger Einl Rn 34; Voser Lois d'app/ication immediate 57. 
95 MtinchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 99; Kreuzer Ausldndisches Wirtschaftsrecht 91,92; 
MtinchKomm/Sonnenberger Einl58 et seq, 379 et seq; see also Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1990 I) 13, 
168 Footnote 363; Schiffer Normen 159, 160. 
96 Siehr RabelsZ 52 (1988) 41, 65, 84; MtinchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 99; Coester ZVerglRWiss 82 
(1983) 1, 8 et seq; MtinchKomm/Sonnenberger Einl Rn 34; Schubert RIW 1987, 729, 734; Mentzel 
Sonderanknupfung 228 et seq; Schurig RabelsZ 54 (1990) 217,231; Erne Vertragsgultigkeit 96,97; see 
also Lipstein Conflicts of Public Laws 357, 358 et seq; Philip Recent Provisions 241, 248. 
97 Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1990 I) 13, 168; Soergel/von Hoffmann Art 34 Rn 89, 92; von Hoffmann 
RabelsZ 38 (1974) 413; see also Kropholler IPR § 3 II. 
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on the foreign rule's claim to apply. In effect, the forum state has the power to 
determine whether the foreign rule's claim to apply is reasonable and justified.98 
The prevailing opinion, on the other hand, understands the condition of the foreign 
mandatory law's claim of application as a final exclusionary criterion that must be 
fulfilled. A foreign internationally mandatory rule is - although applicable according to 
choice of law principles of the forum state - not applied if it does not claim to be 
applicable in the situation.99 
The Special Connection Theory as developed by Wengler and Zweigert has 
sometimes been interpreted as similar to unilateralism, or as expressing a unilateral way 
of thinking. 100 The criticism was that the claim of application of the foreign law is the 
wrong connecting factor. lOI But this conclusion does not follow from Wengler's article. 
Although often not clearly expressed, according to Wengler and most advocates of this 
theory, it is the forum that decides which foreign law may be applied. From the point of 
view of the forum, the relevant criteria for the decision are a sufficient close connection 
or the forum's interest in application of the foreign rule. 102 The misunderstanding might 
be a result of the fact that the classification of a foreign rule as internationally 
mandatory has unfortunately been placed at the beginning of the choice of law 
process. 103 However Wengler made it clear that: 
It shall be permitted to start with a sentence which should logically be the last, but 
which is easier to understand: the foreign mandatory law is applied in so far as it 
claims application. 104 
To avoid the continual confusion, Sonnenberger has suggested that the sequence of 
conditions should be changed. 105 
98 SoergeVvon Hoffmann Art 34 Rn 89 et seq; Philip Recent Provisions 241, 249. 
99 See MUnchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 99; MUnchKomm/Sonnenberger Einl Rn 63. Kreuzer 
Auslandisches Wirtschafisrecht 90 stresses that the reference to the foreign rule is not a reference to 
substantive law that does not consider the will to apply. Also see Siehr RabelsZ 52 (1988) 41,71, 72. In 
this regard, also see the differing bilateral approach that applies foreign mandatory rules in the 
circumstances in which the forum's internationally mandatory rules apply. 
100 Eg Anderegg Eingriffsnorm 129 et seq; Mentzel Sonderanknupfimg 57 et seq; Schurig Lois 55, 67; 
Schubert RlW 1987, 729, 734 et seq; contra Schiffer Normen 159 et seq; critical also Vischer Rec des 
Cours 232 (199 I) 13, 168 Footnote 363; on the general debate, see supra section 3, b. 
101 Coester ZverglRWiss 82 (1983) 1, 5, 29; Schurig Lois 55, 66; Schubert RlW 1987, 729, 743 et seq. 
102 Similar Schiffer Normen 159 et seq; Bar IPR Bd 1234; MUnchKommlSonnenberger Einl Rn 58, 379. 
10) Also see Schiffer Normen 160. 
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h Close Connection 
The foreign rule's claim to apply regardless ofthe proper law is a necessary, but not 
sufficient, condition for a special connection. Further conditions must justify its 
application and most of the academic authors speak of close connection as a criterion. 106 
In contrast to the earlier approaches that attempted to find a unified solution for all 
kinds of foreign internationally mandatory rules and for all types of contracts, the 
prevailing opinion is that special criteria for a close connection are to be developed with 
particular reference to the type of mandatory rule and contract in question. This is 
because ofthe realisation that a special connection is not possible by the use of only one 
general conflict rule that comprehensively covers all kinds of internationally mandatory 
rules. Rather the type of contract and the kind of rule must be differentiated. 
Generally, the criterion of a close connection is concretised by specifying certain 
spatial, personal or functional characteristics that depend on the type of contractual 
relationship and subject matter of the mandatory provision itself. 107 A sufficiently close 
connection that depends on the rule in question and the factual situation can, for 
instance, be the situs, if assets or property are disposed of within the enacting country. 
Other examples include the effect on the market for application of an anti-trust law, the 
movement of value as a relevant criterion for foreign exchange regulations, the place of 
business, habitual residence, and nationality. 108 The choice of law of the contracting 
parties, however, is usually not sufficient. 109 
104 Wengler ZverglRWiss 54 (1941) 168,183. 
105 MilnchKommlSonnenberger Einl Rn 58 et seq, 379 et seq - (1) interest of the forum in applying the 
foreign rule, (2) specification of the connecting factor, (3) claim of application of the foreign rule; Voser 
7 Am Rev Int'l Arb 319, Lexis-Nexis 26 et seq of 38 - (l) close connection, (2) international mandatory 
nature of a rule, (3) content of the mandatory rule. 
106 MiinchKommIMartiny Art 34 Rn 99 et seq; Neymayer BerGesVR 2 (1958) 35 et seq; see also 
Zweigert and Wengler supra under section 3, c; Schiffer Normen 176 et seq; Erne Vertragsgiiltigkeit 190 
et seq; for a spatial specification of the connecting factors depending on the legal area and its 
characteristics, see MUnchKomm/Sonnenberger Einl Rn 383. 
107 MiinchKommIMartiny Art 34 Rn 103 et seq; ReithmannlMartinylLimmer Internationales 
Vertragsrecht Rn 405 et seq; Kreuzer SchlechtriemlLeser 89, 100 et seq; Radtke ZVerglRWiss 84 (1985) 
325, 336; Mentzel Sonderankniipfung 32. 
108 See MiinchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 100, 105 et seq; Radtke ZVerglRWiss 84 (1985) 325, 336. 
109 Kreuzer SchlechtriemlLeser 89, 10 I, 106; id Auslandisches Wirtschaflsrecht 64. 
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i Control of the content, 'shared values' 
Finally, a control of the content of the internationally mandatory rule is necessary: The 
content and the legal consequences of the rule must be somehow compatible with the 
legal system of the forum. 
This 'quality check' 110 can be located within the ordre public of the forum. It could 
result in an ordinary public policy exclusionary rule that refuses to apply a rule, after the 
choice of law process has been already followed, and the foreign mandatory rule has 
been rendered applicable by the forum's conflict rules. I II Most of the authors, however, 
tend to favour' a kind of ordre public control' of the content and purpose of the rule as 
condition for the applicability. In this study, this aspect will be called the condition of 
equality of interests or shared values. I 12 
Different proposals have been made with regard to establishing the necessary 
'degree' of equality of interests or shared values. Some authors wish to exclude from 
application only those rules which are directed against the forum state and those rules 
that have legal consequences that are not compatible with the forum. I 13 Others consider 
whether the foreign internationally mandatory rule merits protection, for example, if the 
foreign state enacted the rule within the borders of its legislative competence and the 
content of the rule is appropriate for the forum. 114 
Many authors refer to German case law, which will be dealt with later in this 
chapter, and thus try to structure typical cases. For example, GroBfeld and Rogers ask 
whether the mandatory rule expresses values that are commonly shared and that the 
receiving country is itself willing to protect (shared values approach). They refer to 
typical international interests. liS Kreuzer maintains that the foreign provision must 
110 Kreuzer SchlechtriemlLeser 89, 103. 
III Wengler ZVerglRWiss 54 (1941) l68, 197; Lorenz RlW 1987,569,582; Mentzel Sonderankniipfung 
38; Radtke ZVerglRWiss 84 (1985) 325, 335. 
112 MtinchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 121 et seq; Erne Vertragsgiiltigkeit 190 et seq; for some authors this 
is the main reason for the application, the precondition which enables a special connection Kreuzer 
Auslandisches Wirtschaflsrecht 92; MtinchKomm/Sonnenberger Einl Rn 63; critically Mentzel 
Sonderankniipfung 37. 
113 Lorenz RlW 1987,569,582. 
114 Erne Vertragsgiiltigkeit 191 et seq. 
115 GroJ3feLdlRogers ICLQ 32 (1983) 931,938,939,943. 
135 
promote the interests of the forum state, 116 and provides different categories for this 
criterion. Promotion of the forum's interests or shared values are presumed if the foreign 
provISIOn: 
• indirectly protects or promotes the interests of the forum, 117 or 
• protects universally recognised legally protected interests that are shared by the 
community of nations. 118 
Furthermore, foreign mandatory rules should be applied even though they do not protect 
universally recognised interests if: 
• the provision serves the fundamental co-ordination of national economic policies 
and/or the interest of the forum in the smooth functioning of international trade and 
the economic system,119 or 
• application would lead to a mutual application of German mandatory provisions in 
the foreign state. 120 
A necessary condition for the applicability of foreign mandatory rules is thus that 
the provision expresses values and interests that are somehow commonly shared by the 
forum and the foreign law. Otherwise, the provision is not applicable. As will be seen 
later, this corresponds with the German case law. 121 The Federal Supreme Court 
considered foreign mandatory rules as 'facts' within the notion of German boni mores. 
Accordingly, the court declared a contract infringing foreign rules to be illegal to the 
extent that the rules expressed values or served interests shared by Germany or the 
international community as a whole. Technically, however, the findings of illegality 
were based on German boni mores and not on a direct application of the foreign rule. 122 
116 Kreuzer Auslandisches Wirtschaftsrecht 90, 92 et seq; MUnchKomm/Sonnenberger Einl Rn 6 I et seq, 
379; id FS Rebmann 819, 833. 
117 Examples are the US-embargo cases of the Federal Supreme Court BGHZ 34, 169 et seq (Borax); 
BGH NJW 1962, 1436 (Borsaure) - see infra CHAPTER 5, 11,2, c, d. 
118 Examples include the protection of cultural heritage BGHZ 59,83,85 et seq (Nigerian Mask), the 
protection of threatened animals and plants and the general protection of the public; RG JW 1927,2288. 
119 See also Schnyder Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht 185 et seq. 
120 For all the categories, see Kreuzer Auslandisches Wirtschaftsrecht 93, 94; for the law of arbitration, 
see Voser 7 Am Rev Int'l Arb 319, Lexis-Nexis p 3 of38; for criticism regarding this criterion, see 
MlinchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 99. 
121 Chapter 5, II, 2. 
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j Legal consequence - Means and scope of application 
The legal consequence of the Special Connection Theory is in general direct application 
of the foreign internationally mandatory rule to the contract. 123 
It should, however, be noted that according to some authors the legal consequence 
of a special connection may also be the consideration of the rule as 'fact' within the 
substantive law of the lex causae. These authors stress that there is little difference 
between applying the rule and considering the rule as fact, since in either case it is the 
foreign rule that is taken into account. 124 The present author agrees with this view. 125 For 
example, if the rule itself provides for nullity, (provisional) invalidity or non-
enforceability of the contract, the judge makes such an order and does not enforce the 
contract. 126 He then integrates the foreign internationally mandatory rule into the proper 
law of the contract. 127 The indirect consequences of the foreign rule, such as 
compensation for damages or remission of debt, depends on the lex causae. 128 If the 
rule, on the other hand, merely imposes a prohibition without itself providing for 
invalidity or other legal consequences, the consequences of an infringement, viz its 
private law effects on the contractual relationship, are founded upon the substantive law 
rules of the lex causae. 129 
If the direct application of the foreign mandatory provision and its legal 
consequences are not reconcilable with the proper law of the contract, the judge can 
alter or moderate the legal consequences in accordance to the legal system of the lex 
122 Chapter 5, II, 2, d. 
123 Wengler ZverglRWiss 54 (1941) 168,211; Zweigert RabelsZ 14 (1942) 283, 295,300; Schiffer 
Normen 195, 196; Erne Vertragsgulligkeit 197, 198. 
124 See Kreuzer Auskindisches Wirtschaftsrecht 79,81; Schurig Lois 55, 73, 74; Drobnig FS Neumayer 
159, 174. The Swiss Federal Tribunal also stated that the distinction between application and 
consideration as fact is fallacious, see BO 18.9.1934 BOE 60 II 294, 311. 
125 This approach presupposes that, in contrast to the opinion of some academics and German courts, a 
recognition as fact within the substantive law does not provide relief from choice of law considerations. 
126 Schafer FG Sandrock 37,46; Lorenz RIW 1987,569,580,581; Drobnig FS Neymayer 159,179; 
Radtke ZVerglRWiss 84 (1985) 325, 339; StaudingerlMagnus Art 34 Rn 145; but Kreuzer Auslandisches 
Wirtschaftsrecht 95 and Kropholler IPR § 52 XI 4 who wish to extract the legal consequences in principle 
from the lex causae only. 
127 MtinchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 55, 60; Schiffer Normen 196; Zweigert RabelsZ 14 (1942) 283,300. 
128 Schiffer Normen 196; Zweigert RabelsZ 14 (1942) 283,300; MUnchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 57, 60. 
129 Drobnig FS Neymayer 159,179; Schurig RabelsZ 54 (\990) 217, 240; MtinchKommIMartiny Art 34 
Rn60. 
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causae. 130 Furthermore, alteration and modification of the legal consequences of the 
foreign mandatory provision is possible if they conflict with the legal system of the 
forum. 13l This modification process is based on the (German) choice of law technique of 
adaptation or adjustment (Anpassung or Angleichung), that results when two conflicting 
legal systems are cumulatively applicable (Normenhaufong).132 
k Subsidiary consideration as fact in the substantive law 
There will be situations where the foreign provision cannot be applied or taken into 
account by means of a special connection, because it serves interests that are not 
commonly shared, or is directed against the interests of the forum state, or the 
cOlmection is not close enough to justify a special connection. Nevertheless, the 
provision can require consideration on the level of substantive law. According to the 
advocates of the Special Connection Theory, a subsidiary consideration on this second 
level is still possible.133 For example, where a foreign rule, which serves economic and 
political interests that are not shared by the forum state, sanctions a violation with heavy 
penalties, and performance would create undue hardship for the debtor, it might be 
necessary to consider the factual effects of a fore ign provision as a reason for 
impossibility of performance. Non-consideration of the impact of mandatory provisions 
on the private relationship would create injustice for one or both of the contracting 
parties. 134 
On this 'second level', the analysis focuses upon the circumstances ofthe 
individual party who faces conflicting rules. 135 In contrast to the application of foreign 
mandatory rules by means of a 'special connection', where the forum uses its own 
\30 Schiffer Normen 196, 197; Erne Vertragsgiiltigkeit 198. 
\31 Lorenz RJW 1987, 569, 582, 583; for art 7 (I) RC, see infra CHAPTER 5, IV, I, e. 
132 See Schiffer Normen 196, 197; Erne Vertragsgiiltigkeit 198. For an explanation of the technique of 
adaptation which is in a way a problem of qualification in private international law and which is res nova 
in South African Law, see already CHAPTER 4, I, I. Also see Bennett 105 III (1988) SALJ 444 et seq. 
However, in the case of a 'gap' following on situations where no internationally mandatory rule of a legal 
system claims application, the technique of adaptation is not necessary because a conflict in law does not 
exist. The consequence then is simply that no rule is applied. 
133 Gro/3feldIRogers ICLQ 32 (1983) 931,945; Siehr RabelsZ 52 (1988) 41,94,97; Erne 
Vertragsgiiltigkeit 209; Zweigert RabelsZ 14 (1942) 283,302 et seq; Radtke ZVerglRWiss 84 (1985) 
325, 340; Kropholler IPR § 52 XI 4 MUnchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 49; for a contrary opinion, see 
Schiffer Normen 197; Wengler ZVerglRWiss 54 (1941) 168,202 et seq, 212. 
\34 Also see Kropholler IPR § 52 XI 4. 
IJ5 Grof3feldIRogers ICLQ 32 (1983) 931, 945 
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values and standards to assess the foreign rule, the consideration of the factual effects of 
the foreign rule within the substantive law of the proper law should depend on the 
values and standards of the (foreign) proper law.136 
4 Combination Theory 
Some authors advocate a combination of the Schuldstatutstheorie and the Special 
Connection Theory.137 In accordance with the Schuldstatutstheorie all rules of the proper 
law are applicable no matter whether they are of a private or public law nature, whether 
the rule pursues private or public interests, or whether they are mandatory or facultative. 
The rules are applicable because the forum's conflict rules indicated to the legal system 
of which form part to govern the transaction. Mandatory provisions of a third country 
are not only considered as 'fact' within the material law of the lex causae, but are 
applied or given effect to by means of a 'special connection' .138 
The advocates of this approach argue, that in respect of rules belonging to the lex 
causae, the principle of 'non-applicability of foreign public law' cannot be upheld, 
because the borders between private and public law are blurred and a clear distinction is 
hardly possible. Furthermore, the reason for referring to foreign law is to decide a 
factual situation in the same way as it would have been settled by the foreign court. 
Restricting reference to foreign private law would only distort the foreign law. 139 
With regard to third countries' mandatory rules, an application of these rules by 
means of a special connection is supported, because (1) foreign interests are filtered out 
of the case, (2) the judge assesses the foreign rule and considers an application in 
accordance with the forum's interests and political values, (3) application of a foreign 
rule does not depend on the assessment of the lex causae, which may differ from the lex 
136 Siehr RabelsZ 52 (1988) 41,93,94,98. 
137 Siehr RabelsZ 52 (1988) 41,73 et seq, 96 et seq, 103; KnUppel Zwingendes Recht 84 et seq, 212, 234; 
Becker Sonderankniipfung 58, 74 et seq; similarly Lorenz RIW 1987, 569, 583; Vischer Rec des Cours 
132 (1974 II) 1,22 et seq; Erne Vertragsgiiltigkeit 188 et seq; Lando CMLR 24 (1987) 159,213,214; 
Lipstein Conflict of Public Laws 357, 365 et seq; see for references Schafer FG Sandrock 37, 48; Kreuzer 
Ausliindisches Wirtschaftsrecht 65 et seq; Radtke ZverglRWiss 84 (1985) 325, 349. 
138 Cf Radtke ZVerglRWiss 84 (1985) 325, 349; Mentzel Sonderankniipfung 80, 81; Siehr RabelsZ 52 
(I988) 41, 75 et seq, 96; KnUppel Zwingendes Recht 234,235; Becker Sonderankniipfung 56 et seq. 
139 Siehr RabelsZ 52 (1988) 41, 75, 76; KniippeJ Zwingendes Recht 20 et seq. 
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fori, and (4) foreign rules are not 'facts' in the true sense that have to be taken into 
account simply because they exist. The substantive law approach leaves it up to the lex 
causae to decide whether effect is to be given to the foreign rule; a correction is possible 
only by means of the forum's ordre public. However, it is the lex fori that should 
ultimately decide whether foreign mandatory rules are to be taken into account. This 
principle cannot be ignored by considering the foreign rule as 'fact' within the 
substantive law of the lex causae. 140 
Many authors assume that the Rome Convention and the Swiss IPRG are based on 
this approach. This is because art 7 (1) of the Convention and art 19 of the Swiss IPRG 
refer only to internationally mandatory rules of a country other than the governing law, 
while those of the lex causae are not referred to and are thus held to be automatically 
applicable because they belong to the proper law. 141 In fact, art 7 (1) and (2) of the 
Convention and arts 18 and 19 of the Swiss IPRG refer to the rules of the lex fori and of 
a third country, and it would be absurd to conclude that internationally mandatory rules 
of the proper law are therefore inapplicable. However, it is debated in Switzerland and 
in Germany whether the legislature should regulate the matter and whether the loophole 
has to be closed by an analogous application of art 7 (1) of the Convention and art 19 of 
the Swiss IPRG to rules pursuing public interests of the lex causae. 142 
5 Consideration only on the level of substantive law 
There are also a few authors who favour a consideration on the level of substantive law 
and omit any application on the level of conflict of laws ('Substantive Law Approach'). 
They content that the only possible way of considering foreign internationally 
mandatory rules, those of the lex causae and those of a third country, is to subsume 
them under the substantive law of the lex causae. The reason for this approach is that 
140 See Siehr RabelsZ 52 (1988) 41, 80. 81, 96. 
141 MUnchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 40; Mentzel Sonderankniipfung 80; Kreuzer SchlechtriemlLeser 89, 
104; id Auslandisches Wirtschaftsrecht 69 N 237; Lehmann ZRP 1987, 319; Becker Sonderankniipfung 
58,74 et seq; Schubert RlW 1987, 729, 736; see for Switzerland Voser Lois d'application immediate 73 
et seq; Schnyder Das neue IPRG 29,30; HonselVVogtiSchnyderlMachler-Eme Art 13 Rn 23. 
142 In Switzerland, art 13 of the Swiss IPRG contains a regulation regarding the scope of reference to the 
foreign law, the content of which is debated in Switzerland, see Voser Lois d 'application immediate 73 et 
seq; HonselVVogtiSchnyderlMachler-Eme Art 13 Rn 21 et seq; and infra CHAPTER 5, IV, 4, b. 
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the substantive law has better tools for dealing with the rules influencing a private 
relationship.143 An application on a 'conflict of laws level' by means of a 'special 
connection process' would not consider all the possible actual effects of internationally 
mandatory rules on the private relationship, and would render applicable rules that do 
not have any effect on the contract. 144 Therefore, the consideration as fact within the 
substantive law is regarded as the better technical means of recognising foreign 
internationally mandatory rules. 
This Substantive Law Approach is in principle the position of the German and Swiss 
courts. Miilbert attempts to give this approach a theoretical basis by means of the Datum 
theory. 145 The Datum theory was originally founded by Ehrenzweig,146 and is supported 
in Germany mainly by Jayme. 147 Miilbert transfers this theory to the question of the 
application of foreign internationally mandatory rules and thereby assumes that certain 
foreign rules are not rendered applicable by choice of law rules, but rather concretise the 
operative facts of the proper law's substantive rules as facts (' local data'). 148 
In contrast to the Special Connection Theory, this approach does not lead to 
application of the foreign rule but only to its consideration as fact, since the foreign rule 
serves to realise the operative facts of the rules of the lex causae without having regard 
to their legal consequences. 149 
143 Anderegg Eingriffsnormen 199 et seq; Radtke ZVerglRWiss 84 (1985) 325, 355; see also Piehl RlW 
1988,843; Baum RabelsZ 53 (1989) 152 et seq. 
144 Radtke ZverglRWiss 84 (1985) 325, 341, 355, 356. 
145 Miilbert IPRax 1986, 140 et seq; Baum RabelsZ 53 (1989) 152, 160. 
146 Ehrenzweig's analysis was not concerned with the question of applicability of mandatory rules, see 
Ungeheuer Beachtung III Footnote 122; Becker Sonderanknilpfung 78; see the references of Siehr 
RabelsZ 52 (1988) 41, 80 Footnote 206 . . 
147 Jayme GS Ehrenzweig 35 et seq. 
148 Millbert IPRax 1986, 140, 141. But see Jayme GS Ehrenzweig 35,43,45 who stresses the differences 
between the datum theory and the question of the treatment of foreign internationally mandatory rules, 
and furthermore assesses the German case law considering foreign mandatory rules within the boni mores 
as 'moral data' . 
149 Jayme GS Ehrenzweig 35,39,45; Mentzel Sonderanknilpfung 110. 
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6 Summary 
The different approaches to the application or consideration of foreign internationally 
mandatory rules by the court of the forum state can be summarised thus: 
a Internationally mandatory rules of the foreign proper law 
The Schuldstatuts-theory and the Combination Theory assume that the internationally 
mandatory rules of the proper law are in general rendered applicable by the ordinary 
conflict rules of the forum. They are, however, only applicable if they claim application 
to the situation and do not infringe the forum's ordre public. 
The theory of International Administrative Law distinguishes between private and 
public law rules. While private law rules are rendered applicable by the ordinary conflict 
of law rules, public law rules are subject to international administrative law, which is 
based on the principle of territoriality. Thus, foreign public law rules are in principle 
only applicable within the territory of the enacting country. On the basis of a further 
subdivision, public law rules that pursue public interests are applicable (or at least 
considered) independently of their belonging to the proper law, provided that the 
enacting state has the power to enforce its rules or in cases of equality of interests. 
The Special Connection Theory distinguishes between internationally mandatory 
rules serving the interests of the parties and those pursuing public interests. While the 
former are clearly subject to the proper law, the latter are connected separately and 
independently from the proper law of the contract. They are rendered applicable by 
special conflict rules, the operative facts of which are not yet fully established. 
Generally, it is held that the following conditions must be fulfilled: 
(1) there must be a close connection between the situation and the enacting country, 
(2) the rule must claim application whatever the proper law of the contract, and 
(3) the rule must express values that are commonly shared. 
• 
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The same distinction between the interests pursued by the rule seems to be true for 
those authors who advocate a consideration of internationally mandatory rules on the 
level of substantive law only. With regard to rules belonging to the proper law, 
however, this approach does not express a clear point of view. Nevertheless, it seems 
reasonable to assume that, ifthe foreign rules serve private interests, they are applicable 
as part of the proper law, and if they serve public interests they may be taken into 
account as fact within the operative facts of the private substantive law rules of the 
proper law. 
b Third country's internationally mandatory rules 
Internationally mandatory rules of a third country are rendered applicable on a conflict 
of laws level by means of a special connection that is advocated by the Special 
Connection Theory and the Combination Theory, or in accordance with the 
International Administrative Law Theory. Otherwise, these rules can only be considered 
as facts within the substantive law of the lex causae in the areas of boni mores, 
frustration of the contract, or impossibility of performance. This solution is favoured by 
the Schuldstatuts-theory (proper law doctrine) and the Substantive Law Approach. Only 
where a special connection fails, does the Special Connection Theory take into account 
the actual effects of foreign rules within the substantive law governing the contract. 
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7 Critical analysis of the different approacbes and final remarks 
Before embarking on a critical analysis of the above approaches it has to be stressed that 
they usually have similar outcomes. It is the technical method and the foundation or 
reasoning that differ. 150 Furthermore, and this comment is relevant to the entire 
discussion about the application of third countries' internationally mandatory rules, not 
one academic author contends that foreign internationally mandatory rules, even if they 
emanate from a third country, should not somehow be considered or taken into 
account. 151 Under certain conditions foreign provisions are either held to be applicable 
on a conflict of laws level, or the rules or their factual effects are taken into account on 
the level of substantive law. Thus, it is clear that the dispute is concerned with the 
appropriate method and reasoning. The crucial question is not 'whether' to consider 
foreign mandatory rules, but 'when' (under what conditions) and ' how'. 
a Principle of unity of the conflict of laws relating to contracts versus the special 
connection 
The Schuldstatuts-theory advocates that the contract should be governed by one law, 
including all rules, regardless of their nature. It is argued that the advantages of this 
approach are uniformity of the law applicable to the contract and protection of the 
justified expectations of the contracting parties. 152 Nevertheless, this approach is 
justifiably criticised by the advocates of the Special Connection Theory and the 
Combination Theory. 
The criticism is mainly based on the aforementioned assumption that the ordinary 
conflict rules are designed to achieve a fair reconciliation of the (conflicting) interests of 
the contracting parties, but they do not contain appropriate criteria to determine the 
150 CfRadtke ZverglRWiss 84 (1985) 325, 357; the recommendation of the Max Planck Institute in 
RabelsZ 47 (1983) 669; MiinchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 33; critically, Mentzel Sonderanknupfung 112 
et seq. 
151 MiinchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 33; Becker Sonderanknupfung 77; Hentzen RIW 1988, 508, 509. 
152 What is meant, is the expectation in the application of only one law, cf Mann Effect 31, 34; id FS 
Beitzke 607,613,623; see as well Schafer FG Sandrock 37, 41 ; Radtke ZVerglRWiss 84 (1985) 325, 
344; critically Schiffer Normen 91 , 92; Erne VertragsgUltigkeit 142 et seq. 
• 
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applicability of internationally mandatory rules pursuing public interests. 153 The 
connecting factors of the ordinary choice oflaw rules - in particular, the parties' choice 
of law, but also the objective connecting factors - are not suitable for rendering 
applicable mandatory rules that pursue the economic and political interests of foreign 
states. All these rules are binding and do not permit any derogation, even in an 
international setting, since they must be applied by the courts of the enacting country 
regardless of the proper law of the contractual relationship. Therefore, it cannot be left 
to the parties to determine which country's internationally mandatory rules will apply.154 
Furthermore, strict adherence to the principle of unity - all rules of the legal system 
designated by the connecting factors of the ordinary choice of law rules are applicable, 
while laws outside the lex fori and the lex causae do not apply - may lead to odd 
results. 155 For instance, this proposition would lead to application of an export 
prohibition of the seller's country (because it is the seller who must effect the 
characteristic performance), while an import ban of the buyer's country would be 
ignored. 156 That this result cannot be justified becomes obvious where the parties have 
chosen a neutral law, with which the situation has no spatial connection, as the proper 
law of their contract. It is inappropriate to apply internationally mandatory rules that 
pursue the public interests of a law that was chosen because it was neutral, while there 
might be another law which has a reasonable interest in the application of its mandatory 
rules because there is a close connection with the situation in question. 157 
It has also been convincingly argued that lip service alone is paid to the principle of 
'uniformity of the law applicable to a contract' and protection of the expectations of the 
contracting parties. This is because third countries' internationally mandatory rules are, 
according to the Schuldstatuts-theory, given effect on the level of substantive law, 
despite their inapplicability on the level of conflict of laws. 158 Thus, infact there is no 
uniformity of law nor are the potential expectations of the contracting parties protected. 
153 See Basedow RabelsZ 52 (1988) 8, 22; Schubert RlW 1987, 729, 732; Kreuzer Ausldndisches 
Wirtschaftsrecht 81 et seq; MiinchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 34; for details, see CHAPTER 5, I, 3. 
154 Hentzen RlW 1988, 508, 509; Kreuzer SchlechtriemlLeser 89, 107; Schafer FG Sandrock 39, 43. 
155 Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992 I) 13, 166; Remien RabelsZ 54 (1990) 431, 463; Schafer FG 
Sandrock 39,43. 
156 See Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1990 I) 13, 166; Schafer FG Sandrock 39,43. 
157 Hentzen RlW 1988, 508, 509; von Bar IP R Bd I Rn 267; Remien RabelsZ 54 (1990) 431, 462; Schafer 
FG Sandrock 39, 42. 
158 Also see Schiffer Normen 91, 92; Erne Vertragsgiiltigkeit 142 et seq. 
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F or the parties it is irrelevant how a third country's internationally mandatory rule 
renders the contract invalid or performance impossible - whether considering it on the 
level of conflict of laws or on the level of substantive law. 
Moreover, is it not inconsistent to assume that ordinary conflict rules are acceptable 
to render foreign internationally mandatory rules applicable, but that they are 
unacceptable to exclude internationally mandatory rules of the forum?159 
Finally, it should be noted that statutory exceptions to the unity principle do exist, 
and the scope of the proper law is not all-embracing. Some contractual issues - for 
example, capacity, formalities, mode of performance - are governed by separate laws 
(depeyage). These issues are connected separately and lead to severable parts of the 
contract being governed by separate laws. 160 Articles 5 and 6 of the Rome Convention 
contain further statutory exceptions to this general principle. Thus, the special 
connection by special choice of law rules, separate from the ordinary conflict rules, is 
not excluded in principle, but is a well-known method for determining the appropriate 
legal system for certain legal issues. 
b Does taking account of (third countries') internationally mandatory rules as 
'facts' replace choice of law considerations? 
Third countries' international mandatory rules may not be applicable, but their 
consequences and effects can be recognised as facts within the substantive law rules of 
the lex causae. The substantive law approach in general and the Schuldstatuts-theory 
supports this approach. This is certainly one possible method of considering the 
internationally mandatory rules of a third country, but for a number of reasons it is 
preferable to develop separate criteria on the level of conflict of laws that indicate under 
what conditions these rules are to be taken into account. 
159 Radtke ZVerglRWiss 84 (1985) 325,339; Schubert RlW 1987,729,733; MilnchKommlMartiny Art 
34 Rn 34; Kropholler IPR § 52 IX 4. 
160 See Lando CMLR 24 (1987) 159, 167 et seq; Siehr RabelsZ 52 (1988) 4 I, 69; Schiffer Normen 91 et 
seq; Becker Sonderankiipfung 57 . 
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Firstly, foreign mandatory rules are not 'facts' in the true sense. 161 Only if the 
foreign state is able to enforce its prohibition and the performance becomes factually 
impossible, (for example, because of seizure attachment,) is it the factual effect of the 
foreign mandatory rule that is taken into account and not the rule itself. 162 It is debatable 
whether the mere existence of a prohibition suffices to render performance impossible 
(which then would be legal impossibility) or whether the state must have already 
enforced its prohibition. Some authors stress that, at least in the former situation, if not 
in general, it is not the actual effect (fact) that is taken into account in the strict sense, 
but rather the prohibition itself. 
In general, it is questionable whether there is any difference between application of 
a rule and its consideration as fact. 163 Even recognition as fact demands an examination 
on different levels. The court will first have to answer the primary question of whether 
there is a foreign law that claims application to the transaction. Only if there is an 
affirmative answer, will the question arise whether the foreign rules may be taken into 
account as 'fact' so that performance is rendered impossible. 164 
The Substantive Law Approach and the Schuldstatuts-theory, referring to German 
and Swiss case law, submit that infringement of the foreign rule is the reason for 
immorality. Here one might argue that the foreign rule is not 'applied as a rule' in the 
strict sense, since the legal consequences are taken from the substantive law rules of the 
lex causae, which is the sanction of nullity imposed when the contract is contrary to 
boni mores. However, it is submitted that this assumption is incorrect, and that 
consideration of the foreign rule within the lex causae nevertheless constitutes a 
consideration as rule and not as/act, nor are the actual effects of the rule taken into 
account. 
Although the notion of boni mores is determined by reference to the third country's 
law, the decision whether to give effect to the foreign rule is not a question of material 
161 Siehr RabelsZ 52 (1988) 41,80; Schurig RabelsZ 54 (1990) 217, 241 et seq. 
162 Junker JZ 1991, 699, 702; Schafer FG Sandrock 39, 51; Schurig RabelsZ 54 (1990) 217, 241, 242 . 
163 Schiffer Normen 94 et seq; Kreuzer Ausldndisches Wirtschaftsrecht 79,80; Schurig Lois 55, 73, 74; 
Lehmann ZRP 1987, 319, 320; Morscher Rechtssetzungsakte 64, 117 et seq. 
164 Morscher Rechtssetzungsakte 64, 117 et seq; Schiffer Normen 94 et seq; for criticism, also see 
Schwander Lois 365; Schulte Eingriffsnormen 37. 
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law, but of conflict oflaws. 165 As von Bar has pointed out, the recourse to substantive 
boni mores does not avoid choice of law considerations. 166 Boni mores are construed as 
a safeguard for the domestic code of practices and do not answer the question whether 
and under what conditions an infringement of foreign rules leads to immorality under 
the lex causae. Thus, the application of the boni mores rule in these cases is not based 
solely on the moral values of the lex fori, and often the contractual agreement does not 
violate the forum's boni mores. In fact, the agreement is held to be immoral because a 
foreign rule has been violated. 167 The private international law questions about whether 
and under what conditions foreign law is to be given effect to is thus transferred to the 
level of substantive law and dealt with under the 'fraudulent label' of boni mores. 168 
c The ultimate control of the forum 
In addition, the recognition of third countries' internationally mandatory rules as 
supposed 'facts' within the lex causae's substantive law depends on whether the 
substantive law offers means permitting a consideration of the effects of third countries' 
mandatory rules, such as impossibility of performance, frustration, or illegality. 
Whether the substantive law offers always a suitable relief/an appropriate means has 
been debated. 169 
The result of this approach is that, in cases where the proper law is a foreign law, 
the judge must interpret and extend foreign substantive rules in order to take the third 
country's mandatory rule into account. 170 
Lastly, it has often been stressed that the private international law of the forum 
decides whether foreign rules are to be applied. It then seems illogical, when taking into 
165 Mentzel Sonderanknupfimg 106; Kreuzer Ausldndisches Wirtschaftsrecht 86; Schiffer Normen 96 . 
166 Von Bar IPR Bd 1 Rn 265. 
167 Also see Morscher Rechtssetzungsakte 67; von Bar IPR Bd 1 Rn 265; Kreuzer Ausldndisches 
Wirtschaftsrecht 87. 
168 Hentzen RIW 1988,508,509; Schwander IPR 542 et seq; MtinchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 35; 
similar von Bar IPR Bd I Rn 265; Lehmann Zwingendes Recht 200 et seq; Schubert RIW 1987, 729, 737; 
Mentzel Sonderanknupfung 106 et seq; Schurig RabelsZ 54 (1990) 217, 242, 243 with further arguments; 
id Lois 55, 73; Junker JZ 1991,699,701. 
169 For details, see Schwander IPR AT250 et seq; see also Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992 I) 13, 168; 
Siehr RabelsZ 52 (1988) 41,79. 
170 Schwander IPR AT250 et seq; Kreuzer Ausldndisches Wirtschaftsrecht 86. 
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account third country's mandatory rules within the operative facts of the lex causae's 
substantive law rules, to hand this decision over to the proper law.l7I This runs counter 
to the general principle that the reason for taking account of foreign law is always to be 
found in the law of the forum state and not in the foreign lex causae. 172 
Thus, a 'special connection-process' for international mandatory rules by means of 
a separate conflict rule would be the systematically appropriate means of solving the 
problem, since it solves the question of application or recognition of internationally 
mandatory rules on a conflict of laws level, instead of blurring primary choice of law 
issues with application of the lex causae's substantive law rules. 173 
d Principle of territoriality or non-applicability of foreign public law 
The principle of 'non-applicability of foreign public law', on which the Gennan and 
Swiss case law and Kegel's doctrine of International Administrative or Public Law are 
partly based, has been subjected to fundamental criticism and cannot be upheld. 174 
The criticism is based on different aspects. It is argued that, together with the 
difficulties of distinguishing private from public law rules (particularly because the 
boundaries are blurred and the notion of public law has a different meaning in common 
law), the principle of the non-applicability of foreign public law is not supported in its 
real fonn. Rather, it is subject to several exceptions (such as the exception that the 
principle does not apply to public law rules serving the protection of private 
interests). 175 
The fundamental objection, however, is that the principle of 'territoriality' on which 
this approach is based is of no use in detennining whether foreign law should be applied 
171 The only means of correcting unjustified results from forum's point of view, would be the ordre 
public; Siehr RabelsZ 52 (\988) 41, 80; see also Mentzel Sonderankniipfung 113. 
172 KIeuzer Ausldndisches Wirtschaftsrecht 87; see also 1unker 1Z 1991, 699, 70 I. 
173 Schiffer Normen 148, 156, 166; Schafer FG Sandrock 39, 47; Hentzen RlW 1988, 508, 509; Schubert 
RlW 1987,729,745; KIeuzer Ausldndisches Wirtschaftsrecht79 et seq. 
174 For details, see Mann Rec des Cours 132 (1971 I) 115, 182 et seq; Siehr RabeIsZ 52 (1988) 41, 75 et 
seq; Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992 I) 13, 150 et seq; MtinchKomm/Sonnenberger Einl Rn 374, 377; 
Schiffer Normen 79 et seq; KIopholler IPR § 22 II 2. 
175 A further exception to this principle occurs where the foreign state is able to enforce its law and in 
cases of equality of interests, see supra section 2 and CHAPTER 5, II, I, c. 
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by a judge.176 The notion ofthe principle of territoriality is used in various senses, but 
none of them can provide any guidelines for determining when the forum should apply 
foreign law.177 The inapplicability of certain foreign public law rules does not follow 
from the principle ofterritoriality; rather it is a decision of the forum's conflict of 
laws. 178 
It is more appropriate to talk about the principle of territoriality with regard to the 
enforcement of foreign public law rules that impose a positive duty on government 
authorities in favour ofthe foreign State.179 However, in private litigation the concern is 
not enforcement of foreign public laws, but instead whether a foreign law that represents 
the public interests of the foreign enacting state, and pursues these interests indirectly by 
intervening in the private contract, can be applied. The concern is thus not the 
enforcement or 'direct' application of foreign public law in favour of the foreign state, 
but, rather the influence and consequences of public law on private law and private 
relationships, the' reflex effects' of public on private law. 180 A judge in the forum 
considers only the private law effects of the foreign public law, a process that has 
nothing in common with the direct application or enforcement of foreign law. If the 
principle of the non-applicability of foreign public laws is understood to exclude even 
the consideration of the reflex effects of public law rules on private law and 
relationships (which is the position in the German and Swiss case law and some 
academic writing), then it must clearly be rejected. 181 
This conclusion does not necessarily mean that the legal effects of the public law of 
the lex causae are always applicable, nor that they are exclusively applicable. Whether 
the forum applies or considers foreign public law rules as they affect the private 
relationship is still a decision of its own conflict of laws. As noted above, the 
176 Siehr RabelsZ 52 (1988) 41,75 et seq; Lipstein Conflict o/Public Laws 357, 358 et seq; Mann Rec des 
Cours 132 (1971 J) 115, 188; Erne Vertragsgiiltigkeit 82; Schiffer Normen 79, 80 with further references. 
177 Erne Vertragsgiiltigkeit 81, 82; Schiffer Normen 79; MiinchKomm/Sonnenberger Einl Rn 374. 
178 Erne Vertragsgiiltigkeit 82,83; Neuhaus IPR 179 et seq; Mann Rec des Cours 132 (1971 I) 115, 190. 
179 Schiffer Normen 79; MUnchKomm/Sonnenberger Einl Rn 375; Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992 I) 
13, 151; Mann Rec desCours 132(19741)115, 184. 
180 MiinchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 36; Schiffer Normen 76 et seq; Kropholler IPR § 22 II 2; Neymayer 
RabelsZ 25 (1960) 649, 651; Siehr RabelsZ 52 (1988) 41, 73; KnUppel Zwingendes Recht 25 . 
181 Schiffer Normen 77; Erne Vertragsgiiltigkeit 84; MiinchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 36; Vischer Rec des 
Cours 232 (1992 I) 13, 150 et seq. It has been assumed that the German case law is based on the error 
that application would mean enforcement, see Mann Rec des Cours 132 (1971 I) 109, 187; Schiffer 
Normen 75 . 
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applicability of these rules can be appropriately detennined only by separate conflict 
rules. Vi scher states that: 
The question which state's public law and which of its regulations in particular are 
to be applied is not prejudiced by the inclusion of foreign public law as such .... The 
lex causae ... includes neither all laws pursuing public interests of that state nor are 
public law rules of other states completely excluded .... 182 
e The advantage of the solution of the Special Connection Theory 
The Special Connection Theory (Sonderanknilpfungslehre) is basically the opposite of 
the Schuldstatuts-theory. Therefore, some of the fundamental objections to the SpeCial 
Connection Theory overlap with arguments in favour of a Schuldstatuts-theory, and vice 
versa: for example, the principle of unity of conflict of laws relating to contracts as 
opposed to dividing the proper law of the contract. These were discussed above. There 
are, however, further objections to the Special Connection Theory: While some of them 
are directed against the theory in general, others are interwoven with attacks on the 
statutory approaches of art 7 (1) of the Rome Convention and art 19 of the Swiss IPRG, 
because these provisions are based on similar considerations. 183 
MaIm argues that there is no justification for a special cOlUlection since case law has 
developed clear criteria to deal with the problem - the consideration of third countries' 
mandatory rules within the substantive law of the lex causae - and the decisions of the 
courts were correct. 184 He maintains that there is no occasion for methodological and 
structural debates if the case law has developed acceptable solutions. 
However, although MalUl does not seem to approve of it, the discussion is not about 
the outcome, but rather about the principled reasoning and foundation for consideration 
of foreign internationally mandatory rules (the proper law's and a third country's). The 
182 Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992 I) 13,151. 
183 For these articles, see CHAPTER 5, IV. 
184 Mann FS Beitzke 607,608,614,616. SandrocklSteinschulte Handbuch Rn 196 argue alomg similar 
lines although they favour the principle of non-applicability offoreign public law. For this argument, also 
see Schiffer Normen 165 et seq. 
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crucial question is the appropriate means of determining the applicability or 
consideration of foreign mandatory rules. 18s 
As already stated, a 'special connection process' conforms with the system of 
international private law, because it solves a question of that system - the applicability 
of foreign mandatory rules - on a conflict of laws level, by means of conflict rules. The 
Schuldstatuts-theory and the Substantive Law approach transfer this question to the 
level of substantive law and take account of a third country's mandatory rules as alleged 
'facts' , and not as rules, within the operative facts of substantive rules of the lex 
causae. 186 
f Does the special connection imply a departure from the traditional allocation 
technique? 
It has been said that the Special Connection Theory implies a methodological return to 
unilateral ism, since the proposed conflict rules would not indicate a specific national 
legal system, but start from the foreign mandatory rule that claims application. 187 In 
theory, this would mean that the judge must examine every legal system in the world to 
establish whether it contains a mandatory provision claiming application. 188 But, as 
already emphasised,189 this is not the starting point of most of the advocates of the 
Special Connection Theory, despite the fact that there are some authors who expressly 
favour a move towards unilateralism, and thus start with the question of which foreign 
law claims application. 190 No forum state is obliged to accept a foreign rule's claim of 
application. It is the autonomous decision of the lex fori whether and how it is to give 
effect to foreign rules. 191 Hence, the starting point should rather be discovering whether 
185 Schiffer Normen 147,166. 
186 See supra section 3, band g. 
187 SchurigLois 55, 66 et seq; id RabelsZ 54 (1990) 217,236; Coester ZVerglRWlss 82 (1983) 1,10,29; 
Mentzel Sonderankiipfung 126. 
188 Schurig Kollisionsnormen 197,323; Schubert RlW 1987,729,734,741. Both favour a special 
treatment of internationally mandatory rules; von Bar IPR Ed I Rn 266. 
189 Supra section 3, b, g . 
190 For example, Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992 I) 13, 168. 
191 Also see Becker Sonderankniipfung 56; Lorenz RlW 1987,569,578. 
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there is a country with which the situation has a close connection, or whether the forum 
has an interest in applying a foreign rule. 192 
The close connection is a connecting factor that is well known and broadly accepted 
in international private law. 193 In general, the plea of one contracting party will in any 
event indicate the legal system and its mandatory provision prohibiting a certain 
conduct or action, which might be taken into account by the forum. 194 A 'special 
connection' is examined only where the enacting legal system has a (close) connection 
with the situation, which implies that the claim of application is not the primary 
condition for a special connection, but only one of the conditions. 195 The self-limitation 
of foreign rules is regarded within the choice oflaw process as a kind of 'limitation-
factor', since application of foreign mandatory rules that pursue public interests, and do 
not claim application, cannot be justified. 196 Understood in this manner, a 'special 
connection' conforms with the principled and structured system of international private 
law. 
Recognition of the foreign rule's self-limitation indicates an acceptance of renvoi, a 
matter that is normally excluded from the choice of law of contracts. 197 However, the 
supporters of all the theories apply or take into account foreign internationally 
mandatory rules only in so far as they claim application. This is even true of the 
advocates of the Schuldstatuts-theory, according to which internationally mandatory 
rules are applicable if they belong to the proper law as designated by the ordinary 
conflict rules, claim application, and do not infringe the forum's ordre public. 198 
Acceptance of renvoi does not create difficulties for the Special Connection Theory, 
since the application of internationally mandatory rules is based upon separate conflict 
192 See among others Mentzel Sonderankniipfung 126; Sonnenberger FS Rebmann 819,827,833; Lorenz 
RlW 1987,569,578; Martiny IPRax 1987,277,279; MtinchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 99. 
193 Schiffer Normen 160 et seq and see art 4 (1) RC for the objective connection of contracts. 
194 Lehmann ZRP 1987, 319, 321; Schiffer Normen 161. 
195 Schiffer Normen 161; MtinchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 99; Schubert RlW 1987,729,734 et seq; 
already Zweigert RabelsZ 14 (1942) 283, 285 and Wengler ZverglRWiss 54 (1941) 168, 183; supra 
section 3, b, g. 
196 Schiffer Normen 160; Morscher Rechtssetzungakte 58,59; MUnchKomm! Martiny Art 34 Rn 99; 
MUnch Komm/Sonnenberger Einl Rn 59 et seq. For similar proposals made by the critics of the 'putative' 
unilateral approach, see Schurig Lois 66 et seq; id RabelsZ 54 (1990) 217, 236; Schubert RlW 1987, 729, 
735, 745 . 
197 Also see Radtke ZverglRWiss 84 (1985) 325, 343; Kreuzer Ausliindisches Wirtschaftsrecht 90. 
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rules, reference to which is dependent on the foreign law's claim of application. 199 In 
contrast, the Schuldstatuts-theory assumes that the reference to ordinary conflict rules 
covers internationally mandatory rules, which would normally mean that the attached 
conflict rule is to be disregarded. In order to recognise the self-limitation these authors 
have to argue that the territorial scope of the rule is part of its material content instead of 
an attached conflict rule.20o 
It is however acknowledged that a 'special connection process' differs from the 
orthodox choice of law process because it is supplemented by a more policy-orientated 
investigation. Such an investigation takes account of the purpose of the foreign rule, the 
interests of the involved states in an application of the foreign rule, and the result of its 
application.201 
g Other objections to a 'special connection process' 
The other arguments refer to the conflict rules proposed for a 'special connection 
process'. Advocates of this theory have been criticised for being unable to develop clear 
criteria in terms of which foreign mandatory laws are applicable and capable of being 
connected separately. Nothing more than a comprehensive or blanket clause was 
formulated. In particular, Article 7 (1) of the Rome Convention, with its vague criteria 
and the broad discretion granted to the judge, would lead to uncertainty.202 The 
objections to art 7 (1) of the Rome Convention will be discussed later.203 Furthermore, 
all attempts to distinguish criteria for the comprehensive clauses, such as 'a close 
connection', failed. 204 
In the present author's opinion this criticism is not justified. Convincing attempts 
have been made to specify the criteria of a close connection with reference to different 
198 See Mann FS Wahl 139, 153, 160. 
199 Schurig RabelsZ 54 (1990) 217,238; also see Radtke ZvergIRWiss 84 (1985) 325,343 Footnote 71; 
Kreuzer Auslandisches Wirtschaftsrecht 90, 91. 
200 Critically, Radtke ZverglRWiss 84 (l985) 325, 343 Footnote 71; Schubert RlW 1987,729,732,733 . 
201 Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (I 992 I) 9, 169; Guedj Am J Camp L 39 (l991) 661 et seq. 
202 Schafer FG Sandrock 39, 47, 48; Mann FS Beitzke 607, 613 et seq, 617; Sandrock Steinschulte 
Handbuch Rn 194; Coester ZverglRWis 82 (l983) 1,29,30; Heini ZSR 100 (1981) 65, 68 et seq. 
203 See infra CHAPTER 5, IV, I. 
204 Heini BerGesVR 22 (1982) 37, 43; Mann FS Beitzke 607, 613. 
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contracts and mandatory provisions.205 Furthermore, the advocates of a special 
connection have developed useful criteria to assist judges in exercising their discretion, 
such as equality of interests and shared values.206 Finally, it has to be noted that 
advocates of the Special Connection Theory have recently said that the problem cannot 
be solved by the development of a comprehensive clause, but rather by the creation of 
special conflict rules for certain areas of law where internationally mandatory rules are 
typically involved.207 
It has further been argued that the Special Connection Theory is not useful because 
the diversity of opinions within it shows that the criteria of a conflict rule, pointing 
towards the applicable internationally mandatory rules, are not yet clarified.20s However, 
it is doubtful whether this criticism is justified. As was shown above, all the different 
approaches use the same criteria to determine whether a foreign rule is applicable: the 
close connection as a spatial criterion and equality of interests as a kind of 'content-
control' of the foreign rule. Nevertheless, it is conceded by the advocates of the Special 
Connection Theory that a central problem of this theory is specifying the criteria for a 
special connection.209 
The Special Connection Theory has also been criticised for not being flexible 
enough to cope with the different effects of mandatory rules on private relationships, 
since the legal consequence of a special connection would clearly be the application of 
the foreign rule.2lO This argument is not necessarily correct with regard to the advocated 
'special connection process' and is not true of art 7 (1) ofthe Rome Convention and art 
19 of the Swiss IPRG.2Il The judge has a discretion to decide whether and how effect is 
to be given to a foreign rule, which can mean application or consideration as a rule or as 
205 MtinchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 100 et seq; see supra section 3, d, h. 
206 See Kreuzer Auslandisches Wirtschaftsrecht 93 et seq and section 3, d, i. 
207 Schubert RlW 1987, 729, 745; Sonnenberger FS Rebmann 819,831 et seq, 834; Lorenz RlW 1987, 
569,581; Schurig RabelsZ 54 (1990) 217, 239. 
208 Schafer FG Sandrock 39, 47; Heini BerGesVR 22 (1982) 37, 38,43; Lorenz RlW 1987,569,581. 
209 Becker Sonderanknupfung 82; Lehmann Zwingendes Recht 321; Siehr RabelsZ 52 (1988) 41, 72. 
210 Mtilbert IPRax 1986, 140, 141; Schafer FG Sandrock 39,48; Radtke ZverglRWiss 84 (1985) 325, 
353. For the opposite position, that a consideration within the German bani mores would lead to a nullity 
sanction regardless of the foreign rule's legal consequences, Kreuzer Auslandisches Wirtschaftsrecht 86 . 
211 See supra section 3, j and infra CHAPTER 5, IV, I, e; also see Schurig RabelsZ 54 (1990) 217,240 . 
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a fact within the applicable substantive law. This flexibility is the very advantage of a 
comprehensive clause.212 
The difficulty of determining whether a foreign rule claims application regardless 
of the proper law of the contract remains. It is not an easy task to determine the 
internationally mandatory character of a foreign rule, particularly where the rule does 
not contain an express term and its international scope has to be deduced from an 
interpretation of its purpose. All that can be submitted here is that in cases of doubt, 
where the scope of applicability cannot be clearly determined the foreign rule should not 
applied or considered.213 
Furthermore, it should be noted that the Special Connection Theory cannot deal 
with all situations in which foreign rules claim application and affect private 
relationships. Therefore, in cases where a rule cannot be applied on a conflict of laws 
level, the factual effects of mandatory rules within the substantive rules of the lex 
causae have to be considered.214 However, it can at least be stated that this secondary 
consideration on the level of substantive law can be reduced to the situation where the 
rule has an actual impact on the relationship, if the foreign state has enforced its rule 
already, or if the sanctions are so great that it would cause undue hardship to the debtor 
to perform in violation of the rule. 
h International comity, decisional harmony 
The advantage of the Special Connection Theory is that it serves decisional harmony, 
because it does not exclude application of foreign internationally mandatory rules 
pursuing public interests, but has developed criteria and principles to give effect to these 
rules on a conflict of laws level.215 Secondary special conflict rules refer to foreign 
internationally mandatory rules independently of the normal conflict rules, and therefore 
refer to rules from the lex causae and from a third legal system. The mutual assistance 
212 Siehr RabelsZ 52 (1988) 41, 72, 73. 
2lJ Lorenz RlW 1987,569,578,579; Siehr RabelsZ 52 (1988) 41,92, for criticism of the determination 
of the scope ofa foreign rule, see Coester ZVerglRWiss 82 (1983) I, 16. 
214 Radtke ZVerglRWiss 84 (1985) 325, 355; Schafer FG Sandrock 39,53; Schubert RIW 1987,729, 
736. 
215 For this advantage, see MtinchKommIMartiny Art 34 Rn 33; Schiffer Normen 148 et seq; Wengler 
ZverglRWiss 54 (1941) 168, 181; Max Planck Institut RabelsZ 47 (1983) 595, 668. 
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between states in pursuing their national interests is thus served, ie comitas of nations.216 
The Special Connection Theory is able to recognise, within the choice of law process, 
the realities of increasing state intervention in the economy.217 
This reality is not ignored by advocates ofthe Schuldstatuts-theory either. These 
authors cannot avoid taking third countries' internationally mandatory rules into account 
within the substantive law rules of the lex causae, although they declare that these rules 
are inapplicable, because they are not referred to by a conflict rule. 
The better solution, however, is to develop choice of law criteria, on a conflict of 
laws level, for the application of foreign internationally mandatory rules, instead of 
blurring choice of law considerations with the application of substantive law. The 
Special Connection Theory has convincingly shown that the ordinary conflict rules are 
not suitable for rendering internationally mandatory rules applicable. The normal 
conflict rules based on private interests do not recognise the public interests of the 
enacting state. Rules serving the economic and political interests of the state have to be 
connected separately on the basis of conflict rules that consider the conflicting interests 
of the foreign enacting state and the forum. 218 
Combination Theory 
The Combination Theory, which applies all internationally mandatory rules of the lex 
causae because of their belonging to the proper law, and those of a third country by 
means of a 'special connection', can be criticised for the same reasons mentioned in 
respect of both the Schuldstatuts- and the Special Connection theories. Further 
objections to the combination of the theories include the following. 
Because the theory uses two different choice of law rules for the same category (the 
internationally mandatory rule), and because the basic ideas underlying these rules are 
216 Zweigert RabelsZ 14 (1942) 283, 291; MtinchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 33; Schiffer Normen 149 et 
seq; Wengler ZverglRWiss 54 (1941) 168, 181; Max Planck Institut RabelsZ 47 (1983) 595, 669; Erne 
VertragsgUltigkeit 184. 
217 MtinchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 33; Schafer FG Sandrock 37, 47; Hentzen RIW 1988,508 et seq. 
218 Schiffer Normen 151 et seq; Kreuzer Ausldndisches Wirtschaftsrecht 83 et seq; Schubert RIW 1987, 
729,733; Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992 I) 13, 180 et seq; see supra CHAPTER 5, I, 3, a,e. 
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mutually exclusive, the theory is contradictory.219 If one assumes that the ordinary 
choice of law rules for contract are suitable to solve the problem of internationally 
mandatory rules, then it is inconsistent to apply (under certain circumstances) a third 
country's mandatory rules by means of special conflict rules. The inconsistent result of 
this approach is that, on the one hand, internationally mandatory rules are applied on the 
basis of special conflict rules and, on the other hand, on the basis of the normal conflict 
rules as part ofthe proper law.220 
However, in the opinion of the present author, and as stated before, the major 
objection is that the Combination Theory is based on an understanding that the scope of 
reference of the ordinary conflict rules also covers those rules that serve only the public 
interests of the foreign enacting state. As we have already seen, however, the normal 
conflict rules are not appropriate for rendering these rules applicable. 
219 Radtke ZverglRWiss 84 (1985) 325, 332, 351; Schubert RlW 1987,729,736; Schafer FG Sandrock 
39,48; for criticism, see Becker Sonderankniipfung 56 et seq; Drobnig RabelsZ 52 (1988) 1,5. 
220 Radtke ZverglRWiss 84 (1985) 325, 351; Schubert RlW 1987, 729, 736. For criticism of this 
approach, see Becker Sonderankniipfung 76 et seq, who assumes that the lex causae is in principle · 
applicable, but that third countries' mandatory rules can be considered as facts of an issue. 
158 
n German and Swiss case law solutions 
In this section, I will analyse German case law solutions to the question of foreign 
internationally mandatory rules. Unlike Germany, Switzerland has enacted a special 
provision dealing with foreign internationally mandatory rules - art 19 of the Swiss 
IPRG - and so the Swiss case law can be dealt with more briefly.220 The two 
jurisdictions are grouped together because the courts' solutions are, at least 
theoretically, quite similar, and for the purposes ofthis study it is not necessary to 
examine both countries in detail. 221 
As will be seen below, German case law does not express one specific opinion on 
the academic approaches already described. Depending on the facts of the situation, the 
ratio decidendi of each decision varies from case to case, and it is difficult to identify an 
over-arching principle underlying all the cases.222 Nonetheless, the starting point is the 
well established principle in German private international law that the conflict rules 
refer to the foreign law, including its mandatory legislation, and that mandatory rules of 
the forum state or an otherwise applicable legal system are thus excluded.223 With regard 
to the application of internationally mandatory rules, however, this principle is subject 
to a number of exceptions. 
To begin with, the foreign law can be excluded if its application leads to a result 
that infringes the forum's ordre public. (This generally accepted negative function of 
the ordre public is not discussed. 224) There are, however, further exceptions that are 
relevant to the application of mandatory rules of the proper law. The first is the non-
applicability of foreign public law. Basically, the Federal Supreme Court distinguishes 
between (internationally mandatory) rules of private law and those of public law. 
Whereas the former rules are subject to private international law, the latter rules fall 
220 It is dealt with art 19 later in CHAPTER 5, IV. 
221 For an examination, see Erne Vertragsgilltigkeit 12 et seq. However, this is restricted to the question 
whether third countries' internationally mandatory rules can be applied or taken into account so that the 
contract is null and void, see Erne ibid 1,2. 
222 See among all ReithmannlMartinyfLimmer Internationales Vertragsrecht Rn 461; Becker 
Sonderanknupfung 86; Coester ZverglRWiss 82 (1983) 1,30; Orobnig FS Neumayer 159,160; Mentzel 
Sonderanknupfung 89. 
223 MiinchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 24 with further references; ReithmannIMartinyfLimmer 
Internationales Vertragsrecht Rn 452. 
224 For this principle, see Firsching/von Hoffmann IPR 248 et seq; Raape/Sturm IPR Bd 1199 et seq. 
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outside the scope of reference of the nonnal conflict rules. Irrespective of whether they 
stem from the proper law or a third legal system, public law rules are subject to a so-
called Public Conflict of Laws that is based on the principle of territoriality of public 
laws. 
The second exception to the general rule is that, under certain circumstances, 
Gennan courts consider the internationally mandatory rules of third countries as facts 
within the substantive law rules of the proper law. This exception has been categorised 
as the 'substantive law approach' of the Gennan case law. The first exception - that 
public law rules are beyond the scope of reference of the nonnal conflict rules and are 
subject of Public Conflict of Laws - has been designated the' conflict of law approach', 
because the courts' arguments are situated on the level of conflict of laws.225 
Drobnig explains that the Gennan case law uses two different methodological 
rationales, independently of each other, for deciding whether to give effect to foreign 
internationally mandatory rules. On the level of conflict of laws, the application of such 
rules has often been rejected because of their public law character. However, third 
countries' internationally mandatory rules, in particular, have been taken into account as 
facts without any choice oflaw considerations on the level of substantive law.226 
1 The general rule - Application of mandatory rules of the proper law of the 
contract 
The general rule in conflict of laws in Gennany is that, if the conflict rules of the forum 
refer to a foreign legal system as governing the transaction, the rules render applicable -
within their scope - the foreign law, including its facultative and mandatory provisions, 
to the exclusion of the rules of the forum state and any other legal system.227 The crucial 
question in Gennany, however, is whether the choice of law rules, when indicating the 
applicable foreign law, refer to the foreign legal system as a whole, including its public 
225 For this description, see Busse ZverglRWiss 95 (1996) 387, 391, 394 et seq; Bauro RabelsZ 53 (1989) 
152, 155 et seq, Drobnig FS Neumayer 159, 160 et seq; Mentzel Sonderankniipfung 94 et seq; for 
criticism, see Zimmer IPRax 1993,65 et seq. 
226 Drobnig FS Neumayer 159 et seq; Erne Vertragsgiiltigkeit 22 et seq; Baum RabelsZ 53 (1989) 152 et 
seq; Becker ZVerglRWiss 95 (1996) 386,395 et seq; Mentzel Sonderankniipfong 94,97; the situation in 
Switzerland is very similar, see Erne Verlragsgiiltigkeit 12 et seq. 
• 
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law (more precisely, rules that serve public interests) or whether they refer only to 
private law (rules that serve private interests).228 
a 'Proper law doctrine' of the Supreme Court of the German Reich 
The Supreme Court of the German Reich assumed that the choice of law rules of 
international private law referred to the application of the proper law of the contract as a 
whole. Accordingly, internationally mandatory rules ofthe proper law were applied by 
the courts, no matter whether they had a private or public law character, or whether they 
served the interests of the contracting parties,229 or public interests of the foreign state.230 
In accordance with this general rule, foreign export restrictions were held to be 
applicable as part of the proper law of the contract.231 Similarly, under German law prior 
to art VIII (2) (b) of the Bretton Woods Agreement (IMF), the Supreme Court declared 
a contract governed by Russian law void, because it infringed Russian foreign exchange 
regulations.232 In the same way, it applied foreign currency regulations of the proper 
law, despite their public law nature.233 Notorious rulings include the so-called 
'Goldklauselfalle' in which the courts held that a United States enactment was 
applicable provided the proper law was that ofthe United States.234 
227 MilnchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 24; Lehmann ZWingendes Recht 22; StaudingerlMagnus Art 34 Rn 
16. 19; ReithmannlMartinylLimmer Internationales Vertragsrecht Rn 452. 
228 ReithmannlMartinylLimmer Internationales Vertragsrecht 452; Staudinger/Magnus Art 34 Rn 19, 21; 
Kropholler IPR § 52 IX 3; Schurig RabelsZ 54 (1990) 217, 244; this is equally true for Switzerland, see 
Voser Lois d'app/ication immediate 50 et seq. 
229 See Lehmann Zwingendes Recht 22 et seq. Provisions about the non-enforceability of gambling and 
wagering debts were applied by the RG if they formed part of the proper law of the contract and made the 
contract unenforceable, cfRG 10.5.1884 RGZ 12,34 (the proper law was French and Art 1965 Code 
Civil was applied, which reads 'La loi n'accorde aucune action pour une dette du jeu ou pour Ie payement 
d'un pari'); RG 4.4.1929 IPRespr 1929 Nr 31 (the proper law was Swiss and the RG applied Art 513 (1) 
OR: 'Aus Spiel und Wette entsteht keine Forderung'); with regard to usury and immorality cfRG 
26.5.1900,RGZ46,112. 
230 Cf Lehmann Zwingendes Recht 22 et seq, 26 et seq; Kreuzer A uslandisches Wirtschaftsrecht 19. 
231 RG 21.10. 1921 NiemeyersZ 1924,452 et seq, The case concerned a sale of livestock. The court left it 
open whether the contract was governed by German or Dutch law, but stated that if the contract were 
governed by Dutch law the Dutch export restriction would have been applicable as part of the proper law. 
However, the foreign prohibition would violate the interests of German economy and would therefore 
infringe the German ordre public. 
232 RG 1.7.1930 IPRespr 1930 Nr 15; for further references, see Kreuzer Ausldndisches Wirtschaftsrecht 
35 Footnote 99; Becker Sonderanknupfung 90. 
2JJ See Kreuzer A uslandisches Wirtschaftsrecht 41; Lehmann Zwingendes Recht 35. 
234 RG 28.5.1936 RabelsZ 1936, 385 et seq; JW 1936, 2085 et seq; cf Lehmann Zwingendes Recht 33 
with regard to the historical background and the' Joint Resolution' of 5.3.1933, in which the legislature 
of the United States determined that all obligations expressed in US-Dollars were to be settled in the par 
value Dollar notes irrespective of agreed Gold clauses and irrespective of the lex causae. 
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However, although these rules were in principle held to be applicable, the German 
courts often refused to apply in particular public law rules, and corrected undesirable 
outcomes by an extensive application of the public policy exclusionary rule. 235 Another 
common method of avoiding the application of mandatory rules was to apply a different 
law as the proper law.236 
b Principle of 'non-applicability of foreign public law', 'International 
Administrative Law' or 'Public Conflict of Laws' in the Federal Supreme Court 
In a leading case in 1959 the seventh Senate of the Federal Supreme Court abandoned 
the proper law approach of the Supreme Court of the German Reich and broke with the 
former case law.237 The case concerned a foreign exchange control regulation and was 
based on German national law, since the Bretton Woods Agreement of 1122 July 1944238 ,. 
was not applicable. 
The facts of the decision were as follows. In 1948 the defendant borrowed the sum 
of RM 10.000. from Mrs W. Both parties to the loan agreement were resident in the 
Soviet Zone of Germany, the Democratic Republic (DDR) as it then was. A statute was 
enacted in 1950 stipulating that the assignment of debts in respect of debtors resident in 
the Federal Republic required the consent of the Ministry in the Soviet Zone, otherwise 
the cession was invalid according to the law of the Soviet Zone. In 1955 the defendant 
moved to the Federal Republic, and in 1957 Mrs W. assigned his debt to the plaintiff, 
who resided in the Federal Republic, without the consent of the Ministry. In his defence, 
the defendant relied on the statute of 1950 and argued that the cession was invalid.239 
The court, however, did not uphold his defence and the plaintiff succeeded. 
The Federal Supreme Court investigated whether the assignment of the loan debt in 
1957 was invalid because it violated the foreign exchange control regulation of the 
235 Cf Kreuzer Auslandisches Wirtschaftsrecht 19; RG 21.1 0.1921 NiemeyersZ 1924, 452; RG 28.5.1936 
RabelsZ 1936,385,388. 
236 This happened in the so called 'Rubelfallen' where German courts were faced with the economic 
consequences of the Russian Revolution between the two World Wars, Lehmann Zwingendes Recht 28 et 
seq; Becker Sonderankniipfung 91; for example RG 3.10.1923 RGZ 108,241 . 
237 BGH 17.12.1959 BGHZ 31,367 et seq. 
238 In legal force in Germany since 14.8.1952, BGB!. 1952 II, 728. 
239 For a summary of the facts, see Mann Rec des Cours 132 (1971 I) 107, 161, 187 who criticises the 
rationale and conclusion of the judgment. 
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German Democratic Republic. In its reasoning the court left open the question of 
whether the proper law of the loan contract was that of the Federal Republic (FR)or that 
of the German Democratic Republic (GDR).240 The court adopted the so-called principle 
of 'non-applicability offoreign public law' (Grundsatz der Nichtanwendung 
auslandischen offentlichen Rechts) from the law of expropriation, and applied it to the 
'interzonal,241 foreign exchange control law. 
It was held that the applicability of the GDR's foreign exchange control regulation 
had to be determined independently of the proper law of the contract, because of the 
fundamental distinction between private and Public Conflict of Laws.242 The former was 
said to rest 'upon the idea of recognition and application of foreign private law 
according to statutory or customary rules'. The latter emanated from the idea of 
territoriality oflaw: 'It is dominated by the concept that provisions of public law have 
in principle no effect beyond the frontiers of the legislating state', ie the principle of 
non-applicability of foreign public law. 243 
However, the court ruled that the principle of non-applicability of foreign public 
law was subject to exceptions. With reference to a decision by the Federal Tribunal of 
Switzerland/44 it stated, very vaguely, that foreign restraints of competition of public 
law might nevertheless 'exclusively or at least primarily serve the protection or interests 
of individuals or the fair reconciliation between them', and that it is 'not unthinkable' 
that these rules might under certain circumstances have an influence (effect) on 
domestic private relationships.245 However, this exception did not apply to foreign 
(restraints on disposition) rules of public law which served the implementation of the 
240 The court of appeal held that the foreign law was not applicable because the proper law of the contract 
changed to the law of the Federal Republic by hypothetical intention of the parties, see 17.12.1959 
BGHZ 31,367,369,370. 
241 Federal Republic and Democratic Republic of Germany, BGH 17.12.1959 BGHZ 31, 367, 371, 373, 
and later to international foreign exchange law BGH 19.4.1962 VII. ZS IPRespr 1962/63 Nr 163, cf 
Kreuzer Auslandisches Wirtschaftsrecht 37 for further references. 
242 BGH 17.12.1959 BGHZ 31,367,370. 
243 BGH ibid 371; cfMann Rec des Cours 132 (1971 I) 107, 187. 
244 BGE 80 II, 53, 61 et seq. 
245 BGH ibid 371, the statement is extremely vague and difficult to translate, cf' ... Es scheint auch nicht 
undenkbar, daB derartigem Offentlichen Recht ungeachtet seiner grundsatzlich territorial beschrankten 
Wirksamkeit unter bestimmten Voraussetzungen nicht jeder Einflull auf inlandische Privatrechtsverhalt-
nisse abzusprechen ist.. .. ' 
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legislating state's economic or political purposes. These rules were subject to the Public 
Conflict oj Laws and were thus in principle not applicable.246 
The court noted that German courts apply and enforce such public laws only if and 
to the extent that the foreign state holds the power to enJorce their provisions.247 In the 
case of state interference in a debt, the foreign state has the power to enforce its law if 
the debtor resides within the enacting state.248 With regard to the foreign exchange 
control regulation of the GDR, the court ruled that it served the welfare of the state, not 
the interests of the contracting parties, and was thus not applicable beyond the territorial 
borders of the GDR. In addition, the relevant authorities of the GDR did not have the 
power to enforce the legislation, because the debtor had assets in the Federal Republic. 
Finally, the judgment referred to a further exception to the principle of 
territoriality: With regard to International Conventions, such as the Bretton Woods 
Agreement, art VIII (2) (b) IMF, foreign exchange restrictions should be recognised. 249 
However, in the present case the IMF agreement was inapplicable because the foreign 
exchange regulation emanated from the GDR, which was not a member state of the 
Convention.250 
These principles developed by the Seventh Senate in 1959 have been confirmed by 
the same senate in later judgments, with regard to Austrian exchange control regulations 
and Polish currency regulations/51 and have been adopted by other senates of the 
Federal Supreme COurt.252 In most judgments, the court either left open the question of 
246 BGH 17.12.1959 BGHZ 31, 367, 371, 372. 
247 The court's wording was that the foreign law 'is taken into consideration and enforced', BGH ibid 
372,373; see also BGH 28.1.1965 IzRspr 1964/65 Nr 68; BGH 16.4.1975 (I ZS) BGHZ 64,183,190. 
248 BGH ibid 373. 
249 BGH ibid 373. 
250 Also see BGH 28.1.1965 IzRspr 1964/65 Nr 68. In BGH 19.4.1962 IPRespr 1962/63 Nr 163 an 
Austrian exchange control regulation was applied despite its public law character and the principle of 
territoriality of public law, because Austria was a member state of the Bretton Woods Agreement and the 
Austrian legislation was applied on basis of art VIII (2) (b) IMF. 
251 BGH 19.4.1962 (VII ZS) IPRespr 1962/63 Nr 163; cfalso BGH 18.2.1965 (VII ZS) BGHZ 43,162, 
165 et seq. The court held that a Polish currency regulation radically reducing the original amount of a 
loan, the proper law of which was Polish law, was not applicable. In place of the Polish regulation rules 
of German law were substituted. Alternatively, the court also upheld the territoriality of public law rules 
as well as the need to determine the law applicable to currency separately from the proper law of the 
contract. For the facts, see Mann Rec des Cours 132 (1971 I) 107, 193. 
252 BGH 28.1.1965 (Ia ZS) IzRespr 1964/65 Nr 68 concerning the foreign exchange regulation as well as 
an expropriation provision of the GDR, which were held to be inapplicable; BGH 16.4.1975 (I ZS) 
BGHZ 64, 183, 189 ('August Vierzehn' or 'Solchenizyn'). For the facts of this case see (2) (a); also see 
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whether the foreign public law rule was part of the proper law, or was concerned with 
the application of a third country's public law rule to a German contract, a situation 
which is dealt with in the next section. Nearly all the cases where the principle of non-
applicability of foreign public law rules was invoked by the courts resulted in such rules 
not being applied.253 
c Exceptions to the 'principle of non-applicability of foreign public law' 
The Federal Supreme Court mentioned on several occasions the exceptions to the 
principle of non-applicability of foreign public law. It asked whether the foreign 
regulation served to protect the interests of individuals or to reconcile those interests, or 
whether the foreign state had the power to implement its public law. The consequences 
of both exceptions are vague. 
(1) The foreign public law rule serves predominantly private interests 
Although the exception in favour of public law rules serving only or primarily private 
interests or the fair reconciliation of the contracting parties has been affirmed several 
times, it was applied only once in a judgment concerning the foreign adjudication of 
bankruptcy.254 
As to the consequences of this exception, the Federal Supreme Court said in its 
leading case that it was 'not unthinkable' that these rules might affect 'domestic private 
relationships' . In later judgments the court stated that, at least with regard to those 
public law rules that do not serve private interests but serve economic and state-political 
interests of the foreign enacting country, the principle of tc:rritoriality, and, as its 
BGH 8.4.1976 (II ZS) VersR 1976,678 (for a foreign import restriction); BGH 11.7.1985 (IX ZS) BGHZ 
95,256,264,265 (for foreign bankruptcy proceedings); BGH 17.11.1994 (III ZS) BGHZ 128,41,52 
(foreign trade restriction based on a state monopoly); OLG Hamburg 6.5.1993 RlW 1994, 686, 687 
(foreign import restrictions). 
253 In BGH 19.4.1962 (VII ZS) IPRespr 1962/63 Nr 163 an Austrian foreign exchange control regulation 
was held to be applicable because of art VIII (2) (b) IMF, but the court made it clear that the foreign law 
would not otherwise have been applied. 
254 11.7.1985 (IX ZS) BGHZ 95, 256, 264, 265 with regard to a Belgian bankruptcy proceeding and held 
that adjudication of bankruptcy in a foreign country includes the domestic assets, since the bankruptcy 
proceedings, despite their public law nature, serve the fair reconciliation of the interests of the contracting 
parties; see also Baurn RabelsZ 53 (1989) 152, 158. 
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consequence, the principle of non-applicability of foreign public law applies.255 Does 
this exception mean that these rules could be applied or considered only if they fonn 
part of the proper law, or could it lead to an application or consideration of a third 
country's public law rule?256 The scope of this exception is uncertain, particularly 
because, apart from in the bankruptcy case, the Federal Supreme Court never applied 
(2) The foreign state has the power to enforce its law 
The second exception to the principle of non-applicability of foreign public law, that the 
foreign state is able to enforce its law, has also often been discussed.258 It is debated by 
scholars whether this exception results in application of the foreign provision or in a 
consideration of the factual effects of the foreign provision within the substantive law of 
the governing legal system.259 
The Federal Supreme Court applied this exception in only one case.260 The facts 
were complicated and will not be repeated here. The crucial question was whether GDR 
foreign exchange regulations, as well as a rule of an expropriatory nature, applied to a 
contract. At the time of conclusion of the contract in 1955, both parties were residents of 
the GDR. In 1960, however, the plaintiff moved his habitual residence to the Federal 
Republic. Despite the fact that the court held that the contract was governed by the law 
ofthe GDR, it refused to apply both the foreign exchange regulation and the 
expropriatory rule, because these rules were subject to the Public Conflict of Laws and 
thus territorially limited in their scope to the GDR.261 
The court examined the first exception to the principle of territoriality and the non-
applicability of foreign public law, and held that both laws served the public interest and 
not the interests ofthe parties. With regard to the second exception it stated that: 
255BGH 16.4.1975BGHZ64, 183, 189. 
256 For this assumption, see Busse ZverglRWiss 95 (1996) 387, 396; Baum RabelsZ 53 (1989) 152, 156. 
257 See Drobnig FS Neumayer 159, 161, 167; Lehmann Zwingendes Recht 43,45; Mentzel 
Sonderanknilpfung 97. 
258 BGH 17.12.1959 BGHZ 31,367,372; BGH 28.1.1965 IzRespr 1964/65 Nr 68; BGH 16.4.1975 
BGHZ 64, 183, 190. 
259 For different interpretations, see Baum RabelsZ 53 (1989) 152, 156; Drobnig FS Neumayer 159, 161, 
167; Busse ZVerglRWiss 95 (1996) 387, 397, 398. 
260 BGH 28.1.1965 IzRespr 1964/65 Nr 68. 
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A German court considers and enforces only exceptionally the civil law 
consequences of a foreign exchange control regulation ... in the private relationship 
if and in so far the foreign state has the power to enforce its law. 
Concerning the foreign exchange control regulation, the court held that the foreign state 
did not have the power to enforce its law, since the debtor had assets in the territory of 
the Federal Republic and the plaintiff resided there. Concerning the foreign 
expropriation rule, the court held that the foreign state was able to enforce the law (and 
in fact, had already enforced it). Although the second exception was in principle 
applicable, the court nevertheless refused to apply the foreign regulation because it was 
held to be contrary to the German ordre public. 
Finally, with regard to both provisions, the court held that despite their 
inapplicability because of the conflict of public laws and the violation of the German 
ordre public, the actual or de facto effects of the foreign provisions on the private 
relationship may be taken into account and may lead to impossibility of performance. 262 
Thus, it can be stated that the foreign public law rule is applied (as a result of 
conflict of laws considerations) if the foreign state has the power to enforce its law. In 
this case, the court refused to apply the foreign public law rule because of a violation of 
the German ordre public, despite the ability of the foreign country to enforce it. 
Nevertheless, it is still possible to take into account the de facto effects of the provision 
on the private relationship within the substantive law rules.263 
d Swiss case law solutions 
The principle of non-applicability of foreign public law was also used in Switzerland to 
prevent the application of foreign public law rules despite their belonging to the proper 
law. However, the early Swiss judgments were often based on a number of reasons. 
261 Ibid. 
262 For details of the facts and reasoning of this decision, see Drobnig FS Neumayer 159, 169; Busse 
ZVerglRWiss 96 (1995) 386, 398; Becker Sonderankniipfung 92; Kreuzer Auslandisches 
Wirtschaflsrecht 38,51. 
263 For criticism of the application of the ordre public where the foreign state has the power to enforce its 
law and the double-examination of the provision on the level of conflict of laws and afterwards on the 
level of substantive law, see Drobnig FS Neumayer 159, 169 et seq. 
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Sometimes non-application was based on an infringement of the Swiss ordre public/64 
on other occasions judgments referred to the principle of non-application of foreign 
public laws, based on the notion that choice of law rules refer only to foreign private 
law, not to public law. By relying on the principle of territoriality it was held that public 
law rules are only applicable within the borders of the enacting country.265 
In the leading case of the Swiss Federal Tribunal in 1954/66 the court deviated from 
the former case law in that it rejected a strict adherence to the principle of non-
application offoreign public laws. However, it did not adopt the proper law doctrine 
according to which all mandatory rules of the proper law are in principle applicable, 
irrespective of their private or public law nature. Instead, the court differentiated 
between different kinds of public law rules and thus laid the foundations of German case 
law.267 
Again, the facts of the case are complicated and shall not be repeated here.268 The 
crucial question was whether Dutch emergency legislation, enacted after the Second 
World War, which rendered void any shares or securities acquired by looting during the 
German occupation, could be applied. The court held that the proper law of the 
transaction was Dutch and classified the Dutch legislation as public law. It referred to 
the principle of non-applicability of foreign public law but rejected the strict adherence 
to this principle, due to the principle of unity of a legal system. Instead it differentiated 
rules on the basis of their purpose. It stated that: 
As long as an encroachment upon private law or private relationships with public 
means intends to serve only or predominantly the protection of private interests (in 
contrast to direct interests of the state), there is no need for a Swiss judge to refuse 
to apply the foreign law for the sole reason of its public law nature. 269 
264 BGE 60 II 294, 311 et seq (German exchange control regulations); BGE 62 II 108, 110; BGE 64 II 88, 
96 et seq (gold clause prohibition); BGE 67 II 215; BGE 68 II 203, 210. 
265 BGE 39 II 640, 652; BGE 42 II 179, 183; BGE 61 II 242, 246 BGE 74 II 224, 229; BGE 76 II 33, 41 
et seq; cf Sturm FS Moser 3, 14 et seq; Morscher Rechtssetzungsakte 48 et seq. 
266 (BG 2.2.1954) BGE 80 II 53 et seq. 
267 In BGHZ 31,367 et seq. 
268 For facts and reasoning HonselllVogt/SchnyderlMachler-Eme Art 13 Rn 13; Voser Lois d'app/ication 
immediate 66; Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992) 21, 183. 
269 BGE 80 II 53, 62. 
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The Swiss court regarded the Dutch legislation as applicable despite its public law 
character, because its purpose was the protection of private property. The regulations 
were therefore held to be in the interests of the individuals and to support the purpose of 
foreign private law. Thus, the court distinguished between foreign public law serving 
primarily 'selfish' interests of the foreign state on the one hand, and foreign public law 
protecting the interests of individuals and supplementing foreign private law on the 
other.270 Only the latter public law rules were held to be applicable, while the former are 
inapplicable on the basis of territoriality. 271 
The principles developed in this case have been affirmed several times in later 
decisions ofthe Swiss Federal Tribunal.272 However, foreign public law rules were 
always applied if required by an international Convention or a special choice of law 
rule. 273 
e Concluding remarks 
In conclusion, it can be stated: 
(1) The Federal Supreme Court - by abandoning the Schuldstatuts-theory, which was 
at least formally supported by the Supreme Court of the German Reich - distinguished 
between internationally mandatory rules of a private and public law nature. The former 
are subject to private international law and are therefore applied if they form part of the 
proper law of the contract. The latter are subject to Public Conflict of Laws, based on 
the principle of territoriality, and are accordingly not applicable outside the territory of 
the legislating country. 
(2) However, the principle of non-applicability is subject to exceptions. The first 
exception, which was developed by the Swiss Federal Tribunal in a leading case of 1954 
and adopted by the Federal Supreme Court in 1959, emanates from a functional 
distinction between different kinds of public laws: viz. public law rules serving private 
270 See Voser Lois d 'application immediate 67 et seq; Morscher Rechtssetzungsakte 85, 86. 
271 BGE 80 II 53, 61 et seq. 
272 CfStunn in FS Moser 3,14 et seq; in particular BGE 95 II 109, 114; BGE 82 I 196, 197; BGE 83 II 
312,319; compare as well the relatively recent judgment of26.11.1981 in BGE 107 II 489, 492 
273 Cfonly BGE 82 1196,197; BGE 95 II 109,114, HonsellNogtJSchneider/Machler-Eme Art 13 Rn 18. 
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interests and those that pursue the public interests of the foreign state. Only the latter 
are held to fall under the principle of territoriality, while the former, although of a 
public law nature, might well, under certain circumstances, 'have some effect on the. 
private relationship' under certain circumstances, because they can be classified as an 
integral part of the system of private law. 
The content and the result ofthis exception is, however, uncertain. The decisions of 
the Federal Supreme Court lack clarity regarding the circumstances under which foreign 
public law serving private interests may be applied. Furthermore, it is by no means clear 
how the foreign rule is given effect, viz. whether the court applies it in the direct sense 
or simply considers it as fact. German courts applied this exception only once in a case 
where an act of the state was in question, rather than a foreign rule, and this was in a 
bankruptcy case. In the leading Swiss case of 1954, however, this exception had already 
resulted in application of the foreign public law rule as part of the Dutch proper law. 
Most academic authors refer to the distinction made by the Swiss Federal Tribunal 
and the German Supreme Court between different kinds of public law rules according to 
the interests pursued by the rule and this distinction is used to separate internationally 
mandatory rules from mandatory rules in a domestic sense.274 It seems reasonable to 
agree with most of the German and Swiss commentators that foreign public law rules 
serving predominantly private interests are subject to private international law and are 
thus applied as part of the proper law.275 Thus, the principle of non-applicability of 
foreign public laws is restricted to rules that pursue public interests of the foreign state. 
274 Foreign rules serving predominantly private interests are mandatory in a domestic sense and applied as 
part of the proper law. Rules pursuing public interests of the foreign state are internationally mandatory 
rules. See, for instance, Drobnig FS Neumayer 159, 161, 167; Voser Lois d'app/ication immediate 50 et 
seq, 66 et seq; Morscher Rechtssetzungsakte 87, 88; Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992 I) 13, 184; Schiffer 
Normen 30,31,74; Schubert RIW 1987,729,731; Radtke ZVerglRWiss 84 (1985) 325, 328. 
275 See similar Lehmann Zwingendes Recht 43; Voser Lois d'app/ication immediate 58 et seq, 62 et seq, 
66 et seq. But it has to be admitted that this conclusion is not cogent: The exception was mentioned in 
cases where the foreign mandatory provision emanated from the lex causae as well as in cases where it 
came from a 'third' country. Thus it might well be possible that these rules would be applied regardless 
of the proper law and thus connected separately (be subject to a 'special connection'). CfBusse 
ZverglR Wiss 96 (1995) 386, 400 also with regard to international mandatory rules of a private law; see 
also von Hoffmann RabelsZ 38 (1974) 397, 407, 418. However, in this regard case Jaw gives no clear 
guidance, as it was more concerned with the question of whether foreign rules belonging to the lex 
causae were excluded from application because of their public law character. 
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(3) In a further step the Federal Supreme Court formulated a second exception to the 
general inapplicability of foreign public laws. This exception concerns, in particular, 
those rules that pursue public interests of the foreign state. The court held that according 
to the principles of International Administrative Law or Public Conflict of Laws, the 
latter rules are only applicable outside their territory to the extent that the foreign state 
has the power to enforce them. The scope of this exception is narrowly defined by the 
courts, and it has been applied in only one case where the foreign state had de facto 
already enforced the provision already.276 Finally, there is the further possibility of 
taking into account only the actual effects of a foreign provision within the substantive 
law, despite its inapplicability on a conflict of laws level. 277 
2 Internationally mandatory rules of a third country 
With regard to the internationally mandatory rules of third countries the Federal 
Supreme Court's above-mentioned structurally different solutions - the solution on a 
conflict of laws level and consideration as fact within the substantive law of the lex 
causae - become even more evident. In general, it can be stated that the' conflict 
solution', which is based on the so-called Public Conflict of Laws, had the result that the 
foreign rule which had been functionally classified as territorially limited public law, 
was never directly applied nor considered as fact within the substantive law of the lex 
causae. 278 
However, there are a number of cases where German courts considered the foreign 
legislation (irrespective of its public law character) within the German substantive law 
that constituted the governing law of the contract. This Substantive Law Approach 
(materiellrechtlicher Ansatz) originated in the Supreme Court of the German Reich and 
was adopted by the Federal Supreme Court. The infringement of the foreign rule was 
considered to the extent that the contract was deemed immoral, and the rule could thus 
render the contract invalid. Alternatively, the actual effects of the foreign rule on the 
276 See BGH 28.1.1965 IzRespr 1964/65 Nr 68; also see Drobnig FS Neumayer 159, 168. 
277 Regardless of whether the foreign provision is inapplicable because it is of a public law character or 
because it violates the forum's ordre public, cfBGH 28.1.1965 IzRespr 1964/65 Nr 68; also see Drobnig 
FS Neumayer 159, 168; RG 28.6.1918 RGZ 93, 182, 183 about which see later; for the contrary opinion 
of Swiss courts, see BGE 60 II 294, 311 et seq; BGE 64 II 88, 100. 
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private relationship were taken into account, and the rule could render performance 
impossible. 
What is characteristic ofthese judgments is that the foreign provisions are 
considered on the level of substantive law without any conflict of laws consideration: 
The judgments do not refer to the so-called Public Conflict of Laws, or to the principles 
of territoriality and non-applicability of foreign public law.279 In the Supreme Court of 
the German Reich the inapplicability of a third country's rule followed from the fact 
that the contract was governed exclusively and entirely by the lex causae.280 However, 
the Federal Supreme Court rejected this theory in its leading case in 1959, and held that 
public law rules are subject to Public Conflict of Laws, which is independent from the 
proper law as indicated by the ordinary conflict rules of private internationallaw.281 
The differing solutions, the lack of uniform decisions, and the lack of 
methodologically sound explanations according to the general principles of conflict of 
laws have been the subject of much criticism. It has therefore been argued that German 
case law has not been able to develop congruent and uniform criteria to deal with the 
problem of the application of foreign internationally mandatory rules.282 However, in 
few judgments the Federal Supreme Court combined or at least referred to both 
solutions as follows: Third countries' internationally mandatory rules (of public law) 
have in principle not been applied on a conflict of laws level, but under certain 
circumstances have been taken into account as 'fact' within the substantive rules of the 
proper law.283 
278 See only BGH 17.12.1959 BGHZ 31,367 et seq; BGH 16.4.1975 BGHZ 64, 183 et seq. 
279 All the decided cases concerned 'false third country' cases: German law was held to govern the 
transaction and the issue was whether and how a foreign internationally mandatory provision could be 
applied. CfMiinchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 49; Lehmann ZWingendes Recht 12,45. 
280 Also see the above mentioned Schuldstatuts-theory. 
281 As elaborated by Drobnig (id FS Neumayer 159, 160 et seq) the incompatible solutions emanate from 
the different senates of the Federal Supreme Court. The seventh senate submitted that foreign public law 
rules were inapplicable, while third countries' mandatory rules were - as will be seen - considered within 
the substantive law of the proper law several times by the eighth and the second senate. See BGH 
21.12.1960 (VIII ZS) BGHZ 34, 169; BGH 24.5 .1962 (II ZS) NJW 1962, 1436; BGH 22.6.1972 (II ZS) 
BGHZ 59,82; BGH 29.9.1977 (III ZS) BGHZ 69, 295. 
282 ReithmannlMartinylLimmer Internationales Vertragsrecht 461; Mentzel Sonderanknupfung 94; also 
see Schubert RIW 1987,729,737; Radtke ZVerglRWiss 84 (1985) 325, 341, 345 et seq; Kratz 
Auslandische Eingriffsnormen 80-84. 
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a Non-applicability ofthird countries' public law - Public Conflict of Laws 
In some cases concerning the mandatory public law provisions of a third country, the 
Federal Supreme Court adopted the principle of non-applicability offoreign public laws 
and the distinction between different kinds of public laws. 
For instance, in the notorious Solzhenitsyn case in 1975, the court was concerned 
with a Russian trade restriction. The plaintiff, a Swiss publisher, had purchased the 
copyright for the novel 'August 14' from the Russian author Solzhenitsyn in 
Switzerland. This publisher sued the defendant, who published the same book in 
Gennany, for infringement of copyright. The defendant argued that the plaintiff could 
not acquire the copyright due to the Soviet state monopoly on foreign trade, but his 
defence was rejected by the court. 
The court held that the foreign monopoly was of a public law nature and could thus 
have only territorial effects, irrespective of the proper law of the contract. The Federal 
Supreme Court referred to the 1959 case, and stated that at least those rules that do not 
serve the protection and interests of individuals or their fair reconciliation, but pursue 
public interests of the foreign state, are subject to the principle of territoriality and are 
thus in principle not to be applied or enforced outside their territory. The court went on 
to examine the second exception regarding the foreign authorities' power to enforce the 
relevant public law provision, but it ultimately rejected both exceptions.284 
Thus it can be stated that the Federal Supreme Court confirmed the principle of 
non-applicability of foreign public law and the principle of territoriality of public law 
rules with regard to third countries' public law rules that do serve predominantly 
economic and political interests ofthe enacting state. Irrespective of the law governing 
the contract according to the rules of private international law, public law rules are 
subject to Public Conflict of Laws and, according to the principle of territoriality, are 
applicable only within the territory of the enacting state. Nevertheless, these rules can be 
considered if the foreign state has the power to enforce its law. These principles were 
283 BGH 8.4.1976 VersR 1976,678; also see BGH 17.11.1994 BGHZ 128, 41,52,53. 
284 BGH 16.4.1975 (I ZS) BGHZ 64, 183, 189 (August Vierzehn or Solschenizyn); for the facts of this 
case, see Lehmann Zwingendes Recht 44 et seq. 
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again confinned in a recent judgment that concerned trade restrictions based on a state 
monopoly.285 
b Public law rules serving private interests and internationally mandatory 
private law rules of a third country 
The question of applicability of a third country's internationally mandatory rule of a 
public law nature serving private interests has not yet been decided.286 In all decisions 
the German courts have interpreted the rules in question as pursuing the state's 
economic and political interests. The fact that the Federal Supreme Court mentioned this 
exception to the principle of non-applicability of foreign public law, even in a case of a 
third country's mandatory rule,287 might indicate that the foreign rule would be applied 
or at least considered. Whether this is, in truth, the approach of the German courts is 
uncertain.288 
The courts have never been faced with the question of whether a third country's 
internationally mandatory rules of a private law nature are also applicable.289 This issue 
is disputed in academic writings.29o Many authors favour an application of these rules 
only ifthey form part of the proper law of the contract and thus subject them to the 
ordinary conflict rules of private internationallaw.291 
c Consideration as factum within the substantive rules of the lex causae 
Apart from the conflict of law solution, another solution has found authority in 
judgments of the Federal Supreme Court, which is based on the case law of the Supreme 
Court ofthe Gennan Reich.292 Third countries' internationally mandatory rules have 
been considered in the substantive rules of the lex causae, in particular German boni 
285 BGH 17.11.1994 BGHZ 128,41,52,53; also see BGH 8.4.1976 VersR 1976,678 (obiter dicta); OLG 
Hamburg 6.5. 1994 RIW 1994, 686, 687. Both decisions concerned third countries' import restrictions. 
286 CfLehmann Zwingendes Recht 45; StaudingerlMagnus Art 34 Rn 127. 
287 BGH 16.4.1975 BGHZ 64,183,189 with reference to BGHZ 31, 367, 371. 
288 A 'special connection' of foreign rules in the sense submitted by the Special Connection Theory was 
expressly rejected in the early German judgment, cfBGH 17.12.1959 BGHZ 31, 367, 373 . 
289 Lehmann Zwingendes Recht 46; StaudingerlMagnus Art 34 Rn 127. 
290 See supra CHAPTER 3, II, 2 and CHAPTER 4, III, 2. 
291 For instance, Drobnig FS Neumayer 159, 167; Kropholler IPR § 52 VIII I; Anderegg Auslandische 
Eingriffsnorm 88; Sonnen berger FS Rebmann 819,823; Staudinger/Magnus Art 34 Rn 127; for the 
contrary view: Busse ZVerglRWiss 96 (1995) 386, 400; von Hoffinann RabelsZ 38 (1974) 397, 407, 418. 
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mores (§138 German Civil Code, BGB), provisions for impossibility of performance 
(initially § 306 BGB or subsequently § 275 BGB), or under the heading of frustration of 
contract because of unreasonableness of performance. 293 
d Infringement of foreign prohibition laws as a violation of German boni mores 
The Supreme Court of the German Reich rendered contracts that infringed foreign 
mandatory rules void, under the plea of contra boni mores in the sense of § 138 BGB.294 
All judgments referred to the violation of bani mores and did not base the nullity 
sanction on the infringement of a statutory prohibition (§ 134 BGB),295 because § 134 
BGB is concerned only with domestic, not foreign, statutory prohibitions.296 Only 
prohibitions that had been in force at the time of conclusion of the contract were 
considered by the courts as immoral violations of foreign law under § 138 BGB. 
Supervening illegality was dealt with under impossibility of performance or 
frustration. 297 
(1) Smuggling contracts and import restrictions 
The first judgments of the Supreme Court of the German Reich that dealt with the 
question of foreign internationally mandatory rules under German law as the lex causae 
concerned smuggling contracts.298 Thus the court was concerned with contracts that 
directly involved the execution or promotion of smuggling in defiance ofjoreign import 
dutiei99 or import bans. 300 For example, the Supreme Court held that a contract to 
292 See Drobnig FS Neumayer 159, 161; Lehmann Zwingendes Recht 46 et seq. 
293 As already stated this solution has been particularly favoured by the eighth and second senates of the 
Federal Supreme Court: BOH 21.12.1960 (VIII ZS) BGHZ 34, 169 et seq; BGH 24.5.1962 (II ZS) NJW 
1962,1436; BGH 22.6.1972 (II ZS) BGHZ 59,82; also see BGH 8.5.1985 (IVa ZS) BGHZ 94, 262, 268. 
294 § 138 (I) reads 'Ein Rechtsgeschaft, das gegen die Guten Sitten verst6Bt, ist nichtig': 'A legal 
transaction (contract) that violates bani mores is void'. 
295 § 134 reads 'Ein Rechtsgeschaft, das gegen ein gesetzliches Verbot verst6Bt, ist nichtig, wenn sich 
nicht aus dem Gesetz ein anderes ergibt': 'A legal transaction (contract) that infringes a legal prohibition 
is void, unless something else follows from the prohibition.' 
296 See RG 5.11.1898 RGZ 42, 295, 297, 298 and RG 2.12.1903 RGZ 56, 179 et seq; RG 3.10.1923 RGZ 
108,241,243; RG 17.6.1939 RGZ 161,269,299. 
297 In RG 2.5.1923 RGZ 107, 174 et seq the court applied initial impossibility. 
298 For many references, see Kreuzer Ausldndisches Wirtschaftsrecht 13 et seq. 
299 For instance RG 5.11.1898 RGZ 42, 295 et seq (Russian customs law). 
300 RG 17.10.1930 JW 1931,928; 26.10.1928 JW 1929,244 (sales contract); RG 10.3.1927 JW 1927, 
2287 (loan agreement to finance smuggling); RG 9.2. 1926 JW 1926,2169 (shipping contract to support 
smuggling). 
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smuggle textiles to Russia, which was governed by Gennan law and infringed Russian 
custom laws, was invalid. The court rejected a nullity resulting from infringement of a 
statutory prohibition (illegality), since the infringement of the foreign law was not 
forbidden or penalised in Gennany. Nevertheless, the court stated that smuggling was 
immoral and therefore a smuggling contract or a contract directed towards smuggling 
was invalid.30l 
The Supreme Court of the Gennan Reich consistently ruled that smuggling 
contracts were immoral and thus invalid, if they were directly and intentionally directed 
towards customs fraud. The court was particularly concerned about cases involving the 
smuggling of alcohol into countries where the importing of alcohol was prohibited. 302 
The immorality of these contracts, which violated foreign provisions, lay in the fact that 
smuggling leads to 'moral decadence and aberration that would jeopardise the general 
welfare,303 or that smuggling would have a 'demoralising effect in the highest degree' .304 
In 1927 the Supreme Court of the Gennan Reich delivered a notorious decision on 
foreign import restrictions. The court had to deal with the validity of a contract 
governed by Gennan law to export cocaine to India. The defendant did not have the 
required Indian import licence. The plaintiff knew this and at the request of the 
defendant gave a false description of the goods. The court considered the policies 
pursued by the foreign import restriction: If it was based on reasons of public health, 
then the contract would be contra boni mores and invalid. But, if the import restriction 
was based on trade policy, then, were it not for the false description of the goods, there 
could be no objection to the contract. However, if the parties intended to deceive 
customs authorities of the foreign state in order to evade customs duties, then the 
contract would be immoral on the ground of smuggling and therefore null and void.305 
301 RG 5.11.1898 RGZ 42, 297, 298. 
302 RG 26.10.1928 JW 1929,244 (sales contract); RG 10.3.1927 JW 1927,2287; RG 9.2. 1926 JW 1926, 
2169, RG 2.12.1903 RGZ 56, 179; RG 30.9.1919 RGZ 96, 282. For references, see Kreuzer 
Auslandisches Wirtschaftsrecht 14 Footnote 18, 19. 
303 RG 30.9.1919 RGZ 96, 282,283. 
304 RG 5.11.1898 RGZ 42, 295, 297. 
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(2) The Federal Supreme Court 
The Federal Supreme Court adopted the approach of the Supreme Court of the German 
Reich, and held that under certain circumstances contracts that infringed foreign 
prohibitions were immoral and thus invalid. Accordingly, the Federal Supreme Court 
ruled that § 134 BGB was inapplicable, since it was only concerned with German 
prohibitions, but applied the boni mores rule (§ 138 BGB).306 
The subjective criterion of the conscious deception required for immoral contracts 
was slowly but surely detached from consideration of the foreign rule in the context of § 
138 BGB, and the objective criterion of' equality of interests' was developed.307 In time, 
the court developed principles specifying the circumstances in which such an equality of 
interests is assumed so that violation of a foreign prohibition leads to immorality under 
German boni mores. 
(3) Borax and Borsiiure case - the foreign prohibition also serves German 
interests 
In the notorious Borax308 case in 1960, the Federal Supreme Court was concerned with 
the validity of a contract between two German companies. The defendant had to deliver 
100 tons of borax to the plaintiff. The borax was produced in Germany from the basic 
material Rasurit, which was imported from the United States. The USA granted export 
licences with the condition that the borax would not be transferred to socialist countries. 
The parties knew that the final destination of the Borax was Rostock in East Germany, 
and conspired to conceal this fact by selling the goods c.i.f. Copenhagen. However, the 
US law required every subsequent buyer in the line of trade to sign a statement of 
confession, which contained an obligation not to transfer the borax to socialist countries. 
When the buyer (plaintiff) refused to sign, the seller (defendant) declined to deliver the 
borax and was sued for damages for breach of contract. 
305 RG 24.6.1927 JW 1927,2288,2289; for the facts of this case: Kegel Role of Public law 29,55; cf also 
RG 8.12.1927 JW 1927,790 et seq; BGH 8.4.1976 VersR 1976,678; OLG Hamburg 6.5.993 RlW 1994, 
686. 
306 BGH 21.l2.1960 BGHZ 34,169,176; BGH 22.6.1972 BGHZ 59, 82, 85; BGH 29.9.1977 BGHZ 69, 
295,296. 
307 CfKreuzer Ausliindisches Wirtschaftsrecht22; Drobnig FS Neumayer 159. 
308 BGH 21.12.1960 BGHZ 34, 169 et seq; for a summary of the facts and the reasoning of the case, see 
Basedow GYBIntL 27 (1984) 109, 121 et seq. 
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The Federal Supreme Court rejected the claim, holding that the contract was 
immoral. The immorality was evident in the intention of the parties to deceive the 
United States Bureau of Foreign Commerce, in order to obtain the necessary consent, 
and in the violation of German interests, as the infringement of the foreign prohibition 
constituted a threat to the maintenance of peace and freedom. The Court stated that: 
The American export restrictions are enacted to prevent the increase of war 
potential of the Eastern countries by means of western economic assets and thus 
serve the protection to the maintenance of peace and freedom of the West. The 
measures are therefore not only in the American interest but also in the interest of 
the entire free West and thus also in the interest of Germany. The embargo 
regulation therefore serves vital interests ofthe general public ... and whoever 
frustrates the maintenance of these interests out of self-interest acts against public 
policy ... .' 
Thus, consideration of the foreign prohibition within the German bani mores was based 
on the argument that the foreign prohibition served interests that were commonly shared 
by Germany and the entire free West. 
Two years later the Federal Supreme Court confirmed this decision in a case 
concerning an insurance contract.309 The court refused to enforce an insurance policy 
covering the transport of boric acid from the United States to Germany where a trans-
shipment was planned for Poland. At that time the export of boric acid to socialist 
countries was prohibited under a United States law and the seller obtained an export 
licence by fraudulently stating that the goods were to remain in Germany. Nevertheless, 
the export licence was provisionally cancelled and the boric acid was seized in New 
York. A suit brought by a bank holding the bills of lading against the insurer was 
dismissed by the Federal Supreme Court. The court confirmed the previous Borax 
decision and held that insurance of carriage that was illegal under the law of the United 
States was immoral under § 138 BGB, and therefore void, since it was designed to shift 
the high risk of illegal conduct. 310 
309 BGH 24.5.1962 NJW 1962, 1436 et seq (Borsaure case). 
310 The court expressly referred to the borax case and added that in the meantime Germany had adopted 
the American embargo policy and had imposed its own prohibition (§ 134 BGB invalidity because of 
offence against the law); for a summary of the facts and reasoning of this case, see Basedow GYBlntL 27 
(1984) 109, 126; Kegel Role of Public Law 29,46. 
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(4) Nigerian mask case - the foreign provision serves interests shared in common 
by all civilised nations 
In the Nigerian Mask case in 1972311 the plaintiff had acquired an insurance policy 
covering the transport of art objects from Nigeria to Hamburg. This export was 
prohibited under Nigerian law. When six statues were lost during the sea passage the 
plaintiff sued the insurer for compensation. However, the court held that the export of 
the masks was immoral and could therefore not be insured. The court again stated that § 
134 BGB was not applicable to foreign prohibitions, since a foreign law is not binding 
in Germany, but that a foreign prohibition can nevertheless be indirectly of relevance to 
the question of whether the insured contract is immoral in the sense of § 138 BGB. 
The court recognised that the Nigerian export prohibition, in contrast to the US 
embargoes in the borax and boric acid cases, did not indirectly protect German interests 
as well. However, it held that it follows from a basic persuasion of the international 
community, as reflected in the 1970 Convention,312 that every nation willing to protect 
its cultural heritage is entitled to foreign assistance. The Court stated that: 
The circumvention of such protective law has to be regarded as being reprehensible 
since it is against the generally respected interests of all nations, according to 
contemporary belief, to maintain cultural values in place .... 313 
The Federal Supreme Court therefore considered the violation of the foreign import 
restriction within German boni mores because the foreign provision was held to be 
based on interests shared in common by all nations. 
(5) Generally valid moral principles 
In a more recent judgment of the Federal Supreme Court in 1985,314 the Court held that 
an offence against a foreign prohibition was immoral, because the violation of the 
311 BGH 22.6.1972 BGHZ 59, 82 et seq; NJW 1972, 1575 with note by Mann 2179. 
312 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of 
Ownership of Cultural Property, Paris 14.11.1970. 
313 BGH 22.6.1972 BGHZ 59, 82, 85. 
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foreign rule constituted an offence against generally valid moral principles. The court 
was concerned with the validity of an agency contract governed by German law, the 
main object of which was to bribe a Nigerian civil servant and to forward the money to 
him in violation of Nigerian law. The court held that: 
[A] request for, and acceptance of a bribe by foreign officials has to be disapproved 
of, inasmuch as they thereby offend the legal order of their native country. The 
offence against foreign prohibitions, which has to be recognised according to the 
legal and moral views that prevail in Germany, at the same time constitutes an 
offence against generally valid moral principles .... 
Foreign rules that prohibit and penalise corruption were held to fulfil these conditions. 
(6) Inapplicability of German boni mores 
In other judgments the Supreme Court of the German Reich and the Federal Supreme 
Court did not apply foreign internationally mandatory rules, and the infringement of the 
foreign provision was not held to be inunoral and thus indirectly considered. Generally, 
the German courts did not give effect to a third country's provision if, from a German 
viewpoint, the provision was enacted for improper reasons, or served interests not 
shared in common by German interests or by the interests of all civilised nations, but 
based on 'selfish ' trade policies, or was directed against German interests. The courts 
either ignored the foreign provision without investigating an invalidity on the ground of 
immorality, or expressly declared § 138 BGB inapplicable. 
The judgments already investigated, that subjected foreign rules of a public law 
nature to Public Conflict of Laws, based on the principle of territoriality, may serve as 
examples of the former situation. In 'Solzhenitsyn' the court rejected the application or 
recognition of a foreign law - a Russian trade monopoly - because of its territorially 
limited effect. The court did not even mention the possibility of the contract being 
314 BGH 8.5.1985 BGHZ 94, 268, 271 et seq; but see a judgment of the RG 26.9.1919 JW 1920, 138, 139 
where the court had indeed asked a Bulgarian seller to tip civil servants in order to make delivery 
possible during the First World War. 
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contrary to German boni mores, although the German contract was according to the 
infringed legislation null and void. 315 
However, in other decisions the German courts did refer to § 138 BGB and held 
that it was inapplicable. The Supreme Court ofthe German Reich, for instance, did not 
apply the exchange control regulations of a third country or consider the violated rules 
indirectly within the German boni mores rule. This approach was substantiated by the 
argument that foreign exchange control regulations could not be justified by legal-moral 
considerations shared in common by all civilised states; on the contrary, they were 
based on trade policies of the foreign state only, which were opposed to the German 
point ofview.316 
Foreign trade restrictions were not given effect if enacted for improper reasons or 
designed to curtail the competitive position of German companies or directed against 
German interests.317 Therefore, the Supreme Court of the German Reich upheld a 
contract to smuggle a cargo of linseed oil out of Sweden in violation of a Swedish trade 
embargo against Germany. The contract was held to be valid because' export 
prohibitions of foreign states, caused by the war and directed against German interests 
will not be protected by German Courts'.318 
Furthermore, in a case concerning an insurance contract for the transport of goods 
from Hamburg to Bolivia, the Federal Supreme Court indicated in an obiter dictum that 
the intended violation of Bolivian or Argentinean import restrictions and customs duties 
did not affect the validity of the insurance contract.319 This was based on the following 
reasoning: Firstly, the intended violation ofthe foreign import restriction did not affect 
315 BGH 16.4.1975 BGHZ 64,183, et seq; but see BGH 17.11.1994 BGHZ 128,41,52,53. The contract 
was governed by Gennan law (Federal Republic), and was held to be valid and not violating bani mores, 
although it offended the export trade monopoly of the GDR. 
316 RG 3.10.1923 RGZ 108, 241, 243 et seq (Russian exchange control regulation); for criticism of that 
argument, see Kreuzer Ausliindisches Wirtschaftsrecht 35,36. Foreign currency regulations were not 
applied or considered by the Supreme Court RG 27.4.1936 IPRespr 1935-1944 Nr 468. As was seen 
above the BGH applied the principle of territoriality to foreign exchange control regulations and 
currency regulations, and refused to give effect to these provisions. 
317 See for this BasedowGYBIntL27 (1984) 109, 121; BGH21.12.1960 BGHZ 34, 169, 176 (obiter 
dicta with reference to the 'cocaine case' RG 24.6.1927 JW 1927,2288). 
318 RG 22.12.1916 Cruchot Vol61 (1917) 460; in the same sense RG 15.2.1930 IPRespr Nr 13; RG 
28.6.1918 RGZ 93, 182 et seq (the English Trading with the Enemy Act 1914 was refused application on 
this reasoning but within the dogmatic scope of the notion of ordre public). 
319 BGH 8.4.1976 VersR 1976,678 et seq. 
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the insurance contract if the infringement was intended to take place after the transport. 
Secondly, the court referred to the Borax and Nigerian Mask cases and doubted whether 
'the same principles apply to a violation of foreign import restrictions, since these are 
less important than export restrictions which were enacted for the protection of state 
security or the cultural heritage of a state'. 
This judgment seems to deviate from the smuggling cases of the German Reich. 
However, the statement of the Federal Supreme Court was only obiter and, in addition, 
very vague. Nevertheless, it is of some relevance for other reasons. It is one of the rare 
occasions when the Federal Supreme Court combined solutions which were usually 
applied independently: the principle of non-applicability of foreign public law rules and 
consideration on the level of substantive law. In considering whether the violation of the 
foreign import restriction could lead to immorality and violate German bani mores, the 
court stated that consideration of the violation of a foreign law within the notion of boni 
mores forms an exception to the principle that foreign public law rules do not have any 
effect outside the territory of the enacting country.no 
Another famous judgment of the Federal Supreme Court in 1977 - the Escape-agent 
case321 - clearly illustrates the principles developed by the case law. The facts of the case 
were as follows. The plaintiff, a Norwegian, helped the defendant, a citizen of the East 
Germany, to flee to West Germany in violation of East German penal law. Crossing the 
border from East to West Germany and assisting the defendant to flee East Germany 
could have rendered the Norwegian liable for prosecution. After the flight, the defendant 
agreed to pay the Norwegian a certain amount (DM 4.500, plus interest) for his 
assistance. The defendant refused to pay the entire debt, and the plaintiff sued for 
performance. 
The court investigated whether the 'escape agent-agreement' was illegal or 
immoral. The Federal Supreme Court rejected illegality on the grounds of § 134 BGB 
and immorality on the grounds of § 138 BGB. An 'escape agent agreement' would not 
320 BGH 8.4.1976 VersR 1976, 678. Also see OLG Hamburg 6.5.1993 RIW 1994, 686, where the court 
did not take into account a foreign import restriction within the notion of Gennan bani mores for the 
reason that it served economic political (trade political) interests, and referred to the public law nature of 
the rules and the principle of non-applicability of foreign public law. 
321 BGH 29.9.1977 BGHZ 69, 295 et seq. 
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violate good morals, nor could the violation of the foreign penal law lead to immorality. 
The court stated that: 
[T]he violation of a foreign prohibition may lead to immorality and thus invalidity, 
if the infringed foreign prohibitions protect indirectly also German interests or the 
infringement is opposed to generally respected interests of all Nations. 
The Court held that these conditions were not fulfilled.322 
e Consideration within the operative facts of § 826 BGB 
Recently, the Federal Supreme Court considered foreign embargoes in the context of a 
tortious claim for damages (§ 826 BGB).323 Because § 826 BGB is a tortious claim and 
not a contractual one, a detailed examination of these decisions is beyond the scope of 
this study. Nevertheless, the judgments are concerned with the effect given to third 
countries' internationally mandatory rules by the forum and they are dealt with in this 
context by the German academics.324 In ajudgment of20 November 1990,325 the Federal 
Supreme Court ruled that the violation of a foreign (Thai) import ban on products from 
South Africa could constitute immoral conduct and violate the notion of bani mores. 
The court thus considered the foreign import ban indirectly, within the tortious claim of 
§ 826 BGB. In its reasoning the court referred to the Borax and Borsdure cases, but 
stressed that the violation of the foreign provision in itself did not suffice; the violation 
must result in the conscious endangerment of the pecuniary interests of an uninvolved 
third party. 326 
It is not clear whether the Federal Supreme Court transferred the principles 
developed with regard to the nullity sanction of immorality and consequently whether it 
is necessary that the foreign provision should either indirectly protect German interests 
as well, or should be based on interests commonly shared all civilised nations. 
Alternatively, the court would have meant that the foreign provision is considered only 
322 BOH ibid 298 et seq; see affirmative BOH 21.10.1980 NJW 1980, 1574, 1575. 
323 § 826 BOB says 'Wer in einer gegen die guten Sitten versto13enden Weise einem anderem vorsatzlich 
Schaden zufilgt, ist dem anderen zum Ersatze des Schadens verplichtet': 'Who causes damage to another 
in a way offending intentionally against good morals, is obliged to compensate the damage of the other.' 
324 See among others ReithmanniMartinylLimmer lnternationales Vertragsrecht Rn 466. 
325 JZ 1991, 719 et seq; see also BOH 20.10.1992 NJW 1993, 194 et seq. 
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in so far as its actual effects on the private relationship are concerned, independently of 
its normative content and background.327 The reference to the borax and boric acid cases 
and the immorality solution suggests the first assumption. The fact that at the time of the 
judgment the European Community joined the United Nations in its embargo against 
South Africa, which included the import of steel and iron from South Africa, could 
justify an equality of interest. 328 However, the Federal Supreme Court did not 
investigate the purpose of the foreign regulation or the need for an equality of interest; 
this could indicate the second assumption.329 
f Impossibility of performance or frustration of contract 
In other judgments the German courts took account of foreign internationally mandatory 
rules by considering the de facto or actual effects of the provisions on private 
relationships as a reason for impossibility of performance or frustration of contract. The 
foreign prohibition may result in the performance of the contract becoming factually 
impossible, for example, if the goods are seized in the seller's country or in a foreign 
country because of an export restriction. Performance may also cause undue hardship to 
the seller if, for instance, the violation of a restriction results in high penalties. 
Acceptance of performance can also be dangerous for the buyer, for example, if the 
import of the goods is prohibited and penalised with a prison or death sentence. 
The actual effects on the private relationship cannot be ignored and the contractual 
obligations must be modified or cancelled. Only afterwards does the question arise as to 
which party should bear the consequences, viz. whether performance is to be excused or 
whether the duty-bearer is liable for compensation for non-performance based on fault 
or on guarantee. 330 
326 BGH 20.1 1.1990 JZ 1991,719,721; BGH 20.10.1992 NJW 1993, 194 et seq. 
327 See Junker JZ 1991,699,702 who sees the violation of boni mores not in the violation of the foreign 
embargo provisions as such, but in the use of a third person to violate these provisions. For the violation 
of boni mores in the sense of § 826 BGB it only matters that the foreign embargo can be enforced 
effectively, it is only a 'Datum'. 
328 Junker JZ 1991, 699, 70 I. 
329 For a discussion, see Junker JZ 1991,699,702; ReithmannlMartinylLimmer lnternationales 
Vertragsrecht Rn 466; von Hoffmann IPRax 1991,345,346. 
330 See also Basedow GYBlntL 27 (1984) 129, 130; Baum Rabelsz 52 (1989) 152, 158; Reithmannl 
Martiny/Limmer lnternationales Vertragsrecht Rn 468; Schiffer Normen 87. 
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German scholars and courts accept that a foreign prohibition can lead to physical 
impossibility of performance, but not to legal impossibility.331 If the impossibility of 
performance cannot be imputed to the debtor, the non-performance is excused, and the 
debtor is discharged from his obligation to deliver or to pay the damages caused by non-
delivery. If the prohibition existed ab initio (at the time of conclusion of the contract) 
and the foreign sovereign was able to enforce its law, the contract can be declared 
invalid on grounds of initial factual impossibility.332 But most cases involved foreign 
prohibitions that were enacted after the parties had concluded the contract and the courts 
considered the effects of the foreign prohibition as subsequent impossibility of 
performance.333 
In 1918 the Supreme Court of the German Reich was concerned with the following 
case. An English company sold 'Quebracho extract' to a German buyer; then war was 
declared, and performance was prohibited under the British Trading with the Enemy 
Act.334 Because ofthe Act the debtor refused to deliver the goods and the buyer sued for 
damages caused by non-delivery. The Supreme Court dismissed the buyer's claim on 
the grounds that the British prohibition made performance impossible. 
At the first stage, the court held that the British prohibition was directed against 
German interests and infringed the German ordre public and consequently could not be 
applied. It went on to hold that application of the foreign prohibition was not the issue 
raised in the case, but that the actual effects of the foreign provision on the contractual 
obligation of the sued debtor had to be considered instead. The court said that it could 
not and must not ignore the existence of the English Act, because a violation of the Act 
was heavily sanctioned. Accordingly, it was held that delivery by the English party was 
JJI ReithmannIMartinylLimmer Internationales Vertragsrecht Rn 467; Schiffer Normen 87; RG 
13.11.1917 RGZ 91 , 260, 262; RG 28.6.1918 RGZ 93, 182 et seq; RG 17.6.1939 RGZ 161,296,300. 
m See only recently BGH 17.11.1994 (III ZS) BGHZ 128,41,53; see also von Hoffmann IPRax 1981 , 
155,156; MtinchKommIMartiny Art 34 Rn 53. 
m See eg: the 'fish oil case' RG 13 .11.1917 RGZ 91, 260 et seq. For the facts and the reasoning of this 
case, see Vischer Rec des Cours 232 {I 992 I) 13,176 and Zimmer IPRax 1993,65,67; RG 17.10.1919 
RG 97, 6, 9 et seq (Dutch export prohibition; the obligor was excused and thus not liable for damages); 
RG 17.6.1939 RGZ 161,296,300 et seq (foreign prohibiting law); RG 22.12.1916 Cruchot Vo161, 460, 
462 (unreasonable for the debtor to perform); BGH 30.11.1972 BGHZ 60, 14, 16 (proper law of the 
contract was German law, foreign prohibition on entry that was based on health political reasons made 
performance impossible); BGH 11.3.1982 BGHZ 83, 197 (but impossibility of performance was based on 
the political situation in the foreign country, not on an infringement of foreign law); for further 
references, see Anderegg Eingriffsnormen 14 et seq. 
JJ4 RG 28.6.1918 RGZ 93, 182 et seq. 
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factually impossible.335 In effect, the foreign prohibition was not applied, but considered 
as an impediment to performance, despite being contrary to German interests.336 
In other cases the German courts considered the actual effects of a foreign 
prohibition by adapting the contract to the new situation on the basis of cessation of the 
contractual basis (Wegfall der Geschtiftsgrundlage). This principle is comparable with 
the English law frustration of the contract. It is applicable if and to the extent that it 
would be unreasonable for the debtor to fulfil his obligation because of heavy sanctions 
and the possibility of the enacting state enforcing the prohibition.337 In a judgment on 
the 8 February 1984,338 the Federal Supreme Court was concerned with an Iranian 
Government ban on the import of alcohol to Iran. The ban on alcohol impeded the 
execution of a settlement between a German seller and an Iranian importer. Prior to the 
enactment of the ban, the parties had agreed to settle difficulties that had arisen under 
previous contracts: the German exporter was to pay damages, half of which would be 
due after the Iranian party had issued a letter of credit for further deliveries. The German 
party had further agreed to deliver beer at a preferential price for a certain period of 
time. After the enactment of the ban, the delivery of beer became impossible. The 
Iranian party claimed payment of the outstanding portion of the damages agreed upon in 
the settlement agreement. 
The proper law of the transaction was held to be German law. The Federal Supreme 
Court held that, although the claim for damages had not become impossible, the 
transaction had lost its fundamental contractual basis and had to be adapted to the new 
circumstances. The court therefore held that both parties had to share the risk of the 
subsequent Iranian restriction. The German party had to pay half of the outstanding 
amount of the agreed damages and half of the hypothetical profit that the Iranian party 
would have made on further deliveries at the preferential rate.339 It follows that account 
m RG 28.6.1918 RGZ 93, 182, 184. 
336 For a discussion of this judgment, see Basedow GYBIntL 27 (1984) 129, 132, 134 who criticises the 
consideration of the foreign provision on grounds of the extraterritorial effect of the prohibition. The 
English company had contracted through its Argentine subsidiary and the goods were exported from the 
Argentine and thus situated outside the prohibiting state. 
337 RG 22.12.1916 Cruchot Vo161, 460, 462; BGH 8.2.1984 IPRax 1986, 154 et seq; Vischer Rec des 
Cours 232 (1992 I) 13, 176; ReithmannlMartinylLimmer Internationales Vertragsrecht Rn 469. 
3J8 IPRax 1986, 154 et seq; for a discussion of this case Mtilbert IPRax 1986, 140 et seq and Baum 
RabelsZ 53 (1989) 152 et seq. 
339 For the facts and reasoning Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992 II) 13, 176. 
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was taken of the actual effects of the foreign prohibition on the private relationship; the 
settlement agreement was adjusted to the altered circumstances on the basis of cessation 
of the contractual basis. 
g Swiss case law 
Using an approach similar to that of the German courts, the Swiss courts did not apply 
third countries' internationally mandatory rules on the basis of a Special Connection 
Theory.34o They refused application of the rules either on the basis of their public law 
nature, or the principle of territoriality, or the doctrine of Public Conflict of Laws, or on 
the basis of Swiss ordre public.341 However, as in Germany, there are some judgments 
where a third country's mandatory laws were considered asfact within the substantive 
law of the lex causae.342 Furthermore, the Swiss courts were only concerned with a third 
country's internationally mandatory rules of public law that pursued state interests. 
They were never faced with the problem of public laws that served private interests.343 
(1) Refusal of application of third countries' mandatory laws 
The judgments that refused to give effect to a third country's public laws were all 
concerned with foreign exchange regulations that intervened in private contracts, for 
example, internationalloans,344 endorsement contracts/45 and the transfer of claims from 
loans.346 Article VIII (2) (b) of the IMF was not applied by the Swiss courts since 
Switzerland is not a member of the International Monetary Fund. 
The reasons for the decisions were often based on ordre public considerations, 
rather than on the general rule that a contract and its validity is governed exclusively by 
3~O A 'special connection' was expressly rejected in BGE 76 II 33 et seq; cf Schwander JPR AT251 . 
3~1 HonsellNogtiSchnyderlMachler-Erne Art 19 Rn 5; Erne Vertragsgiiltigkeit 12 et seq. 
342 See Erne Vertragsgiiltigkeit 12. 
343 Erne Vertragsgiiltigkeit 12, 119; see also Schnyder Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht Rn 27,277 who stresses, 
in the context of a special connection of third countries' mandatory laws serving private interests, that a 
'special connection' of those rules will be rare. The dispute whether those rules fall under the scope of art 
19 IPRG is therefore of a rather theoretical nature, for the dispute, see CHAPTER 5, IV, I, c. 
344 BGE 68 II 203 et seq, for criticism of this ruling with regard to the ignorance of the court concerning 
the factual position of constraint Heini 100 ZSR (1981) 65, 73 . 
345 BGE 60 II 294 et seq. 
346 BGE 95 II 109 et seq; see also BGE 62 II 108 et seq; Erne Vertragsgiiltigkeit 12. 
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the proper law.347 However, although the Federal Tribunal referred to the ordre public 
and vaguely remarked that the value judgment depends on the Swiss point of view. No 
attempt was made to define the content of this ordre public rule.348 
It is interesting to note that, in contrast to Germany and England, Swiss courts were 
concerned with real third country cases.349 Here, too, effect was not given to the third 
country's mandatory rule and the rulings were based on ordre public considerations. 
The Federal Tribunal had to deal with an international bond issue governed by the law 
of New York that infringed German foreign exchange control regulations, which 
claimed application to the situation in question.350 According to the law of New York, 
the foreign exchange control regulations were inapplicable because they infringed the 
ordre public of the governing law. The Federal Tribunal asked whether non-recognition 
of the German regulations by the law of New York infringed the Swiss ordre public. It 
held that the Swiss ordre public was not violated, but that the principle pacta sun! 
servanda had to be protected.351 
In other judgments the refusal to give effect to third countries' internationally 
mandatory provisions was based on the principle of non-applicability offoreign public 
law and/or the prinCiple ofterritoriality.352 Such a rationale is found in a ruling of the 
Federal Tribunal in 1969 regarding an assignment governed by Swiss law.353 The 
question was whether effect should be given to a Hungarian foreign exchange control 
regulation. The court held: 
According to a well established principle of public international law public law is 
applicable only within the territory of the enacting state, principle of territoriality. 
Therefore, [the Hungarian exchange control legislation] cannot be applied in 
347 BGE 62 II 108; BGE 67 II 215; BGE 68 II 203; BGE 95 II 109, 114. For instance, in BGE 62 II 108, 
110 the Swiss Federal Tribunal was concerned with an assignment of claims under a brokerage contract, 
the proper law of which was held to be Swiss law. The question was whether the assignment was void 
because it infringed German foreign exchange law. The Federal Tribunal held that 'the German foreign 
exchange control regulations regarding assignments are repugnant to the Swiss public order'. The court 
went on to hold that the foreign exchange control regulations would not have been applied even if the 
proper law had been German law. 
348 For criticism, see Erne Vertragsgiiltigkeit 14. 
349 BGE 67 II 215; BGE 68 II 203. 
350 BGE 68 II 203, 209 et seq; see also BGE 67 II 215, 221 et seq where a contract of guarantee was 
governed by the law of New York and a Hungarian foreign exchange control regulation was not applied 
on the basis of the ordre public of New York law. 
351 BGE 68 II 203, 210; for the facts and the reasoning Erne Verlragsgiiltigkeil 14. 
352 BGE 42 II 179; 44 II 163; 95 II 109, 114; 107 II 489, 492; cfEme Vertragsgilltigkeit 15. 
353 BGE 95 II 109, 114. 
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Switzerland unless demanded by Swiss law, in particular if Switzerland is obliged 
by an international Convention or if the foreign public law supports the applicable 
private law by intervening into private law relationships in order to protect private 
interests.354 
In a recent decision the Federal Tribunal applied or considered a third country's 
public law rule, a German subrogation law, to a Swiss contract on the basis of the 
principle ofterritoriality.355 This is one of the rare examples where the invocation of the 
principle of territoriality resulted in an application of the foreign public law. 
(2) Consideration as fact within the substantive law of the lex causae 
A number of cases in Switzerland did not apply a third country's internationally 
mandatory rules, but considered the effect of those rules within the substantive law of 
the lex causae. In all the cases the proper law was Swiss law, and they were all 
concerned with smuggling in defiance of foreign import/export restrictions356 or customs 
regulations.357 The question before the courts was whether the contracts were valid 
according to the Swiss proper law. As in the German cases, the Swiss courts held that 
the contracts were not unlawful in the sense of art 20 (1) of the Code of Obligations 
(OR), since unlawfulness according to this provision can only be the violation of Swiss 
law.358 The courts then asked whether the intended circumvention of a third country's 
mandatory laws would fall under the blanket clause of boni mores (art 20 (1) OR). Thus 
the crucial question was whether the violation of foreign law resulted in the immorality 
of the contract. 359 
A leading case of the Swiss Federal Tribunal in 1950360 laid down the fundamental 
rules about when a third country's internationally mandatory rules can be considered 
within the notion of Swiss boni mores. The case concerned a contract that guaranteed a 
foreign exchange contract, and the question was whether the violation of a third 
354 BGE 95 II 109, 114. 
355 BGE 107 II 489, 492. 
356 BGE 80 II 45. 
357 Commercial Court at Zurich 9.5.1968 SJZ 64 (1968) 354; see also BGE 76 II 33; 80 1149; 81 11227; 
BG SJZ 54 (1958) 218; SJZ 56 (1960) 43, for this ruling, see Erne Vertragsgiiltigkeit 12, 16 et seq. 
358 BGE 76 II 33, 40; 80 II 49,51; BG SJZ 54 (1958) 218, 219; SJZ 56 (1960) 43; Commercial Court at 
Zurich 9.5.1968 SJZ 64 (1968) 354. 
359 BGE 76 II 33, 41; Commercial Court at Zurich 9.5.1968 SJZ 64 (1968) 354,355; BGE 81 II 227, 232. 
360 BGE 76 II 33. 
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country's foreign exchange regulation could render the contract void. The court held 
that violation of foreign legislation can render a transaction immoral if and to the extent 
that the violation is immoral according to the Swiss viewpoint. 
The court went on to distinguish different kinds of foreign rules according to their 
object of legal protection. Only those rules that, according to the general view, are of 
such importance that non-recognition of their violation affects the Swiss ethical order 
can be considered. The foreign rule infringed must serve the protection of individual 
interests and the interests of the human community that are according to the general 
view offundamental and lifesaving importance. Alternatively, the foreign rule must 
protect objects that are according to ethical opinion of higher importance than domestic 
party autonomy and the validity of the contract under the proper law. 
Foreign provisions concerning drug dealing or slave trading were regarded as 
fulfilling these conditions. Foreign exchange control laws and economic-political 
measures in general, however, do not fall under the same category, because they serve 
predominantly the economic interests of the foreign state.361 The court therefore refused 
to give effect to the foreign exchange control regulation and held that the contract was 
valid according to its Swiss proper law.362 
According to this leading case, therefore, the violated third country's internationally 
mandatory rule is deemed to fall within the notion of Swiss immorality if and to the 
extent that theforeign rule protectsfondamental values regarding the individual and the 
community. Furthermore, violation of the foreign rule must lead to an impairment of the 
foreign and domestic public order. Hence, a correspondence of the objects of legal 
protection is necessary. 363 
361 BGE 76 II 33, 41. Also see the decision of the Federal Tribunal BGE 80 II 49 et seq. The violation of 
German foreign exchange control regulations was held to be not immoral because the violation would not 
infringe the public order; for vehement criticism, see Mann FS Wahl 139, 150; id Rec des Cours 132 
(1971 I) 109, 195, 196. 
362 BGE 76 II 33, 41. Based on this differentiation the Federal Tribunal in 1954, "aGE 80 II 49, 51, 
refused to give effect to a German foreign exchange regulation which the parties intended to circumvent; 
the contract governed by Swiss law was held to be valid. The court held that this was not a contract for 
smuggling and that the violation in Germany of the German foreign exchange control law was not 
contrary to Swiss immorality, because exchange control laws were not 'laws affecting the ethical order' 
and could therefore be freely violated without offending Swiss conceptions of morality. For this decision, 
see Heini 100 ZSR (1981) 65,81; for criticism Mann FS Wahl 139, 150; id FS Beitzke 607, 622; id Rec 
des Cours 132 (1971 I) 9,195, 196. 
363 Cf also Erne VertragsgUltigkeit 18. 
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However, the Commercial Court at Zurich ruled that a Swiss contract for smuggling 
coffee into Italy, and thus infringing Italian customs regulations, was invalid on the 
grounds of immorality. The court held that the foreign customs regulations fulfilled the 
strict conditions of a rule being worthy of protection and that' a smuggling action 
motivated by making profit for the disadvantage of a neighbouring country is rejected in 
this country by all decent and fair thinking people as injustice' .364 
In other cases the question was whether violation of third countries' mandatory 
legislation could render performance impossible according to the Swiss proper law.365 A 
Swiss Tribunal recognised an Austrian and German export restriction that had been 
enacted after the conclusion of the contract.366 The court held that the contracts were 
governed by Swiss law, but that performance was impossible according to the same law 
because it would violate foreign export restrictions. Thus, impossibility was not 
restricted to factual impossibility, but was also taken into account where it caused undue 
hardship for the debtor who had to perform in violation of the foreign law, and could be 
exposed to heavy sanctions.367 
In contrast to the German courts, however, the Swiss courts refused to take into 
account the actual effects of foreign internationally mandatory rules that were held to be 
contrary to the forum's ordre public. As a result ofthis rigid approach the debtor will 
not be released from fulfilling his obligation if performance violates a foreign 
legislation, the application of which would be contrary to the Swiss ordre public.368 
364 Commercial Court at Zurich 9.5.1968 SJZ 64 (1968) 354; see also BGE 80 II 45, 48. 
365 Cffor a discussion of these cases Schulte EingrifJsnormen 35 et seq; Morscher Rechtssetzungsakte 61 
et seq. 
366 BGE 42 II 379, 381 et seq; BGE 43 II 225, 230 et seq. 
367 BGE 42 II 379, 381; BGE 45 II 42 et seq. However, this does not preclude the debtor from paying 
damages for non-performance in cases where he took the risk of non-performance on the basis of an 
opposed prohibition; see Morscher Rechtssetzungsakte 62, 63; BGE 72 I 278; BGE III 11354. 
368 BGE 60 II 294,311 et seq; BGE 64 II 88, 100. This contrasts with the German case law. The Supreme 
Court of the German Reich in RGZ 93, 184 expressly took into account on the level of substantive law 
the actual effects of foreign legislation that violated the German ordre public. 
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h Conclusion 
With regard to third countries' internationally mandatory rules, German and Swiss 
courts used different solutions: 
(1) Application of a third country's internationally mandatory rules was in general 
refused by reference to their public law nature on the basis of Public Conflict of Laws 
and the principle of territoriality of public law. In Switzerland the courts sometimes 
referred to the ordre public exclusionary rule. It is interesting to note, that the courts in 
both countries explained the inapplicability of a third country's rule by referring to their 
content. They did not refer to the fact that the rule formed part of a law other than the 
proper law or that the rule was not part of the proper law.369 
(2) Application of the principle of territoriality of Public Conflict of Laws shows that 
Swiss and German courts treat foreign public law rules on the same footing, irrespective 
of whether the rule emanates from the proper law or a third country. 
(3) In both countries the principle of territoriality has been restricted to those public 
law rules that served the public (viz. economic and political) interests of the enacting 
state. It is uncertain, however, whether the courts would apply public law rules serving 
private interests, as well as the internationally mandatory private law rules of a third 
country, because there have been no cases dealing with such rules. 
(4) Third countries' internationally mandatory rules are applied if required by an 
international treaty, for example, art VIII (2) (b) IMF.370 
(5) Under certain circumstances, courts have considered a third country's 
internationally mandatory rules as 'facts' within the substantive law of the lex causae. 
In Germany, apart from a few exceptional cases, this Substantive Law Approach has 
resulted in recognition of the foreign law. Swiss courts in contrast have been much more 
reluctant to take third countries' internationally mandatory rules into account. 
369 See also Erne Vertragsgiiltigkeit 13. For the contrasting common law approach, cfCHAPTER 5, III. 
370 Switzerland, however, is not a member of the IMF. 
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(6) The German case law can be summarised as follows. Apart from the smuggling 
cases, which perhaps fall in a special category, third countries' internationally 
mandatory rules have been considered within the notion of German boni mores if they 
protected either indirectly German interests or the generally respected interests or 
moral values of all nations. However, provisions enacted for improper reasons, directed 
against German interests or based only on the trade policies of the foreign state 
(interests not shared in common) were not recognised within the notion of German boni 
mores. In time, the Federal Supreme Court deviated from the subjective criteria of the 
parties' intention to evade and violate the foreign law, and instead focused on the 
content and protected interests of the violated foreign law.371 
(7) In Switzerland violation of a third country's internationally mandatory rules can be 
deemed immoral, if the foreign rule protected interests and policies of such importance 
that non-recognition of its violation would affect the Swiss ethical order. The foreign 
rule infringed must serve to protect individual interests and the interests of humanity 
which are, according to general views, offundamental importance. Foreign laws 
serving predominantly the economic interests of the enacting state do not fall into this 
category.372 Basing their decisions on these principles, the Swiss courts usually refused 
to consider third countries' internationally mandatory rules within the notion of Swiss 
boni mores.373 
(8) In other cases German courts recognised the factual effects of the foreign legislation 
within the (domestic law) rules of impossibility of performance or frustration of 
contract. The factual effects of the foreign rule on the private relationship have been 
considered, even though the rule infringed the German ordre public or was directed 
against German interests. Swiss courts took a similar approach, but refused to consider 
the effect of foreign rules that were repugnant to the Swiss ordre public. 
371 Cfalso Zimmer IPRax 1993,65,67. 
372 BGE 76 II 33 , 41; BGE 80 II 49 et seq; see however the Commercial Court of Zurich 9.5.1968 SJZ 64 
(1968) 354. 
313 For criticism, see Erne Vertragsgultigkeit 20,21. 
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3 Critical remarks 
The German (and Swiss) case law has been criticised for a number of reasons. In 
general it can be stated that, while the principled foundation and reasoning of the court's 
approach was constantly criticised, the final decisions were generally approved?74 The 
objections therefore focus on the principles underlying the decisions of the courts: 375 the 
principle of non-applicability of foreign public law and the consideration as 'fact' 
within the substantive rules of the proper law. 
a Duality of solutions 
The criticism that the COurtS376 were unable to develop clear and consistent criteria to 
deal with the problem of the application of foreign internationally mandatory rules is of 
a very general nature.377 In fact the German courts did not adopt a consistent approach or 
develop unified principles; they based their decisions on the facts of each case. The 
cases where the court refused to apply or consider a foreign rule on basis of the principle 
of territoriality of foreign public law did not in general mention the possible 
consideration of the rule within the substantive law of the proper law of the contract, 
and vice versa.378 
However, the different approaches may nevertheless be synthesised as follows. The 
German case law never applied foreign internationally mandatory rules of public law 
that pursued the economic and political interests of the enacting country, but rather 
considered them as facts within the substantive law governing the contract.379 Thus, 
despite their inapplicability, such rules may be recognised as fact within the substantive 
law. 
374 See Baum RabelsZ 53 (\989) 152; Mtilbert IPRax 1981, 140, 141. 
J75 For the academic approaches, see supra CHAPTER 5,1. 
376 This criticism was made in respect of the Federal Supreme Court in particular, but is equally true for 
Swiss decisions. 
377 Mentzel Sonderankniipfung 94, 100; Reithmann/MartinylLimmer Internationales Vertragsrecht Rn 
461; Becker Sonderankniipfung 86; Schubert RlW 1987,729,737; SoergeVvon Hoffmann Art 34 Rn 79. 
378 Schubert RlW 1987,729,737; Mentzel Sonderankniipfung 105; Drobnig FS Neumayer 159, 162, 174; 
Schurig Lois 55, 73, 74; Kreuzer Auslandisches Wirtschaftsrecht 79,80. 
379 MtinchKommIMartiny Art 34 Rn 28, 49; Busse ZverglRWiss 95 (1996) 387,394; StaudingerlMagnus 
Art 34 Rn 119; Mtilbert IPRax 1941, 140; Soergel/von Hoffinann Art 34 Rn 79; critically Zimmer 
IPRax1993. 65 et seq. 
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The first mention of the divergence of approaches occurred in a judgment of the 
Federal Supreme Court in 1976: The Court indicated that the consideration of the 
foreign public law rule within the notion of boni mores was an exception to the general 
principle of territoriality.380 In a more recent judgment the Federal Supreme Court stated 
that according to German case law foreign internationally mandatory rules pursuing 
economic and political interests of the enacting country can only be considered when 
the foreign state holds the power to enforce its law. Otherwise, it can only be considered 
as fact within the notion of boni mores or as impossibility ofperformance.381 The court 
thus combined both solutions. 
Still, many questions arise about the case law solutions, particularly because the 
criteria are vague and perhaps because cases in point are rare. For example, neither the 
Federal Supreme Court nor the Federal Tribunal has ever been confronted with a third 
country's internationally mandatory rules of a private law character or at least serving 
private interests, so that there is in fact no way of knowing what the approach of the 
courts might be. This does show, however, that the question is really of academic 
interest only.382 
b Public Conflict of Laws; principle of territoriality 
The system of Public Conflict of Laws and the principle of territoriality of foreign 
public law, on which the non-applicability of foreign public law rules is based has been 
the subject offundarnental criticism in Switzerland and Germany, and should not be 
maintained.383 
380 BOH 8.4.1976 VersR 1976,678; see also OLO Hamburg 6.5 .1993 RlW 1994, 686. 
381 BOH 17.11.1994 BOHZ 128,41,52,53. 
382 For Switzerland, also see Schnyder Wirtschaflskollisionsrecht Rn 27,277 who stresses in the context 
of a special connection of third countries' mandatory laws serving private interests that a special 
connection of those rules will be rare. The debate about whether these rules fall under the scope of art 19 
Swiss IPRO is therefore of a rather theoretical nature. 
383 See for criticism Mann Rec des Cours 132 (1971 I) 115, 182 et seq; Siehr RabelsZ 52 (1988) 41, 75 et 
seq; Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992 I) 13, 150 et seq; Schiffer Normen 79 et seq; MtinchKomml 
Sonnenberger Einl Rn 374, 377; Kropholler IPR § 22 II 2; Morscher Rechtssetzungsakte 48 et seq; Voser 
Los d'app/ication immediate 33 Footnotes 21, 22; Erne Vertragsgiiltigkeit 82 et seq. 
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As has already been explained in the discussion of the different academic 
approaches/84 the formal distinction between private and public law has little merit in 
conflict of laws. Particularly in the modem welfare state, the distinction is blurred. The 
state may enact private law rules pursuing public interests and vice versa. Furthermore, 
the distinction between public and private law is a continental European peculiarity that 
does not have the same meaning in common law countries.385 The fundamental 
objection to this approach is, however, that the non-applicability offoreign public law 
does not follow from the principle of territoriality. The principle is of no use in 
determining whether foreign law should be applied by the forum. 386 
It has already been explained that the principle is reasonable with regard to the 
enforcement of foreign public law rules, which impose a positive duty on the 
goverrunental authorities in favour of the foreign state.387 However, in private litigation 
the concern is not the enforcement of public law rules in favour of the foreign state, but 
rather the influence and consequences of public law on private law and private 
relationships: the 'reflex effects' of public law on private law.388 
The question is thus whether a foreign law that represents the public interests of the 
foreign enacting state, and pursues these interests indirectly by intervening in private 
contracts, can be applied. The forum considers only the effects of public enactments 
upon the private relationship. To the extent that the principle of non-applicability 
excludes even consideration of the reflex effects of public law rules on private 
relationships, as it has been understood by the German and Swiss courts and some 
writers, it must clearly be rejected.389 Currently, the principle of non-applicability of 
384 Supra CHAPTER 5, I, 7, d, see as well CHAPTER 3, 11,2, b. 
385 MilnchKomm/Sonnenberger Einl Rn 38; Siehr RabelsZ 52 (I 988) 41, 75, 76, 91; Schubert RlW 1987, 
729,731; Busse ZverglRWiss 95 (1996) 387,389,390. 
386 Siehr RabelsZ 52 (I988) 41, 75 et seq; Lipstein Conflict of Public Laws 357, 358 et seq; Mann Rec des 
Cours 132 (1971 I) 115, 188; MtinchKomm/Sonnenberger Einl Rn 374; Erne Vertragsgiiltigkeit 82; 
Schiffer Normen 79, 80 with further references. 
381 Schiffer Normen 79; MlinchKomm/Sonnenberger Einl Rn 375; Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1990 I) 
13, 15 I; Mann Rec des Cours 132 (1974 I) 115, 184. 
388 MilnchKomrnlMartiny Art 34 Rn 36; Schiffer Normen 76 et seq; Kropholler IPR § 22 II 2; Neymayer 
RabelsZ 25 (1960) 649, 651; Siehr RabelsZ 52 (I 988) 41, 73; Kntippel Zwingendes Recht 25; Morscher 
Rechtssetzungsakte 49; Erne Vertragsgiiltigkeit 82 et seq; Schwander Lois d'app/ication immediate 73. 
389 Schiffer Normen 77; Erne Vertragsgiiltigkeit 84; MtinchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 36; Vischer Rec des 
Cours 232 (1992 I) 13, 150 et seq. It has been assumed that the German case law is based on the 
misunderstanding that application would mean enforcement, cf Mann Rec des Cours 132 (1971 I) I IS, 
187; Schiffer Normen 75. 
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foreign public law following on the principle of territoriality is almost never 
supported. 390 
This conclusion does not necessarily mean that the legal effects of the public law of 
the lex causae are always applicable, or the only applicable effects. The application or 
consideration of foreign public law rules (as well as private law rules) by the forum 
must still be determined by its conflict of laws. 391 
It was previously noted that the applicability of rules serving the economic and 
political interests of a foreign country should not be determined by the ordinary conflict 
rules. The latter are based on the private interests of the contracting parties and do not 
take into account the interests of the forum and foreign state. 392 
However, internationally mandatory rules are not in general inapplicable, although 
German and Swiss case law may give that impression because of the unfortunate 
principle of territoriality. They are subject to separate conflict rules, because they 
predominantly serve the economic and political interests of a state.393 Nonetheless, third 
country's internationally mandatory rules serving public rather than the private interests 
were taken into account within the substantive law of the lex causae. It follows that 
special considerations are necessary to account for this type of rule. 
c Different kinds of public law rules 
The Federal Supreme Court and the Federal Tribunal distinguished between those 
public law rules serving predominantly private interests or the fair reconciliation 
between them, and those pursuing public interests of the foreign state.394 Only the latter 
rules have been held to be subject to the principle of territoriality and therefore in 
principle inapplicable. 
390 Apart fram a few authors, such as Schafer FG Sandrock 39, 48 et seq. 
391 Erne VertragsgUltigkeit 82, 83; Neuhaus IPR 179; Mann Rec des Caurs 132 (1971 I) 115, 190; Siehr 
RabelsZ 52 (1988) 41,80,81; Schafer FG Sandrock 39,48; Kreuzer Auslandisches Wirtschaftsrecht 77 . 
392 Vischer Rec des Caurs 232 (1992 I) 13, 151, 180; Kreuzer Auslandisches Wirtschaftsrecht 81 et seq. 
393 Vischer Rec des Caurs 232 (1992 I) 13, 180 et seq; Schurig RabelsZ 54 (1990) 217, 244; cf supra 
CHAPTER 5, I, 3. 
394 BG 2.2.1954 BGE 80 II, 53, 61 etseq; BGH 17.12.1959 BGHZ 31, 367, 371; BGH 16.4.1975 BGHZ 
64,183, 190. 
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This distinction has been criticised for being impossible to apply.395 However, apart 
from the starting point adopted by the courts - the subdivision of the foreign law only 
within the category of public law - which must be rejected for several reasons, the 
distinction developed by Gennan and Swiss case law does have its merits.396 It provides 
some guidance as to which foreign law falls under the scope of reference of the nonnal 
conflict rules and which deserves special consideration. Only those rules that are used 
by the foreign state to pursue its economic and political interests, and beyond the 
interests of the contracting parties and an attempt to effect a fair reconciliation between 
them, fall outside the scope of reference of the ordinary conflict rules. However, there 
remains a grey zone of rules that serve both private and public interests. In this regard 
no useful criteria have been found to identify these rules. 397 
d Consideration as fact within the applicable substantive law 
Advocates of the Substantive Law Approach have endorsed the consideration of foreign 
internationally mandatory rules within the substantive law rules of the governing law of 
the contract, and the Schuldstatuts-theory approves of this approach with regard to third 
countries' internationally mandatory rules. It has already been noted that consideration 
of a third country's mandatory rules within the substantive law of the lex causae is a 
possible solution, but that a solution on the level of conflict of laws is preferable. The 
many objections to the consideration within the substantive law have been discussed.398 
In contrast to the academic approaches, court decisions lack even fonnal choice of 
law explanation, rather proceeding with an immediate examination of whether the 
violation of the foreign rule may lead to impossibility of performance, frustration of 
contract, or immorality. 
395 Busse ZverglRWiss 95 (1996) 387, 415; Masch Rechtswahlfreiheit 135 et seq; Schurig RabelsZ 54 
(1990) 217, 227 et seq. 
396 Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992 J) 13, 184 et seq; Voser Lois d'application immediate 68; Morscher 
Rechtssetzungsakte 88; Schiffer Normen 30, 31. 
397 See Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992 J) 13, 184 et seq; Voser Lois d'application immediate 68; see 
the approaches of MilnchKomm/Sonnenberger Einl Rn 32; Anderegg EingrifJsnormen 87 et seq; 
Schubert RIW 1987,729,731; Radtke ZVerglRWJss 84 (1985) 325, 328; BGH 17.11.1994 BGHZ 128, 
41,52; Schnyder Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht Rn 10, 13; see also supra CHAPTER 3, II, 2. 
398 See supra CHAPTER 5, J, 7, a, b, c. 
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(1) Are foreign rules facts? The need for choice of considerations 
As has been stated above, the argument that a violated foreign rule can be considered as 
supposed 'fact' within certain substantive rules ofthe proper law is unconvincing. It is a 
general accepted principle that foreign law cannot be applied or considered by the forum 
state unless a conflict rule, whether statutory or of a common law nature, so directs. 399 
The conclusion drawn from this principle by the advocates ofthe Schuldstatuts-theory is 
that the conflict rules of the forum state refer to the proper law as a whole, to the 
exclusion of any other law. Therefore, it is held that third countries' internationally 
mandatory rules cannot be applied, but only considered as facts. 4oo 
However, it is doubtful whether there is any difference between the application of 
foreign law and its consideration as fact within the substantive law rules as far as choice 
oflaw considerations are concerned.401 Foreign rules are not 'facts' in the true sense and 
to take the 'normative content' of a rule into account means that it is applied in some 
sense, and deserves conflict of laws considerations.402 The actual effects of a rule are 
only taken into account if the concern is truly the de facto impact of the foreign rule 
alone, and not its material or normative content.403 
German courts have recognised the violation of foreign law as immoral and 
contrary to German boni mores if the foreign provision also indirectly serves German 
interests, or interests that are shared by all civilised nations, or are based on general 
moral values. This clearly shows that that the rule itselfis taken into account, not simply 
the de facto effects of the violated foreign rule, or the rule as a kind of 'fact'. The 
foreign rule has been the very basis of the court's decision. 
399 Siehr RabelsZ 52 (1988) 41, 84; Schiffer Normen 98, 99; Junker JZ 1991, 699, 700; Kreuzer 
Ausfandisches Wirtschaflsrecht 78; Schafer FG Sandrock 39,49. 
400 See supra CHAPTER 5, I, 1. 
401 Schiffer Normen 94 et seq; Schurig Lois 55, 73, 74; Kreuzer Auslandisches Wirtschaflsrecht 79, 80; 
Mentzel Sonderanknilpfung 105 et seq; von Bar IPR Bd I Rn 265; Lehmann ZRP 1987,319,320; 
Schubert RIW 1987,729,737; Schurig RabelsZ 54 (1990) 217, 241. 
402 Schubert RIW 1987, 729, 737; Radtke ZverglRWiss 84 (1985) 325, 345 et seq; Schurig Lois 55, 73, 
74; Kreuzer Auslandisches Wirtschaflsrecht 79, 80; Schiffer Normen 94. Likewise, the Swiss Federal 
Tribunal in BGE 60 II 294, 311 et seq stated that it is fallacious to distinguish between the application 
and the recognition of a foreign rule. 
403 Schurig Lois 55,73,74; Schubert RIW 1987,729,737; critical Schiffer Normen 95, 96. 
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The notion of boni mores usually protects an elementary domestic code of practices 
and does not indicate under what Circumstances third countries' internationally 
mandatory rules, based on public interests, lead to immorality.404 The application of the 
boni mores rule in the decisions that have been discussed is not based on German moral 
values, but rather on whether the interests of the forum state can be served by an 
application or consideration of the foreign law. The characterisation of the contract as 
immoral is connected with the content and purpose of the foreign rule. If the contract 
were completely legal under the foreign law, no question of immorality would arise.405 
In considering the material content and objective of the foreign rule or the interests 
pursued by the rule, German courts take account of the rule itself, not only its actual 
effects. 
Consideration of the foreign rule within boni mores must first of all examine 
whether there is a foreign law that has been violated by the contracting parties. 
Thereafter, the judge must determine whether the foreign law protects interests shared in 
common by the forum state, and only then he can decide whether or not the violation of 
foreign law leads to immorality. Thus, before considering the infringement of the 
foreign rule within the notion of boni mores, the judge has to examine the primary 
question of when a foreign law can be considered within the notion of boni mores. He 
thereby looks at the existence, operative facts, and normative content of the rule.406 
It is therefore argued that the choice of law question about whether and under what 
circumstances foreign law can be applied - or, more broadly, given effect to - is 
transferred to the level of substantive law and dealt with under the 'fraudulent label' of 
boni mores, or is blurred with or concealed behind application of substantive law.407 
The consideration of the foreign rule as a reason for impossibility of performance or 
frustration of contract is not quite so obvious. According to Schiffer, this situation also 
404 Kreuzer Auslandisches Wirtschaftsrecht 87; von Hoffmann Contract Conflicts 221, 230. 
405 Mentzel Sonderanknupfung 106; Morscher Rechtssetzungsakte 67; Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992 
I) 13, 171. 
406 For details, see Schiffer Normen 96 et seq; Lehmann Zwingendes Recht 200 et seq. 
407 See Hentzen RIW 1988, 508, 509; MtinchKomm/Martiny Art 34 Rn 35; Schiffer Normen 96 et seq; 
Schubert RIW 1987, 729, 737; Lehmann Zwingendes Recht 200 et seq; Schurig RabelsZ 54 (1990) 217, 
242; Morscher Rechtssetzungsakte 67; Junker JZ 1991, 699, 70 I; Drobnig FS Neumayer 159, 177; 
ReithrnannIMartinylLimmer Internatjonales Vertragsrecht Rn 463, 465. 
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implies a choice of law as to whether there is a foreign law to be taken into account, and 
whether the situation falls within the scope ofthe foreign rule. Only after the court has 
concluded that the transaction falls within the foreign law and that the foreign rule 
prohibits the conduct or action, can the judge determine whether that rule may be 
deemed to render performance impossible under the law of the lex causae.408 
However, it is doubtful whether this is always the case. There are cases where only 
the actual effects of a foreign rule have in truth been taken into account, for example, 
where the foreign enacting state has already enforced its legislation by seizure 
attachment.409 Difficulties arise in situations where the foreign state has not yet enforced 
its law, or the foreign law has not yet been violated because the debtor refuses 
performance. Is the mere existence of a foreign law, possibly with heavy sanctions for 
the violation thereof, enough to render performance impossible? The courts have ruled 
that it is.4lO But, is it in truth only the actual effect of a foreign rule that is being taken 
into account? It seems that in this case it is at least the 'normative content' ofthe rule 
that is being considered.411 
Swiss courts have refused to take foreign rules into account and render performance 
impossible, because the foreign law was held to be contrary to the Swiss ordre public.412 
The Swiss Tribunal itself stated in this context that there is no difference between 
applying foreign legislation directly and applying it indirectly by recognising its factual 
effects.413 The approach of the Tribunal is to ask whether the content or the application 
of the foreign legislation would infringe the forum's ordre public, and thus determine 
whether its effects can be taken into account and thereby render performance 
impossible. This approach has been the subject of some scepticism, and it is argued that 
recognising the actual effects of the foreign legislation is independent from the ordre 
public of the forum. The reference to the ordre public exemption means that the Swiss 
court not only took into account the actual effects of the foreign rule within the 
408 Schiffer Normen 94 et seq. 
409 Schurig RabelsZ 54 (1990) 217, 241, 242; id Lois 55, 73; for criticism, see Schubert RIW 1987,729, 
737; Zimmer IPRax 199365,66 et seq. 
410 28.6.1918 RGZ 93, 182 et seq. 
411 Schurig RabelsZ 54 (1990) 217,241,242; id Lois 55, 73; Schubert RlW 1987,729,737. 
412 BGE 60 II 294, 311 et seq. 
413 BGE 60 II 294, 311; BGE 64 II 88, 100. 
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substantive law rules, but also applied the foreign legislation on a conflict of laws 
leve1.414 
In Germany, in contrast, the consequences of the existence of a foreign provision 
and foreign executed power have been considered on a de facto level as reason for 
impossibility, without any evaluation of the content of the foreign rule, which could 
even be directed against German interests.415 According to German case law it is the 
physical pressure and constraints that can arise for the parties of a contract governed by 
a foreign law that are taken into account. The issue is whether the foreign law can be 
enforced.416 Again, the question can be raised about when the pressure becomes a fact, 
or when the foreign rule is taken into account because it is held to be an undue hardship 
for a debtor to perform in violation of a foreign law. The latter can also result in a 
consideration of the foreign rule itself, and not its actual effects. 
(2) The need for a conflict rule 
The conclusion that can be drawn is that in cases where the foreign rule is considered as 
a rule and not only as 'true' fact, choice of law considerations are necessary to 
determine under what circumstances the foreign rule can be considered. According to 
the general principles of choice of law, this is a matter for the conflict rules of the forum 
state. 
The need for a conflict rule cannot be avoided by the consideration of a foreign rule 
within the substantive law. In fact, a choice is made, albeit blurred and hidden within 
the substantive law. It is preferable to determine, on the level of the forum's conflict of 
laws, when it is justified to recognise third countries' internationally mandatory rules, as 
well as those of the proper law.417 It has been shown by advocates of the Special 
414 Morscher RechtssetzungsakJe 64; Blir Kartellrecht 120; Schwander Lois d'app/ication immediate 365; 
Schubert RlW 1987,729,737. 
415 ReithmanniMartinylLimmer lnternationales Vertragsrecht Rn 467; Baum RabelsZ 53 (1989) 152, 
156; Drobnig FS Neumayer 159, 169; Basedow GYBIntL 27 (1984) 109, 132. 
416 See RG 28.6.1918 RGZ 93, 182 et seq. 
417 Also see Schiffer Normen 98 et seq; id ZverglRWiss 90 (1991) 390, 405; Kreuzer Auslandisches 
Wirtschaftsrecht 89 et seq; StaudingerlMagnus Art 34 Rn 139. 
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Connection Theory that the criteria that have been used by the courts can easily be 
transported to the level of conflict of laws in the form of a conflict rule.418 
(3) The enlargement of substantive law rules 
There are other objections to the consideration of the foreign law as 'facts/rules' within 
the substantive law of the proper law. For example, the substantive law rules, that are 
designed for domestic situations, need to be extended so that they can be applied to a 
violation of foreign law.419 
In all decided cases where the foreign legislation was considered within the notion 
of boni mores or impossibility of performance, the contracts were governed by the law 
of the forum state. The courts have never been faced with a case where the proper law 
was a foreign law, and a protection-worthy or enforceable internationally mandatory 
rule of a third country claimed application. A judge can no doubt extend the law of his 
home country without any difficulty. But, if the governing law were a foreign law, he 
would be faced with the difficult task of extending the scope of foreign law, if it offered 
suitable relief. 420 
(4) The ultimate control of the forum state 
Finally, it has been emphasised that, in cases where the foreign proper law can decide 
whether to recognise a third country's internationally mandatory rules, the decision 
about application of the rule is thus handed over to the foreign law. As has been noted, it 
is for the forum to decide when to recognise foreign law. Thus even those authors who 
support the substantive law solution of the case law submit that in cases where the 
foreign lex causae does not provide a means of applying the foreign legislation, the 
judge may have recourse to the forum's ordre public or to an 'ordre public universal'.421 
418 See CHAPTER 5, I, 3, f, g, h, i. 
419 See Schwander IPR AT250 et seq; Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (19921) 13, 177; Schurig RabelsZ 54 
(1990) 217, 243; Drobnig FS Neumayer 159,177. 
420 For details, see Schwander IPR AT250 et seq; Schurig RabelsZ 54 (1990) 217, 244; Sonnen berger FS 
Rebmann 819, 837; Hentzen RlW 1988, 508, 510. 
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e Conclusion 
In the light of all these arguments, the German and Swiss courts' solution clearly does 
not lead to legal certainty, nor does it conform to the fundamental principles of conflict 
of laws. The non-application of foreign law on the basis of the principle of territoriality 
must be rejected as erroneous. Consideration of foreign rules within the substantive law 
of the proper law is possible, but the judge must still primarily make a choice of law. 
This decision takes place at the level of substantive law, and is blurred and hidden 
within the substantive law. 
The reasons for the courts' decisions change from case to case according to the 
particular situation. Because, the judgments use vague criteria and extend the 
substantive law rules, it is difficult, if not impossible, to predict the outcome of a case.422 
Finally, in cases where a foreign law governs the contract, the forum is faced with the 
difficult task of extending the scope of foreign domestic law, and the decision about 
whether a foreign rule is to be applied - a matter for the forum's conflict of laws 
approach - is handed over to the lex causae. 
421 Heini 100 ZSR (1981) 65, 73, 82. However, Heini does not clarify exactly what constitutes the ordre 
public universal. 
422 Also see Kreuzer Auslandisches Wirtschaftsrecht 87; Mentzel Sonderankniipfung 106 et seq; Lehmann 
ZRP 1987, 319, 321. 
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III The English common law approach 
Compared with Gennany and Switzerland, English case law has developed relatively 
firm principles with regard to the application of foreign internationally mandatory rules. 
According to English law most aspects of contract are governed by the proper law of the 
contract, whether this is the chosen law or the law which is applicable in the absence of 
a choice (objectively determined law).434 This was already the well established basic rule 
under the common law before the Rome Convention: The material or essential validity 
of the contract, its interpretation, effect and discharge was determined by the proper 
law.435 
However, with regard to the question of the application of internationally 
mandatory rules, exceptions have been made to the basic rule, and a contract that was 
valid according to the proper law was not enforced if it was unlawful according to 
another law.436 Apart from the above mentioned application of the forum's 
internationally mandatory rules, the 'control of the proper law' has been limited by the 
occasional application or consideration of internationally mandatory rules of a third 
country. This aspect will be discussed later. 
The crucial question in the following section is whether, according to the common 
law position, all mandatory rules ofthe proper law are applied for the sole reason that 
they belong to the proper law, or whether, as in Germany and Switzerland, some 
mandatory rules are not applied as a result of their public law nature or their material 
content, even though they do belong to the proper law of the contract. 
434 Collier Conflict of Laws 185; Kaye The New Private International Law IS et seq; Morse Public Policy 
England-59. 
4JS Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol II 1190 and 1253; Carter BYBIL 57 (1986) I, 7. The rule is 
subject to some exceptions, such as capacity or formal validity, the proper law of which is indicated by 
special choice of law rules and does not correspond necessarily with the law governing the contract. See 
on these and further exceptions: Kaye The New Private International Law 18 et seq; Dicey & Morris 
Conflict of Laws Vol II 1190, 1205 et seq 
436 See Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol II 1190, 1241 et seq; Cheshire and North's Private 
International Law 518 et seq. 
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1 The general rule: Application of mandatory rules of the lex causae 
English courts have generally applied the mandatory provisions of the lex causae and do 
not enforce a contract that is void or illegal according to the applicable law.437 English 
authors presume that the position under the Rome Convention is essentially the same: 
The essential validity of the contract is determined by the governing law (art 8 ofthe 
Rome Convention) so that mandatory provisions of the proper law are in principle 
applicable.438 
To avoid confusion it is useful to mention at this point that the questions of 
application of mandatory rules and illegality or material (or essential) validity of a 
contract are closely connected. Therefore, in the past, and even now, the problem of 
mandatory rules has also been dealt with under the more general topic of illegality of 
contract.439 The reason for the latter approach lies in the fact that mandatory rules are 
typically of a prohibitive nature and often contain the order that a contract is void or 
illegal. However, illegality logically presupposes the infringement of mandatory rules 
(statutory mandatory rules as well as mandatory common law rules).44o 
Application of the mandatory rules is based on the general principle that statutes 
forming part of the proper law of the contract will normally be applied (because they are 
rendered applicable by the ordinary choice oflaw rules), and/or on the basis of the 
principle that the essential validity depends on the governing law.441 
437 CfDicey & Morris Conflict o/Laws VallI 1241, 1252, 1253; Cheshire & North's Private 
International Law 518; Collier Conflict a/Laws 206; Jaffey ICLQ 23 (1974) 1,3; Mann Rec des Cours 
132 (1971 I) 109, 157; see also for judicial authority Royal Exchange Assurance Corp v Vega [1902] 2 
KB 384 (CA); Vita Food Products Inc v Unus Shipping Co Ltd [1939] AC 277 (PC), Kahler v Midland 
Bank Ltd [1950] AC 24, [1949] 2 All ER 621; Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v Bankers Trust Co [1989] 3 
All ER 252; subject of course to the exclusion of foreign law on grounds of public policy and overriding 
statutes of the forum state. 
438 Dicey & Morris Conflict o/Laws Vol I 21,22 and Vol II 1253; Cheshire & North's Private 
International Law 518. 
439 Eg, Cheshire& North's Private International Law 518 et seq; Lando CMLR 24 (1987) 159, 205 
'essential validity and Lois de police'; Hartley Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 341, 385 et seq' illegality'; 
Carter BYBIL 57 (1986) I, 28; Mann BYBIL 18 (1937) 97; clearly Collier Conflict 0/ Laws 206, 207; 
Jaffey ICLQ 23 (1974) l. 
440 Jaffey ICLQ 23 (1974) 1. 
441 'According to standard doctrine in the conflict of laws, a statute does not normally apply unless it 
forms part of the governing law of the contract', see Dicey & Morris Conflict o/Laws Vol 121 with 
references in Footnotes 1 - 5 and Vol II 1241,1253, 1254; Forsyth The role o/public law 94, 102 et seq. 
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a Private and public law 
Although the distinction between public and private law is now known in England, it 
does not have the same effect on the question of applicability of foreign mandatory 
rules.442 Unlike the continental European countries, England does not distinguish 
between the application of foreign public or private mandatory rules as such and there is 
no doctrine of non-applicability offoreign public law.443 Nevertheless, in England the 
concept of public law surfaces in the context of exclusionary rules: Foreign penal, 
revenue or other 'public laws' will not be enforced by an English court. The content of 
this exclusionary rule and whether it in fact forms an exception to the general 
applicability of the rules of the lex causae will be investigated later.444 
The general principle is that, when an English choice of law rule indicates a foreign 
legal system as the applicable law, this is usually understood as a reference to all the 
relevant rules of that legal system, including public law rules.445 Therefore, English 
courts apply both foreign mandatory rules of a private law nature446 and rules that may 
be considered as public law rules, or that are at least held to serve collective state 
interests rather than the fair reconciliation of the contracting parties. Examples of such 
public law rules are foreign currency or exchange control regulations, competition laws, 
and import and export restrictions. The courts therefore regard the contracts as illegal in 
terms of their proper law.447 
442 See in this regard the complex article of Forsyth The role o/public law 94 et seq, in which he defines 
rules of public law as 'rules which deal with the relationship between citizen and state, including ... 
revenue laws, penal laws, laws providing for confiscation and expropriation of property, social security 
and national insurance laws, foreign exchange control regulations .... ' However in Footnote 5 he remarks 
with reference to dicta in case law that 'confusion reigns in English law as to the content of public law'. 
Also see Lipstein Conflict 0/ Laws 38 et seq; id Offentliches Recht 39 et seq; id Conflict 0/ Public Laws 
357 et seq; Mann Rec des Cours (1971 I) 109 et seq; Hartley Foreign Public Law 13 et seq. 
443 Mann Rec des Cours 132 (1971 I) 109, 184 with references; also see Lipstein Conflict o/Public Laws 
357,358 et seq, 364; Forsyth The role o/public law 94, 102. 
444 See infra under section III, I, b. 
445 CfForsyth The role o/public law 94, 102; Lipstein Conflict 0/ Public Laws 357,364 et seq. 
446 Cf the examples given by Dicey & Morris Conflict 0/ Laws Vol I 21 Footnote 2 for statutes affecting 
wagering contracts. 
447 CfForsyth The role o/public law 94,102 et seq; Mann Rec des Cours 132 (1971 I) 109, 184; Lipstein 
Conflict 0/ Public Laws 357, 365; see De Beeche v South American Stores Ltd [1935] AC 148; Re 
International Trustee/or the Protection o/Bondholders Act [1937] 2 All ER 164; [1937] AC 500 (HL); 
Re Banque des Merchands des Moscou (No 2) [1954] 1 WLR 1108; Re Helbert Wagg & Co Ltd [1956] 
Ch 323; [1956] 1 All ER 129. 
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One example of the English courts' general disregard of the private / public law 
distinction is Re Helbert Wagg & Co Ltd's Claim. 448 The question was whether a 
subsequent German moratorium law that provided that a foreign currency debt could be 
discharged by the payment of an appropriate sum of Reichsmark into a 
Konversionskasse was applicable to a loan agreement between an English and a German 
company. In terms ofthe loan agreement, the German company borrowed a sum of 
Pounds Sterling from the English company. 
The court held that the German moratorium law was applicable on the grounds that 
the contract was governed by German law and consequently held that payment to the 
Kasse in accordance with the moratorium law had discharged the debt. Upjohn J stated 
that: 
[I]n general every civilised state must be recognised as having the power to 
legislate ... in respect of contracts governed by the law of that state [that enacted the 
legislation] and that such legislation must be recogn,ised by other states as valid and 
effectual ... to modify or dissolve such contracts .... 449 
Another case often cited in this context is R v International Trustee for the 
Protection of Bondholders Act. 450 The proper law of the contract (a bond raised by the 
British government on the New York money market) was held by the House of Lords to 
be the law of the United States of America.451 For that reason the majority of Judges of 
the House of Lords applied a Joint Resolution of Congress that was passed in July 1933 
and had the force of law. This resolution rendered payment of a dollar debt in gold coin 
illegal and declared that all dollar obligations could be discharged only by payment of 
the dollar sum in any currency that was legal tender at that time (abrogation of gold 
clauses). The bondholders were therefore not entitled to payment in gold coin.452 
448 [1956] 2 WLR 183; [1956] Ch 323; [1956] 1 All ER 129; see for the facts Jaffey ICLQ 23 (1974) 1,6. 
449 With regard to the Gennan legislation he stated that a state has the right 'to protect its economy by 
measures of foreign exchange control and by altering the value of its currency.' 
450 [1937] 2 All ER 164; [1937] AC 500 (HL); [1936] 3 All ER 407 (CA). For the facts of the case: 
Forsyth The role of public law 94, 103 and Jaffey ICLQ 23 (1974) 1,5. But also see the case New 
Brunswick Railway Co v British & French Trust Corporation Ltd [1939] AC 1; [1938] 4 AllER 747 
where the HL left the question of which country's law governs the bonds open, and held that the foreign 
(Canadian) gold clauses were inapplicable if the litigation took place in England. However, the bonds 
were already due three years before the Canadian mandatory provision entered into force. 
451 In contrast to the Court of Appeal where it was held that the proper law was English law. 
452 Lord Atkin stated 'that which comes first under consideration is what is the proper law of the contract; 
for if that is to be answered in one way no further issues remain.' 
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The same result could have been reached by applying the lex loci solutionis rule 
(with which will be dealt with later). The contracting parties agreed that New York was 
the place of performance, and according to the lex loci solutionis rule the mandatory 
provisions of the place of performance are applicable regardless of the proper law of the 
contract. 453 
In other cases the House of Lords upheld foreign exchange control regulations that 
prohibited the delivery of securities without the consent of the nominated foreign 
authority, because the regulations formed part of the proper law and the contracts were 
held to be invalid or discharged.454 
For instance, in Kahler v Midland Bank LtrfsS the House of Lords applied Czech 
foreign exchange control regulations on the grounds that the contract was governed by 
Czech law. It followed that the plaintiff could not have enforced delivery of the shares 
that were owed without the permission of the National Bank, and this permission had 
been refused. Consequently the plaintiff's action in detinue failed. 456 This judgment has 
been subject to fundamental criticism. It has been held that the court granted 
extraterritorial operation to the Czech exchange control regulations, because the Czech 
law could prevent the delivery of the shares from the debtor - an English bank - to the 
plaintiff, who was not even resident in Czechoslovakia.457 
In Zivnostenska Banka National Corporation v Frankmann458 the court was once 
again concerned with a contract governed by Czech law and a Czechoslovakian 
453 See the dicta of Lord Wright in the Court of Appeal decision: the lex loci solutionis rule is 'too well 
established now to require any further discussion' [1936] 3 All ER 407, at 428. Also see Schulte 
Anknilpfung von Eingriffinormen 93, who refers in his argument to the possibility of a 'special 
connection'; however, the lex loci solutionis rule is far from clear. Although the rule is often designated 
as well- established principle in English law, the interpretation of the 'methodical content' of the 
principle differs amongst cases and academic writers. For further details, see infra under section 2, c, d. 
454 De Beeche v South American Stores Ltd [1935] AC 148; St. Pierre and Others v South American 
Stores (Gath and Chaves) Ltd and Chilean Stores (Gath and Chaves) Ltd [1937] 3 All ER 349; Kahler v 
Midland Bank Ltd [1950] AC 24 (HL); [1949] 2 All ER 621; Zivnostenska Banka National Corporation v 
Frankman [1950] AC 57 (HL); Re Banque des Merchands des Moscou (No 2) [1954] 1 WLR 118. 
455 [1950] AC 24 (HL); [1949] 2 All ER 621. Lord Radcliffe stated that the proper law of the contract not 
merely sustains, but because it sustains may also modify or dissolve the contractual bond (at page 641). 
456 The facts of the case are complicated and shall not be repeated here. For details, see Forsyth The role 
of public law 94, 110 et seq and Morse Public Policy England-I 30 et seq. 
457 For criticism see Forsyth The role of public law 94, 110 et seq. For the sake of comparison, see that 
Kahler v Midland Bank was not followed by a South African decision Standard Bank of South Africa v 
Ocean Commidities 1983 (1) SA 276 (A). 
458 [1950] AC 57 (HL); ([1949] 2 All ER 671. 
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mandatory provision. Most of the judges applied the foreign mandatory legislation 
because it formed part of the proper law. Lord Reid, however, referred to the lex loci 
solutionis rule and stated that it is settled law that 'whatever the proper law of the 
contract an English court will not require a party to do an act in performance of a 
contract which would be an offence under the law in force at the place where the act has 
to be done. ,459 
In St Pierre and others v South American Stores (Gath and Chaves) Ltd and Chilean 
Stores (Gath and Chaves) Ltcf60 the court was concerned with a contract governed by 
Chilean law, the performance of which was restricted by a Chilean mandatory exchange 
control regulation if the money was transferred to the United Kingdom. The reasoning 
of the judges in this case differed. While Lord Greer applied the foreign mandatory 
legislation because the proper law was Chilean, Lord Slesser applied the mandatory law 
because the order to transfer would take place in Chile and not anywhere else in the 
world.461 
b Exceptions to the general rule; non-enforcement of foreign penal, revenue and 
other public laws 
The exclusive and comprehensive application of the mandatory rules of the proper law 
and the principle that the essential validity depends on the governing law is subject to 
the ordinary rule that the application of the foreign rule must not violate the forum's 
public policy. English courts will not apply or give effect to a foreign mandatory 
provision (as well as foreign law in general) if it, or the result of its application, violates 
fundamental principles of public policy, despite the fact that the provision is applicable 
according to the English choice of law rules.462 Therefore, the foreign proper law 
(including its internationally mandatory rules) may be disregarded on the basis of 
English public policy.463 This effect of public policy corresponds with the so-called 
459 At page 78, (or at page 681). 
460 [1937] 3 All ER 349. 
461 Ibid 352 and 356. 
462 Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol 188 et seq; id Vol II 1277 et seq; Cheshire & North's Private 
International Law 128 et seq, 503 et seq; Morse Public Policy England - 9 et seq, 59 et seq. 
463 The application of the public policy rule may leacfto the court regarding a contract that would be valid 
according to its governing law as void or unenforceable. On the other hand, it may well have the opposite 
effect that English courts enforce contracts that are illegal under their proper law and thus disregard the 
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'negative function' of the continental European doctrine of ordre public. 464 This 
'negative function' of the ordre public or the so-called public policy exclusionary rule 
will not be considered further in this thesis.465 
However, England adheres to the principle thatforeign revenue, penal and other 
public laws will not be enforced either directly or indirectly.466 This principle is well 
founded in many jurisdictions.467 Its effect may be that mandatory rules of the proper 
law that have this character should not be applied, and this proposition will be 
investigated in the following paragraphs. 
Although there is some academic debate concerning the theoretical basis of the 
principle,468 the most suitable explanation is considered to be that given by Lord Keith 
in Government of India v Taylor. 469 The court held that the enforcement of a tax claim 
(as in casu) constitutes part of the sovereignty of the state that imposes those claims. 
'[A]n assertion of sovereign authority by one state within the territory of another, as 
distinct from a patrimonial claim by a foreign sovereign, is (treaty or Convention apart) 
contrary to all concepts of independent sovereignty'. The principle had already been 
referred to by Lord Watson in 1893, in the notorious case Huntington v Attrill,470 where 
the court was dealing with foreign penal laws. The principle was held to designate 'that 
class of actions which, by the law of nations, are exclusively assigned to their domestic 
forum'. The court noted that: 
foreign mandatory legislation that invalidates the contract. On this aspect, see Dicey & Morris Conflict of 
Laws Vol 190, 91; Morse Public Policy England - 63; Hartley Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 341, 351. 
464 Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol I 88, 90, 91 and Vol II 1277, 1280; Morse Public Policy England 
- 63; Hartley Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 341, 351. The' positive function' of public policy renders the 
law of the forum applicable despite the foreign proper law. In England the distinction between the 
negative and positive functions of public policy or ordre public is often not mentioned. Cf Dicey & 
Morris Conflict of Laws Vol II88 et seq; see, however, Fletcher Conflict of Laws 172; Hartley Rec des 
Cours 266 (1997) 341, 350 et seq. 
465 With regard to public policy and the conditions of its application, such as the connection with the 
forum or the violation of afundamental principle of justice, see Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws VolI88 
et seq; id Vol II 1277 et seq; Cheshire & North's Private International Law 128 et seq, 503 et seq; Morse 
Public Policy England - 9 et seq, 59 et seq. Another aspect of the English public policy rule will be dealt 
with in the context of third countries' internationally rules, see infra under 2, a. 
466 Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol 197 Rule 3; Cheshire & North's Private International Law 113 
et seq; see also Mann Rec des Cours 132 (1971 I) 109, 166; Collier Conflict of Laws 359 et seq, Forsyth 
The role of public law 94, 112 et seq, all with a discussion of the principle and references to case law. 
467 Eg in Germany, Switzerland and France, cfBasedow GYBIL 27 (1984) 109, 115 et seq. It is equally 
valid for South Africa, see Forsyth Private International Law 104 et seq with references. 
468 See Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vo1I97, 98; Mann Rec des Cours 132 (1971 I) 109, 166. 
469 [1955] AC 491, at 51!. 
470 (1893) AC 150, at 156 (PC). 
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[The principle has] its foundation in the well recognised principle that crimes, 
including in that term all breaches of public law punishable by pecuniary mulct or 
otherwise, at the instance of the state government or of someone representing the 
public are local in the sense that they are only cognisable and punishable in the 
country where they were committed. Accordingly, no proceeding, even in the shape 
of a civil suit, which has for its object the enforcement by the State, whether 
directly or indirectly, of punishment imposed for such breaches by the lex fori, 
ought to be admitted in the Courts of any other country.471 
What type of foreign law is affected by this exclusionary rule? In general, English 
law has held that it decides whether the law of a foreign country falls within the 
categories oflaws that will not be enforced by English COurtS.472 
The non-enforcement of the categories of foreign penal and revenue law on the 
basis of this principle is clearly established. In Huntington v Attrill473 the court was 
concerned with foreign penal law. It defined penal law as 'crimes, including in that term 
all breaches of public law punishable by pecuniary mulct or otherwise, at the instance of 
the state government or of someone representing the public,.474 In Government of India 
v Taylor475 the court held, with regard to revenue laws, that it would not uphold or 
enforce claims on behalf of a foreign state to recover taxes due under its law.476 The 
category 'revenue law' has never been defined, but certainly includes a rule requiring a 
non-contractual payment of money to a central or local goverrunent.477 
However, obscurity surrounds the existence and content of' other public laws' as a 
category of rules that the English courts will not enforce.478 Dicey and Morris describe 
'other public laws' as 'all those rules (other than penal and revenue laws) which are 
471 The court, however, held that the principle was inapplicable, despite the penal nature of the New York 
statute, because the cause of action was exercising the rights of individual parties. 
472 See Huntington v Attrill [1893] AC 150, at 156 (PC); Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol I 98. It has, 
however, been submitted by academic authors that the categorisation of laws using a pigeon hole 
technique is often problematic, as the determination and definition of what laws are of a penal, revenue or 
'other public laws' nature is unclear. Cf Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol I 101 (penal law), 102 
(revenue law), 103 (other public laws) for definition and references to case law. 
473 [1893] AC 150, at 156 (PC). 
474 For a more detailed definition of penal law, see Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol I 100 et seq. 
475 [1955] AC 491; see Collier Conflict of Laws 367 for further references. 
476 However, this rule was held to be subject to a contrary agreement or treaty, and the Court thus held 
that the state of Norway could seek the extradition of its nationals for tax-related offences. 
477 Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol I 102; eg 'capital gains tax', cf Government of India v Taylor 
[1955] AC 491. 
478 CfDicey & Morris Conflict o/Laws Vol 1103 ; Collier [1989] CLl33 et seq; Collier Conflict of Laws 
368 et seq; Morse Public Policy England - 13 et seq. 
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enforced as an assertion of the authority of central or local government. ,479 Examples are 
generally found in import and export restrictions, regulations banning trade with the 
enemy, price control and anti-trust laws.48o 
It is uncertain whether there is a residuary class of public laws that an English court 
will not enforce.481 However, Dicey and Morris's three-fold classification of foreign 
penal, revenue and other public laws has been adopted by the COurtS.482 The latter 
category was first adopted by Lord Denning in Attorney-General of New Zealand v 
Ortiz483 where the court was concerned with ownership of a valuable Maori carving that 
had been unlawfully exported from New Zealand. The Attorney-General of New 
Zealand brought an action to restrain the sale in London and asked the court to order 
that it should be returned to New Zealand. The Court of Appeal rejected the claim, 
generally speaking because the violated New Zealand legislation was unenforceable. 
Lord Denning expressed the view that 'other public laws' were laws 'eiusdem generis 
with penal and revenue laws' and held that the violated law was unenforceable in 
England because of its public law nature.484 In US v Inkley,485 too, the Court of Appeal 
clearly accepted that foreign public law was an express category that the court would 
not enforce.486 Furthermore, the High Court of Australia and the Court of Appeal of 
New Zealand have confirmed the classification of public laws as a residuary category.487 
479 Conflict of Laws Vol I 103. 
480 In principle it is held that 'other public laws' is apparently a wider concept that encompasses both 
revenue and penal laws, but includes other public laws as well, cfDicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol I 
103; Cheshire & North's Private International Law 114; this was approved in US v Inkley [1989] QB 
255,264-265 (CA). See the examples of Dicey & Morris ibid 107; Collier Conflict of Laws 368, 369; 
481 See Collier Conflict of Laws 368 et seq; Forsyth The role of public law 94, 117; Morse Public Policy 
England - 14 who rejects it as independent category. He holds that merely because a public law involves 
an act done in the exercise of sovereign authority does not itself indicate that such an act is unenforceable 
outside the territory of the foreign state. 
482 See Attorney-General of New Zealand v Ortiz [1984] AC 1,20 et seq; Williams and Humbert v W & H 
Trade Marks (Jersey) Ltd [1986] AC 386, 394 and 401; Re State of Norway's Application [1987] QB 
433,477-478 (CA). The rule was supported by the House of Lords in Re State of Norway's Application 
(Nos I and 2) [1990] 1 AC 723 . 
483 [1984] AC 1,20 et seq . 
484 However, Ackner LJ held that it was totally unrealistic to deny that the Act was penal. The decision 
was affirmed by the HL solely on the ground that the act was interpreted as not providing for automatic 
forfeiture. The Maori carving was not seized in New Zealand and, therefore, not forfeited to the Crown. 
485 [1989] QB 255, 264 (CA). 
486 However, the court dismissed application of United States law primarily because it was a criminal or 
penal law. 
487 Attorney-General (UK) v Heinemann Publishers Australia Pty Ltd (1988) 165 CLR 30, 42-43; 
Attorney-Generalfor the United Kingdom v Wellington Newspapers Ltd [1988] 1 NZLR 129, 173 et seq; 
on which see Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol I 105, 06; Collier Conflict of Laws 369. 
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Still, the question whether all public law rules fall under the exclusionary rules, and thus 
the exact content of this category, remains uncertain.488 
However, the crucial question that has to be asked in this study is whether the 
principle can in fact be an exception to the general rule that mandatory public law rules 
of the proper law will be upheld in the English forum. It is submitted that this is not the 
case and this argument will be borne out by the following considerations. 
The crucial distinction that has to be drawn is that the principle relates only to 
enforcement; it does not prevent application or recognition of the same law. 
Direct enforcement occurs where a foreign country or its nominee seeks to obtain relief, 
property or monetary orders, on the basis of its public law.489 Indirect enforcement 
means that a foreign state or its nominee pursues a remedy that is not founded on the 
public law in question, bilt which in substance is designed to give it extraterritorial 
effect.490 Furthermore, indirect enforcement can occur where a private party raises a 
claim or defence based on the public law, to enforce the rights bestowed by the foreign 
country.491 
In essence, the universal rule applies if the plaintiff or defendant is the foreign state, 
which claims its rights in any form, either directly or indirectly.492 If the plaintiff or 
defendant is a private person who enforces his own private right in his own interest, the 
universal principle or rule has no application. This occurs irrespective of whether the 
claim evolves as a consequence of a foreign state's public laws and the private person's 
application thereof in a cause of action.493 
The proposition that the universal rule does not apply in private litigation is 
generally accepted494 and is already supported by the seminal case of Huntingdon v 
488 Compare Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol I 106, 107. 
489 See, eg, Williams & Humbert Ltd v W & H. Trade Marks (Jersey) Ltd [1986] AC 368, at 437. 
490 See Peter Buchanan Ltd v McWey [1955] AC 516 (Supreme Court of Ireland). In this case a foreign 
company in bankruptcy sought to recover assets from a director. The liquidator who was appointed by the 
court had, at the instance of the revenue agency of the foreign country, obtained the assets to satisfy the 
foreign country's claim for taxes due by the company and not to satisfy the creditors of the company. 
491 Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol 199. 
492 Mann Rec des Cours 132 (1971 I) 109, 177. 
493 Mann Rec des Cours 132 (1971 I) 109, 180. 
494 See Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol I 99; Cheshire & North Private International Law 117, 120; 
Forsyth The role of public law 94, 112 
214 
Attrill.495 Lord Watson held that 'contractual penalties or even statutory penalties 
imposed in favour of private parties are not exigible496 by the state in the interest of the 
community - but by private persons in their own interest', and are hence exempt from 
the rule. Likewise, Lord Simonds stated in Regazzoni v KC Sethia Ltcf97 that' [i]t does 
not follow from the fact that ... the court will not enforce a revenue law at the suit of a 
foreign State, that ... it will enforce a contract which requires the doing of an act in a 
foreign country which violates the revenue law of that country .... ' 
Consequently, foreign public law rules will be applied in private law relationships. 
Therefore, in instances of foreign exchange control law, foreign tax laws and foreign 
export bans, such laws will not be directly enforced by the courts, but will be suitable as 
. defences in contractual scenarios. In other words, the issue is not the enforcement of 
foreign legislation and claims that are based on the foreign legislation, but the 
recognition of foreign legislation in private litigation between private subjects. In cases 
where a private action to enforce a contract is resisted by relying upon foreign law, 
English courts will give effect to the foreign legislation, even though the foreign rule is 
of a penal, revenue or public law nature.498 
Thus, although from the outset it appears that penal, revenue and public laws are 
exceptions to the general rule that mandatory rules of the proper law are upheld by the 
English courts, one can see that in instances of foreign legislation being utilised in 
private litigation between private persons such an exception does not stand.499 
495 [1893] AC 150, 156 (PC). 
496 Or demanded. 
497 [1958] Ac 301, 322. 
498 See Huntington v Attrill [1893] AC 150, at 156 (PC) (penal laws); Ralli Brothers Ltd v Compania Sota 
Aznar [1920] 2 KB 287 (HL) (revenue laws); Foster v Driscoll [1929] 1 KB 470 (CA) (penal laws); De 
Beeche v South American Stores Ltd [1935] AC 148; Zivnostenslca Banlca v Frankmann [1950] AC 57; 
Re Helbert Wagg & Co Ltd's Claim [1956] Ch 323; Regazzoni v Sethia (KC) (1944) Ltd [1958] AC 301 
(penal laws); Kahler v Midland Ltd [1950] AC 24. 
499 Lipstein Conflict o/Public Laws 357, 365, 361; Hartley Foreign Public Law 13,26. 
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c Concluding remarks 
The above-mentioned principles and the relevant case law may be summarised as 
follows: 
(1) Foreign (internationally) mandatory rules are applied to foreign contracts if they 
form part of the governing law of the contract. Therefore, contracts that are illegal under 
their proper law will not be enforced in English courts, even if they are valid according 
to English law. The reason for the applicability is the fact that they belong to the proper 
law. 
(2) However, in many cases where the foreign internationally mandatory rule was 
applied, the proper law was also the lex loci solutionis. 50o Therefore, some judges 
reached the same result - that the foreign legislation was applicable - on the basis of the 
lex loci solutionis rule. When applying foreign mandatory provisions of the proper law 
to a contractual relationship between private parties, the courts do not distinguish 
between private and public law. 
(3) The principle of non-enforcement of foreign penal, revenue and other public laws is 
not an exception to the general rule that the mandatory provisions of the proper law are 
applicable in private litigation. Thus, in applying all rules of the proper law, the 
common law position differs substantially from the solution of German and Swiss case 
law that rejects both the enforcement and application of foreign public law in private 
litigation. 
500 For instance, Re International Trusteefor the Protection of Bondholders Act [1936] 3 All ER 407,428 
(CA); [1937] AC 500 (HL); St Pierre and Others v South American Stores (Gath and Chaves) Ltd and 
Chilean Stores (Gath and Chaves) Ltd [1937] 3 All ER 349, 352, 356; clearly Zivnostenska Banka 
National Corporation v Frankmann [1949] 2 All ER 671, at 681. 
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2 Application of a third country's internationally mandatory rules 
As stated above, the general rule is that the material validity of a contract is determined 
by the governing law, and the mandatory rules of the lex causae are in principle 
applicable. 50 I It can therefore be stated that, thus far, unless an English choice oflaw 
rule directs otherwise, the foreign law is not applied by the English court even if that 
rule is mandatory in its nature.502 Using this principle, the English courts upheld 
contracts that were legal according to the proper law and the lex fori, but illegal 
according to the lex loci contractus, the law of the domicile, residence or nationality of 
one of the parties503 
Nevertheless, English case law has sometimes applied or at least considered foreign 
mandatory rules of a legal system other than the proper law of contract, and has refused 
to enforce a contract that infringed the foreign legislation. In this regard, two different 
'techniques' can be distinguished.504 
The first rests on comity and English public policy considerations (see (a) below). The 
second reasoning is based on the principle that a contract which is illegal under the lex 
loci solutionis should not be enforced by the English courts (see (c) below). The 
classification of these techniques is disputed in English academic writings (see (b) and 
(d) below).505 
All the cases decided were false third country cases, because in all cases the contract 
was governed by English law. Nevertheless, it is debated whether the approaches of the 
case law are suitable for addressing real third country cases. 
501 See supra under section land Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol II 1241; Lipstein 26 ICLQ (1977) 
884, 889, 897; id Conflict of Public Laws 357, 362; Mann Rec des Cours 132 (1971 I) 109, 153 et seq. 
502 With regard to foreign 'public laws', see Forsyth The role of public law 94, 110; see art(s) 3(3), 5(2), 
6(1) and 7 Rome Convention and art VIII (2) (b) IMF-Agreement; Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol 
111241; Mann Rec des Cours 132 (1971 I) 109, 157, 158; see, however, Lipstein Conflict of Public Law 
357,365 et seq and id Conflict of laws and public law 38,49, who submits a special reference 
(connection) to third countries' public Jaw rules. 
503 Kleinwort, Sons & Co v Ungarische Baumwolle Industrie AG [1939] 2 KB 678 (CA) (defendants 
residence); similar Metliss v National Bank of Greece and Athens S.A. [1957] 2 All ER 1,3, II; Toprak v 
Finagrain [1979] 2 Lloyd's Rep 98; Vita Food Products Inc v Unus Shipping Co [1939] AC 277, 292, 
296 (lex contractus); see also British Nylon Spinners v ICI [1955] Ch 37; Rossano v Manufacturer's Life 
Insurance Co Ltd [1963] 2 QB 352; see also infra section III, 2, f. 
504 See also Morse Public Policy England-69 et seq. 
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a English public policy, 'international comity' solution 
Prior to the incorporation of the Rome Convention, English courts, in limited 
circumstances, refused to enforce contracts that were illegal in terms of a foreign law 
although valid according to the proper law and the lex fori. The decisions were based on 
the principle that it would be contrary to comity and English public policy if English 
courts were to assist in the breach of the law ofa foreign and friendly country.506 This 
principle was regarded as 'well established', but it is nevertheless rather nebulous and 
vague with respect to its juristic basis. Dicey and Morris state that: 
According to one of the most important rules of English public policy a contract is 
void which is opposed to British interests of State and, in particular, which is apt to 
jeopardise the friendly relations between the British government and any other 
government with which this country is in peace.507 
In accordance with this rule, the courts applied or at least considered the third 
country's law within the scope of English public policy. The relevant cases will be 
discussed before analysing the content and nature of this rule as a choice of law or 
domestic law rule. 
(1) Foster v Driscoll 
Foster v Drisco1l508 concerned a contract between a group of English people for the 
supply and sale of whisky that would be smuggled into the United States and ultimately 
sold and consumed there, thus violating the Prohibition Laws ofthe United States. The 
plan was to purchase whisky in Scotland that would clear British customs (in the usual 
manner) and would then be transferred to the smugglers' boat at some place outside the 
United Kingdom. This plan was never executed because the smugglers fell out with 
each other. The contract was governed by English law. 
505 The question of whether the pre-existing common law rules are still valid under present law is dealt 
with later in CHAPTER 5, IV, 5. 
506 De Wutz v Hendriks (1824) 2 Bing 314; Foster v Driscoll [1929] 1 KB 470 (CA); Regazzoni v K C 
Sethia [1958] AC 301 (HL). 
507 Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol II 1281 ; also see Cheshire & North's Private International Law 
131 et seq, 504; Morse Public Policy England-68. 
508 [1928] All ER Rep 130; [1929] 1 KB 470 (CA). For the facts and reasoning of the case, see Hartley 
Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 341, 389; Kaye The New Private International Law 19, 20. Also see De Wutz v 
Hendriks (1824) 2 Bing 314 where a contract to raise money to assist rebellion in Crete was not enforced. 
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The question before the Court of Appeal was whether the contract was 
unenforceable under English law because it was illegal. The majority held that the 
contract could not be enforced.509 Lawrence L. J. stated that: 
On principle however I am clearly of opinion that a partnership formed for the 
main purpose of deriving profit from the commission of a criminal offence in a 
foreign andfriendly country is illegal, even though the parties have not succeeded 
in carrying out their enterprise, and no such criminal offence has in fact been 
committed; and none the less so because the parties may have contemplated that if 
they could not successfully arrange to commit the offence themselves they would 
instigate or aid and abet some other person to commit it. The ground upon which I 
rest my judgment that such a partnership is illegal is that its recognition by our 
Courts would furnish a just cause for complaint by the United States Government 
against our Government (ofwhich the partners are subjects), and would be 
contrary our obligation of international comity as now understood and recognised, 
and therefore would offend against our notions of public morality.5lo 
The court therefore held that the contract was illegal according to public policy 
because the real object and intention ofthe parties was to break the law of a foreign 
country, despite the fact that there may have been alternative modes or places of 
performance under which the contract could have been performed legally. The violated 
foreign mandatory provisions were thus applied or taken into account on the grounds of 
English public policy and international comity regardless of the place of performance. 
(2) Regazzoni v K C Sethia 
In the leading case Regazzoni v K. C. Sethia (1944) Lt~11 an English company agreed to 
sell jute bags to a Swiss buyer to be delivered to Genoa. The proper law of the contract 
was English law. On the face of it, the contract was not contrary to the law of any 
country. The contract itself contained no statement about the origin and the ultimate 
destination of the jute bags. However, both parties knew that the only country where the 
jute could be obtained was India, and the seller knew that the buyer intended to resell 
509 Scrutton LJ dissented, holding that the contract was valid because the parties had a back-up plan to 
land the whisky lawfully in Canada or some other suitable place and sell it to some third party who would 
smuggle it into the United States. He thus held that the direct import into the United States was not 
proved, at page 138 et seq. The majority thought that the fact that the contracting parties had this 
possibility in mind was insignificant. 
510 At page 143, see also Lord J Sankey at page 147. 
511 [1958] AC 301 (HL); [1957] 3 WLR 752; [1957] 3 All ER 286. For the reasoning and the facts of the 
case, see Hartley Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 341,390; id Foreign Public Law 13,25. 
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and deliver the goods to South Africa. They also knew that at that time India operated 
an embargo against South Africa and that it was a criminal offence to export jute from 
India that was destined for South Africa. The seller failed to deliver the goods and the 
buyer sued in England for breach of contract. 
The House of Lords refused to enforce the contract (or to award damages for its 
breach), because both parties knew and intended that its performance would violate 
Indian law. They ruled that it was contrary to English public policy to enforce a contract 
if the parties knew that the contract would require the performance of an act in a foreign 
andfriendl/ 12 country that was illegal in terms of the law of that country. Viscount 
Simonds stated that' must as public policy avoids contracts which offend against our 
own law, so it will avoid at least some contracts which violate the laws of a foreign 
State, and it will do so because public policy demands that deference to international 
comity.' 
The reason for the application of English public policy was therefore held to be 
international comity. The court thus stressed again the intention of the contracting 
parties to break the law of a foreign and friendly country and applied the same' comity -
public policy' principle to the case where the parties intended to require another person 
to perform the illegal act. 
(3) Other cases 
This principle was confirmed several times in obiter dicta by English courts and is not 
only valid for import or export restriction - as was seen in the cases discussed above -
but also applies if the foreign laws in question are exchange control regulations, revenue 
laws, or penal laws. 513 
512 A country that is not at war with the United Kingdom, see at page 318 (per Viscount Simonds). 
5IJ As was seen supra the principle of non-enforcement of foreign revenue penal or other public laws does 
not stand in private litigation; Regazzoni v Sethia, supra, at page 322, 328; Rossano Manufacturers' Life 
Insurance Ins Co [1963] 2 QB 352, 376 et seq; Re Emery's Investment Trusts [1959] Ch 410 where the 
English court struck down in pursuance of this principle a contract designed to defraud a foreign revenue 
authority; Euro-Diam Ltd. v Brathurst [1990] 1 QB 1,40 (CA), for details about this decision, see infra 
under section III, 2, a, (4) . 
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(4) Inapplicability of English public policy despite the violation of foreign law 
In some cases the principle of English public policy was referred to but was held to be 
inapplicable.514 For example, this inapplicability was based on the fact that the 
contracting parties did not have the 'wicked intention' to violate or assist in violating the 
law of a foreign country, and on the fact that a contract is not invalidated on grounds of 
public policy by the mere fact that a contract involves doing something that is 
prohibited under foreign law (unless the mandatory rule forms part of the proper law).515 
The situation was different in the case of Euro-Diam v Bathursr 16 where the 
violation of foreign law was intended. An English diamond merchant (Euro-Diam) sold 
a consignment of diamonds to a German buyer. At the latter's request the English 
company provided an invoice that understated the value of the diamonds. By providing 
such an invoice the company must have realised that the purpose thereof was to enable 
the buyer to defraud the German tax authorities. The diamonds were stolen when they 
were still Euro-Diam's responsibility, and Euro-Diam had insured them at their true 
value and paid the correct premium. The question before the court was whether the 
infringement of German tax law rendered the insurance contract illegal, since by 
providing the false invoice Euro-Diam was guilty of a criminal offence under German 
tax law. The Court of Appeal held that it did not render the insurance contract illegal. 
The Court argued that although the action of Euro-Diam's managing director in issuing 
the false invoice was reprehensible, it had no bearing on the loss of the diamonds; 
furthermore, it involved no defrauding of the insurers. It was thus held to be not 
contrary to public policy to enforce the insurance contract. 
514 British Nylon Spinners Ltd v Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd [1955] Ch 37; Euro-Diam Ltd. v 
Brathurst [1990] I QB 1 (CA); Howard v Shirlstar Ltd [1990] 1 WLR 1292 (CA). 
515 Dicey & Morris Conflict 0/ Laws Vol II 1282; Morse Public Policy England-68, 70; British Nylon 
Spinners Ltd v Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd [1955] Ch 37, at page 52; see as well Toprak v 
Finagrain [1979] 2 Lloyd's Rep 98. 
516 [1990] 1 QB 1; [1988] 2 WLR 517; [1988] 1 Lloyd's Rep 228 (CA); [1987] 2 All ER 113. For the 
facts of the case and the reasoning, see Hartley Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 341, 393 et seq; Forsyth CLl 
1987, 404 et seq; Kaye The New Private International Law 20. Also see Mitsubishi Corporation v 
Ala/onzos [1988] 1 Lloyd's Rep 191 where the court was concerned with an English contract to deceive a 
third party. The contract was held to be unenforceable on grounds o/public policy although the deceiving 
transaction took place abroad. For a discussion, see Morse Public Policy England-67. 
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However, the reason why the infringement of the foreign tax legislation was not 
contrary to English public policy was not that the violated law was foreign, but that the 
relationship between the criminal offence and the insurance contract was too remote. 
The court expressly rejected the argument that English public policy is not concerned 
with a violation of foreign law.517 Thus, if it had been the British tax authorities that had 
been deceived, the result would have been the same. 
Hartley assumes that if the relationship between the insurance contract and the 
criminal offence had been more direct, the former would not have been enforced by the 
English court.518 By example he refers to a scenario that has been decided by German 
courtS.519 A person exports works of art from a foreign country in violation of the law of 
that country. The person insures them against loss and they are in fact lost. In such a 
case, Hartley argues that the contract would not be enforced by the English courts and 
the exporter would not therefore be allowed to claim under the insurance contract (since 
otherwise the exporter would enjoy the fruits of his illegal activity).52o 
Lastly, it should be stressed that according to the general principle of public policy, 
a contract made for the purpose of violating the law of a foreign country will not be 
considered as contrary to English public policy ifthe foreign law itself is contrary to 
English public policy.521 
It can therefore be stated that the violation of a foreign third country's law does not 
infringe English public policy if the violation of foreign law is not the object of the 
contract, or if the relationship between the criminal offence and the contract is so 
remote that even if the rules of the forum or the proper law had been violated the 
contract would still be valid. Furthermore, a contract that violates foreign law will not 
be considered contrary to English public policy if the foreign law itself is contrary to 
English public policy. 
517 At page 40. 
518 Hartley Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 341,393. 
519 See for the similar facts BGHZ 59,82 et seq; cf on this case CHAPTER 5, II, 2, d, (4). 
520 Hartley Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 341, 393. 
521 'Such as laws concerning slavery or the like', see Regazzoni v KC SetMa Ltd (1958] 1 AC 301, 322, 
328 et seq; Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol If 1282. 
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(5) Application of English public policy where foreign public policy is violated, 
not a foreign statute 
In this context another English case, Lemanda Trading Co v African Middle East 
Petroleum CO,522 will be considered. This case concerned a contract that contravened a 
foreign state's public policy. Two contracts were involved. The first was between 
Lemanda, a Bahamas company, and African Middle East Petroleum, a United Kingdom 
company. The latter company wished to secure the renewal of an oil-supply contract 
with a state-owned oil company in Qatar. In the second contract, a lobbying contract, it 
was agreed that the principal shareholder in Lemanda would use his influence to help 
African Middle East Petroleum obtain the oil-supply contract. It was agreed that if 
African Middle East Petroleum obtained the contract as a result of the shareholder's 
efforts, it would pay Lemanda a commission. After African Middle East Petroleum 
obtained the contract, it refused to pay the commission, and Lemanda sued in the United 
Kingdom. 
The question before the court was whether the 'lobbying contract' was invalid and 
therefore unenforceable. The court held that the contract was governed by English law, 
and there was evidence that under the law of Qatar the lobbying contract was contrary to 
public policy, but not contrary to an actual rule oflaw. The court then investigated 
whether the contract was contrary to English public policy. Under English law, 
contracts to secure benefits from persons in public positions are contrary to English 
public policy, but do not constitute criminal offences and are not contrary to a positive 
rule oflaw.523 But the crucial question was whether it is contrary to English public 
policy to agree to lobby a foreign government. The court stated that although the 
principles underlying public policy were essential principles of morality of general 
application, these principles were not so weighty that they prevented the enforcement of 
the contract per se, irrespective of the attitude and the law of the country of 
performance. Since under the law of Qatar the lobbying contract was contrary to public 
522 [1988] 3 WLR 735; [1988] 1 All ER 513; [1988] QB 448; about which see Hartley Rec des Cours 266 
(1997) 341, 394; Collier [1988] CLl 169 et seq; Morse Public Policy England - 66 et seq; see also Dicey 
& Morris Conflict of Laws Vol Il128!. 
523 CfHartley Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 341, 394; Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws VollI 1281. 
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policy, the court refused to enforce the contract on the grounds of international comity, 
combined with English domestic public policy.524 
Thus, if the contract does not infringe a rule of positive law, but is contrary to the 
public policy of a foreign and friendly country, and would offend the English public 
policy on general principles of morality, the contract might nonetheless not be enforced 
on grounds of international comity and English public policy. 
(6) Summary 
(1) The English case law discussed above shows that English courts will give effect to 
a third country's internationally mandatory rules within the notion of English public 
policy. The decisions were based on the well established rule of English public policy 
that 'a contract is void which is opposed to British interests of State and, in particular, 
which is apt to jeopardise the friendly relations between the British government and any 
other government with which this country is in peace. ,525 
(2) In all decided cases the object and intention of the parties to break the law of a 
foreign and friendly country were essential elements of the application of this public 
policy rule. In the absence of such 'wicked intention' the mere fact that the contract 
involves doing something which is prohibited under a third country's law will not 
invalidate the contract on the basis of public policy.526 However, it is not a requirement 
that the parties themselves intend to perform the illegal act; requiring another person to 
perform the illegal act will suffice.527 
524 For details see Collier [1988] CLl 169, 170 et seq; Morse Public Policy England-66, 67. The authors 
have different opinions regarding the question of whether the judgment was based on English public 
policy as a rule of English substantive law or as a rule of English conflict of laws. Morse ibid 66, 67 
speaks of ordre public international, whereas Collier ibid 171 stresses that it is a rule of English 
substantive law. However, he held it is applicable regardless of the proper law. 
525 Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol 11 1281. 
526 British Nylon Spinners Ltd v Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd [1955] Ch 37; see also Toprak v 
Finagrain [1979] 2 Lloyd's Rep 98; Morse Public Policy England - 68, 70; Dicey & Morris Conflict of 
Laws VallI 1282. 
527 Regazzoni v KC Sethia Ltd [1958] AC 301. 
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(3) Furthermore, the application of the public policy principle is not restricted to 
situations where the illegal act is performed at the place of performance; it is valid in 
respect of any legal system where the illegal act is intended to take place.528 
(4) However, the violated foreign legislation is not taken into account if the relationship 
between the criminal offence and the contract is so remote that even if the rules of the 
forum or the proper law had been violated, such violation would not affect the validity 
of the contract. 529 
(5) It appears to be necessary that the act envisaged must be unlawfol according to the 
foreign law; if it merely contravenes foreign public policy, the contract will only be 
invalid ifit is also contrary to English public policy.530 
(6) A contract concluded with the intention of violating a foreign law will not be 
considered as contrary to English public policy if the foreign law itself is contrary to 
English public policy. 
(7) The decisions rested on English public policy and international comity. A third 
country's mandatory legislation was thus applied within the notion of English public 
policy because English public policy 'demands that deference to international comity'. 
b Academic discussion of the rule of public policy and critical remarks 
Although the public policy rule on which the above judgments are based is said to be 
well established, the juristic basis of the rule is nevertheless uncertain.531 Academic 
statements concerning the precise categorisation of the rule are cautious,532 and it is 
uncertain whether the principle, developed under pre-existing law, is still applicable 
under the present English conflict of laws, which is now based on the Rome 
528 Lipstein Conflict 0/ Public Laws 357,368; Forsyth The role o/public law 94, 105, 106. 
529 See Euro-Diam Ltd v Bathurst [1987] 1 QB 1. 
530 Lemenda Trading Co Ltd v African Middle East Petroleum Co Ltd [1988] 3 WLR 735 . 
S3l Also see Kaye The New Private International Law 19,240,241. 
S32 Most authors assume that it is a rule of English domestic public policy, but nevertheless it is held to be 
applicable to contracts governed by a foreign law. See Dicey & Morris Conflict o/Laws Vol II 1282; see, 
however, Hartley Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 341, 353, 354, 388,403. 
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Convention.533 The reason for the uncertainty in categorising this 'public policy-comily 
rule' may either be that a clear division between domestic and international public 
policy is impossible,534 or that the rule has been clearly established only in cases where 
the proper law of the contract was English. 
(1) The scope of this rule of public policy 
Most English academics assume 'beyond doubt', that if the contract had been governed 
by the law of a foreign country, in terms of which it was perfectly unobjectionable, the 
result would have been the same, since the decisions rested on English public policy. 535 
Nevertheless, the precise scope of the public policy rule is unclear. Is it a rule of English 
domestic public policy or of English international public policy? And if it is a rule of 
English international public policy, is its function viewed positively or negatively? This 
classification is relevant to determining the legal basis for applying the rule to real third 
country cases.536 It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to discuss the concept of 
public policy in English domestic and international law in great depth, so a few remarks 
shall suffice here. 
(2) Public policy in English law 
Public policy is a concept applicable to both English domestic law and international 
law. The concept, however, does not have quite the same meaning in the two contexts. 537 
Nonetheless 'it is doubtful whether a formal distinction between those two concepts 
exists in English private international law. Rather it is more accurate to say that public 
policy in a private international law context is to be more narrowly circumscribed than it 
is in a context which is purely internal to the forum. ,538 
533 Eg Hartley Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 341, 403; Collier Conflict of Laws 211, 212, see on this problem 
detailed infra under CHAPTER 5, IV, 5, b. 
534 Cf Morse Public Policy England-19; Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol 188 and id Vol II 1280. 
535 Morse Public Policy England--68; Collier Conflict of Laws 211, 212, 373; id [1988] CLJ 169, 170, 
171; Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol II 1282; Hartley Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 341, 353, 354; 
Cheshire & North's Private International Law 504 Footnote 6. 
536 With regard to the question of the relevance of the rule under present law, see CHAPTER 5, IV, 5, b. 
537 Morse Public Policy England - 19 et seq; Hartley Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 341, 385 et seq. 
m Morse Public Policy England - 19; cf Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol I 88 and Vol II 1280. 
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In international law the concept of public policy is used in a narrower sense. Its 
normal effect is the exclusion of foreign law, otherwise applicable according to the 
choice of law rules, if that law is held to be contrary to English international public 
policy (negative/unction). Conversely, international public policy can render rules of 
the forum applicable that would be inapplicable according to the ordinary choice of law 
rules (positive function). 539 In the English decisions that were discussed above, public 
policy was used to give effect to a foreign rule. Therefore, under certain circumstances, 
English public policy requires application of foreign mandatory rules irrespective of the 
proper law of the contract.540 
(3) The juristic basis of the public policy rule 
Most authors assume that the public policy rule is one of English domestic law and not 
ofprivate internationaiiaw.541 According to them the concern in the decided cases was 
with domestic law, not choice of law. The applicable law had already been chosen, and 
the crucial question was merely whether the infringement of foreign law was to be 
treated differently from an infringement of English law as the governing law and the lex 
/ori. 542 However, despite the fact that in all decided cases the proper law was English 
law, and the public policy rule is held to be a rule of English domestic law, these authors 
assume that the rule operates regardless of the governing law and is thus applicable to a 
foreign contract. 543 Many authors simply say that the rule is based on English public 
policy and is therefore applicable regardless of the proper law. 544 
The effect of this rule, however, is the application or, more cautiously, the 
recognition of a third country's mandatory rules. Clearly, English public policy 
(whether a rule of domestic or international private law) has been extended in scope by 
the English courts in order to cover the intended violation of a third country's law. 
539 See Hartley Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 341, 351 et seq. 
540 Also Hartley Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 341, 353. 
541 Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol II 1282; Mann (1937) 18 BYIL 97, 109. But see Hartley who 
seems to advocate that it is a rule of international public policy as well as a rule of domestic public 
policy, id Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 341, 353, 354, 388, 403. 
542 See Hartley Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 341, 388; see, however, on page 403 where Hartley states that 
the decisions rested on international public policy. 
543 Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol II 1282; Hartley Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 341, 353, 354. 
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Alternatively, it may be that English case law has developed a rule of public policy 
which determines the circumstances or criteria under which the violation of foreign law, 
other than the proper law, invalidates a contract. The present author submits that the 
public policy-comity rule of English case law is a rule of English private international 
law rather than of domestic law. The reason for this conclusion is that the justification 
for the application of public policy is found in the international comity o/nations, and 
this is a criterion of private international law, not English domestic law. 
(4) The public policy-comity rule as special conflict rule? 
The English rule may also be interpreted as a special conflict rule indicating the 
circumstances in which third countries' internationally mandatory rules can be applied 
(despite being formally discussed under the notion of public policy).545 This 
interpretation is based on the assumption that the English public policy rule has been 
extended in scope so that the violation of foreign law, rather than the result of the 
application of foreign law, can violate the English public policy. The true concern of the 
rule is not the protection of the fundamental values of English law, but the violation of 
third countries' law and the comity of nations. 
The public policy rule indicates the circumstances in which an infringed foreign 
law can be applied or taken into account, but the conditions are vague.546 The foreign 
legislation must emanate from a foreign and friendly country, and the contracting parties 
must intend to violate the foreign law. Furthermore, the violated foreign legislation is 
only considered on the basis of public policy in situations where the prohibited act took 
place or was intended to take place in a foreign country.547 This latter condition could 
constitute a type of connecting/actor in the sense of a 'close connection'. 
544 Cf Collier Conflict of Laws 211, 211; id [1988] CLl 169, 170; Morse Public Policy Engand-68. 
545 See also Basedow GYBIL 27 (1984) 109,120, 121. Lipstein Conflict of Public Laws 357, 365seems to 
favour this interpretation. It is however acknowledged that there appears to be no other English author 
who advocates this point of view. On the contrary, cfDicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol/l1282. 
546 Also see Kaye The New Private International Law 240 who states that it is not quite clear whether the 
breach of any criminal law is sufficient or whether the law in question must be especially imperative for 
the principle to be invoked. Furthermore, it is uncertain what is meant by a friendly foreign country. 
547 See eg the dictum of Viscount Simonds in Regazzoni v KC Sethia [1958] AC 30 I, at page 318: 'it may 
well be that that different considerations will arise and a different conclusion will be reached if the law of 
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Finally, the public policy-cornify rule is only invoked where application of the 
foreign legislation itself does not violate the forum's ordre public.548 This recourse to 
the public policy exclusionary rule indicates that the process of taking account of the 
foreign law forms part of the choice of law process and is not simply a matter of the 
English substantive law. If recognition of the foreign law were solely a matter for 
English substantive public policy, the public policy exclusionary rule could not be 
invoked. 
It is, however, submitted that such a conflict rule differs substantially from the 
ordinary choice of law rules, which are based on a more neutral allocation technique. 
The latter takes into account the interests of the contracting parties, rather than 
collective state interests. The public policy-cornify rule, on the other hand, is concerned 
with an evaluation of policy considerations and state interests.549 Therefore, it is 
understandable that English courts settled this question within the context of 
(international) public policy. 
If the proper law of a contract is a foreign law, it becomes evident that the rule 
forms part of the choice of law process and is not purely domestic. The assumption that 
the public policy rule is applicable irrespective of the proper law can technically be 
founded either upon public policy in its positive sense (eg to render a fundamental rule 
of English law applicable), the internationally mandatory character of the rule of 
English law, or characterisation as a special conflict rule. 
(5) The vagueness of the public policy rule 
As in the German and Swiss case law, where consideration of a third country's rules 
was based upon the notion of domestic boni mores, the English public policy-cornify 
rule is vague and uncertain in its scope and conditions.55o The German court practice is 
clearer as it developed a criterion that the interests pursued by the rule must indirectly 
the contract is English and the contract can be wholly perfonned in England or at least in some other 
country than that whose law makes the act illegal' . 
548 See Regazzoni v KC Sethia [1958] AC 301, 322, 325, 328 et seq; Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol 
111282; Basedow GYBIL 27 (1984) 109, 121. 
549 Such as the interest of the foreign state in the application of its law and the interest of the forum state 
in the assistance of a friendly country. 
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protect German interests or interests commonly shared by all nations. German law thus 
provides at least an indication of the circumstances in which foreign law can be 
considered in terms of German bani mores. 
The scope of application ofthe English rule is extremely vague, because only a few 
requirements are specified, for example, that the prohibition must emanate from a 
friendly country.551 Nonetheless, the rule has the advantage of determining questions 
about when foreign law is to be applied at a conflict oflaws level.552 
c The lex loci solutionis rule; Ralli Bros v Compania Naviera Sota y Aznar 
A number of authorities have suggested that under English private international law 
prior to the Rome Convention, the English courts would not enforce a contract, if 
performance thereof was illegal under the law a/the place o/performance.553 In Dicey 
& Morris it is stated that there is a principle in the pre-existing common law 'a contract 
whether lawful by its proper law or not is, in general, invalid in so far as the 
performance of it is unlawful by the law of the country where the contract is to be 
performed (lex loci solutionis), .554 
The leading case RaW Bros v Campania Naviera Sola y Aznar555 is often saiEl to be 
authority for this principle, and it is argued that the Court of Appeal adopted the 
principle formulated by Dicey & Morris.556 The principle has been confirmed in a 
number of cases, although mostly by way of obiter dicta. 557 Nevertheless, some writers 
doubt whether this broadly stated proposition can in fact represent the position under 
550 See Kaye The New Private International Law 240 et seq. 
551 Or the 'wicked intention' of the contracting parties. 
552 Of course, only to the extent that one assumes that it is a rule of English private intemationallaw and 
not of English domestic law. 
55) CfForsyth The role o/public law 94, 104 et seq; Lipstein Conflict 0/ Public Laws 357,366. 
554 As exception 1 to Rule 184, Dicey & Morris Conflict o/Laws Vol III 1111 ed 1218, see also Dicey & 
Morris Conflict o/Laws Vol II 1241,1243 et seq. 
555 [I 920] 2 KB 287 (CA). 
556 Dicey & Morris Conflict o/Laws Vol jI 1243; Lipstein Conflict of Public Laws 357,366; for criticism, 
see Collier CLl [1988] 169, 171. 
557 Foster v Driscoll [1929] 1 KB 470, 520; Re v International Trusteefor the Protection 0/ Bondholders 
[1937] AC 500, 519; Kleinwort, Sons & Co v Ungarische Baumwolle Industrie AG [1939] 2 KB 678 
(CA); Kahler v Midland Bank Ltd [1950] AC 24, 48; Zivnostensa Banka v Frankman [1950] AC 57, 78; 
Toprak v Finagrain [1979] 2 Lloyd's Rep 98, 114; United City Merchands (Investments) Ltd v Royal 
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English private international law before the Rome Convention and whether the RaW 
case is authority for it. 558 
The crucial question concerns the juristic basis of this principle, as well as its scope 
and content. Is it a subsidiary rule of conflict of laws to be used to determine whether 
the contract is unenforceable by virtue of illegality in terms of the lex loci solutionis, as 
the above mentioned formulation suggests? Is it an example of the public policy 
exclusionary rule as some recent judgments may indicate? Or is it a rule of the English 
domestic law of contract that applies when English law governs the contract and holds 
that a contract may be frustrated by (supervening) illegality according to the place of 
performance? Opinion amongst commentators differs. 559 The answer, however, affects 
the question of whether the principle survives the Rome Convention.560 
In contrast to the cases previously discussed that concerned contracts that were 
illegal in terms of the foreign law when they were concluded (ab initio), RaW Brothers 
v Compania Naviera Sota y Aznar56 I concerned a contract that was concluded legally, 
but subsequently became illegal as a result of a change of law in a foreign country. A 
Spanish ship owner contracted with an English charterer in London to carry jute from 
Calcutta, India, to Barcelona, Spain. In terms of the contract, half the freight was 
payable in England when the ship left India, and half was payable in Spain when it 
arrived. The contract was governed by English law and was lawful in terms of all the 
relevant legal systems when it was concluded. 
The ship duly left India with its cargo and the English company paid half of the 
freight. Before the ship reached its destination, Spain enacted price control legislation 
Bank of Canada [1982] QB 208, 228 (reversed by the HL on other points); Lybian Arab Foreign Bank v 
Bankers Trust Co [1989] 3 All ER 252; Euro-Diam Ltd v Bathurst [1990] 1 QB 1, 15, 30. 
558 See Carter BYIL 57 (1986) 1,29 et seq; already Mann BYBIL 18 (1937) 97 et seq; Forsyth The role of 
public law 94, 104 et seq; Collier CLJ [1988] 169, 171; id Conflict of Laws 212,213; Cheshire & North's 
Private International law 519. 
559 See Kaye The New Private International Law 21; Lasok & Stone Conflict of Laws 373 Footnote 26; 
Collier Conflict of Laws 212,213; Lipstein Conflict of Public Laws 357,366; id Offentliches Recht 39, 
47,48; Mann BYBIL 18 (1937) 97; Cheshire & North's Private International Law 518,519; Carter 
BYBIL 57 (1986) 1,28 et seq. 
560 At least according to the English academic writers Dicey & Morris Conflict of Law Vol II 1243, 1245 
et seq. This question is discussed later in connection with art 7 (1) RC. 
561 [1920] 2 KB 287 (CA). For the reasoning and the facts of this ruling, see Collier Conflict of Laws 212; 
Carter BYBIL 57 (1986) 1,30; Hartley Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 341, 391, 392. For a similar decision, 
see Kursell v Timber Operations & Contractors Ltd [1927] 1 KB 298 (CA). 
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that imposed a limit on the freight, and this legislation was in force when the second 
instalment became due. As payment was to be made in Spain, and the contractual 
amount was much more than the maximum permitted (50 pounds sterling instead of the 
permitted maximum of 10 pounds sterling per ton), payment in full would have been 
illegal under Spanish law. Infringement of the legislation would result in the imposition 
of penalties. The English charterer would not pay any more than the maximum 
permitted by Spanish law. An action for the balance was brought by the Spanish 
company in England, and failed. The English Court of Appeal rejected the plaintiffs 
argument that because the proper law of the contract was English law, the Spanish 
legislation did not justify the English company's failure to pay the full amount. 
However, the ratio decidendi of the case is unc1ear. 562 Some passages in the 
judgment suggest that the decision was based on a conflict rule that the lex loci 
solutionis governs illegality - at least illegality of the performance aspects of the 
contract - alongside the ordinary conflict rules that indicate the proper law of the 
contract. Other passages suggest that the decision was based on a rule of English 
domestic law, and not private international law, because the case concerned supervening 
illegality, which in terms of the internal rules of English law as the proper law would 
constitute an event that would frustrate the contract. The court thereby treated the 
Spanish legislation as a frustrating event, and relied on cases that concerned 
supervening illegality caused by British legislation.563 
But besides these two interpretations, there is another possible reason why reference 
was made to Spanish law - the lex loci solutionis - in the matter of illegality. In a 
passage of Lord Scrutton' s judgment, he examined the contract and held that there was 
an implied term in the contract that payment was due only to that extent that it was legal 
in terms of the law of the country where it was to take place. He stated that: 
I should prefer to state the ground of my decision more broadly and to rest it on the 
ground that where a contract requires an act to be performed in a foreign country, it 
is, in the absence of very special circumstances, an implied term of the continuing 
562 See the discussion of Kaye The New Private International Law 20-22; Dicey & Morris Conflict of 
Laws Vol II 1243 et seq; Jaffey ICLQ 23(1974) 1,25 et seq; Carter BYBIL 57 (1986) 1,28 et seq. 
563 Such as Metropolitan Water Board v Dick, Kerr & Co [1918] AC 119 (HL). 
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validity of such a provision that the act to be done in the foreign country shall not 
be illegal by the law of that state. 564 
It might then be said that it was not that the internal rules of the English proper law 
required supervening illegality under the Spanish lex loci solutionis to be taken into 
account as a frustrating event. As a matter of contractual construction, the question was 
whether the parties could have intended that the contract would be unenforceable if 
illegal according to the lex loci solutionis, or even according to any other law. 565 
Since English law was the applicable law, the court was able to use all three 
reasonings, and was thus able to decide that the contract was frustrated because the 
Spanish legislation had the effect of preventing full performance. 
d The juristic basis of the lex loci solutionis principle 
As a result of the ambiguous reasoning of the judgement, a dispute arose in academic 
writings concerning the juristic basis of the rule expressed in the Ralli Bros case. 
(1) Conflict of laws approach 
Some authors assume that the rule constitutes a choice of law rule: A contract that is 
illegal in terms of the law of the place of performance cannot be enforced by an English 
court (regardless of whether it is lawful in terms ofthe governing law or not). The 
prohibitive law of the place of performance is thus referred to by a special subsidiary 
choice of law rule, in addition to the ordinary choice of law rules indicating which law 
governs the contract.566 This is the suggestion of Lipstein, who stated with reference to 
the RaW Bros case that: 
564 [1920] 2 KB 287, 304. 
565 For this interpretation: Kaye The New Private International Law 22,23. However, Lord Scrutton's 
reference to an implied term was made at a time when the English doctrine of frustration was based on 
the implied term theory. This suggests that he regarded the contract as having been discharged by a 
frustrating event (change of Spanish law) in accordance with English law. CfCarter BYBIL 57 (1986) 1, 
30. 
566 Lipstein Conflict of Public Laws 357, 366, 367; id Offentfiches Recht 39, 47, 48; Kaye The New 
Private International Law 20,21,22,69; cfthe German author Schulte Eingriffinormen 93 et seq; see 
also the formulation of the above cited rule of Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol II 1243. However, 
despite the formulation of the rule the author of Rule 177 (in the 12th edition) suggests that the rule is a 
rule of domestic law, see ibid 1247. 
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In the sphere of contracts a special conflict rule refers to the public law [mandatory 
law] of the place where a contract is to be performed in order to determine as an 
incidental datum whether the private law relationship is prohibited by an absolute 
rule of the latter. 567 
Kaye seems to favour 'the general proposition that the lex loci solutionis governs 
illegality - at least of performance aspects of contract - alongside the proper law. ,568 
This solution would mean that the (public) prohibitive law ofthe lex loci solutionis 
is applicable according to a special subsidiary conflict rule of English private 
internationallaw.569 Ifthe contract is illegal according to the lex loci solutionis, the legal 
consequence of the special conflict rule is not necessarily that the contract will be 
regarded as illegal by the forum. The court may possibly refer to solutions offered by 
the lex causae with regard to the legal consequences of the illegality in the place of 
performance, or simply regard the contract as unenforceable.570 
The advocates of this solution do not distinguish between initial or subsequent 
illegality.571 Thus, although the court in RaW Bros was concerned only with a Spanish 
prohibition enacted after the contract was concluded, the conflict rule would most 
probably also cover situations where the contract is ab initio illegal according to the lex 
loci solutionis. 
The proper law of the contract in RaW Bros was English law. However, the lex loci 
solutionis rule would equally be applicable to the situation where the forum is England, 
the contract is governed by a foreign proper law, and is illegal according to the 
mandatory legislation of a third country where performance must take place. This 
conclusion is based on the assumption that the rule is a special subsidiary choice of law 
rule of the forum that refers to the lex loci solutionis, irrespective of the proper law of 
the contract designated by the ordinary choice of law rules for contracts. 
567 Lipstein Conflict of Public Laws 357,366,367; id Offentliches Recht 39, 47,48; more careful id 
Conflict of Laws 38,50,51; id ICLQ 26 (1977) 884,898,899. 
568 Kaye The New Private International Law 20,22; 23. However, he assumes that the rule cannot apply 
under the Rome Convention and therefore prefers Lord Scrutton's solution for construing the contractual 
intentions of the parties. 
569 That refers to the lex loci solutionis in order to determine the validity of the contract. 
570 See the careful formulation of Lipstein Conflict of Public Laws 357, 366. 
57l See Lipstein Conflict of Public Laws 357, 366; Kaye The New Private International Law 20,22. 
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(2) Substantive law approach 
However, the predominant view is that the rule of RaW Bros is a rule of English 
domestic law regarding the doctrine of frustration of contract. 572 This proposition is 
based on the fact that in Ralli Bros the proper law of the contract was English and on the 
above-cited statement of Lord Scrutton. It is said that, if read in context, the principle in 
Ralli Bros was not a principle of conflict of laws, but simply an application of internal 
English rules dealing with the 'discharge or suspension of contractual obligations by 
supervening illegality.'573 The illegality under the lex loci solutionis was thus taken into 
account as factum by the English court in determining whether performance had become 
impossible.574 
The crucial question then was simply whether the English internal doctrine of 
frustration of contract applied to subsequent illegality under the lex loci solutionis. This 
question was answered in the affirmative. The advocates of this approach also suggest 
that under pre-Rome Convention English private international law, there was no general 
principle that a contract, whether lawful or not by its proper law, is unenforceable 
because of illegality under the lex loci solutionis. There is no direct authority for such a 
proposition, however, since the proper law in all the relevant cases was English law.575 
This approach means that the principle is only applicable if the contract is governed 
by English law. If the contract is governed by another foreign law, the rule would not be 
applicable, and the proper law must determine whether illegality under the lex loci 
solutionis is to be taken into account. Thus, if the proper law of a contract is French law 
and performance is illegal by another foreign lex loci solutionis, it is a matter for French 
law to determine whether illegality of performance under the law of a third country is to 
572 Mann SYBIL 18 (1937) 97,107 - 113; id Rec des Cours 132 (1971 I) 109, 158; Collier Conflict of 
Laws 212,213; id CLJ [19881169, 171; Hartley Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 341, 392; Forsyth The role of 
public law 94, 105; Jaffey ICLQ 23 (I974) 1,29; Carter BYBIL 57 (1986) 1,28,30 et seq. However, at 
page 32 Carter submits that one effect of illegality under the lex loci solutionis 'should be to inhibit the 
availability of a remedy such as specific performance'. Cheshire & North's Private International Law 
518, 519; Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol II 1247. 
573 Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol II 1245. 
514 Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol II 1245; Carter BYBIL 57 (1986) 1, 30; Collier Conflict of Laws 
212. 
575 Marse Public Policy England - 70; Carter BYBIL 57 (1986) 1, 30; Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws 
Vol II 1245, 1246, 1247. 
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be taken into account.516 In other words, if French law does not regard the contract as 
illegal in terms of the lex loci solutionis, the contract will be enforced in England.m 
However, some authors doubt whether an English court would happily order a party to 
perform in a foreign country if performance there is illega1.578 
Advocates of the English internal law character of the lex loci solutionis rule 
disagree with the legal approach to another situation, namely, where a contract was 
illegal ab initio according to a foreign law and the contracting parties did not intend to 
break the law of that country. How are contracts that are not against English public 
policy, but nevertheless involve an illegal act according to the law of place of 
performance, to be dealt with? Some authors restrict the lex loci solutionis rule to 
supervening illegality and suggest that in such a case the contract, governed by English 
law, will be enforced.579 Others argue that the consequences of initial illegality 
according to the lex loci solutionis will be identical to those consequences that arise 
from initial illegality according to the English domestic law of a contract that is to be 
performed in England.580 
(3) Dicta in English case law 
The lex loci solutionis rule has been confirmed several times by the English COurtS.581 
However, in all cases where the principle was applied the proper law was held to be the 
576 Morse Public Policy England - 70; Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol Il1245, 1247; Collier 
Conflict of Laws 212, 213; Carter BYBIL 57 (1986) 1,30 et seq; Mann BYBIL 18 (1937) 97, 107-113; 
Jaffey ICLQ 23 (1974) 1, 29. 
577 This is in fact the crucial difference between the' conflict of law solution' and the' domestic law 
approach'. See Collier Conflict of Laws 212,213 . 
578 Morse Public Policy England-70; Jaffey ICLQ 23 (1974) 1, 30. According to Mann BYBIL 18 (1937) 
97, 113 the contract would not be enforced in such a case on the basis of English public policy. 
579 Morse Public Policy England-70. Also see Toprak v Finagrain [1979] 2 Lloyd's Rep 98 where the 
court enforced a contract although it violated Turkish mandatory law. 
580 Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol Il1244 . 
581 For instance, Kleinwort Sons & Co v Ungarische Baumwolle [1939] 3 All ER 38, at page 42 et seq 
where the court expressly referred to the rule in the Ralli case. Also see R v International Trustee for the 
Protection of Bondholders Act [1936] 3 All ER 407,428 (CA), [1937] AC 500, 519 (CA); Zivnostenska 
Banka National Corporation v Frankmann [1949] 2 All ER 671 , at page 681; Kahler v Midland Bank Ltd 
[1950] AC 24, 48; Metliss v National Bank of Greece and Athens S.A . [1957] 2 All ER I, at page 3, II; 
Toprak v Finagrain [1979] 2 Lloyd's Rep 98,114; United City Merchands (Investments) Ltd v Royal 
Bank of Canada [1982] QB 208, 228 (reversed by the HL on other points); Lemenda Trading Co Ltd v 
African Middle East Petrolium Co Ltd [1988] 2 WLR 735; Lybian Arab Foreign Bank v Bankers Trust 
Co [1989] 3 AllER252, 265, 266; Euro-DiamLtdvBathurst [1990] 1 QB 1, 15,30. 
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law of England, and hence there is no direct authority on the point.582 Furthennore, the 
dicta in the judgments are ambiguous and it is not always clear whether the courts 
understood the principle as applicable, regardless ofthe proper law, or whether it was 
applicable because English law governed the contract. 583 
For instance, in Kahler v Midland Bank Ltd,584 Lord Reid, referring to Ralli Bros, 
stated that 'the law of England will not require an act to be done in perfonnance of an 
English contract if such act ... would be unlawful by the law of the country in which the 
act has to be done .... ' However, in Zivnostenska Banka v Frankman,585 the same judge 
regarded it as settled law that' ... whatever be the proper law of the contract, an English 
court will not require a party to do an act in perfonnance of a contract which would be 
an offence under the law in force at the place where the act is to be done .... ' The 
fonnulation of the fonner statement seems to support the view that the lex loci 
solutionis principle is a rule of English domestic law and therefore only applicable if the 
governing law of the contract is English law. But the latter statement clearly favours the 
view that the rule is applicable regardless of the proper law. This would support the 
suggestion that the principle is a rule of English private international law, not English 
domestic law.586 
There are further ambiguous dicta which allow for interpretation either as rule of 
English domestic law87 or as a rule of English private internationallaw. 588 
582 Morse Public Policy England - 70; Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol II 1245; Carter BYBIL 57 
(1986) 1, 30 et seq. 
583 See Morse Public Policy England -70; Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol II 1245. 
584 [1950] AC 24, 48 et seq, [1949] 2 All ER 621; for the case, see supra section III, 1. 
585 [1950] AC 57, 78 et seq, [1949] 2 All ER 671, 681; for the case, see section III, 1. 
586 The equivocality of the statements is stressed by Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol II 1245. For 
criticism about the statement of Lord Reid in the Zivnostenska case, see Carter BYBIL 57 (1986) 1, 31. 
However, in both cases the court was concerned with contracts governed by Czech law (according to the 
predominant view of the judges) that violated Czech exchange control regulations. Thus the other judges 
deduced the applicability of the foreign legislation from their belonging to the proper law, whereas Lord 
Reid referred to the lex loci solutionis rule in order to justify the application of the Czech foreign 
exchange control law and the refusal to enforce the contract. Also see the differing reasoning of the 
judges in St Pierre and others v South American Stores (Gath and Chaves) Ltd and Chilean Stores (Gath 
and Chaves) Ltd [1937] 3 All ER 349. The court was concerned with a contract governed by Chilean law, 
the performance of which was restricted by a Chilean mandatory exchange control regulation if the 
money was transferred to the United Kingdom. While Lord Greer applied the foreign mandatory 
legislation on the basis that the proper law was Chilean, Lord Slesser applied the mandatory law because 
the order to transfer would take place in Chile and nowhere else, ibid. at page 352, 356. 
587 In De Beeche and Others v South American Stores (Gath and Chaves) Ltd and Others [1934] All ER 
Rep 284; at page 288 Lord Sankeys stated that 'the law of this country will not compel the fulfilment of 
an obligation whose performance involves the doing in a foreign country of something which the 
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It has been stated that 'in the light of the authorities it is not possible to reach a 
definite conclusion on the effect of illegality by the place ofperformance,.589 In fact, the 
dicta differ in their wording and in all cases where the rule was applied the proper law 
was English law. However, it is suggested by the present author that the English courts 
expressed - even though these statements were only obiter dicta - a strong view that the 
lex loci solutionis rule is applicable regardless of the proper law and that an English 
court will not enforce a contract that is valid according to its foreign proper law where 
its performance would be illegal in terms of the lex loci solutionis.590 
e Concluding remarks 
The following conclusions can be reached with regard to the lex loci solutionis rule in 
English law prior to the Rome Convention. 
English authors unanimously hold that if England is the place of performance, and a 
contract is illegal under English law, English courts will refuse to enforce the contract, 
despite its validity in terms of its foreign proper law.591 Furthermore, an English court 
will not enforce a contract governed by English law, if the performance of the contract 
is illegal under the law of the place of performance. This situation is exemplified by the 
RaW Bros case. It is debated in English doctrine whether the principle in the Ralli Bros 
case is a rule of private international law or merely a rule of English domestic law that is 
supervening law of that country has rendered it illegal to do'. The court was examining the impact ofa 
Chilean mandatory prohibition on an English contract and held that performance was 'impossible' . Read 
in this context, the dictum rather refers to the principle as rule of English domestic law. 
588 The dictum of Lord Diplock in Mackender v Feldia AG [1967] 2 QB 590 may be interpreted as 
favouring an interpretation of the principle as a rule of English private international law: Furthermore, 
[save where the illegality stems from breach of a foreign revenue law], the English court will not enforce 
performance or give damages for non-performance of an act required to be done under a contract, 
whatever be the proper law of the contract, if the act would be illegal in the country in which it is 
required to be performed. 
589 Morse Public Policy England-70; Kaye The New Private International Law 21. 
590 Besides the already mentioned dicta, compare eg Toprak v Finagrain [1979] 2 Lloyd's 98; Lemenda 
Trading Co Ltd v African Middle East Petroleum Co Ltd [1988] WLR 735; Lybian Arab Foreign Bank v 
Bankers Trust Co [1989] 3 All ER 252; Euro Diam Ltd V Bathurst [1990] 1 QB 1. It is perhaps justified 
to criticise the fact that the courts referred to Ralli Bros as supposed authority for the lex loci solutionis 
rule being applicable regardless of the proper law. CfCheshire & North's Private International Law 519; 
Collier CLJ [1988] 169, 171. 
591 This exception to the application of the proper law is based either on the internationally mandatory 
character of the rule or on English public policy, see Kaye The New Private International Law 20; 
Cheshire & North's Private International Law 520; Morse Public Policy England-70. 
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applied because English law governs the contract. However, if the contract is governed 
by English law, both approaches will yield the same result: The contract will not be 
enforced.592 
(1) The problematic situation 
It is highly controversial what will happen if a contract that is governed by one foreign 
law, and is illegal to the law of another country where the contract is also to be 
performed. The debates concerning the juristic basis of the lex loci solutionis rule are of 
considerable interest in this situation.593 If it were a conflict rule, then the contract would 
not be enforced because of the English rule of conflict of laws that a contract, whether 
lawful by its proper law or not, may not be enforced if its performance is unlawful under 
the lex loci solutionis. Ifthe lex loci solutionis rule were a rule of English domestic law, 
however, then the rule would be inapplicable where the contract is governed by a 
foreign law. It would be for the governing law to determine whether and how the 
illegality under the lex loci solutionis is to be taken into account. 
As was seen above, there is no direct authority on this point, since in all cases the 
proper law of the contract was English. Nevertheless, as was stated above, there are 
frequent dicta attributing decisive effect to illegality under the lex loci solutionis, 
regardless of the proper law. The present author is of the opinion that the courts thereby 
implicitly confirmed the existence of the lex loci solutionis as a rule of English conflict 
of laws. 
(2) The necessity of choice of law considerations 
A final remark needs to be made concerning interpretation of the rule expressed in Ralli 
Bros. The prevailing academic view is that the principle is merely an application of the 
English doctrine of frustration of contracts. However, even if the court in Ralli Bros 
592 Despite the fact that the juristic basis of the principle is uncertain, it can be stated that 'up to this point 
the consequences of illegality according to the lex loci solutionis is covered by authority', Dicey & 
Morris Conflict o/Laws Vol II 1244, 1245; see also Morse Public Policy England-70. 
S91 The question of whether the lex loci solutionis principle survives the Rome Convention, so that it 
fonns a principle of current private intemationallaw, is disputed by academics and will be discussed 
within the context of art 7 (I) of the Rome Convention, CHAPTER 5, IV, 5, b. 
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referred to Spanish law merely as fact within the internal English proper law doctrine of 
frustration of contracts, the foreign rule, and not its factual effects, is nonetheless 
considered. 
There are clear parallels with the German and Swiss case law solutions. The critical 
remarks made in that regard are equally valid.594 English rulings cannot be reduced, 
however, to those situations where the foreign state has already enforced its prohibition, 
and thereby rendered performance impossible for the debtor, or alternatively to cases 
where violation of the foreign law is sanctioned with heavy penalties, so that it would 
mean an undue hardship for the debtor to perform. In such cases, it is of course the 
effect of the foreign rule that is taken into account as fact. 
Rather, the case law indicates that an English court will not require a party to 
perform a contract if its performance would be an offence under the lex loci solutionis. 
In this situation it is clearly the foreign rule that is taken into account. Recognition 
thereof within the English doctrine of frustration of contracts requires a primary choice 
of law. The court must determine whether there is a foreign provision that prohibits 
performance, and whether the contract or the performance of the contract falls within 
the scope of the foreign rule. Only when these questions have been answered in the 
affirmative, will the question arise whether the foreign prohibition can prevent 
enforcement of the contract on the basis of the English doctrine of frustration. 
Thus, in most cases, the prior question is which law can be applied or taken into 
account within the internal rules of English law. This is a matter of private international 
law, not internal law. It may therefore be concluded that taking account of the lex loci 
solutionis on the illegality of performance, as an incidental question, is a reference to 
foreign law on the main issue of the validity and enforceability of a contract. The 
consideration of illegality in terms of the law of place of performance, within the 
internal English law, thus implicitly presupposes the existence of the lex loci solutionis 
rule as an English choice of law rule. 595 
594 See supra under CHAPTER 5, II, 3. 
595 Also see Kaye The New Private International Law 22 and Jackson Contract Conflicts 59,62. 
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f Illegality under legal systems other than the lex loci solutionis, in particular 
under the lex loci contractus and the law of the parties domicile or nationality 
Under pre-existing English law the mandatory rules of third countries other than the lex 
loci solutionis were not taken into account on grounds other than comity and public 
policy.596 In particular, mandatory provisions that were subsequently enacted, thus 
leading to supervening illegality, were disregarded by the English courts. 
(1) Kleinwort Sons & Co v Ungarische Baumwolle Industrie AG 
A notorious decision in this context is Kleinwort Sons & Co v Ungarische Baumwolle 
Industrie AG,597 a case that concerned foreign exchange controls. The case exemplifies 
the attitude of English courts towards the application of foreign third countries' 
exchange control regulations in cases where the IMF Agreement with its special 
provision is not applicable. Furthermore, the case shows that a subsequently enacted 
foreign mandatory rule is only given effect under certain limited circumstances. 
The facts of the case were as follows. A Hungarian company entered into a contract 
with an English bank in terms of which the Hungarian company was obliged to pay a 
sum of money in British currency in England. At the time the contract was concluded, it 
was lawful under all relevant legal systems. Before payment became due, however, 
Hungary introduced exchange control legislation that made it illegal for the Hungarian 
596 As was said above the recognition of foreign mandatory rules of a law other than the lex loci solutionis 
is possible on the grounds of comity and public policy. See Regazzoni Sethia, where the mandatory rule 
stemmed from the country from which the goods were exported and not the country of destination and 
fmal performance. The rule was nevertheless given effect because international comity so demanded, and 
the court refused to enforce the contract on grounds of public policy. Also see Foster v Driscoll where the 
place of performance was unclear. For the general statement, see Kaye The New Private international 
Law 23; Mann Rec des Cours 132 (1971 I) 109, 157 et seq; Forsyth The role of public law 94, 107 et seq; 
for criticism, Lipstein Offentliches Recht 39,48,49; id Conflict of Public Laws 357, 367 et seq. 
597 [1939] 2 KB 678; [1939] 3 All ER 38 (CA). For the facts and the reasoning, see Hartley Rec des Cours 
266 (1997) 341, 421 et seq; Jaffey ICLQ 23 (1974) 1,25. Also see British Nylon Spinners v ICI [1955] 
Ch 37; [1953] Ch. 19 where the Court of Appeal restrained ICI from committing any such breach of 
contract and thus extended American anti-trust law into Britain. Also see Toprak v Finagrain [1979] 2 
Lloyd's Rep 98 et seq, (CA) where the Court of Appeal was concerned with a contract between a Swiss 
seller and a Turkish buyer who intended to import the goods to Turkey. The Turkish party refused to pay 
on the grounds that the Turkish authorities refused to consent to the import of the goods and held that the 
contract was invalid according to Turkish law. The Court of Appeal, however, held that the contract-
governed by English law by the choice of the parties - was valid, and disregarded the initial Turkish 
import restriction because the place of performance was not Turkey for the Turkish buyer (at page 114). 
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party to fulfil its payment. The company therefore defaulted, and the English bank sued 
in England. 
Because the proper law of the contract was English, the court refused to allow the 
Hungarian party to rely on the defence that payment was prohibited by the Hungarian 
legislation.598 The court referred to the principle in RaW Bros599 - that a contract which is 
illegal under the lex loci solutionis will not be enforced by English courts - and said 
that, if the place of payment had been Hungary, the position would have been different. 
Since the place of payment was England, however, this principle could have no 
application, and so the court refused to apply the Hungarian legislation. 
Thus, it is clear that English courts will allow foreign exchange controls that do not 
form part of the proper law to be pleaded as a defence only if payment is to take place in 
the foreign country. If the contract, when it was concluded, had been illegal under the 
law of the place of payment (initial illegality), the public policy-comity rule in 
Regazzoni v KC Sethia600 would possibly apply. If the exchange control regulations were 
imposed subsequently, it would fall under the rule in RaW Bros.601 However, apart from 
the public policy-comity rule, which is not restricted to the lex loci solutionis, illegality 
in terms of the law of a place, other than that of the place of performance, is not taken 
into account. The court disregarded the fact that the debtor was situated in Hungary, 
and did not consider the question of where the contract was concluded. 602 
Similarly, in Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v Bankers Trust CO,603 the court refused to 
apply United States sanctions that were intended to block accounts held by Libya in 
London branches of the United States banks, because the deposits were governed by 
English law and did not require performance in the United States. The London branch 
could thus not refuse to return the deposits on the strength of the United States 
legislation, despite the fact that it was a branch of a United States bank. 
598 The court's argument is in fact quite incredible, if one compares the reasoning in RaW Bros, where the 
court rejected the argument that the foreign law was inapplicable because English law was the proper 
law. In both judgments, however, the true reason for application or non-application of the foreign 
legislation is to be found in the connection with the foreign country: the place of performance rule. 
599 [1920] 2 KB 287 (CA). 
600 [1958] AC 301. 
601 [1920] 2 KB 287. For this interpretation, see Hartley Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 341, 422. 
602 Also see Toprak v Finagrain [1979] 2 Lloyd's Rep 98. 
603 [1989] QB 728 . 
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(2) The lex loci contractus 
It is a well established rule in English conflict of laws that illegality in terms of the 
place of contracting is disregarded, and that a contract that is valid under its proper law 
is enforceable.604 Thus, in the early case Re Missouri Steamship Company,60S the court 
disregarded illegality under the lex loci contractus. 
Vita Food Products Inc v Unus Shipping Co Ltcf'°6 also dealt with this question. The 
case concerned the liability of the respondent, a company from Nova Scotia, under 
certain bills of lading issued in Newfoundland. The bills of lading contained an express 
choice of English law. The crucial question was determining which law governed the 
respondent's liability for damage of the cargo. Under the law of the place of contracting, 
the law of Newfoundland, the bills oflading were null and void because they were not 
issued in accordance with the law of Newfoundland (Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 
1932). Under the English proper law the bills of lading were held to be valid and 
liability was thus to be determined by the exemption clauses contained in the bills. The 
court disregarded the mandatory rules of the law of Newfoundland as lex loci contractus 
because the proper law of the contract was English law, and the bills of lading were 
valid according to English law.607 
604 For this rule, see Forsyth The role of public law 94, 107; Kaye The New Private International Law 23; 
Carter BYBIL 57 (1986) 1, 29. 
605 (1889) 42 Ch D 321 . However, Lord Halsbury said obiter that' [w ]here a contract is void [under the 
lex loci contractus] on the grounds of immorality or is contrary to such positive law as would prohibit the 
making of such contract at all, then the contract would be void all over the world, and no civilised 
country would be called on to enforce it' (at page 336). 
606 [1939] AC 277 (PC). Also see Coast Lines Ltd v Hudig & Veder Cartering NV [1972] 1 All ER 451, 
where the Court of Appeal refused to take into account mandatory Dutch legislation in respect of an 
English contract (a charter party), despite the fact that the contract was concluded in the Netherlands and 
the bills of lading were to be issued in Holland. For the facts of the case and the reasoning, see Jaffey 
ICLQ 23 (1974) 1, 27. 
607 At that time the Hague-Visby Rules as part of English law were held to be self-limiting and in the Vita 
Foods case they were not held to be applicable. But see The Hollandia [1983] 1 AC 565, 576; Dicey & 
Morris Conflict of Laws Vol II 1242. There is only one case indicating that a contract would be regarded 
as invalid if it was invalid in the place where the contract was concluded, whether lawful by its proper 
law or not - The Torni [1932] P 78 (CA). Also see Re Missouri Steamship Co (1889) 42 Ch. D 321, 336; 
but this view was disapproved of by the Privy Council in the Vita Food decision and much criticised. For 
references, see Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol II 1242; Mann 18 (1937) BYBIL 97, 103-107 
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(3) Rossano v Manufacturers' Life Insurance Co 
Another well known example in English case law is Rossano v Manufacturers' Life 
Insurance CO,608 where the court was concerned with subsequent Egyptian legislation. 
Rossano, an Egyptian national, resident in Egypt, acquired life insurance policies from 
the defendant, a Canadian company with its head office in Toronto. The contract was 
concluded through the company's Cairo branch. At the time the parties concluded the 
contract, the agreement was lawful according to all relevant legal systems. However, 
many years later - but before the payment of the policies was due - Egypt enacted 
legislation according to which the payment of the policies without the consent of the 
Egyptian exchange control authorities was illegal. Rossano, then living in Italy, sued the 
Canadian company in London. The latter pleaded in defence that payment of the 
policies without the consent of the Egyptian exchange control authorities was illegal. 
The court, however, held that the contract was governed by the law of Ontario, and was 
legal according to that law. The court thus rejected the defence and recognised the 
creditor's right to claim the money outside Egypt.609 
The English court thus disregarded the subsequent Egyptian legislation on the basis 
that the contract was governed by the law of Ontario, despite the fact that the contract 
was concluded in Egypt between the company's Cairo branch and Rossano, an Egyptian 
national and at that time resident in Egypt. 
608 [1962] 2 All ER 214 (QB); [1963] 2 QB 352. 
609 A garnishee order by the Egyptian Government in respect of tax due did not afford the debtor a 
defence, as this would have amounted to an indirect enforcement of the revenue law of a foreign state. 
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3 Concluding critical remarks 
Compared to Germany and Switzerland, the English courts have developed relatively 
clear criteria with regard to the question of the application of foreign internationally 
mandatory rules. Such rules are applied, if they belong to the foreign proper law as 
indicated by the ordinary conflict rules of contracts, whether subjectively or objectively. 
The foreign law is applied subject to the forum's public policy, and the principle of non-
enforcement of foreign revenue, penal or other public laws does not apply to private 
litigation. 
In all cases where third countries' internationally mandatory rules were recognised, 
the proper law of the contract was English law. The courts never applied a foreign 
internationally mandatory rule to a contract governed by another foreign law. 
Apart from the ambiguity of the English courts' statements and the commentators' 
difficulties with classifying the juristic basis of the principles as conflict of law 
solutions or solutions of domestic law, the English position is relatively settled. Such a 
position allows for certainty in law and predictability of outcome. Third countries' 
internationally mandatory rules are in principle neither applied nor considered as fact, 
subject, however, to two exceptions: the public policy-comity rule and illegality in terms 
of the lex loci solutionis. 
A contract that has the direct purpose of violating the law of a foreign and friendly 
country will usually be illegal under English law and not enforced. The illegality is 
based on public policy because English public policy demands such deference to 
international comity. This rule is not restricted to the lex loci solutionis. 
Furthermore, an English court will not enforce a contract (regardless of the proper 
law of the contract) if performance is illegal under the law of the place of performance. 
Illegality in terms of the lex loci contractus, the law of the domicile, habitual residence, 
place of business, or nationality of the contracting parties, however, is disregarded by 
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English courts. In these situations, internationally mandatory rules are not given 
effect.6lO 
The juristic basis of both principles has been discussed above. It was seen that both 
principles - the public policy-comity rule and the lex loci solutionis rule - result in the 
application or consideration of third countries' laws. Because the proper law was 
English law in all the cases, however, it is not entirely clear whether these rules are 
principles of conflict oflaws (perhaps even special conflict rules) or, alternatively, 
principles of English substantive law. However, the present author favours the 
interpretation that the principles are rules or, at least, principles of private international 
law rather than domestic law.61 I At the very least, the domestic rules and principles have 
to be broadened in scope so as to cover the violation of foreign law as well. 
a The need for choice of law considerations 
The cognizance of foreign rules as/acts within the substantive law of the English proper 
law also involves a choice of law, in order to answer the question which foreign law is 
to be taken account of within the substantive law rules.612 A judge will first have to 
decide whether there is a foreign rule claiming application, and whether the contract 
falls within the scope of the provision. Only afterwards can he decide whether the 
foreign rule renders performance impossible or invalidates the contract according to the 
proper law. In the view of the present author, therefore, there is not much difference 
between direct application of the third country's rule and recognition thereof within the 
substantive law rules of the proper law. 
If the foreign prohibition itself does not determine the private law consequences of, 
for instance, the sanction of nullity, recourse must be made to the proper law rules to 
find how they regulate the effect of violating a prohibition (originally of the lex causae). 
It is submitted that, even ifthe rule is interpreted as a rule of private international law, 
the judge should not be bound to apply the foreign law directly, but should be granted 
610 For criticism, see Lipstein Offentliches Recht 39, 48, 49; id Conflict of Public Laws 357, 367, 368; also 
see Jaffey ICLQ 23 (1974) 1 et seq. 
611 See supra section III, 2, band d, e. 
612 CHAPTER 5, I, 7; II, 3, d; also see Kaye The New Private International Law 22; Jackson Contract 
Conflicts 59, 62. 
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discretion to modify the legal consequences in order to reach a fair result. Thus if the 
foreign rule sanctions a violation with nullity, the judge might as well alter the 
consequences in accordance with the proper law.613 
A different point of view may be required if the foreign rule has either affected the 
legal relationship already, or if the violation is sanctioned with such heavy penalties that 
it would constitute an undue hardship for the debtor to perform in violation of the 
foreign law. In such cases, the foreign legislation affects the parties like a 'stroke of 
fate'. To consider the effects of these rules on the contract may mean taking the effects 
into account as facts, without any choice of law considerations. 
b Internationally mandatory rules stemming from a law other then the lex loci 
solutionis 
With regard to the consideration of third countries' internationally mandatory rules, the 
English decisions have been criticised. They take account only of illegality under the 
law of the place of performance, whereas illegality in terms of other laws, such as the 
law of the defendant's residence or the lex sitae of assets, is disregarded.614 It has been 
argued that 'though real and effective in most cases, the place of performance is 
sometimes chosen artificially and other states may be closely affected by the execution 
of the obligation. ,615 
It does not follow from this statement that the illegality in terms of the law of the 
debtor's residence or the lex sitae is always to be taken into account - as seems to be the 
case with regard to the lex loci solutionis rule. Rather, de lege ferenda, choice of law 
criteria should be developed to take third countries' internationally mandatory rules into 
account. These criteria should not be restricted locally to the lex loci solutionis. 
Objective criteria can be developed, for example, a close connection between the 
contract and the enacting country with regard to the type of contract and the type of 
performance. Thus, it may mean an undue hardship for the debtor to perform in 
violation of the law of his habitual residence and to bear the consequences of a 
613 Also see Kreuzer Auslandisches Wirtschaftsrecht 79 et seq; Schwander IPR AT254. 
614 Lipstein Conflict of Public Laws 357, 367 et seq; for criticism, see Jaffey ICLQ 23 (1974) 1,24 et seq. 
615 Lipstein Conflict of Public Laws 357, 367. 
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violation, especially when all his assets are situated there.616 In Germany, the law of the 
habitual residence of the debtor when all his assets are situated there is a special 
exception to the principle of the non-applicability of foreign public law.617 
The other situation in which English courts can consider a third country's 
internationally mandatory rules is in terms of the rule that it is against public policy to 
enforce a contract intended to break the law of a friendly country. Because the rule can 
embrace the law of any country which is friendly with the United Kingdom and which 
the parties intended to circumvent, it has been said to concede an excessively wide 
scope to foreign internationally mandatory rules.618 However, in most cases where the 
rule was applied, there was a connection between the contract and the country that 
enacted the violated rule.619 The public policy rule is also subject to other restrictions, 
such as the contracting parties having a 'wicked intention'and the relationship between 
the contract and violation of foreign law not being too remote.620 
Despite the vagueness of its criteria, the public policy-cornify rule enables the court 
to take into account third countries' internationally mandatory rules at a conflict of laws 
level. As a result, the forum can take account of the interests of the foreign state and its 
own interests in assisting the foreign state. Although the reason for applying the public 
policy rule is said to be international comity, other criteria are at play. In this regard it 
seems preferable to develop more objective criteria than, for example, the wicked 
intention of the contracting parties, and to make the choice of law process more 
transparent. 621 
616 Lipstein Conflict of Public Laws 357, 367; but: Kleinwort Sons & Co v Ungarische Baumwolle 
Industrie AG [1939] 2 KB 678; British Nylon Spinners v ICI [1955] Ch 37; Toprak v Finagrain [1979] 2 
Lloyd's Rep 98 et seq; Rossano v Manufacturers' Life Insurance Co [1963] 2 QB 352. 
617 BGHZ 31,367,371. 
618 Lipstein Conflict of Public Laws 357, 368. 
619 Regazzoni v KC Sethia [1958J AC 301 ; see, however, Foster v Driscoll [1929] 1 KB 470 where it was 
held to be irrelevant that the parties had a back up plan to sell the whisky legally in Canada, from where a 
third party would smuggle it into the United States. 
620 British Nylon Spinners Ltd v Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd [1955] Ch 37; see also Toprak v 
Finagrain [1979] 2 Lloyd's Rep 98; Morse Public Policy England - 68, 70; Dicey & Morris Conflict of 
Laws Vol II 1282; Euro-Diam Ltd v Bathurst [1990] 1 QB I. 
621 With regard to the content of the criterion 'friendly country' , and what kind of rules are considered, 
see Kaye The New Private International Law 240 et seq; Jackson Contract Conflicts 59, 70. 
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c Internationally mandatory rules of the proper law 
Much has been said in the previous chapters about the application of internationally 
mandatory rules as part of the proper law. It is questionable, however, whether all 
internationally mandatory rules of the proper law should be applied for the sole reason 
that they belong to the proper law.622 Kahler v Midland Ban1l'23 is an example. The case 
has been criticised for giving extraterritorial effect to foreign public law. The plaintiffs 
action for delivery of shares failed because it was held that Czechoslovakian foreign 
exchange control affected the deposit, although the contract concerned a deposit of 
shares with a London bank, the shares were situated in London, and their re-delivery 
was sought in London.624 
Forsyth has suggested that the question of possession of the shares, like title, should 
have rather depended on the lex rei sitae.625 Furthermore, Forsyth states that 'if 
incidentally, some question of contractual rights arises, that question should be resolved 
as an incidental question, and normally this would mean the application of either the lex 
fori or the lex situs, in this case both English' .626 In other words, Forsyth appears to 
favour a 'special connection'.I n any event the proper law should not have been applied 
to the question of possession which would normally be subject to the lex situs. 
Apart from this example, the present author is of the view that the ordinary conflict 
rules are not suitable for rendering applicable foreign internationally mandatory rules 
that are based on public state interests, ie interests beyond the private interests of the 
contracting parties. The ordinary conflict rules, such as the choice of law or the 
objective allocation rules, are based on private interests and do not take into account the 
state's economic and political interests.627 Therefore, internationally mandatory rules of 
the proper law should not be applied simply because they form part of a certain legal 
system, as indicated by the ordinary conflict rules. 
622 See CHAPTER 5, I, 7, a, b, d. For a rare criticism of the application of all rules of the proper law 
amongst English authors, see Jaffey ICLQ 23 (1974) 1,24 et seq. 
623[1950] AC 24. For the facts of the case, see Forsyth The role of public law 94, 110 et seq. 
624 For detailed criticism, see Forsyth The role of public law 94, 110 et seq. 
625 Forsyth The role of public law 94, 110 et seq. 
626 Forsyth The role of public law Ill. 
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As was explained above, strict adherence to the principle of uniformity of the law 
applicable to a contract may lead to odd results.628 Internationally mandatory rules 
require special considerations. They should only be applied if, according to the 
principles of a separate conflict process, it is reasonable to give effect to them. In fact, 
these rules should be treated on the same basis as a third country's internationally 
mandatory rules. De lege ferenda, the choice of law considerations which should 
indicate the applicable mandatory rules that pursue collective state interests could be 
developed alongside the Special Connection Theory.629 It may even be possible to 
extend the English public policy-comity rule, which consists of similar policy 
considerations and also requires a local connection between the transaction and the 
country that enacted the rule in question, to all internationally mandatory rules, whether 
they are part of the proper law or a third legal system. Alternatively, recourse might be 
made to art 7 (1) of Rome Convention, which is discussed later.63o 
Further objections have been raised to the general application of internationally 
mandatory rules ofthe proper law.631 One example is the problem of acceptance of 
renvoi. As was explained earlier, internationally mandatory rules contain an express or 
implied unilateral conflict rule, alongside their material content, indicating their scope 
of application. This general characteristic is true of those rules belonging to the lex fori, 
and also of foreign rules. According to the general rule in private international law the 
initial reference of the forum's conflict rules to foreign law is final. 632 The question 
which has to be asked in this context is whether an English court should, in accordance 
with the general rule in the private international law of contracts, apply the 
internationally mandatory rules as part of the proper law and disregard spatial 
restrictions. The foreign rule will then be applied even if it does not claim application. 
The only situation where it could not be applied is when the 'selflimitation' ofthe rule 
does not follow from the attached conflict rule alone, but from its material content, viz. 
the situation in question does not fall under the scope of this provision. 
627 See supra CHAPTER 5, I, 3 and 7; also see Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992 I) 13, 178 et seq. 
628 For details, see supra CHAPTER 5, I, 7, a. 
629 See supra CHAPTER 5, I, 3. 
630 See CHAPTER 5, IV, l. 
631 For these arguments, see supra CHAPTER 5, I, 7, a, f. 
632 See on this Lipstein ICLQ 26 (1977) 884, 892. 
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It has, however, been submitted that these rules should only be held applicable if 
they claim application, despite their belonging to the proper law.633 In cases where the 
territorial scope is determined by an unilateral conflict rule and does not follow from the 
material content of the rule itself, recognising the spatial restriction of the foreign rule 
results in an acceptance of renvoi - a matter which is normally excluded from the 
ordinary choice of law process in contracts.634 
In fact, the objections to renvoi are not relevant to internationally mandatory rules. 
These rules generally intend to pursue collective state interests and intervene in the 
private relationship by prohibiting certain conduct or requiring certain actions. The 
consequence of recognising the spatial restriction of these rules is simply that the rule is 
not applied as part of the proper law and the contract is not affected by it. However, the 
proper law still governs the contract and the problem of 'cumulation' or 'gap', or the 
application of a third legal system as governing law, which can arise from the 
acceptance of renvoi, are not present. Therefore it is reasonable to recognise the spatial 
restriction of internationally mandatory rules even if they belong to the proper law. It is 
therefore also preferable to subject internationally mandatory rules to a separate choice 
of law process. This process renders internationally mandatory rules applicable only to 
the extent that they claim application, and thereby accepts renvoi. No exception needs to 
be made during the ordinary conflict process, and choice of law considerations take into 
account the particular interests on which these rules are based. 
633 For a discussion, see Lipstein ICLQ 26 (1977) 884, 892, 893; also see id Conflict o/Laws 38, 48; also 
see supra CHAPTER 5, I, I, 7, f. 
634 Also see Lipstein ICLQ 26 (1977) 884, 892 et seq. 
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IV Foreign internationally mandatory rules under the Rome Convention and the 
Swiss IPRG - approaches of the legislature 
In this chapter legislative attempts (by the countries under investigation) to create 
conflict rules regarding the application or consideration of foreign internationally 
mandatory rules will be examined. The discussion will therefore focus on the solution 
adopted by the Rome Convention since it was drafted by leading legal specialists of 
many countries and reflects modem approaches. The new Swiss IPRG also deserves 
attention, because it is a rare occasion where a national legislature developed its own 
choice of law rules on the issue. The Swiss approach, however, is heavily influenced by 
the Rome Convention. Therefore, both solutions will be presented, compared and 
analysed in the following section.693 
(1) Firstly, art 7 (1) of the Convention and the corresponding Swiss provision, art 
19, that indicate under what circumstances a third country's mandatory rule can be 
given effect, will be presented. (2) The academic debates and criticism will then be 
discussed, in particular, criticism of the Convention's art 7 (1), which was so strong that 
(3) the United Kingdom and Germany entered a reservation in respect thereof. In 
contrast, Switzerland enacted art 19 despite the strong criticism. (4) Then, the position 
of the Rome Convention and the Swiss solution with regard to the application of 
internationally mandatory rules of the proper law will be presented. (5) It will be 
interesting to note the impact of the Convention and, in particular, the non-incorporation 
of art 7 (1), on the current law of England and Germany. With regard to Switzerland, the 
question has to be posed whether any change has occurred as a result of the enactment 
of the new statutory conflict rules. (6) The concluding remarks will focus on the 
question whether the reservation to the Convention's art 7 (1) was justified. 
69) There are further examples of special conflict rules taking cognisance of foreign mandatory laws. A 
well known example is art VIII (2) (b) of the IMF Agreement 1945 which indicates the applicability of 
foreign exchange control regulations irrespective of the law governing the contract. This provision fonus 
part of the law of many countries, including England, Germany and South Africa. See on this provision 
and its peculiarities Collier Conflict of Laws 370; Hartley Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 341, 423; MUnch 
KommlMartiny Art 34 Anh II Rn I et seq; also Spiro CILSA (1984) 197,209; Forsyth Private 
International Law 30 I. Other examples are art 16 of The Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Agency 1978, cfSpiro CILSA (1984) 197,209; Erne VertragsgiiJtigkeit 159, 173; Schiffer Normen 142 
all with further references, or art 137 of the Swiss IPRG which indicates the application of domestic or 
foreign anti-trust law, cf CHAPTER 4, III, 1, b. 
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1 Article 7 (1) of the Rome Convention, art 19 of the Swiss IPRG 
Article 7 (1) and the corresponding Swiss provision, art 19, concern internationally 
mandatory rules of a country other than the proper law and the forum. 694 Article 7 (1) 
reads as follows: 
When applying under this Convention the law of a country, effect may be given 
to the mandatory rules of the law of another country with which the situation has 
a close connection, if and in so far as, under the law of the latter country, those rules 
must be applied whatever the law applicable to the contract. In considering whether 
to give effect to these mandatory rules, regard shall be had to their nature and 
purpose and to the consequences of their application or non-application.695 
Article 7 (1) thus enables the court to give effect to a third country's mandatory rules, if 
the situation has a close connection with the third country and the rule claims 
application according to the third country's, regardless of the proper law of the contract. 
The judge has the discretion to decide whether to give effect to the mandatory rule. In 
deciding to give effect to the rule, the court must consider the nature and purpose of the 
rule and the consequences of their application or non-application. 
Article 19 of the Swiss IPRG reads as follows: 
(1) Anstelle des Rechts, das durch dieses Gesetz bezeichnet wird, kann die 
Bestimrnung eines anderen Rechts, die zwingend angewandt sein will, 
berticksichtigt werden, wenn nach schweizerischer Rechtsauffassung 
schtitzenswerte und offensichtlich tiberwiegende Interessen einer Partei es gebieten 
und der Sachverhalt mit diesem Recht einen engen Zusamrnenhalt aufweist. 
(2) Ob eine soIche Bestimrnung zu berucksichtigen ist, beurteilt sich nach ihrem 
Zweck und den daraus sich ergebenden Folgen fUr eine nach schweizerischer 
Rechtsauffassung sachgerechte Entscheidung.696 
694 Art 7 (2) RC and art 18 Swiss IPRG refer to internationally mandatory rules of the forum state, see 
supra under CHAPTER 4, II. 
695 The German version of Art 7 (1): Bei Anwendung des Rechts eines bestimmten Staates aufgrund 
dieses Obereinkommens kann den zwingenden Bestimmungen des Rechts eines anderen Staates, mit dem 
der Sachverhalt eine enge Verbindung aufweist, Wirkung verliehen werden, soweit diese Bestimmungen 
nach dem Recht des letztgenannten Staates ohne RUcksicht darauf anzuwenden sind, weIchem Recht der 
Vertrag unterliegt. Bei der Entscheidung, ob diesen zwingenden Bestimmun-gen Wirkung zu verleihen 
ist, sind ihre Natur und ihr Gegenstand sowie die Folgen zu bertlcksichtigen, die sich aus ihrer 
Anwendung oder ihrer Nichtanwendung ergeben wUrden. 
696 (I) A provision of a law, other than the one designated by this statute that is meant to be applied 
mandatorily, may be taken into account if and in so far as interests of a party that are according to the 
Swiss legal viewpoint legitimate and clearly overriding so require and the situation is closely connected 
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Thus, like the Convention's art 7 (1), art 19 allows Swiss courts to consider the 
mandatory provisions of a third legal system if the provision in question claims 
application according to the foreign legal system, the legitimate and overriding interests 
of a party so require, and the situation has a close connection with the foreign legal 
system. Again, the judge is granted a broad discretion in deciding whether to consider 
the foreign rule. The decision should depend on the policy of the foreign rule and the 
consequences/or a/air judgment according to Swiss law. 
The two articles are very similar, but there are nevertheless differences. Both 
concern only internationally mandatory rules and both use the very broad criterion of a 
close connection between the situation and the enacting country as the connecting 
factor. 697 Both rules are designed to refer to all kinds of internationally mandatory rule 
and all types of contracts and are thus general clauses.698 In contrast to the Rome 
Convention, however, the Swiss statute introduced a further controversial condition: 
Foreign mandatory rules will only be considered if, according to the Swiss legal 
viewpoint, the legitimate and overriding interests of a contracting party so require.699 
The wording of the provisions stipulate the following conditions for the application 
of third countries' mandatory rules. 
a The law of another country 
Articles 7 (1) and 19 envisage recognition of mandatory rules emanating from a law 
other than the proper law of the contract and the lex/ori.7°O Whereas this prerequisite is 
broadly accepted and unquestioned in the United Kingdom, it is disputed in Germany. 
Many authors favour an analogy or direct application to internationally mandatory rules 
to that law. (2) Whether such a provision should be taken into account depends on its policy and the 
consequences for a judgment that is fair according to the Swiss concept of law. 
697 Philip Recent Provisions 241, 248, 249; Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992) 21, 172, 173. 
698 Lehmann Zwingendes Recht 197. In contrast to art 7 (1), art 19 is not limited to the international law of 
contracts but is concerned with all fields of international law, Ungeheuer Beachtung 152. 
699 Von Overbeck IPRax (1988) 329, 333; Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992) 21, 174; Ungeheuer 
Beachtung 152 . 
. 700 Morse YB Eur L 2 (1982) 107, 145; Jackson Contract Conflicts 59, 73; Droste BegrifflO1, 116 et seq. 
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of the lex causae.701 According to them, internationally mandatory rules fall out of the 
scope of reference of the normal conflict rules and can only be applied if a special 
conflict rule renders them applicable. However, the approach of the Rome Convention 
appears to be that art 7 (1) refers to a third country's ius cogens only and not to those 
rules forming part ofthe proper law.702 
Swiss authors have a similar argument regarding art 19.703 Some adhere to the 
wording and insist that the rule must form part of a legal system other than the proper 
law.704 In particular, those authors who favour a special connection ofintemationally 
mandatory rules argue that this criterion unnecessarily limits the scope of art 19 to third 
countries' rules.705 It is argued that the internationally mandatory rules ofthe proper law 
serving predominantly collective state interests should be treated in the same way as 
third countries' rules. Therefore, art 19 should at least be applied analogously to indicate 
under what circumstances internationally mandatory rules are applicable.706 
b With which the situation has a close connection 
The foreign mandatory rule can only be given effect if and to the extent that the 
situation has a close connection with the third country. In providing for a close 
connection between the situation and the third country, the wording of art 7 (1) and art 
19 has been criticised for using vague and imprecise criteria.707 
701 See Radtke ZverglRWiss 84 (1985) 325, 350; Kreuzer Auslandisches Wirtschaftsrecht 97 et seq; 
Martiny IPRax 1987,277,278; Schubert RlW 1987,729,736; Kntippel Zwingendes Recht 84,85; 
Becker Sonderanknupfung 58; Kleinschmidt Anwendbarkeit 283 et seq; Droste Begriff 116 et seq. 
702 Martiny IPRax 1987,277,278; Schurig RabelsZ 54 (1990) 217,246; Kreuzer Ausltindisches 
Wirtschaflsrecht 69 et seq; Jackson Contract Conflicts 59, 64, 73 . 
703 See Morscher Rechtssetzungsakte 101 et seq. 
704 Cf Schnyder Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht Rn 304; Schwander IPR AT248, 249. 
705 For details, see Voser Lois d'app/ication immediate 73, 79 et seq; see also Philip Recent Provisions 
241, 247 et seq; Vischer Rabelsz 53 (1989) 438, 440, 445 et seq. Morscher Rechtssetzungsakte 101 et seq 
argues that, in so far as a foreign public law rule falls outside the scope of reference to a foreign legal 
system, it does not form part of the proper law and is thus another law according to art 19 IPRG. 
706 Morscher Rechtssetzungsakte 101 et seq; Voser Lois d'app/ication immediate 73, 79 et seq. 
707 Morse YB Eur L 2 (1982) 107, 145; Schurig Lois 55, 75; Coing WM 1981,810,813; Coester 
ZverglRWiss 82 (I983) 1, 19 et seq. See, however, Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992) 21, 173 who notes 
slight differences concerning the close connection. It is true that the German version in translation reads 
'close cohesion' instead of' close connection '. However, there is no difference in meaning. 
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In general, it can be stated that a vague connection does not suffice; there must be a 
substantial or genuine connection with the other country and the situation.70s 
Furthermore, the Report makes it clear that the contract as a whole must have a 
connection with the other law; a connection between only the issue in dispute and the 
law of the other country is not sufficient. 709 Examples provided of such genuine 
connections are where the contract is to be performed in that other country (lex loci 
solutionis) or where one party resides there or has his main place of business there.7lO 
Academic authors who support recognition of third countries' law under certain 
circumstances have suggested that special conflict rules for certain kinds of contracts 
should be developed, rather than using a broad general clause. Specified criteria, 
depending on the type of contract, can thus be used, and the close connection criteria 
will therefore differ depending on the type of contract and the rules in question.711 
c Internationally mandatory rule 
A third country's mandatory rules are given effect only to the extent that, in terms of the 
law of the third country, they 'must be applied whatever the law applicable to the 
contract'. The rule must therefore be internationally mandatory. Article 19 is less 
explicit in requiring that the foreign provision demands mandatory application to the 
situation. However, it is nevertheless interpreted as referring only to internationally 
mandatory rules.712 
The internationally mandatory character of a foreign rule follows either from its 
wording, if an express term regulates its territorial scope, or from interpretation of the 
rule. At this point all the previously discussed difficulties arise: determining the 
international scope of a rule; finding a uniform definition for internationally mandatory 
708 GiulianolLagarde Report in Contract Conflicts 381; Jackson Contract Conflicts 59, 73 ; 
709 GiulianolLagarde Report in Contract Conflicts 381; for justified criticism, see Kaye The New Private 
International Law 254 et seq. 
710 GiulianolLagarde Report in Contract Conflicts 381 . 
711 MtinchKommIMartiny Art 34 Rn 48, 100 et seq; Kropholler IPR § 52 IX 3; Schiffer Normen 175 et 
seq; Mentzel Sonderanknupfung 231 et seq; ReithmannIMartinylLimmer internationales Vertragsrecht 
455 et seq; contra with regard to the criterion of a close connection Lehmann Zwingendes Recht 223 who 
proposes the finding of a uniform criterion. 
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rules; and finding criteria to distinguish them from mandatory rules in a domestic 
sense.713 
With regard to foreign rules the court is also faced with the difficult task of 
eventually being required to interpret the law of another country in order to determine 
whether mandatory rules are international or domestic.714 In cases of doubt, it has been 
submitted that the foreign rule should be interpreted as domestic mandatory.715 
Nevertheless, this issue deserves a few further remarks, because some authors tend 
to include within the category of internationally mandatory rules those rules that are 
based on socio- political considerations, viz. rules that protect the weaker contracting 
party, even though the rules are simultaneously held to fall within the scope of reference 
of the ordinary conflict rules to the proper law.716 This 'additional' or 'cumulative' 
application of third countries' protective rules is justified because of their' double-
functionality'. They serve the fair reconciliation of the parties' interests, but also pursue 
the socio-political goals of the whole community.717 
There is therefore an inequality in the treatment of internationally mandatory rules. 
Those serving predominantly state interests are excluded from the scope of reference to 
the lex causae and are cormected separately in accordance with art 7 (1) and art 19. 
However, public law rules serving private interests are applied on the basis of the 
ordinary conflict rules as well as on the basis of a separate process of special 
connection.718 
This result has been justly criticised, and the Swiss author, Voser, submits that it 
can be avoided. One can treat internationally mandatory rules of the proper law that 
mainly serve the interests of the parties on the same footing as rules serving state 
712 All commentators emphasise that the provision has to be internationally mandatory, see amongst 
others Schwander IPR AT 252. However, the wording is slightly different from that of art 7 (1) Rome 
Convention. 
713 Supra CHAPTER 3, II. 
714 Kaye The New Private International Law 253. 
715 Lorenz RlW 1987, 569, 579, 581, 582. 
716 Vischer RabelsZ 53 (1989) 438, 449; Schnyder Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht Rn 29, 77; 
HonselllVogtiSchnyderlMachler-Erne Art 9 Rn 24. 
717 For the reasoning, see Voser Lois d'application immediate 59 Footnotes 42,60. 
718 For this phenomenon and criticism, see Voser Los d 'application immediate 59, 60. 
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interests, and thus exclude them from the scope of reference of the ordinary conflict 
rules. Alternatively, one can restrict the special connection of third countries' 
internationally mandatory rules to those rules serving the foreign state's economic and 
political interests. Voser prefers the second possibility and submits that the scope of art 
19 of the IPRG should be restricted to internationally mandatory rules that serve public 
state interests, while mandatory laws serving private interests should be applied only if 
they form part of the applicable law.719 
In principle the present author supports Voser's view. However, some flexibility 
with regard to the definition of internationally mandatory rules may be preferable. 
Certain rules, although they also serve private interests, might necessarily be excluded 
from the scope of reference, yet others of a law other than the proper law may 
reasonably require application. For instance, public labour law serves public as well as 
private interests, and a clear demarcation is not possible. Nevertheless, these rules 
deserve special consideration and can be subject to a special connection, and might also 
be excluded from the scope of reference to the proper law.720 
d Article 19: Legitimate and overriding interests of a party 
In contrast to art 7 (1) of the Rome Convention, art 19 stipulates that the legitimate and 
overriding interests of a party require the consideration of the foreign mandatory law.721 
This condition has been the subject of controversy, because the wording of the French 
text differs from that of the German and Italian versions. Unlike the latter, the French 
text does not contain the specification that the relevant interests must be those' of a 
party' .722 
Some authors assume that the French text, as the original, should be decisive, thus 
arguing that the restrictive focus on the interests of a party is too narrow.723 Therefore, 
the governmental interests of the enacting country in the application of the foreign 
719 Voser Lois d'app/ication immediate 60 et seq. 
720 Voser Lois d'app/ication immediate 61 needs to make exceptions from her general rule in this regard. 
721 About this condition, see Morscher RechtssetzungsakJe 104 et seq; Sturm FS Moser 3, 17; Vischer 
RabelsZ 53 (1989) 438, 452 et seq. 
722 Schwander fPR AT 253 . For the debates in the commission, see von Overbeck IPRax (1988) 329, 334. 
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mandatory rule are also legitimate.724 Others, however, adhere to the wording and 
assume that the interests of the parties are relevant, and that the interests of both 
contracting parties have to be taken into consideration.725 By referring to the interests of 
'a party' the legislature did not intend to restrict the legitimate and overriding interests 
to one party alone, but intended to emphasise that the foreign mandatory rule should not 
be applied against the interests of the parties.726 
In most cases the different interpretation does not affect the outcome of the decision 
whether to consider a foreign rule, since one party to the contract usually has an interest 
in application or recognition of the foreign rule. An example of this is when 
performance is prohibited by the foreign law, and the debtor wants to be excused.727 
Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether the latter interpretation is reasonable. Firstly, 
the different wording is the result of a mistake made during the drafting of the 
legislation. The French, not the German or Italian texts, was the 'original'.728 Secondly, 
there are cases when it is not in the interests of the parties that a foreign rule is given 
effect, but according to Swiss law the foreign state has a legitimate interest in the 
application of its mandatory rule.729 This is in principle acknowledged by the authors 
who support the German wording. However, since recognition ofthe foreign mandatory 
rule cannot - according to their point of view - be based upon art 19, they have to rely on 
the ordre public. 730 This runs counter to the aim of narrowing the scope of application of 
the ordre public, and circumvents the conditions for a consideration of third countries' 
mandatory laws stipulated in art 19.731 
723 Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992) 21, 174; von Overbeck IPRax (1988) 329, 334; Schwander IPR AT 
253. 
724 Schwander IPR AT253 argues that sometimes the parties intended to circumvent the foreign 
mandatory rule. In this case the foreign rule should be applied against the interests of the parties if 
according to Swiss law it is legitimate and worthy of protection. 
725 See HonselllVogt/SchnyderlMachler-Eme Art 19 Rn 21; Morscher Rechtssetzungsakte 104; 
Ungeheuer Beachtung 151. 
726 Ungeheuer Beachtung 151; Morscher Rechtsetzungsakte 104 et seq. 
727 Von Overbeck IPRax (1988) 329, 334; Morscher Rechtssetzungakte 109. 
728 Von Overbeck IPRax (1988) 329, 334; Vischer RabelsZ 53 (1989) 438, 453. 
729 See von Overbeck IPRax (\988) 329, 334; Schwander IPR AT253. 
730 Morscher Rechtssetzungakte 109 et seq; Vischer RabelsZ 53 (1989) 438,453. 
731 Cfthe complicated reasoning of Morscher Rechtssetzungakte 110 et seq. 
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e Discretion of the court 
According to art 7 (1) a court 'may give effect' to the foreign mandatory rules. Article 
19 similarly states that a foreign provision 'may be taken into account'. Therefore, the 
court is not obliged to give effect to the foreign law, but is granted a wide discretion to 
decide whether and how the foreign rule is to be given effect.732 
(1) Evaluation of the nature and purpose and regard to consequences 
Article 7 (1) provides that, when debating whether to give effect to the foreign rule the 
court shall have regard to the nature and the purpose of the rule and the consequences of 
its application or non-application, while article 19 (2) provides that the decision 
'depends on its policy (purpose) and the consequences with regard to a/air result 
according to the Swiss concept of law' .733 
These requirements are intended to assist judges in the exercise of their discretion. 
With regard to the relevance of the nature and purpose of the foreign rule, the Report 
states that 'the application of a mandatory rule must be justified by its nature and 
purpose' .734 With regard to the consequences 0/ application and non-application, the 
Report stresses the judge's power of discretion, particularly where mandatory rules of 
different countries conflict, and where a choice must be made between them.735 
Similarly, when deciding whether to take into account foreign mandatory rules, a 
Swiss court has to determine the policy of the foreign rule and the consequence of its 
application. The policy and, in particular, the result of its application must conform 
with Swiss concepts. This results in a comparison o/the interests o/the enacting state 
732 Ungeheuer Beachtung 151, 152; Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992) 13, 173, 174; Morscher 
Rechtssetzungsakte 116 et seq. 
m With regard to the discretion see Vischer RabelsZ 53 (1989) 438, 454; Schwander IPR AT254; 
Morscher Rechtssetzungsakte 124 et seq. 
734 It is further stated that one delegation suggested that this question should be defmed by saying that the 
nature and purpose of the foreign rule should be established by internationally recognised criteria. For 
example, similar laws exist in other countries, or they are based on generally recognised interests. This 
suggestion was not disapproved of but was nevertheless rejected because these international criteria did 
not exist and would create difficulties for courts. See Giuliano/Lagarde Report in Contract Conflicts 381 . 
735 Giuliano/Lagarde Report in Contract Conflicts 381. 
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with those of the forum. 736 It is assumed that at least in the case of interest-conformity 
the foreign rule will be considered, as submitted by the former case law,737 
The whole process of evaluating the content and purpose or policy of the foreign 
rule, as well as the consequences of its application or non-application, has often been 
compared with the American 'governmental interest analysis,.738 However, authors 
differ as to whether this comparison should be rejected or accepted, and they also differ 
with regard to the content of the interests analysis. Some authors understand this process 
as meaning that a 'state may have such an interest in the contractual situation ... that it 
has some justification for directing that its laws are to apply irrespective of the "proper" 
law'.739 Others criticise the process because it means that 'in effect the court is being 
required to balance the interests of the States whose laws are potentially involved, but is 
given little guidance on how the interests are to be balanced' ,740 
The view of the present author is that there are certainly similarities with the 
'governmental interest analysis' doctrine,741 but there is nevertheless no fundamental 
departure from prior European conflict of laws. As the Report states, 'Article 7 merely 
embodies principles which already exist in the laws of the Member States of the 
Community' .742 It has also been stressed that art 7 (1) (and likewise, art 19) is based on 
the German Special Connection Theory or on the French doctrine of lois d'application 
immediate.743 It is submitted that the evaluation of the nature and purpose of the foreign 
rule also refers to the court practice of the member states, perhaps particularly the 
German practice, or the Dutch Alnati case, to which express reference is made.744 
736 Ungeheuer Beachtung 151, 152; Schwander IPR AT253, 254 value-judgment; Schnyder Das neue 
IPR-G 33. This has often been compared with the American solution of policy weighing, see Vischer 
RabelsZ 53 (1989) 438, 450, 451. 
737 Ungeheuer Beachtung 151, 152; Morscher Rechtssetzungsakte 108, 124 et seq; for details, see supra 
CHAPTER 5, II, 2, c, d and Erne Vertragsgiiltigkeit 12 et seq. 
738 Morse YB Eur L 2 (1982) 107, 146; Williams ICLQ 35 (1986) 1,22; similarly, Forsyth The role of 
public law 94, 107: Art 7 RC 'implies an abandonment of the traditional jurisdiction selecting method of 
resolving conflict problems and the adoption instead of policy based ("nature and purpose") result 
selecting ("consequences") techniques that have more in common with the other side of the Atlantic than 
the other side of the Channel'. 
739 Williams ICLQ 35 (1986) 1,22. 
740 See for instance Morse YB Eur L 2 (1982) 107, 146. 
741 Guedj Am J Comp L 39 (1991) 661 et seq; Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1991 I) 9, 169. 
742 GiuJiano/Lagarde Report in Contract Conflicts 380. 
743 Coing WM 1981, 810, 811; Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol II 1242; Droste Begriff104. 
744 Giuliano/Lagarde Report in Contract Conflicts 380. 
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As discussed above, these practices have developed criteria for taking into account 
third countries' internationally mandatory rules based on a valuation of their content, 
such as whether the rule protects interests shared in common by all nations or shared in 
common by the forum state.745 The English lex loci solutionis rule and the public policy-
comity rule can also be regarded as principles in English private international law which 
are 'tailor-made' for the situation envisaged in art 7 (1). Both rules are based on 
considerations of policy and governmental interests, rather than on the traditional rigid 
and neutral allocation technique. 
Furthermore, it has been stressed that the evaluation of the content of a foreign rule 
is not unfamiliar to European conflict of laws, because courts have often, within the 
ordre public, evaluated foreign rules and their content in relation to the forum law.746 
What is meant by this 'nature and purpose' criterion in art 7 (1) is a kind of 'content 
control'.747 Here it is also necessary to develop criteria and to establish through case law 
various guides that justify the rule's application or cognizance.748 
(2) To give effect/to take into account 
In deciding how to take the foreign legislation into account, the judge is neither bound 
to apply the foreign rule with its legal consequences directly, nor is he restricted to 
recognising the foreign law as fact within the domestic law of the lex causae.749 Despite 
the broad wording, some authors either interpret art 7 (1) as leading to an application of 
the legal consequences of third countries' internationally mandatory rules or they insist 
on an application of the foreign rule nevertheless. 75o 
The present author's view is that this interpretation is incorrect. The formulation 
'effect may be given' can mean all kind of recognition. The judge is not obliged to 
745 Ungeheuer Beachtung 95; Kreuzer Auskindisches Wirtschaftsrecht 92; Hentzen RlW 1988, 808, 810; 
Lipstein Conflict of Public Laws 357, 368. 
746 Erne Vertragsgiiltigkeit 197; also see Lehmann Zwingendes Recht 226 et seq. 
747 Lehmann ZWingendes Recht 226 et seq; Mentzel Sonderanknupfung 122; Erne Vertragsgultigkeit 197. 
748 Also see Lehmann Zwingendes Recht 226 et seq; see for instance Kreuzer Ausliindisches 
Wirtschaftsrecht 92; also see Lasok & Stone Conflict of Laws 379, 380. 
749 Schiffer Normen 195 et seq; Erne Vertragsgiiltigkeit 197 et seq; Radtke ZVerglRWiss 84 (1985) 325, 
339,340; Coing WM 1981 , 810,811. 
750 Schiffer Normen 196; Lehmann Zwingendes Recht 229; Erne Vertragsgiiltigkeit 198; for further 
references, see Radtke ZverglR Wiss 84 (1985) 325, 339, 340. 
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apply the legal consequences of the foreign rule, but may simply take its purpose into 
account.751 As has been stated, internationally mandatory rules often contain a mere 
prohibition, without regulating the legal consequences of a violation on the private 
contract. In this case, recourse must be had to the substantive law rules that regulate the 
consequences on the private contract. 
In cases where internationally mandatory rules of different legal systems conflict, or 
in cases where the internationally mandatory rules of a third legal system conflict with 
the proper law, the words 'effect may be given' grant the judge the discretion to modify 
the regulation in order to reach a/air result in accordance with the proper law and the 
lex fori. This process corresponds with the German private international law technique 
of adaptation that has been developed to resolve problems that have resulted from the 
choice oflaw process, notably, 'cumulation' or 'gap'.752 Thus, a judge can and should 
develop case law rules that will take account of the peCUliarities of international 
transactions.753 The Report suggests in this regard that 'the words "effect may be given" 
impose on the court the extremely difficult task of combining the mandatory provisions 
with the law normally applicable to the contract in the particular situation in 
question' .754 The Swiss academic Vischer has stated that: 
[The court must] investigate whether the contract can be enforced despite the 
prohibition, which consequences the non-application of the rule will have for the 
parties, whether the prohibition was predictable; but in particular it is of relevance 
whether the sanction of the foreign rule is held to be reasonable by the judge, 
because he affirms the purpose and aim of the rule.755 
Article 7 of the Rome Convention and art 19 of the Swiss IPRG can therefore be 
called 'an attempt to combine rigid conflict rules with a flexible, result-selecting 
751 MUnchKommIMartiny Art 34 Rn 55; Radtke ZVerglRWiss 84 (1985) 325, 339, 340; Coing WM 1981, 
810, 811; contra Erne Vertragsgiiltigkeit 198. 
752 Lehmann Zwingendes Recht 229; Kreuzer Auslandisches Wirtschaftsrecht 95; Schiffer Normen 195, 
196; on the technique of adaptation in general, see Lipstein Rec des Cours 135 (1972 I) 99, 209; Forsyth 
Private International Law 69 et seq; Bennett (1988) 105 SALJ 444 et seq and supra CHAPTER 4, I, 1 
and CHAPTER 5, I, 3, j. 
753 CfSchwander IPR AT254, 255; Vischer RabelsZ 53 (1989) 438, 454; contra Erne Vertragsgiiltigkeit 
198. 
754 Giuliano/Lagarde Report in Contract Conflicts 381, 382. 
755 Vischer RabelsZ 53 (1989) 438, 454. 
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process, with the respective provisions being not [always] directly applied but rather 
simply taken into account' .756 
2 Academic debates and criticism 
Article 7 (1) was sUbjected to criticism from its first draft in 1972 to the final version, 
and it became the most controversial aspect of the Convention.757 The criticism included 
general objections to the principle of giving effect to third countries' laws, as well as the 
concrete formulation of the conflict rule, which is regarded as having failed. 758 In view 
of the fact that art 19 is very similar to art 7 (1) it is not surprising that identical disputes 
arose in Switzerland. Thus the arguments in favour of and against art 7 (l) are equally 
valid for art 19.759 
The idea underlying the two provisions was criticised on the ground that, by giving 
effect to third countries' internationally mandatory rules in particular, they will create 
uncertainty.760 Art 7 (l) is said to be a recipe for confusion since courts may have to 
consider multiple sets of (conflicting) mandatory rules. 761 Moreover, it requires the 
courts to perform a task for which they are ill equipped.762 Because proof of a whole 
range of potentially applicable mandatory rules might be required, the article could 
increase the expense of litigation and delay litigation763 and lead to an outrageous 
756 Vischer RabelsZ 53 (1989) 438, 460. 
757 Lehmann Zwingendes Recht 4, 171; North JBS (1980) 382, 387; Ungeheuer Beachtung 93; Williams 
ICLQ 35 (1986) 1,23. 
m For a detailed discussion of the criticism, see Lehmann Zwingendes Recht 171 et seq; for an overview 
Erne Vertragsgiiltigkeit 162 et seq; see Droste BegrifJ 104 et seq for references; for criticism with regard 
to the Draft 1972, see Mann Effect 31 et seq; id FS Beitzke 607,616 et seq; Collins ICLQ 25 (1976) 35, 
49 et seq; with regard to 7 (1) Rome Convention Coester ZVerglRWiss 82 (1983) I, 17-30; Kegel FS 
Seidl-Hohenveldern 243,278; id SchlechtriemiLeser Ill; Schurig Lois 55, 75; Sandrock RlW 1986,841, 
853; Hentzen RlW 1988,508 et seq; Coing WM 1981,810,812; North JBL (1980) 382,387; id Contract 
Conflicts 3, 19 et seq; Morse YB Eur L 2 (1982) 107, 145 et seq; further references: Lehmann 
Zwingendes Recht 180 et seq; Droste BegrifJI05 Footnote 103. 
759 For the dispute during the legislation, see Erne Vertragsgiiltigkeit 166 et seq; Schwander IPR AT252; 
also see Lehmann ZWingendes Recht 194. 
760 See North JBL (1980) 382, 387; North Contract Conflicts 19,20; Collins ICLQ 25 (1976) 35, 50; 
Coester ZverglRWiss 82 (1983) 1,25; Coing WM 1981,810,813; Mentzel Sonderankniipfung 129; with 
regard to art 19, see Mann FS Beitzke 607, 621; Sturm FS Moser 3, 21; Heini ZSR 100 (1981) 65, 75; id 
BOG VoR 22 (198 I) 37, 43. 
761 Kaye The New Private International Law 249; North Contract Conflicts 19, 20; also see Collins ICLQ 
25 (1976) 35,51; Morse YB Eur L 2 (\982) 107, 146; Coester ZverglRWiss 82 (1983) 1,27,28. 
762 Morse YB Eur L 2 (1982) 107, 146. 
763 In England it is feared that the provision might discourage potential arbitration in the United Kingdom, 
cfMorse YB Eur L 2 (1982) 107, 147; North Contract Conflicts 19,20. 
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additional charge to the courts. Moreover, the provision leads in certain respects to the 
'acknowledgement of a foreign ordre public', which is thus far unknown. 764 
Further objections were that art 7 (1) will lead to a scission of the contract and will 
jeopardise the principle of uniformity of the law applicable to the contract.765 It unduly 
restricts party autonomy,766 and could open the door to the dirigisme of foreign states,767 
which is without counterpart in pre-existing legislation or case law.768 
Besides these general reservations about the concept of art 7 (1), the overall 
character of the article, the use of vague criteria, and the granting of a broad discretion 
to judges have led to criticism, even from authors who in principle favour a special 
connection of third countries' internationally mandatory rules. 769 In particular, the 
uncertainty following from the vagueness of the terms, such as 'situation' and 'close 
connection'. The provision gives no guidance in the exercise of discretion and is even 
designated as non-rule that transfers the decision to the judge.770 In short, the parties to a 
contract cannot determine the law applicable to their transaction, because they cannot 
foresee how a court will decide to exercise its discretion.771 
Nevertheless, there have been also more positive statements in favour of art 7 (1) 
(and the Swiss art 19) that particularly welcome the intention of the 'innovative 
provision'.772 The provision has the beneficial effect of achieving uniformity of results, 
764 See the arguments of the Upper House of Parliament (,Bundesrat') which were adopted by the Federal 
Government and the legal committee of the Lower House of Parliament ('Bundestag') BT-Drucks. 
101504, 100, 106; cffor a discussion of these arguments Kreuzer IPRax 1984, 293; Lehmann ZRP 1987, 
319 et seq; Lehmann Zwingendes Recht 205 et seq; Sonnenberger FS Rebmann 825, 826. 
765 Mann Effects 31, 34, 36. 
766 SandrockiSteinschulte Handbuch Rn A 196; Co ester ZverglRWiss 82 (1983) 1,27; with regard to art 
19, see Heini FS Moser 67,73,74; id ZSR 100 (1981) 65, 77; id BDG VoR 22 (1981) 37, 43 . 
767 SandrockiSteinschulte Handbuch Rn A 196; Mann Effect 31, 36; for a detailed discussion of further 
arguments see Lehmann Zwingendes Recht 170 et seq; Lehmann ZRP 1987,319,321; Kratz 
Eingriffsnorm 96 et seq, Radtke ZverglRWiss 84 (1985) 325, 350; for the above mentioned arguments 
against art 19, see Heini FS Moser 67,73,74; id ZSR 100 (1981) 65,77; id BDG VoR 22 (1981) 37, 43. 
768 SandrockiSteinschulte Handbuch Rn A 196; Coing WM 1981,810,812,813; Morse YB Eur L 2 
(1982) 107, 147 Footnote 188; Mann FS Beitzke 607,620; id Effects 31. 
769 See Sonnenberger FS Rebmann 819,826; MilnchKommlSonnenberger Einl Rn 60; Schurig Lois 55, 
75; id RabelsZ 54 (1990) 217, 235; Lorenz RlW 1987, 569, 572, 580, 584. 
770 Coing WM 1981,810,813; Coester ZverglRWiss 82 (1983) 1,21,29. 
771 Coing WM 1981,810, 813; Mentzel Sonderanknilpfong 129; Fletcher Conflict of Laws 170. 
772 Cf with regard to the Draft 1972: Drobnig Comments 82 et seq; Lipstein Comments 155, 159; Lando 
RabelsZ 38 (1974) 6,33; with regard to 7 (I) RC Stellungnahme des MPI RabelsZ 47 (1983) 595, 668 et 
seq; Kreuzer IPRax 1984, 293 et seq; id Auslandisches Wirtschaftsrecht 97 et seq; Lehmann ZRP 1987, 
319 et seq; id Zwingendes Recht 181, 205 et seq; Martiny IPRax 1987, 277 et seq; Lando CMLR 24 
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irrespective of the forum seized of the dispute, and it fulfils the need for mutual 
consideration of states' interests, ie comity.773 It was also argued that the parties to a 
contract would not be exposed to contradictory rules.774 Finally, it has been observed 
that art 7 (1) is not a fundamental change, but rather a codification of former court 
decisions and academic approaches.775 
In principle the authors who favour art 7 (1) Rome Convention do because it serves 
as a good basis for further developments.776 Earlier legal praxis could be criticised as 
uncertain because it used comprehensive clauses of substantive law of the lex causae to 
consider foreign internationally mandatory rules as supposed facts and thus manoeuvred 
issues of conflict oflaws into the substantive law. Thus, the enactment of art 7 (1) 
served to find a uniform solution. The renunciation of such a provision would run 
counter to the aim of certainty in international law. 777 
To the claim that art 7 (1) constitutes an additional burden on the courts, it is argued 
that arts 5 and 6 of the Convention have the same effect. Moreover, the problem is less 
serious than asserted, as there will usually be only a few foreign mandatory provisions 
under consideration and these will appear from the party's pleadings.778 
With regard to the argument that art 7 (1) will lead to recognition of a foreign ordre 
public, the solution adopted by former case law similarly led to such a recognition. 779 
(1987) 159,213; Williams ICLQ 35 (1986) 1,30; Carter BYBIL 57 (1986) 1,20; Basedow GYBIL 27 
(1984) 109, 140, 141; Kaye The New Private International Law 257; Jackson Contract Conflicts 59, 72 et 
seq; Lasok & Stone Conflict of Laws 378 et seq; with regard to art 19: Neuhaus RabelsZ 43 (1979) 277, 
287 et seq; Schwander IPR AT250; generally positive with regard to a 'special connection': Schwander 
Lois 316 et seq; Bar Kartellrecht 192 et seq, 214 et seq, 225 et seq; Voser Lois d'application immediate 
50 et seq, 69 et seq 
773 Lehmann ZRP 1987,319,321; Drobnig Comments 82, 83; Lando CMLR 24 (1987) 159,213. 
774 Drobnig Comments 82,83. 
775 Carter BYBIL 57 (1986) 1,20; Jackson Contract Conflicts 59, 62; Basedow GYBIL 27 (1984) 109, 
140, 141; Kreuzer Auslandisches Wirtschaftsrecht 98,99; MiinchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 45; von Bar 
IPR Bd I Rn 267; see the Giuliano/Lagarde Report in Contract Conflicts 380. 
776 Lehmann ZRP 1987, 319, 321; Kreuzer IPRax 1984, 293, 295; see the approach of MlinchKomml 
Martiny Art 34 Rn 48,103; also see Lasok & Stone Conflict of Laws 378 et seq. 
777 Von Bar IPR Bd I Rn 265, 266; Kreuzer IPRax 1984,293,295; Lehmann ZRP 1987,319,320,321; 
Schurig RabelsZ 54 (1990) 217, 242; Mentzel Sonderanknupfung 131, 141; also see Jackson Contract 
Conflicts 59, 74, 75; Kaye The New Private International Law 257; for art 19, see KellerlSiehr IPR 277, 
550,551; also see Ungeheuer Beachtung 148; also see Siehr FS Keller 485,507,508. 
778 Lehmann ZRP 1987,319,321; Jackson Contract Conflicts 59, 75. 
779 Lehmann ZRP 1987,319,321; Kreuzer IPRax 1984,293,295. It was further stated that the decision 
about whether effect is to be given to foreign legislation in international contracts is a question of conflict 
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3 Reservations to article 7 (1) 
The anxieties about art 7 (1) resulted in a right of reservation being given under the 
Convention, so that a Member State would not be required to apply it (art 22 (1) (a) of 
the Convention). The United Kingdom made this reservation when it signed the 
Convention.780 Germany did not exercise the right on signing the Convention, and the 
draft of the new EGBGB therefore contained an incorporation of art 7 (1) in art 34 (1).781 
This provision, however, was not retained in the final draft of the EGBGB due to the 
doubts of the Upper House of Parliament ('Bundesrat')782 and the extensive criticism by 
German commentators. In addition, Germany made a reservation with regard to art 7 (I) 
pursuant to art 22 (I) (a) of the Convention.783 
The question that must be posed is whether the fact that art 7 (1) is not in legal force 
in the United Kingdom and Germany has any impact on their laws. Do the former case 
law solutions survive the Convention? How can the legislative gap be closed? 
4 Internationally mandatory rules of the proper law 
According to the Rome Convention and the Swiss IPRG are internationally mandatory 
rules of the proper law automatically applicable? 
a The Rome Convention 
The Rome Convention does not regulate expressis verbis the applicability of 
internationally mandatory rules of the proper law. The Convention's art 7 (1) and (2) 
refers only to rules of the forum state and those of a third country. The predominant 
point of view assumes, therefore, that according to the Convention the internationally 
of laws, and must be made by the forum, not left to the foreign lex causae. Cf Sch wander IP R AT 251, 
252; id Lois 362, 372; Bar Kartellrecht 157. 
780 North Contract Conflicts I, 20; Morse YB Eur L 2 (1982) 107, 147. 
781 BT- Drucks 10/504 vom 20.1 0.1983, 34. 
782 The Federal Government and the legal committee of the Lower House of Parliament ('Bundestag') 
endorsed this point of view, cf. BT-Drucks. 10/504, 100, 106; cfSonnenberger FS Rebmann 825, 826; 
Kreuzer IPRax 1984,293 . 
783 For criticism, see Kreuzer IPRax 1984, 293,294; Lehmann ZRP 1987,319 et seq. 
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mandatory rules of the proper law are applied as part of the law applicable to the 
transaction.784 
Only a few authors think differently. The German academic Kegel, for instance, 
assumes that public law rules fall outside the scope of reference of the normal conflict 
rules, and outside the scope of private international law in general. He holds that, if the 
drafters of the Convention intended to include public enactment within the scope of 
reference, they should have stipulated this statutorily.785 However, most authors think 
that this opinion is erroneous. They say that, if the drafters intended to exclude public 
law rules they would have regulated this expressly. 786 Particularly in respect of art 7 (1) 
and (2) that refers to the forum's and a third country's internationally mandatory rules, it 
cannot be assumed that the drafters did not intend to regulate application of the rules 
emanating from the proper law. 787 
In England the applicability of internationally mandatory rules of the proper law is 
so generally accepted as correct that the issue is often not even mentioned in the context 
of internationally mandatory rules.788 
The Rome Convention thus results in what was above called the Combination 
Theory: The application of internationally mandatory rules forming part of the proper 
law on the basis of the normal conflict rules indicating the governing legal system, and 
recognition of third countries' internationally mandatory rules on the basis of a special 
connection process in accordance with art 7 (1).789 
784 Kreuzer Ausliindisches Wirtschaftsrecht 69, 70; Siehr RabelsZ 52 (1988) 41, 71, 73; Schubert RIW 
1987,729,736; LehmalUl ZRP 1987,319; Martiny IPRax 1987,277,278; Radtke ZverglRWiss 84 
(1985) 325, 350; KnUppel Zwingendes Recht 84, 85; Becker Sonderanknupfung 58; Dicey & Morris 
Conflict a/Laws Vol 111241; Lasok & Stone Conflict a/Laws 372; Lando CMLR 24 (1987) 159,213; 
785 Kegel SchlechtriemiLeser Ill; Droste Begriff 117 et seq, 122, 123; Philip Contract Conflicts 81, 85. 
786 See Jackson Contract Conflicts 59, 64; Kreuzer Ausliindisches Wirtschaftsrecht 73. 
787 Kreuzer Ausliindisches Wirtschaftsrecht 73; id SchlechtriemlLeser 105; Schubert RlW 1987,729,736. 
788 Or the following type of statement is made: Mandatory rules of the law which governs the contract 
under the Convention of course apply by virtue of the general principle of the conflict of laws that a 
statute forming part of the governing law of the contract will normally be applied: by ... art(s) 8 and 10 
Rome Convention questions relating to such matters as validity of the contract or its performance can be 
affected by mandatory rules of the governing law. CfDicey & Morris Conflict a/Laws Vol II 1241; 
Hartley ELR 4 (1979) 236, 240; Lasok & Stone Conflict 0/ Laws 372. 
789 Schubert RlW 1987, 729, 736; Kreuzer Ausliindisches Wirtschaftsrecht 69 et seq; id Schlechtriem! 
Leser 89, 105; MUnchKommiMartiny Art 34 Rn 40; Radtke ZVerglRWiss 84 (1985) 325,350. 
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Despite the Convention, it is debated in Germany whether the scope of reference of 
the normal conflict rules to a foreign legal system is all-embracing, or whether rules that 
pursue predominantly the foreign state's interests are excluded from the scope of 
reference.79o The crucial question is whether Germany is bound by the Convention to 
apply internationally mandatory rules of the proper law as part of the proper law. This 
question will be discussed in the forthcoming section that examines the impact of the 
Rome Convention on the present legal situation in Germany and England. 
b Article 13 of the Swiss IPRG 
Article 13 of the new Swiss IPRG contains a rule that determines the scope of the 
reference to the foreign applicable law: 
Die Verweisung dieses Gesetzes auf ein ausHindisches Recht umfaBt alle 
Bestimmungen, die nach diesem Recht auf den Sachverhalt anwendbar sind. Die 
Anwendbarkeit einer Bestimmung des ausUindischen Rechts ist nicht allein dadurch 
ausgeschlossen, dass ihr ein Offentlich-rechtlicher Charakter zugeschrieben wird.791 
The second sentence of this article provides that reference to a foreign law includes 
, 
public law rules. The Swiss legislature thus enacted a rule addressing an area that had 
formerly been controversial. As was seen above,792 it was uncertain whether the scope of 
reference of the conflict rules included foreign public law rules or rules predominantly 
serving the economic and political interests of the foreign state.793 
The intention of the legislature was obviously to reject the strict non-application of 
foreign public law rules on the basis of the principle a/territoriality, as was submitted 
by early Swiss case law and by some academic authors. 794 This doctrine is therefore 
clearly superseded.795 
790 See only Droste Begriffl16 et seq; MUnchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 40 et seq. 
791 The scope of reference to a foreign law includes all rules that are applicable to the situation according 
to the designated law. The application of a foreign rule is not excluded by the mere fact that it is supposed 
to be of a public law-character. 
792 CHAPTER 5,1. 
793 For an examination, see Voser Lois d'application immediate 50 et seq; KellerlSiehr IPR 488 et seq. 
794 Morscher Rechtssetzungakte 86; for Swiss case law, see CHAPTER 5 II, I, d. 
795 Morscher Rechtssetzungsakte 86. 
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However, despite the second sentence of art 13 the question of whether the scope of 
reference includes all rules of public law is still controversial. 796 By using the expression 
'nicht allein dadurch ausgeschlossen' ('not excluded by the mere fact'), the wording of 
the statute is vague and lends itself to a variety ofinterpretations.797 The former 
arguments about this issue are therefore still upheld by academics. Thus, the crucial 
questions are how this sentence is to be interpreted and whether there has been any 
change to the earlier situation. 
5 Impact on the law in Germany, England and Switzerland 
The issue addressed in this section is the impact of the reservation to the Convention's 
art 7 (1) on the present legal situation in England and Germany. Another question that 
must be posed is whether Members of the Rome Convention are obliged to apply 
internationally mandatory rules of the proper law for the sole reason that they form part 
of the proper law. 
a Germany 
(1) Closing the loophole 
How is the loophole resulting from the reservation to art 7 (1) to be closed? According 
to the prevailing opinion, in exercising its power of reservation in respect of art 7 (1), 
the German legislature did not express a fundamental refusal to apply a third country's 
mandatory rules.798 
It has been argued that the objections were directed against the actual formulation 
of the conflict rule and not against a special connection at all. The problem remained 
unregulated and closing the conscious loophole was left to academics and the courts. 
796 CfVischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992) 21, 178 et seq; id RabelsZ 53 (1989) 438, 441 et seq; Voser Lois 
d'application immediate 50 et seq, 76 et seq; HonselllSchnyderNogt/ Machler-Eme Art 13 Rn 15 et seq; 
Schwander IPR AT248; Morscher Rechtssetzungsakte 85 et seq; Ungeheuer Beachtung 146. 
797 HonseIIlVogt/SchnyderlMachler-Eme Art 13 Rn 17; Vischer RabelsZ 53 (1989) 438, 441. 
798 Martiny IPRax 1987, 277, 279; Sonnenberger FS Rebmann 825, 826; Soergellvon Hoffmann Art 34 
Rn 2; Schurig RabelsZ 54 (1990) 217, 235; Hentzen RIW 1988,508,509; Sandrock RIW 1986,841, 
852; Lorenz RIW 1987, 569, 581; Droste Begriff I 09; Schiffer Normen 210. 
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Therefore the long-standing controversy about whether and how third countries' 
internationally mandatory rules can be given effect is still relevant.799 
German academic approaches have shown that the predominant point of view 
favours a recognition of third countries' internationally mandatory rules on the basis of 
a special connection. However, this recognition should not be based on a broad general 
clause covering all kind of contracts, rules and possible situations, but on special 
conflict rules that have to be de lege ferenda developed for each particular field oflaw, 
with due regard to the type of contract and the nature of internationally mandatory rules 
typically intervening in this type of contract. 800 
German case law seems to adhere to both of its former solutions. In a recent 
judgment,801 the Federal Supreme Court was concerned with the question of whether a 
contract governed by the law of the Federal Republic of Germany was illegal because 
the contracting parties, one of whom was resident in the GDR at the time of contracting, 
concluded the contract without the permission of the relevant authority of the GDR. 
Contracts that were concluded in violation of the state monopoly of the GDR were null 
and void. 
The court stated that according to established principles of German case law foreign 
internationally mandatory rules pursuing economic and political interests of the foreign 
state can only be recognised if that state has the power to enforce its law. Otherwise, the 
foreign legislation can only be considered as fact within the substantive law rules of the 
German lex causae. In this case the court rejected both the application of the foreign 
rule and its cognisance as fact. 802 
(2) Scope of reference of the normal conflict rules 
With regard to the question of whether internationally mandatory rules of the proper law 
are applicable for the sole reason that they form part of that law, the Rome Convention 
799 Sonnen berger FS Rebmann 825, 826; SoergeVvon Hoffmann Art 34 Rn 2; Schurig RabelsZ 54 (1990) 
217,235; Hentzen RlW 1988,508,509; Lorenz RlW 1987,569,581; Sandrock RlW 1986, 841, 852; 
Remien RabelsZ 54 (1990) 431, 462. Contra: Piehl RlW 1988, 841 et seq. 
800 See supra CHAPTER 5, I, 3. 
801 BGH 17 .11.I994 BGHZ 128,41 et seq. 
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could not end the long-standing debate about the scope of reference of the nonnal 
conflict rules. As was stated above, the predominant opinion assumes that the creators 
of the Convention presumed that public law rules serving the state's interests are also 
referred to by the nonnal conflict rules and are thus applicable.803 
Nevertheless, the question of whether the scope of reference of the conflict rules 
also refers to internationally mandatory rules pursuing economic and state political 
interests of the foreign country is still avidly discussed. Only a few authors feel bound 
by the legislative intention ofthe Rome Convention.804 Most presuppose an unconscious 
loophole that again has to be closed by literature and case law. 
The general objection to the application of internationally mandatory rules of the 
proper law is that the nonnal conflict rules of the Convention such as arts 3 and 4 are 
based on private interests and do not take public interests into account. Internationally 
mandatory rules pursuing economic and state political interests are therefore not 
rendered applicable by the nonnal conflict rules, but their application has to be 
detennined by special conflict rules independently of the proper law. It has been 
suggested that either art 7 (1) Rome Convention or the principles developed for third 
country's mandatory rules should be applied by analogy. 80S 
b England 
In contrast to Gennany, the application of internationally mandatory rules of the proper 
law is broadly accepted in England, as it was prior to the Rome Convention.806 With 
regard to the question of whether third countries' internationally mandatory rules can be 
considered, a dispute arose as to whether the fonner case law solutions survive the 
Rome Convention. 
802 BGB 17.11.1994 BGHZ 128,41,52,53. 
803 See Radtke ZverglRWiss 84 (1985) 325, 350; Kreuzer Auslandisches Wirtschaftsrecht 72; 
MiinchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 40; Martiny IPRax 1987,277,278; Schubert RIW 1987,729,736; 
Knlippel Zwingendes Recht 84, 85; Becker Sonderankniipfung 58; Kleinschmidt Anwendbarkeit 284 et 
seq; Kegel SchlechtriemiLeser Ill; Droste Begriff117 et seq, 122, 123. 
804 For instance Becker Sonderankniipfung 58, 74 et seq. 
805 MlinchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 41; Schurig RabelsZ 54 (1990) 217, 244 et seq; Kleinschmidt 
Anwendbarkeit 288 et seq; Kreuzer Auslandisches Wirtschaftsrecht 97; KrophoUer IPR § 52 IX 3; Droste 
Begriff116 et seq, 123, 124; Schubert RlW 1987,729,745. 
806 See supra CHAPTER 5, III, 1. 
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(1) Does the public policy comity rule survive the Rome Convention? 
Most English authors think that the cases in which foreign law was taken into account 
on the basis of English public policy and comity exemplify the situation envisaged in art 
7 (1).807 They also consider that the public policy-comity principle is subsumed under art 
7 (1), not only in cases where the proper law is English, but also in real third country 
cases, where the proper law is that of a foreign country.808 However, since England 
entered a reservation to the article, it cannot be used as basis for the continued 
application of the English public policy-comity principle. 
Which provision of the Rome Convention, then, can be used to accommodate the 
principle? Academic views differ. Most authors assume that the English public policy-
comity rule can be covered by art 16 of the Convention.809 However, this article 
performs in essence the 'negative function' of ordre public, as it is concerned with the 
refusal to apply an objectionable foreign law. It does not have a 'positive function', in 
terms of which a third country's rule should be applied.810 
The public policy-comity principle, as expressed in cases like Regazzoni v KC 
Sethia, indicates the circumstances in which a foreign law, that would otherwise be 
807 Hartley Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 341, 403; Cheshire & North's Private International law 504; see, 
however, Morse YB Eur L 2 (1982) 107, 147 Footnote 188. 
808 Collier Conflict of Laws 211; also see Hartley Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 341, 403. 
809 Collier Conflict of Laws 211, 212; Cheshire & North's Private International Law 504; Lasok & Stone 
Conflict of Laws 372, 373. 
810 CfHartley Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 341, 403; Cheshire & North Private International Law 504. 
Collier rejects the argument that in this situation the effect of the public policy application is to include 
foreign rules (positive function) rather than to exclude them (negative function). He submits that in the 
situation where the contract is governed by a foreign law and the mandatory rule of a third country is 
applied on the basis of public policy considerations (and for that reason the contract is not enforced by 
the English court) public policy is being used to exclude the rule of the foreign proper law that makes the 
contract valid. The law of the third country is treated as fact that produces a situation where it would be 
contrary to public policy to apply the rule of the proper law. CfCollier Conflict of Laws 211,212. This 
interpretation may be possible, however, it is submitted that the English cases refer to the principle of 
English public policy in another sense: The reason for the application of the public policy principle is 
found in comity. It is, thus, not a question of whether the proper law is contrary to public policy and 
therefore inapplicable, but rather a question of under what circumstances English public policy demands 
the application of a third country's law. The issue is a positive and not a negative one. Furthermore, 
Collier's argument omits the fact that the decision about whether the foreign mandatory provision creates 
a factual situation that would render the application of the proper law as being against public policy is 
already a conflict of law decision. The first step of the examination is whether or not to recognise a 
foreign third country's rule. This decision is the primary question that has to be answered. Only 
afterwards the impact on the applicable proper law can be pertinent. Cf for criticism, Kaye The New 
Private International Law 76 and supra CHAPTER 5, III, 2, b. 
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inapplicable, is applied or considered by an English court. Thus, the English principle 
has a positive function which is not contemplated by art 16. It is therefore doubtful 
whether the English principle could be applied under art 16 in cases where the proper 
law is not English law.sll 
Hartley prefers art 7 (2) of the Convention as a legal basis. This article authorises 
the court to apply internationally mandatory rules of the forum. His opinion is that the 
principle expressed in cases like Regazzoni v KC Sethia is one of English domestic law 
that is internationally mandatory and therefore applicable according to art 7 (2), 
regardless of the proper law of the contract.812 
This argument seems irrefutable if Hartley's assumption is correct that the principle 
expressed in cases like Regazzoni v KC Selhia is domestic law. However, if the principle 
were an internationally mandatory rule of England, alongside its material content, it 
would contain a unilateral conflict rule indicating the circumstances in which it applies. 
The rule expressed in Regazzoni v KC Sethia would then form an internationally 
mandatory rule on the legal basis of which foreign internationally mandatory rules of a 
friendly country are considered under certain circumstances. 
In the view of the present author, the whole of this debate is misguided. There is no 
reason why the previous common law solution should not continue to exist under the 
Rome Convention. Although art 7 (1) was said to be tailor-made for these situations, it 
was not enacted by the British legislature. The legislature purposely did not regulate this 
matter with the result that there is a conscious loophole in the current conflict of laws of 
contracts, as in Germany. The English courts may now close the gap by using common 
law rules derived from former cases. This solution seems preferable to adapting the 
public policy-comity principle to a conventional provision that was not designed to 
cover the situation. 
811 The present author's view is that the application of the English rule can also not be based upon art 16 
in situations where the contract is governed by English law. See also generally Cheshire & North's 
Private International Law 504. 
812 Hartley Rec des Cours 266 (1997) 341,403. 
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(2) Does the lex loci solutionis rule survive the Rome Convention? 
According to English academics, the question whether the lex loci solutionis principle 
survives the Rome Convention is dependent on the role or nature of the principle under 
pre-existing law, viz. its juristic basis. 
If it is regarded merely as a rule of English internal law, thus providing indirect 
recourse to the lex loci solutionis via the internal rules of English law (or the internal 
rules of another proper law if it exists) regulating frustration or impossibility of 
performance, then the principle is held to allow for the operation of the lex loci 
solutionis within the regime of the Rome Convention. According to some authors, this 
is because the lex loci solutionis is merely taken into account by English domestic law 
as the governing law after the choice of law process has been followed. 813 
If the proper law of the contract is English law, some authors reach this result by 
virtue of arts 8 and 10 (1) (b) and (d) of the Rome Convention.814 When the proper law 
of the contract is the law of a foreign country and the contract is to be performed there, 
then the effect of arts 8 and lOis that the rules rendering performance illegal are 
applicable on the basis of their belonging to the proper law. Conversely, when the 
contract is governed by a foreign law and illegal according to the English place of 
performance, the English forum will refuse to enforce the contract on the basis of art 7 
(2) of the Convention, or on the basis of public policy.8ls 
However, if the contract is governed by a foreign law and valid according to that 
law, but is illegal according to the law of yet another foreign country where 
performance is to take place, the fmding of an appropriate rule becomes difficult. Some 
authors assume that art 7 (1) of the Convention would have governed that situation and 
rendered the mandatory rules of the lex loci solutionis applicable. However, because art 
7 (1) is excluded from United Kingdom law, it is argued that English courts do not have 
813 Cheshire & North's Private International Law 519; Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol II 1245; 
Kaye The New Private International Law 21; Collier Conflict of Laws 213; 
814 Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol II 1245; Cheshire & North's Private International Law 519; 
Kaye The New Private International Law 21; Collier Conflict of Laws 2 I 3. 
815 Cheshire & North Private International Law 520; Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol II 1246. 
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the discretion to apply such foreign law.816 Others assume that art 10 (2) would be the 
appropriate rule to render the lex loci solutionis applicable. It has, however, been 
vigorously argued that the 'manner of performance' is a fairly narrow category and it 
would not be possible to regard it as an issue covering cases where performance as a 
whole is illegal. 8J7 
Others rely on art 7 (2) of the Rome Convention in referring to illegality under a 
foreign lex loci solutionis. The lex loci solutionis rule is then held to be mandatory 
notwithstanding a foreign applicable law.818 However, it has been argued that if the 
place of performance is outside England, the lex loci solutionis principle cannot itself be 
regarded as a mandatory rule of English law.819 
It has even been suggested that art 16 of the Convention should be applied to 
regulate illegality ofthe place ofperformance.820 But it is not likely that a contract 
governed by foreign law that becomes illegal by the law of the place of performance 
would be regarded as contrary to public policy. And it is not likely that a foreign 
contract that is ab initio illegal according to the foreign law would be held to violate 
English public policy ifthe parties contracted in ignorance of the prohibition.821 
If the lex loci solutionis principle forms a choice of law rule of English private 
international law, English writers argue that it would not be possible under the 
Convention's regime to take cognisance of illegality under the lex loci solutionis, since 
art 7 (1) is not in legal force in the United Kingdom.822 
What was stated above regarding the survival of the public policy-comity rule under 
the regime of the Rome Convention is equally valid for the lex loci solutionis rule. If the 
lex loci solutionis rule really is a principle of private international law, and thus 
816 Cheshire & North Private International Law 520; Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol II 1246; . 
817 Cheshire & North's Private International Law 520; Kaye The New Private International Law 21. 
818 See Kaye The New Private International Law 21,69; Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol 111246. 
819 Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol 111246. 
820 Lasok & Stone Conflict of Laws 373. Also see the tendency in English case law to describe the lex loci 
solutionis rule as being rooted in the notion of public policy Toprak v Finagrain [1979] 2 Lloyd's Rep 
98, 107; Euro-Diam Ltd v Bathurtst [1987] I Lloyd's Rep 178, 187, (1987] 2 All ER 113, 120; Cheshire 
& North ' s Private International Law 520 with further references on this point. 
821 The position is different where the parties intended to break the law of a foreign and friendly country, 
see Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol 111246 and Cheshire & North's Private International Law 520. 
822 Kaye The New Private International Law 22; Dicey & Morris Conflict of Laws Vol II 1246. 
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implicitly a choice oflaw rule as has been submitted, then the exclusion of art 7 (1) 
from English law may well mean that the legislature did not intend to regulate this 
matter. Then English courts should close a conscious loophole by developing principles 
and choice of law rules so as to determine when effect can be given to third countries' 
internationally mandatory rules. The lex loci solutionis principle could constitute such a 
conflict rule. 
c Switzerland 
Unlike the United Kingdom and Germany, Switzerland has enacted a choice oflaw rule 
with regard to the applicability ofthird countries' mandatory provisions: art 19 ofthe 
Swiss IPRG. Furthermore, the new Swiss IPRG contains in the second sentence of art 
13 a regulation of the scope of reference to foreign law. However, what is the impact of 
these provisions on the current Swiss legal situation and has there been any change? 
(1) Article 19: a special connection of third countries' internationally mandatory 
rules 
In view of the long-standing academic debates concerning the question of whether and 
how third countries' internationally mandatory rules can be given effect, it is not 
surprising that art 19 was fiercely debated amongst scholars.823 Nevertheless the Swiss 
legislature decided to enact a conflict rule that enables a Swiss court to give effect, on a 
discretionary basis. to third countries' internationally mandatory rules at the level of 
conflict of laws. 
The authors who favoured the Schuldstatuts-theory criticise art 19.824 According to 
this theory, the governing law is applicable comprehensively and exclusively, and 
mandatory rules of a third country are not applied at the conflict of laws level, but are 
taken into account as supposed facts in the substantive rules of the lex causae. This 
doctrine, however, can be regarded as superseded by the enactment of art 19.825 Even 
before the new Swiss IPRG entered into force the general legal trend was in favour of a 
823 For the academic discussion, see CHAPTER 5, I. 
824 Mann FS Beitzke 607,623; Heini 100 ZSR (1981) 65, 75 et seq; id BerDVOR 1982, 37 et seq. 
825 Voser Lois d'app/ication immediate 73 . 
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special connection of foreign internationally mandatory rules. 826 Those who supported 
this approach welcomed the enactment of art 19.827 
The enactment of art 19 is generally interpreted as meaning a change of former 
Swiss case law.828 As was seen above, Swiss courts in principle did not apply third 
countries' internationally mandatory rules on the basis of a special connection.829 In 
contrast, internationally mandatory rules were refused application by reference to their 
public law nature, the principle of territoriality or the Swiss ordre public.830 Moreover, 
Swiss courts seldom considered third countries' mandatory laws within the substantive 
law of the lex causae.83 ! 
Article 19 makes it possible for a judge to recognise foreign legislation at the level 
of conflict of laws. In addition, judges are free as to how to give effect to the foreign 
legislation and are not bound by the solutions offered by the substantive law of the lex 
causae. Lastly, it should be mentioned that the effect of art 19 will probably be a more 
frequent recognition of foreign internationally mandatory legislation. Switzerland, in 
contrast to Germany and England, used to be much more reluctant to take such 
legislation into account. 
(2) Influence of art 13 sentence 2 Swiss IPRG 
As was noted in the discussion of Swiss case law prior to the IPRO, the courts 
distinguished between foreign public law rules of the lex causae that served primarily 
826 For this development, see Voser Lois d'app/ication immediate 50 et seq, 55; Vischer and Schnyder. 
Both were originally advocates of the 'proper law doctrine', the changed their minds and now favour a 
'special connection' of foreign internationally mandatory provisions, see Vischer Rec des Cours 232 
(1992) 21, 178 et seq; id RabelsZ 53 (1989) 438 et seq; Schnyder Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht Rn 34 et seq, 
301; see also Morscher Rechtssetzungsakte 55 et seq, 85 - 89,101 et seq; Voser Lois d'app/ication 
immediate 50 et seq, 57. Other authors favouring a special connection are Bar Kartellrecht 271 et seq; 
Schwander Lois 322 et seq. 
827 Schwander IPR AT249 et seq; Erne Vertragsgilltigkeit 199 et seq; Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992) 
21, 165 et seq; id RabelsZ 53 (1989) 438; 448 et seq; Siehr FS Keller 485,507,508; Schnyder 
Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht 243 et seq; HonseUNogt/Schnyderl Machler-Erne Art 19 Rn 10 et seq with 
further references. 
828 See only Schwander IPR AT251, 252; HonsellNogt/SchnyderlMachler-Erne Art 19 Rn 5, 12. 
829 Swiss courts expressly rejected a special connection BGE 76 II 33 et seq; see Schwander IPR AT251 
for further references. 
830 HonsellNogt/SchnyderlMachler-Erne Art 19 Rn 5; Erne Vertragsgilltigkeit 12 et seq. 
831 See Erne Vertragsgilltigkeit 12. 
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collective interests of the foreign state, on the one hand, and foreign public law that 
protected the interests of individuals and supplemented foreign private law, on the 
other. Application was allowed only for the latter, while the former were not applied on 
the basis of the principle of territoriality. 832 The Swiss courts had thus already deviated 
from early case law and had abandoned the strict non-application of foreign public 
laws. 833 
Thus, the strict principle of non-applicability of foreign public law was already no 
longer supported by the former case law. Does the distinction between different kinds of 
public law rules of the Swiss courts, however, survive the new Swiss IPRG? The 
question of the application of foreign public internationally mandatory rules of the lex 
causae has not been decided by the courts since the IPRG came into legal force. 
However, some judgments have been concerned with this problem and certain 
tendencies have become apparent: The Federal Tribunal has decided in unreported cases 
that foreign public law rules are applicable in so far as they serve private law 
interests.834 It can therefore be assumed that the former legal practice concerning public 
law rules serving the interests of individuals will be upheld.835 
With regard to foreign public laws of the lex causae that serve mainly the collective 
interests of the state, there is only an obiter dictum from the Federal Tribunal.836 The 
case concerned a loan agreement governed by Chilean law, and the question was 
whether a Cuban foreign exchange restriction was applicable to the contract. The court 
rejected application of the foreign exchange restriction, and held obiter that if Cuban 
law had been the proper law the foreign exchange restriction would not have been 
applied either. The Court acknowledged that the IPRG is less averse to application of 
foreign public law than the former jurisdiction, but public law rules can nevertheless not 
be recognised (in private litigation) if and to the extent that they serve to enforce claims 
of a foreign states' power.837 
8J2 CHAPTER 5, II, 1, d; BGE 80 II 53, 61; 8311 312, 319; 95 II 109, 114; 107 II 489, 492. 
833 See CHAPTER 5, II, 1, d. 
834 Decisions of the Federal Tribunal of3.12.1991 and 23.4.1992. For these cases, see HonselNogtJ 
SchnyderlMachler-Eme Art 13 Rn 18. 
835 Also see HonselN ogtfSchnyderlMachler-Eme Art 13 Rn 18. 
836 BGE 118 II 348 et seq. 
8J7 BGE 118 II 348, 353. However it should be noted that the reasoning of the court is also based on the 
ordre public reservation, see HonselNogtJSchnyder/Machler-Eme Art 13 Rn 22 et seq. 
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Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that the Swiss case law will most probably 
adhere to its former solutions. According to this assumption, sentence two of art 13, 
which states that the public law character of a foreign rule does not per se preclude its 
application, must be interpreted so that public law rules serving the interests of the 
contracting parties are rendered applicable by the normal conflict rules, whereas 
internationally mandatory rules of public law pursuing mainly interests of the foreign 
state are not applied via the ordinary choice oflaw rules. 838 But this is only an 
assumption; it has not yet been established by case law. 
Swiss academic literature is still debating the long-standing issue about the scope of 
the reference to a foreign legal system. The second sentence of article 13 did not end the 
controversy since its wording is too broad to be definite and thus leaves room for 
interpretation. Therefore, the 'old' arguments are still relevant under current law. In 
general one can see that the authors who favoured a certain approach uphold their 
arguments despite the new regulation in art 13 .839 
Swiss academics who previously favoured the Schuldstatuts-theory840 feel affirmed 
by the legislature's introduction of the second sentence of art 13 into the IPRG. They 
submit that under current law the reference to the foreign legal system includes all 
public law rules. 841 Some authors in Switzerland favour the Combination Theory.842 
These authors feel bound by the legislature's decision to enact art 13 . The advocates of 
this approach interpret the second sentence of art 13 to mean that the scope of reference 
838 For a similar interpretation of the case law, see Voser Lois d'application immediate 66 et seq N 74, 55 
et seq; but see also the interpretation of HonselllVogtiSchnyder/Machler-Erne Art 13 Rn 22 et seq. 
839 However the principle of non-applicability of foreign public law cannot be sustained under art 13, 
which is regretted by Sturm FS Moser 3, 14 et seq. 
840 Heini 100 ZSR (1981) 65 et seq; cf for references Vischer RabelsZ 53 (1989) 438,447 Footnote 29. 
See on this approach CHAPTER 5, I, I. 
841 See also Sturm in FS Moser 3, 15, 16. Sturm himself favours the solution of the Swiss case law and 
proposes that at least public law rules that serve economic interests of the foreign should not be applied 
because of the principle of territoriality;. However, since the introduction of art 13 IPRG he regrets that 
the Swiss judge is obliged to apply foreign public law. 
842 For a detailed discussion of this theory, see supra CHAPTER 5, 1,4; Erne Vertragsgiiltigk.eit 201 et 
seq, 209; Schwander IPR AT248; Schnyder Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht Rn 303; id Das neue IPRG 29,30, 
35; Siehr RabelsZ 52 (1988) 41, 73 et seq; 93 et seq; HonselllVogtiSchnyderlMachler-Erne Art 13 Rn 23, 
24. According to the latter author the scope of reference to the proper law should also include public law 
rules subject to the forum's ordre public. But the same author submits that in considering whether the 
foreign rule violates the public policy, the judge should use the conditions of art 19 IPRG by analogy. 
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to foreign law includes all rules, both private and public.843 The only possible means of 
avoiding the application ofthe foreign rule is the forum's ordre public.844 
However, other academics favour a special connection process for foreign 
internationally mandatory rules, particularly public law rules. These authors argue that 
the choice of law rules for contracts designate the law which regulates the conflicting 
private interests between the parties, but they do not take into account the proper scope 
of the state enactment, which intervenes in the private relationship in the public 
interest.845 As was seen above,846 according to these authors only public law rules that 
serve predominantly the interests of private parties are included in the reference to the 
foreign law and therefore applicable if they belong to the proper law.847 Whereas public 
law rules that have no direct relation to private law are beyond the scope of reference to 
the foreign legal system. They are subject to a different conflict of law process, which is 
independent from whether the foreign rule belongs to the proper law or to a third legal 
system.848 
As a result of this approach, the second sentence of art 13 must be interpreted so 
that the scope of reference to the foreign law does not include public law rules that serve 
mainly state interests.849 It is therefore held that art 19 of the IPRG should apply (at least 
by analogy) to these public law rules of the proper law.850 These rules are thus only 
843 Schnyder Das neue IPR-G 29,30,35; Schnyder Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht Rn 304; Schwander IPR AT 
248,249; HonselllVogtiSchnyderlMachler-Eme Art 13 Rn 23. 
844 However, and this is the fundamental difference from the Schuldstatuts-theory, the application of third 
countries' internationally mandatory rules on the basis of a special connection is not excluded. Third 
countries' mandatory provisions are applicable if and in so far the conditions of art 19 Swiss IPRG are 
fulfilled. See the detailed discussion of this interpretation of art 13 s 2 IPRG and art 19 IPRG, Voser Lois 
d'app/ication immediate 73,83 et seq. 
845 Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992) 21, 179; id. RabelsZ 53 (1989) 438,441, Voser Lois d'app/ication 
immediate 51 et seq, 69 et seq; Morscher Rechtssetzungsakte 88 . 
846 Supra CHAPTER 5, I, 3. 
847 Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992) 21, 179, 180 et seq; id RabelsZ 53 (1989) 438, 440 et seq, 443, 
445; Morscher Rechtssetzungsakte 88; Voser Lois d 'application immediate 53; Bar Kartellrecht 3 10,311. 
848 Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992) 21, 181; id RabelsZ 53 (1989) 438, 445; Morscher 
Rechtssetzungsakte 88, 89; see CHAPTER 5, I, 3. 
849 The legislature is said to have intended to leave a conscious loophole. Vischer RabelsZ 53 (1989) 438, 
440 et seq; id Rec des Cours 232 (1992) 21,181, 182; KeIIerlSiehr IPR 491; Voser Lois d'application 
immediate 58 et seq, 64, 73 et seq, 78 et seq. 
850 Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992) 21, 181, 182; id RabelsZ 53 (1989) 438, 440, 445; Morscher 
Rechtssetzungsakte 10 1 et seq; Bar Extraterritoriale Wirkung 3, 16 Footnote 9; Voser Lois d'app/ication 
immediate 72,83,84 for a detailed discussion about whether art 19IPRG should be applied by analogy 
or directly. 
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applied or considered if the conditions stipulated in art 19 are fulfilled, despite their 
belonging to the proper law. 
In conclusion it can be stated that, although Switzerland has enacted a statute 
concerning the scope of reference to foreign law, the question of the application of 
foreign internationally mandatory rules of the lex causae remains open. It is 
unanimously held that the doctrine of non-applicability of foreign public law cannot be 
sustained under the current law. But, apart from this, opinions differ concerning the 
scope of reference, and case law is not yet fully established. However, it is likely that 
the Swiss courts will adhere to their former distinction between different kinds of public 
law and consequently apply those rules that serve private interests. It is uncertain 
whether the courts will refuse to give effect to public law rules serving collective state 
interests on the basis of the unfortunate principle of territoriality or by means of an 
extensive application of the ordre public, or whether they will give effect to those rules 
if the conditions of art 19 are fulfilled. 
6 Concluding critical remarks: Was the reservation in respect of Article 7 (1) of 
the Convention justified? 
In conclusion, it can be stated that the approach of the Rome Convention is that 
internationally mandatory rules of the proper law are applicable because they belong to 
the law governing the contract. At any rate, in the absence of an express regulation, this 
seems to be the position of the Convention. With regard to third countries' 
internationally mandatory rules, the Convention has drafted a conflict rule that enables 
the court of the forum to give effect to third countries' internationally mandatory rules, 
if the situation is closely connected with the enacting country, and if the recognition of 
the foreign rule is reasonable with regard to its content, purpose, and consequences of its 
application. Article 7 (1) of the Convention is a general clause covering all types of 
contracts and therefore uses vague and broad criteria, and grants extensive discretion to 
the courts. 
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This section will investigate whether, in view of case law solutions and the various 
academic approaches, the reservation to art 7 (1) was justified. 851 
a Unity of the law applicable to contracts and the confidence of the parties in the 
application of only one legal system 
It has been argued that art 7 (1) leads to scission of contract and jeopardises the 
principle of unity of the law applicable to a contract.852 The arguments that have been 
raised against the so-called principle of unity of the law applicable to a contract have 
already been discussed, and what was stated there is equally true in the context of art 7 
(1).853 
The principle of unity has never been all-embracing, however, and exceptions have 
always been made to the application of the proper law and particular issues have been 
connected separately on the basis of special choice of law rules. 854 In particular, arts 5 
and 6 of the Convention eventually lead to a scission of the law applicable to the 
contract and to a special connection.855 
But what is even more striking is the fact that the critics ofthe scission effect reject 
a 'special connection' ofa third country's internationally mandatory rules by referring 
to the principle that only one law should govern the transaction, but do also take these 
rules into account as supposedly facts.856 Does this method not lead also to a recognition 
of another law and thus to a scission effect?857 
The analysis of the German, Swiss and English case law solutions has shown that 
courts do not only take into account the actual effects of the foreign rule, but also 
consider the rule itself or at least its normative content. The courts have thus broadened 
851 Clearly, one can and should regard the following discussion as equally true for art 19. The reason for 
focussing on art 7 (1) lies in the fact that it is not in legal force in England and Gennany, while 
Switzerland has enacted art 19. 
852 Mann Effects 31, 34. 
853 See supra CHAPTER 5, I, 7, a, b. 
854 Lando CMLR 24 (1987) 159, 167; Siehr RabelsZ 52 (1988) 41, 69; Schiffer Normen 91 et seq; Becker 
Sonderankniipfung 57; see supra CHAPTER 5, J, 7, a. 
855 For a detailed representation of these articles, see supra CHAPTER 2. 
856 See supra CHAPTER 5, J, 1 and 7, b. 
857 As was seen above the recognition as fact requires choice of law considerations as well. Schurig 
RabelsZ 54 (1990) 217, 243; MUnchKomm/Martiny Art 34 Rn 35, CHAPTER 5, J, 7, b. 
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the substantive law rules in order to cover violation of foreign law instead of domestic 
law.858 This process is based on several steps. The primary question that has to be 
answered is whether there is a mandatory rule in a foreign country that has been violated 
by the contracting parties. Then the court examines whether the situation falls under the 
scope of the provision. Only afterwards can the court decide whether or not it will take 
the foreign rule into account within the substantive law, so that its violation may lead to 
immorality or impossibility of performance. Choice of law considerations are thus 
blurred with the application of substantive law.859 
Thus, only lip service is paid to the principle of unity of the law applicable to the 
contract. This principle is not really upheld in considering a third country's rules as 
supposed facts within substantive rules. So what then is the merit of this principle? 
It has also been stated that the vagueness of art 7 (1) and the broad discretion 
conferred upon the judge will make it impossible for the parties to determine the law 
applicable to their transaction. The parties will be not be able to foresee the way in 
which a court will decide to exercise its discretion and give effect to mandatory rules of 
another law.860 This is perhaps true, but in the course of time, courts will develop 
criteria. Certainty in law will thus be served and parties will be able to predict which 
foreign laws might be given effect regardless of the proper law. 
Furthermore, under the current law, the situation is equally unpredictable for the 
parties.861 Courts have blurred choice of law considerations with application of the 
substantive law. They have not relied on firm principles but on general clauses that are 
not only extremely vague, but also broadened in scope to cover the foreign law. Parties 
do not know whether or not courts will take third countries' law into account, nor do 
they know what the legal basis for the decision will be. In contrast, art 7 (1) would 
enable courts to develop firm criteria at the level of choice of laws. 862 
858 See MiinchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 35; Lehmann Zwingendes Recht 200 et seq. 
859 See CHAPTER 5, II, 3, c, III, 3; subject to the case where truly only the factual effects of the foreign 
rule on the private relationship are taken into account without considering the rule itself; see also 
MiinchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 35; von Bar IPR Bd. I Rn 265 . 
860 Coing WM 1981,810,813; Mentzel Sonderankniipfung 129; Fletcher Conflict of Laws 170. 
861 Also see Schiffer Normen 92; Erne Vertragsgiiltigkeit 142 et seq. 
862 Kreuzer IPRax 1984,293, 295. 
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b Party autonomy is unduly restricted 
It has also been held that art 7 (1) will unduly restrict party autonomy.863 Firstly, art 7 
(1) does not restrict party autonomy, but rather the scope of the proper law, no matter 
whether chosen by the parties or determined objectively. Secondly, this argument 
cannot be sustained because it makes no difference to the contracting parties whether 
their choice is limited by an application ofthird countries' internationally mandatory 
rules by means of a special connection or by recognition of the rules as 'facts' within the 
substantive law of the lex causae. In either case, their choice will not be fully upheld. 
The present author maintains that strict adherence to the principle that only the 
chosen law is the governing law is in itself somewhat contradictory. Parties who have 
chosen a foreign law in the belief that only that law governs their transaction and who 
have made their choice in order to circumvent foreign laws, simply act in accordance 
with this doctrine. Why then should the foreign law suddenly be considered as 'fact', 
possibly rendering their contract invalid or unenforceable?864 
c Uncertainty in law 
It has also been argued that art 7 (1) will create uncertainty in choice of law of 
contracts.865 Of course, the vagueness of the criteria and the broad discretion do create 
some uncertainty in law. It is therefore preferable to develop special conflict rules for 
certain fields of law taking cognisance of the particularities of the legal field and the 
involved interest, rather than using a general clause covering all types of contracts and 
all situations that may arise, as well as all fields of laws where internationally 
mandatory rules typically intervene in private relationships.866 
The vague criteria definitely need to be concretised, and principles must be 
developed that will guide the courts in their deliberations as to when it is reasonable for 
86) SandrockiSteinschulte Handbuch A Rn 196; Coester ZverglRWiss 82 (1983) 1,27. 
864 Also see MilnchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 35. 
865 North JBL (1980) 382, 387; id Contract Conflicts 19,20; Morse YB Eur L 2 (1982) 107, 146, 147; 
Collins ICLQ 25 (1976) 35, 50; Coing WM 1981,810,813. 
866 Vischer RabelsZ 53 (1989) 438, 455; see also Philip Recent Provisions 24 1,249; Erne 
Vertragsgiiligkeit 153 et seq. 
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the forum to give effect to a third country's rules.867 Courts can thus have recourse to 
former case law solutions and can utilise these principles within the provisions of art 7 
(1), since it is based on former court decisions and academic approaches.868 
It has, however, been convincingly argued that the former legal situation was even 
more uncertain.869 Courts simply broadened substantive law rules, particularly 
comprehensive clauses such as public policy and immorality, to cover violations of 
foreign mandatory rules. The principles that the courts thus developed, such as the 
English public policy doctrine, are far from being firm and clear.870 Compared with the 
public policy-comity rule, art 7 (1) provides for firm criteria and certainty in law. The 
criterion of a close connection is better than formulating none at all, which is the case 
with English public policy. In fact, in all the English cases, the courts clearly took 
account of a connection between the situation and a foreign rule, but the connection was 
not seen as a condition for applying English public policy. 
Similar considerations are valid for German and Swiss case law, although in 
addition, the German courts used a variety of solutions. Thus there was no way of 
knowing what the court's decision would be: whether it would refuse application of 
foreign law on the basis of the principle of non-applicability, or whether it would 
consider the foreign law as fact within the substantive law. The fact that choice of law 
considerations were hidden behind application of substantive law rules was even more 
confusing. Furthermore, it is uncertain how courts will decide real third country cases 
because the juristic basis of the 'established principles' is uncertain. If it were only 
substantive law rules that were broadened to cover the foreign law then it would be for 
the proper law to decide whether or not third countries' rules can be considered. This 
clearly does not lead to certainty in law. Finally, the forum would hand over the ultimate 
decision about application ofthe foreign law, a result that is obviously contrary to 
fundamental principles of conflict of laws. 
867 Also see Schiffer Normen 164; Lehmann Zwingendes Recht 206 et seq. 
868 See Giuliano/Lagarde Report in North Contract Conflicts 380. 
869 Von Bar IPR Bd I Rn 265, 266; Kreuzer IPRax 1984,293,295; Lehmann ZRP 1987,319,320,321; 
also see Jackson Contract Conflicts 59, 74; Kaye The New Private International Law 257. 
870 For criticism regarding the uncertainty of the public policy rule, see Kaye The New Private 
International Law 19 et seq, 240 et seq; 257. 
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Thus, in view of the law that was previously applied, it seems contradictory to argue 
that art 7 (1) of the Convention leads to uncertainty.871 
d Move towards Unilateralism 
Does art 7 (1/72 imply a departure from the traditional multilateral allocation technique 
and a move towards a unilateral approach similar to the statutist theory? It is argued that 
the foreign law is applied because it claims application, and only afterwards do close 
connection and other criteria serve as limitations on exorbitant claims of application.873 
This argument, which was also raised against the Special Connection Theory in general, 
has already been discussed.874 The same considerations are valid with regard to art 7 (1): 
If there is any move towards unilateralism, it is incomplete.875 
It is certainly true that art 7 (1) differs from ordinary conflict rules in that the issue 
(operative fact or Anknilpfungsgegenstand) is not a legal relationship or question that is 
connected to a certain legal system, but certain foreign mandatory laws. Firstly, it has 
been convincingly argued that there is no difference between the connection of a legal 
question, a factual situation, or rules of law to a certain legal system.876 
Secondly, the present author's view is that this assumption is based on a 
misinterpretation of art 7 (1) and the condition that the foreign rule 'claims application 
whatever the proper law'. 877 Article 7 (1) differs substantially from art 7 (2), which 
really does imply a move towards unilateralism because the forum's internationally 
mandatory rules are applied ifthey claim application. Foreign internationally mandatory 
871 Also see Kaye The New Private International Law 257; Jackson Contract Conflicts 59, 74; Kreuzer 
IPRax 1984,293,295. 
872 This objection was also made in respect of the Swiss art 19, compare Vischer RabelsZ 53 (1989) 438, 
450; id Rec des Cours 232 (1992) 21, 168; Siehr RabelsZ 52 (1988) 41,71. 
873 Coester ZverglRWiss 82 (1983) 1,5,8 et seq, 29; Schubert RIW 1987, 729, 734 et seq; Schurig Lois 
55, 66 et seq; Heini ZSR 100 (1981) 65, 68; Siehr Rabe1sZ 52 (1988) 41, 71. 
874 See supra CHAPTER 5, I, 3, d, g, 7, f. 
875 CfUngeheuer Beachtung 14, 150. Schwander IPR AT246, 252 refers to a unilateral concept with 
regard to the internationally mandatory rules of the forum, but emphasises that those rules of a foreign 
legal system are to be treated differently. 
876 Schurig Kollisionsnorm 89 et seq. Id Lois 55, 70 who argues that it would not make a difference 
whether one connects a legal question, a legal situation or rules of law in order to determine the 
applicable law; Schubert RIW 1987, 729 et seq. For criticism on this point of view: Mentzel 
Sonderanknilpfung 56 et seq. 
877 Also see Schiffer Normen 159 et seq; Ungeheuer Beachtung 150. 
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rules are applied only if the conditions of art 7 (1) are fulfilled. The foreign law's claim 
of application is a condition, but it is only one amongst others.878 The assumption that 
one has to start with the claim to apply does not follow from the wording of art 7 (1). 
According to the article, the primary connecting Jactor is a close connection between 
the situation and the country that enacted the particular rule. The claim to apply serves 
rather as a kind oflimitation: A court may not apply a third country's law that 
intervenes in the private relationship in the public interest of the foreign state if the law 
does not claim application. Furthermore, the judge is granted broad discretion as to 
whether and how he will give effect to the foreign rule. 
Therefore, the foreign internationally mandatory rule is not applied because it 
claims application, but because the forum has decided to take a third country's 
internationally mandatory rules into account, under certain circumstances, such as those 
stipulated in art 7 (1).879 It is still an autonomous decision of the forum state whether the 
foreign rule is to be given effect or not. The matter is thus not a move towards 
unilateralism, nor does it involve a search of all the world's legal systems for rules that 
claim application to the situation. 
In view of these arguments, this objection cannot be upheld. The forum's decision 
to take foreign internationally mandatory rules into account is an autonomous one, and 
art 7 (1) conforms with this interpretation. 880 There are, nevertheless, obvious 
differences from the orthodox conflict rules, because art 7 (1) in effect leads to 
acceptance of renvoi. 881 Moreover, the vague criteria and the broad discretion granted to 
the judge differ from other conflict rules. This means a departure from the traditional 
'rigid' and 'blind' allocation technique towards a more flexible and result-orientated 
process. 
878 Some authors view the close connection as limitation on unreasonable claims of foreign rules: Vischer 
RabelsZ 53 (1989) 438, 451; id Rec des Cours 232 (1992) 21,169; Philip Recent Provisions 241,249. 
Most authors, however, assume that the claim to apply serves as a kind of limitation, because if the rule 
does not claim application it is not justified to apply it, Schurig Lois 55, 66, 70; id Kollisionsnorm 89-94. 
879 See Schiffer Normen 159 et seq; also see MilnchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 99; Ungeheuer Beachtung 
97 et seq; 150; KeUerlSiehr IPR 549; despite his interpretation as 'tum to an unilateral approach', see 
Vischer RabelsZ 53 (1989) 438, 451; id Rec des Cours 232 (1992) 21,169. 
880 It is anyway only a matter of wording to create a multilateral choice of law rule designating the 
internationally mandatory rules applicable to a contract. For instance: 'The contract may be governed by 
internationally mandatory rules of the legal systems with which the situation is closely connected', also 
see Ungeheuer Beachtung 150; Schurig Lois 55, 69, 71, 75. 
881 With regard to the discussion concerning renvoi, see supra CHAPTER 5, I, 7, f and III, 3, c. 
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e International comity and decisional harmony 
Art 7 (1) Rome Convention has the merit of serving decisional harmony and the mutual 
assistance between states in the furtherance of their interests. States seek not only to 
apply their own internationally mandatory rules but also to take into account the 
justified interests of foreign states. 882 
f The structurally preferable solution 
In an attack on the first draft of art 7, Mann challenged the supporters of the article and 
the Special Connection Theory to prove the need for changing the existing case law.883 
As many authors have said, however, art 7 (1) is not a radical departure from former 
case law. The issue is in fact the method of reasoning. Case law has already taken into 
account the effects of third countries' internationally mandatory rules within the 
substantive law. The question is therefore not whether third countries' rules can be 
given effect, but how, or on what basis.884 Article 7 (1) will enable courts to take third 
countries' internationally mandatory rules into account in a systematic manner, which is 
to be preferred. Courts can refer to situations that have been established in former case 
law in order to concretise the broad and general clause of art 7 (1).885 In fact, art 7 (1) 
has been characterised as 'a restatement of the pre-existing case law'. 886 
Furthermore, art 7 (1) offers the better solution with regard to real third country 
cases where the proper law is foreign. The substantive law approach depends on 
whether the substantive law of the lex causae offers relief and sanctions, which permit a 
consideration of the effects of third countries' mandatory rules, such as impossibility of 
performance, frustration, or illegality. It has been questioned whether this is always the 
882 Schiffer Normen 148; Coing WM 1981,810,813. 
883 'Show me the case you would like to meet. Show me the case which should be decided differently 
from the present practice', cfMann Effect 31,35; also see id FS Beitzke 607,613. 
884 See MunchKommlMartiny Art 34 Rn 33; Schiffer Normen 147; Martiny IPRax 1987,277,279,28. 
Kreuzer IPRax 1984, 293, 295 speaks of 'accuracy or truth of reasoning' (Begriindungswahrheit). He 
means that choice of law considerations are made at the level of conflict of laws instead of broadening 
substantive rules and thus blurring choice of law considerations with the application of substantive law. 
885 See Kreuzer Auslandisches Wirtschaftsrecht 140; id IPRax 1984,293,295. 
886 Basedow GYBIL 27 (1984) 109, 140, 141 with regard to foreign export controls. 
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case.887 The consequence of this approach is that the judge will have to interpret and 
extend the foreign rule in the light ofthe foreign legal system.888 
According to the general principles of the conflict of laws it is a decision of the 
forum's private intemationallaw whether foreign rules are to be given effect. 
Recognition of a third country's mandatory rules within the operative facts of 
substantive law rules would mean that this decision is ultimately handed over to the 
proper law. The only means to correct unjustified results from the point of view of the 
forum would be the ordre pUblic.889 Article 7 (1) thus constitutes the superior method of 
solving real third country cases, since it solves a problem of international private law at 
a conflict of law level. 890 
g Conclusion 
In view of the former legal situation, it is regrettable that both the United Kingdom and 
Germany entered a reservation with regard to art 7 (1) of the Rome Convention. 
887 For details, see Schwander IPR 542 et seq; Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992 I) 13, 168; Siehr RabelsZ 
52 (1988) 41,79. 
888 Schwander IPR 542 et seq; Kreuzer Auslandisches Wirtschaftsrecht 86 .. 
889 Siehr RabelsZ 52 (1988) 41, 80; see also Mentzel Sonderankniipfung 113. 
890 Schiffer Normen 148, 156, 166; Schafer FG Sandrock 39,47; Hentzen RlW 1988, 508, 509; Schubert 
RlW 1987, 729, 745; von Bar IPR Bd I Rn 265 et seq. 
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CHAPTER 6: PROPOSAL FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONALLY 
MANDATORY RULES IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF CONTRACTS 
In this chapter a proposal for regulating the application of internationally mandatory 
rules in the South African private international law of contracts will be submitted. For 
this purpose the previous discussion and analysis of the court decisions and the various 
academic approaches in the countries under investigation will be helpful. Before 
beginning, however, the current South African common law and academic statements 
regarding application of internationally mandatory rules stemming from the lex fori, the 
lex causae and a third legal system will be examined. 
I Legal situation in South African private international law 
In South Africa discussion of the problem of applying internationally mandatory rules 
commenced only recently. I At least with regard to its theoretical foundations, the whole 
issue is to a large extent res nova, and is still unexplored in South Africa. Decided cases 
on the issue are also rare.2 
1 Application of the internationally mandatory rules of the lexfor; 
The South African approach to the application of internationally mandatory rules of 
South African law as lex fori seems clear. Those rules that can be classified as lois 
d'application immediate and that accordingly claim application to a transaction, even 
though South African law is not the lex causae of the transaction, are in principle 
applicable. The internationally mandatory rules of the forum may thus render a contract 
illegal or unenforceable, even if it is valid and legal in terms of its proper law. This 
I See on this Forsyth Private International Law 298 et seq; Edwards Conflict of Laws para 469; Spiro 
XVII CILSA (1984) 197 et seq; Viejobueno XXVI CILSA (1993) 172 et seq; Kahn 20 (1990) BML 35 et 
seq; Neels 1991 TSAR 694 et seq; see Van Rooyen Die Kontrak 40 et seq, 145 et seq, 162 et seq; 232; 
also see Booysen International Transactions 77. 
2 But see Cargo Motor Corporation Ltd v Tofalos Transport Ltd 1972 (1) SA 186 (W); Standard Bank of 
SA Ltd & another v Ocean Commodities & others 1980 (2) SA 175 (T); Murata Machinery Ltd v 
Capelon Yarns (Pty) Ltd 1986 (4) SA 671; Herbst v Surti 1991 (2) SA 75 (Z). 
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approach is supported by academic writers3 and the South African courts, albeit by way 
of obiter dicta.4 According to one author, application of the forum's rules is based on 
public policy,5 while other authors refer to these rules as directly applicable statutes.6 
Clearly not all ius cogens rules of the forum can be classified as internationally 
mandatory, and South African courts have often enforced contracts that contravened 
South African ius cogens on the basis that they were valid according to the governing 
law.? According to Forsyth, a rule of the lex fori must be carefully interpreted to ensure 
that it was intended to override the choice of law process and to render illegal a contract 
that is valid under its proper law.8 
An example of a South African statute that is directly applicable on the basis of its 
express terms can be found in the South African Merchant Shipping Act 57 of 1951. 
Section 306 of this Act provides that Chapter VII, concerning salvage and incidental 
matters, 'shall be applied in all cases determined in any court in the Republic, in 
whatever waters the salvage services in question were rendered'. Another example is s 1 
(1) (a) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1 of 1986, which provides that the Hague 
Rules apply to carriage of goods by sea where the port of shipment is a port in the 
Republic.9 
3 Forsyth Private International Law 13,299; Edwards Conflict of Laws para 469; Spiro XVII CILSA 
(1984) 197,201 et seq. 
4 See, however, the somewhat vague dictum in Murata Machinery Ltd v Cape/on Yarns (Pty) Ltd 1986 
(4) SA 671 (C), 673 1-1. Edwards Conflict of Laws para 469 Footnote 2 also cites Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue v Estate Greenacre 1936 NPD 225, 229 as dicta-support for this position. There is another 
example which is not an obiter dictum, but the case concerned the enforcement of a foreign judgment 
instead of a contract: Taylor v Hollard 1886 (2) SAR 78. The SA court refused to recognise and enforce 
an English judgment because the underlying agreement exceeded the capital sum of the money advanced 
and was thus contrary to SA usury law. For the facts of the case, see Spiro XVII CILSA (1984) 197, 201. 
S Spiro XVII CILSA (1984) 197,201 et seq. 
6 Forsyth Private International Law 299; Edwards Conflict of Laws para 469. 
7 See Berman v Winrow 1943 TPD 213 which concerned the prohibition of a pactum successorium in 
South Africa. The court held that the contract was valid and enforceable, despite the SA prohibition, 
because it was legal according to the proper law. In Bishop & others v Conrath & another 1947 (2) SA 
800 Tat 803, a contract for the purchase of lottery tickets was upheld and regarded as enforceable in 
South Africa notwithstanding a local prohibition of lotteries in SA because it was legal under the 
governing law. The court held that the contract was not repugnant to public policy. For the facts of these 
cases, see Spiro XVII CILSA (1984) 197,201,202; Kahn (1991) 20 BML 147, 149. Also see, however, 
Timms v Nicol 1968 (1) SA 299 (R) where a wagering agreement which was valid in Zambia was held to 
be unenforceable because of the public policy exclusion. 
S Forsyth Private International Law 299. 
9 The Act is also self-limited as it does not apply to the carriage of goods from a port outside the 
Republic, see Forsyth Private International Law 12. 
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Other statutes, however, have to be interpreted, as they do not expressly stipulate 
their scope of application. This interpretation is required whether the statutes implicitly 
claim application to a contract even though it is governed by a foreign legal system, or 
whether the statute is subject to the ordinary conflict rules and applies only if the lex 
causae is South African law. Forsyth notes that despite the fact that both the Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 and the Credit Agreements Act 75 of 1980 
do not contain any term determining their scope of applicability, they are doubtless 
directly applicable. lo Thus by implication the employer cannot avoid application of the 
Basic Conditions of Employment Act and his obligation thereunder to the employee, 
'simply by ensuring that the law governing their contract was not South African' . II 
Forsyth presumes that the Credit Agreement Act would almost certainly apply where 
the contract was concluded in South Africa concerning a res situated locally. However, 
he questions whether the Act would apply if the contract were concluded in South 
Africa, but one party was resident in Namibia and the res was situated there. 12 
2 Application of (internationally) mandatory rules of the lex causae 
It can be stated that, in principle, according to South African private international law, 
the mandatory provisions of a foreign lex causae will be applied by a South African 
court, and a contract that is illegal under the proper law will not be enforced, regardless 
of its validity under the lex fori. 13 
With regard to cases where the proper law was determined by a choice of law of the 
contracting parties, South African courts have never decided the question of whether the 
parties can avoid the mandatory rules of the otherwise applicable law and can render 
applicable those of the chosen law. However, this position is supported by academic 
writings and by obiter dicta in South African decisions. 14 In addition, including in an 
expressly chosen proper law a full reference to foreign law, and not only its facultative 
10 Forsyth Private International Law 13 Footnote 62. 
II Forsyth Private International Law 13. Another Act that may well be internationally mandatory is the 
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
12 Forsyth Private International Law 13, 14. 
13 Forsyth Private International Law 299; Spiro XVII CILSA (1984) 197, 200; Edwards Conflict of Laws 
para 469 and Footnote I; Kahn 20 BML (1990) 147, 150. 
14 See supra CHAPTER 2, VI, 1. 
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norms, has considerable merit (such as legal certainty in law)15 and has been accepted 
world wide. 16 It is therefore submitted that this concept at least should be retained with 
regard to domestic mandatory rules. 17 
The general statement that the mandatory provisions of the proper law are in 
principle applicable, and that a contract that is illegal under its governing law will not 
enforced by a South African court, is supported by South African case law. However, 
this support is based on a reference to English law and expressed in the form of obiter 
dicta. 18 Although there is no express ratio in binding precedent, the principle is 
nevertheless held to be universally acceptable by South African academics. 19 
This proposition seems to be equally true of internationally mandatory rules or 
public law rules of the proper law. Although the public / private law dichotomy is a 
significant feature of South African law, it has not yet been applied in the context of 
private international law, with the possible exception of the non-enforcement offoreign 
revenue and penallaw.20 However, as was discussed above, this principle does not 
prevent a court from taking cognizance of a foreign revenue or penal law in the context 
of private litigation. 21 Apart from this principle, there is no doctrine of non-applicability 
offoreign public law, as has been proposed in Germany and Switzerland.22 
15 This seems now broadly accepted amongst academics in South Africa, cf supra CHAPTER 2, IV, 1. 
16 For details, see Forsyth Private International Law 278 et seq; also see Lando CMLR 24 (1987) 159, 
169 et seq; id Rec des Cours 189 (1984 VI) 119,237,255 et seq. 
17 I adhere to the view that internationally mandatory rules serving predominantly public interests of the 
state should be subject of a separate choice of law process, no matter whether they stem from the proper 
law or a third country. The parties' choice is not an appropriate connecting factor (or choice of law rule) 
to render these kind of rules applicable. Cf infra section II, I, b and 2, c. 
18 Cargo Motor Corporation Ltd v To/alas Transport Ltd 1972 (I) SA 186 (W) at 195 F -196 A; Ocean 
Commodities Inc v Standard Bank o/SA Ltd 1978 (2) SA 367 (W) 372 H - 374 A, F - H; Herbst v Surti 
1991 (2) SA 75 (Z) at 78 G. 
19 Forsyth Private International Law 299 Footnote 155; Spiro XVII CILSA (1984) 197,200; Edwards 
Conflict of Laws para 469; Van Rooyen Die Kontrak 162 et seq. 
20 For the principle in South African law, see Forsyth Private International Law 104 et seq; for case law, 
cfCommissioner a/Taxes, Federation a/Rhodesia v Mc Farland 1965 (I) SA 470 (W) (foreign revenue 
law); for the principle, see the Roman-Dutch authority Voet Commentarius 38.17 App 29. 
21 See CHAPTER 5, III, I, b; cf also Forsyth Private International Law 106, 107 for the recognition of 
these laws in private litigation. 
22 For the doctrine, see supra CHAPTER 5, II, I, b. For the South African position one might refer to the 
case Cargo Motor Corporation Ltd v To/alos Transport Ltd 1972 (1) SA 186 (W) at 195 F -196 A. Here 
the court considered the applicability of a foreign exchange control regulation to a South African contract 
and refused to apply the rule because it did not belong to the proper law of the contract. The public law 
nature of the regulation was not even mentioned. 
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As in all the countries under investigation, in South Africa, the forum's public 
policy constitutes an exception to the general rule that the mandatory rules ofthe proper 
law must be applied. Mandatory rules that violate the forum's ordre public are therefore 
not applied.23 
3 Internationally mandatory rules of a third legal system 
The approach of South African private international law to the application of 
internationally mandatory rules of yet another legal system, which is neither the forum 
nor the proper law, is uncertain. There are different approaches to this issue, which are 
reflected in the writings of the major commentators. 
a Public policy of the forum state 
Most academic authors, relying on English law, seem to favour an approach based on 
public policy.24 However, it is submitted that some South African authors do not 
distinguish between the two solutions developed by English courts; they combine the 
rules, thus creating a new, more restrictive approach to public policy. 
As was shown above, there are two principles in English law that allow for 
consideration of third countries' internationally mandatory rules. These are the lex loci 
solutionis rule and the public policy rule that a contract is void if it is opposed to British 
state interests, particularly if it is likely to jeopardise relations with a friendly nation.25 
South African authors refer to the English case law in stating that it is against public 
policy to enforce a contract (regardless of its proper law) that requires the performance 
of an act that is illegal under the law of the place of performance. 26 This is unfortunate: 
The public policy-comity rule is not and should not be restricted to the lex loci 
solutionis. 
23 See Spiro XVII CILSA (1984) 197,201; Berman v Winrow 1943 TPD 213; Bishop & others v Conrath 
& another 1947 (2) SA 800 (T) (obiter dicta, since in both cases the public policy rule was not applied). 
See Timms v Nicol 1968 (I) SA 299 (R) where a wagering agreement that was valid in Zambia was held 
to be unenforceable because of public policy exclusion. Also see Kahn ASSAL (1991) 583 et seq for the 
policy aspects in Herbst v Surti 1991 (2) SA 75 (Z). 
24 For instance, Forsyth Private International Law 299 et seq; Spiro XVII CILSA (1984) 197,207,208; 
Viejobueno XXVI (1993) 172, 207. 
25 See supra CHAPTER 5, III, 2, a and c. 
26 Forsyth Private International Law 299,301,302. 
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According to Forsyth, the mandatory rules of third legal systems are in principle 
inapplicable, even if their application would render the contract illegal. A contract that 
is valid under its proper law and the lex fori is thus held to be enforceable despite its 
illegality under the lex loci contractus. However, Forsyth also argues that public policy 
can lead to the application of a third country's mandatory legislation if the 
inapplicability of these rules leads to 'a result offensive to deeply held local 
principles' .27 
Forsyth examines whether it is contrary to public policy to enforce a contract that is 
illegal under the law ofthe place of performance. According to him, 'this is an issue 
that is largely res nova in South African courts' .28 In the course of his examination he 
discusses the solution of art 7 (1) of the Rome Convention, according to which the 
mandatory rules of a third legal system may be applicable if the rule claims application 
and there is a close connection between the legal system and the contract. Forsyth is 
clearly not in favour of the introduction of this principle. He claims that 'introduction of 
such a principle - to be applied on a discretionary basis by the court - threatens to 
undermine that very certainty which is so vital in international commercial contracts and 
which is one of the major beneficial results of adopting party autonomy' .29 
Moreover, he believes that it is a fundamental principle of South African law that 
foreign law is applied locally only when so ordered by the local sovereign. In other 
words, the legislature enacts choice of law rules to enable or order foreign law to be 
applied in certain instances. Forsyth is therefore extremely critical of application of 
foreign law by means of a nebulous' nature and purpose' approach, which in his 
opinion is reflected in art 7 (1) of the Rome Convention.30 However, he accepts that the 
27 Forsyth Private International Law 299. 
28 Ibid 301; sceptically Kahn ASSAL (1991) 584 and Edwards Conflict o/Laws para 469. 
29 Ibid 301. 
30 Ibid. It was shown above that art 7 (I) is not based solely on a nature and purpose-approach, but also 
consists of traditional elements of a choice of law rule, such as the use of a connecting factor: close 
connection. It is also debatable whether art 7 constitutes a move away from the general rule that a foreign 
law is applied only if the local sovereign so orders. The present author's view is that the foreign 
internationally mandatory rule is not applied because it claims application, but because art 7 (1) (on a 
discretionary basis) so directs if certain conditions are fulfilled, and it is the local sovereign that either 
incorporates art 7 (1) or enacts a similar provision. 
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legislature may enact fUles that provide for the application of the mandatory rules of a 
third legal system in particular instances.3) 
Turning back to his initial question of whether it is contrary to public policy to 
enforce a contract, the performance of which is illegal under the lex loci solutionis, he 
refers to decided English cases. He concludes that there is a principle in English law that 
it is contrary to public policy to enforce contracts, whatever their proper law, that 
require the performance of acts that are illegal under the lex loci solutionis.32 Forsyth 
submits that, in applying Roman-Dutch law, South African courts 'should not enforce 
contracts - irrespective of their proper law - that require the performance of acts contrary 
to the lex loci solutionis.'33 Generally, Forsyth maintains that the question oflawfulness 
(or lack thereof) is the prerogative of the sovereign state of the place of performance, 
and that it 'is contrary to local public policy to allow the local courts to be used in 
support of illegal acts there'. 34 The reason for applying this rule is based on 'comity and 
common sense rather than rigid logic' .35 
According to Spiro, 'it is for the (internal) ordre public of (South Africa as) the lex 
fori to decide whether or not to implement or else to consider imperative provisions of 
other legal systems which have or have not been chosen by the parties to govern their 
contract' .36 This statement would indicate that the public policy of the forum state must 
determine whether or not third countries' internationally mandatory rules will be taken 
into account. However, Spiro proceeds to state that, in the absence of any adverse ordre 
public of the lex jori, the proper law governs, and therefore it is the ordre public of the 
governing law that determines whether the mandatory rules of the third country will be 
31 It would thus be possible to apply third countries' mandatory legislation where a statutory special 
conflict rule provides for such application. Forsyth refers to art VIII (2) (b) of the fMF Agreement, ibid 
301. The requirement of a statutory choice of law rule is remarkable, since South African private 
international law is based to a large extent on Roman-Dutch common law rules established by case law, 
see Forsyth Private International Law 274. Therefore, the present author submits that a statutory choice 
of law rule is not in any event necessary. South African courts may develop common law choice of law 
rules in this field as they did in others. 
J2 In contrast to the proposition that it is for the lex causae to determine under what circumstances the law 
of the place of performance is to be taken into account. He refers to cases like Regazzoni v KC Sethia 
(1944) Ltd [1958] AC 301; Libyan Arab Bank v Bankers Trust Co [1988] 3 WLR 314; Forsyth Private 
International Law 302. 
33 Forsyth Private International Law 302. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid 302, 303. 
36 Spiro CILSA XVII (1984,) 197,207. 
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applied.37 Spiro's submission is thus not quite clear: Is it the ordre public of the forum 
or of the lex causae that must determine whether to apply or consider a third country's 
mandatory legislation?38 
Viejobueno simply reformulates Spiro's view9, but she does add that there must be 
a connection between the third legal system and the contract. It is thus for the public 
policy of the forum state to decide whether effect is to be given to a third country's 
internationally mandatory rules. 
b Reasonable claim of application 
Van Rooyen on the other hand, in an extensive analysis states that in South Africa the 
law governing a contract is applied subject to (public policy and) the (imperative) rules 
of a third country which reasonably claim application.40 Thus, the mandatory rules of a 
third legal system might be applicable and influence the validity of a contract if their 
claim of application is reasonable.41 Therefore, the legal systems of the lex fori, the lex 
loci contractus, the lex loci solutionis, and yet another legal system could all qualify as 
the law of a third country and be applied under certain circumstances.42 
Edwards follows Van Rooyen's approach.43 He rejects the lex loci solutionis rule, 
arguing that it is for the proper law of a contract, not the lex fori, to decide whether and 
how illegality at the place of performance is to be taken into account. Nevertheless, he 
favours the general position that the mandatory rules of a third country with which the 
contract is connected may be applicable and possibly even displace the proper law.44 For 
37 Spiro CILSA XVII (1984) 197,208. 
38 It seems as if Spiro supports a cumulative application of the ordre public of the fonun as well as of the 
lex causae. In the first instance the ordre public of the proper law is decisive, and the ordre public of the 
fonun state is the ultima ratio. In addition, it is not clear whether he refers to the internal or international 
ordre public of the lex causae. Bearing in mind the principle of exclusion of renvoi, he is most probably 
referring to the internal ordre public of the lex causae. 
39 Viejobueno CILSA (1993) 172; 207. 
40 Van Rooyen Die Kontrak 164-165. In general, as the present author interprets Van Rooyen, he takes a 
modem approach as it is expressed in art 7 (1) RC. His approach may serve as a useful solution for South 
African private international law. 
4 1 Van Rooyen Die Kontrak 164 et seq. 
42 Critically Spiro XVII CILSA (1984) 197,206 et seq; Forsyth Private International Law 281,300. 
43 Edwards Conflict of Laws para 469. 
44 He refers to Ocean Commodities Inc v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 1978 (2) SA 367 (W) 375 F - H with 
regard to the IMF Agreement. 
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example, application of a third country's mandatory (economic) legislation is reasonable 
ifthe authorities of the enacting country have the power to enforce it.45 
c South African cases on this issue 
Although there are few decided cases on this issue, there are at least some dicta, albeit 
often obiter, that indicate how South African courts tend to deal with internationally 
mandatory rules from a third legal system. 
Bishop & Others v Conrath & Another46 concerned a wagering contract that was 
illegal in terms ofthe law of the place where it was concluded (the Transvaal),47 because 
of a prohibition on lotteries and the sale or disposal of lottery tickets. The contract, 
however, was valid and legal under its proper law (Rhodesian law). The court held that 
the prohibition did not have extraterritorial effect, and the contract was enforced by the 
South African court. 
This dictum has been interpreted as support for the proposition that illegality under 
the lex loci contractus is irrelevant.48 It is questionable, however, whether one should go 
so far. Although the court referred to the lex loci contractus, it cannot be overlooked 
that the lex loci contractus was also the lex fori, and that the Transvaal statute was a 
statutory prohibition of the forum state. The court reached its conclusion by interpreting 
the statute, and held that in the absence of a clear contrary intention, a statute does not 
have extraterritorial effect if it applies to acts committed beyond the limits of the 
legislature's jurisdiction. 49 
Cargo Motor Corporation Ltd v Tofalos Transport Ltd 50 provides obiter support 
for the application or at least recognition of mandatory rules of the lex loci solutionis. In 
this case Margo J referred to English law5l and held that 'the Courts of that country will 
45 Edwards Conflict of Laws para 469. 
46 1947 (2) SA 800 (T). 
47 Which was also the lexfori, see Spiro XVII CILSA (1984) 197,203. 
48 For instance, Viejobueno XXVI CILSA 1993, 172,207. 
49 At 803. 
50 1972 (1) SA 186 (W) at 195. 
51 Quoting Ralli Brothers v Compania Naviera Sota Y Aznar [1920] 2 KB 287; Foster v Driscoll [1929] I 
KB 470; De Beeche v South American Stores (Garth & Caves) Ltd [1935] AC 148; Regazzoni v KC 
Sethia (1944) Ltd [1958] AC 301. 
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not enforce a contract if the locus solutionis is in a foreign country, and if that contract 
or its performance would be illegal under the laws of that foreign country' .52 The court 
went on to note that in English law illegality under a third legal system other than the 
lex loci solutionis is not taken into account, and stated that 'this proposition, as a matter 
of principle and of common sense should be equally valid in the system of private 
intemationallaw applied by our courts, where direct judicial authority on 
unenforceability does not seem to be plentiful'. 53 
Using the English rule, the court therefore ruled that by applying the lex loci 
solutionis (which coincided with the lex loci contractus and the proper law), the contract 
was not invalidated because it infringed an exchange control regulation of a third 
country, other than the lex loci solutionis. The court held that the contract was 
enforceable in South Africa as the place of performance, regardless of the foreign 
exchange control regulations of a third state, which one contracting party claimed had to 
be applied as he was a national and carried on business in that country. 54 
Obiter support for the recognition of illegality under the lex loci solutionis is also 
found in the case Herbst v Surti55 where Adam J referred to dicta in English cases that 
support the lex loci solutionis rule. 56 
It can thus be stated that these cases support the view that illegality under the lex 
loci solutionis is taken into account, regardless of the proper law of the contract. 
Furthermore, a contract that requires the performance of acts that are illegal under the 
law of the place of performance will not be enforced by South African courts. It also 
seems reasonable to conclude from the case law that illegality under yet another foreign 
law is not taken into account, and that the mandatory rules of the lex loci contractus, or 
the habitual residence, or place o/business, or nationality of one of the parties, are 
therefore inapplicable. 
52 At 195 A, B. 
53 At 196 E. 
54 For an interpretation of the case, see Viejobueno XXVI CILSA (1993) 172,207. 
551991 (2) SA 75 (Z) at 78 F-1. 
56 See for obiter support also Henry v Branfield 1996 (1) SA 244 (D). 
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4 Conclusion 
The position of internationally mandatory rules in South African law in respect of 
international contracts is uncertain, since there have been few decided cases. 
Nevertheless, the current position may be recapitulated as follows. 
Firstly, the proper law will be applied by the courts and hence a contract that is 
illegal under its proper law will be unenforceable. It seems that no distinction is made 
between public and private law rules. Secondly, the imperative provisions of the South 
African forum that claim application to the transaction, either expressly or by statutory 
interpretation, irrespective of the proper law, are applicable and may render a foreign 
contract illegal or unenforceable despite its legality under the proper law. Thirdly, the 
application of internationally mandatory rules of a third legal system is an issue res 
nova before the courts and the discussion amongst academic writers has only started 
recently. 
Most authors rely on English case law and in particular on illegality under the lex 
loci solutionis. Some authors submit that the internal ordre public of the forum state 
must decide whether and how third countries' mandatory rules are to be taken into 
account. 57 Others seem to rely on the international ordre public of South African private 
international law, since the invocation of public policy is based on comity and common 
sense.
58 Others take a more progressive view and argue that third countries' mandatory 
rules should be applied or considered if they reasonably claim application and if there is 
a close connection between the legal system and the transaction. 59 
However, apart from some very vague statements, for example, that the public 
policy of the forum state must determine whether foreign ius cogens is to be applied or 
considered, no real suggestions have been made by academic writers indicating when 
57 Spiro XVII CILSA (1984) 197,207,208; Viejobueno XXVI CILS (1993) 172,207. 
58 Forsyth Private international Law 302, 303. 
59 See Van Rooyen Die Kontrak 164 et seq; Edwards Conflict o/Laws para 469. 
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foreign rules should be given effect,60 and the South African courts have yet to deal with 
the issue. 
II Proposed Approach for South African private international law of contracts 
In this section, a solution will be proposed on a general basis for the application or 
consideration of internationally mandatory rules in private international law of 
contracts. These suggestions may serve to guide the South African courts in combining 
internationally mandatory rules with the ordinary choice of law process.61 Furthermore, 
this proposal may serve as a contribution to a discussion amongst South African 
scholars about a relatively unexplored area. 
1 The common denominator 
The previous discussion and comparative analysis ofthe different case law solutions, 
the various academic approaches, and the relatively recent legislative solutions adopted 
by the Rome Convention and the Swiss IPRG will be taken into account and serve as a 
cornerstone. As was seen during the course of this study, the approaches differ 
substantially, and the legal situation in the various countries is far from clear. However, 
the analysis of the different approaches has also identified similarities. These 
similarities may serve as a lowest common denominator, which will form the basis of 
and justification for a proposal. 
a Internationally mandatory rules of the forum 
Internationally mandatory rules of the forum state always prevail over the choice oflaw 
process. This proposition is apparently true for all the countries under 
60 However, for a possibly useful approach, see Van Rooyen Die Kontrak. 
61 Legislation in this field is unlikely. The SA parliament is currently busy with a full programme that 
involves issues as fundamental as the introduction of an inquisitorial procedure in criminal proceedings 
and a new law of succession. In these circumstances the private international law of contracts will 
certainly not be considered a priority. In any event, it would not be advisable to legislate on the 
applicability of (foreign) internationally mandatory rules. First, the SA private international law of 
contracts needs to develop principled rules in the course of time. Secondly, the issues are complex, and as 
has been shown in this study, application of internationally mandatory rules is an area that is still 
unsettled and contested in the countries under investigation. 
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investigation.62 The reason for application of these rules by the court of the forum is 
simply that the court is bound by its sovereign. Aside from constitutional issues of 
human rights, the legislature of the forum state is always free to create rules that 
override the choice of law process. There is nothing remarkable about this.63 
There are differences, however, with regard to the juristic basis of this principle. A 
duality of method existed or exits in all the countries under investigation. On the one 
hand, the application of the mandatory laws of the forum state regardless of the foreign 
proper law, was based on the forum's ordre public,64 or alternatively, on the nature of 
the mandatory rule itself (overriding the choice of law process). 65 A statute has an 
implied or express unilateral choice of law rule attached to it, indicating its territorial 
scope of application. The major problem faced by the court is to identify internationally 
mandatory rules and to distinguish them from those mandatory rules that are subject to 
the normal conflict rules, particularly where the territorial scope of the rule has to be 
determined by interpretation of a statute.66 
b Internationally mandatory rules of the proper law 
Academic and judicial approaches differ with regard to the application of internationally 
mandatory rules of the proper law. In England mandatory rules of the proper law are 
generally applied because they belong to the law governing the contract, as indicated by 
the ordinary conflict rule.67 In private litigation no distinction is made between public 
and private law rules, or rules serving private interests and those pursuing 
predominantly public interests of the foreign state.68 These rules are applicable subject 
only to the English public policy exclusionary rule. 
In Germany and Switzerland, however, the approach is different and is extensively 
debated amongst scholars.69 According to the German and Swiss courts, private and 
62 See CHAPTER 4. 
63 Forsyth Private International Law 299 Footnote 156; Schurig Lois 55, 59 et seq. 
64 CHAPTER 4, I, 1. 
65 CHAPTER 4, I, 2 and II. 
66 See CHAPTER 3, II and CHAPTER 4, II, 2, for examples III. 
67 CHAPTER 5, III, 1. 
68 CHAPTER 5, III, 1, a, b. 
69 CHAPTER 5, I. 
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public law rules serving predominantly the private interests of the contracting parties or 
the fair reconciliation between them, are applicable if they emanate from the proper law. 
However, public law rules that pursue mainly the interests of the foreign state are in 
principle not applied. This non-application of foreign public laws is based on the 
'Public Conflict of Laws' or 'International Administrative Law', which are founded on 
the principle of territoriality of public laws.70 However, foreign public law rules can be 
considered ifthe foreign state is in a position to enforce its law. Alternatively, the 
foreign rule can be given effect within the substantive law of the lex causae.71 
Most academics reject such a restrictive approach. Generally speaking, they either 
favour a comprehensive application of the proper law as it is in force in the foreign 
country (Schuldstatuts-theory and Combination Theory),72 or propose a special 
cormection of internationally mandatory rules (Special Connection Theory).73 The 
former solution leads to application of the internationally mandatory rules of the proper 
law. These authors nonetheless submit that cognisance must be taken of the self-
limitation of the foreign rule. Thus, if the foreign rule does not claim application, it is 
not applied.74 According to the latter solution, the foreign rule is not rendered 
automatically applicable by the ordinary conflict rules, but is subject to special conflict 
rules that indicate its application. The internationally mandatory rules of the proper law 
are thus treated on the same basis as the rules of any other foreign legal system, the so-
called 'third country's' internationally mandatory rules. 
Thus the crucial question is whether these rules should be applied as part of the 
proper law, or whether they are subject to a special connection and are only applicable if 
the conditions of a special choice of law process (or a special conflict rule) are fulfilled. 
However, according to all the approaches, the self-limitation is respected despite the 
general principle in private international law of contracts of exclusion of renvoi. 
Accordingly, the proper law's internationally mandatory rules are not applied if they do 
not claim application to the situation in question. 
70 CHAPTER 5, II, I, b, d. 
71 CHAPTER 5, II, I, c; d. 
72 See CHAPTER 5, I, 1,4. 
7J CHAPTER 5, I, 3. 
74 As was seen above, this at least sometimes leads to the result that renvoi is accepted, CHAPTER 5, I, 7, 
f, III, 3, c. 
304 
c Internationally mandatory rules of a third country 
The application of a third country's internationally mandatory rules is the main issue in 
dispute. Combining these rules with the ordinary choice of law process is extremely 
controversial and so far legal scholars have been unable to agree on one solution.75 
Article 7 (1) ofthe Rome Convention enables the court ofthe forum to give effect 
to third countries' internationally mandatory rules on a discretionary basis. However, 
Germany and England entered a reservation to this article, with the result that it is not in 
legal force in either country. 76 Switzerland, on the other hand, has enacted art 19 of the 
IPRG which enables Swiss courts to consider third countries' internationally mandatory 
rules, if the foreign rule is internationally mandatory; the situation is closely connected 
with the enacting country; and the legitimate and overriding interest of a party requires 
the consideration of the foreign rule according to a Swiss viewpoint. Furthermore, the 
court has to consider the purpose of the foreign rule and the consequences of its 
application for a judgment that is fair according to the Swiss law.77 
The German courts pay little attention to academic approaches and decide cases in a 
more pragmatic manner. 78 They have therefore relied on the principle of territoriality of 
foreign public law or the forum's ordre public to avoid application of a third country's 
internationally mandatory rules. In other cases, however, the courts recognised foreign 
internationally mandatory rules within the substantive law of the lex causae (which 
corresponded with the lex fori in all decided cases).79 The violation of foreign law could 
lead to inunorality under German law and thus render the contract null and void, or the 
foreign rule could lead to impossibility of performance or frustration of contract. The 
courts thus extended the scope of the substantive law rules in order to cover the 
violation of foreign law as well. German courts have considered foreign internationally 
mandatory rules within the notion of boni mores if the foreign rule also indirectly served 
75 CHAPTER 5, I. 
76 CHAPTER 5, IV, 1,3. 
77 CHAPTER 5, IV, I. 
78 CHAPTER 5, II, 2 . 
79 CHAPTER 5, II, 2. 
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German interests, or interests shared in common by all civilised nations, or pursued 
general valid moral values.80 
German academics in general have rejected the principle of territoriality as basis 
for refusal to apply foreign public law.81 It is much debated whether and how third 
countries' internationally mandatory rules can be applied or considered. Even so, no one 
supports the idea that third countries' internationally mandatory rules should not be 
given effect at all. The dispute focuses rather on the method that should be used to apply 
or consider these rules. 82 
According to the Schuldstatuts-theory, third countries' mandatory rules are in 
principle inapplicable, because they do not form part of the proper law as indicated by 
the normal choice of law rules. The advocates of this approach argue that there is no 
conflict rule that could render these rules applicable, apart from such exception as art 
VIII (2) (b) of the IMF Agreement. Despite their inapplicability, however, these rules 
are taken into account as supposed 'facts' within the substantive law of the lex causae.83 
The Special Connection and Combination Theories favour recognition of a third 
country's internationally mandatory rules on the basis of choice oflaw criteria by means 
of a special connection.84 Although there are many disagreements amongst the 
advocates of a Special Connection Theory about the special conflict rule,85 the different 
views in essence have four propositions in common: (1) a sufficiently close connection 
between the situation and the enacting country; (2) the rule in question must be 
internationally mandatory; (3) the conditions in terms of which the rule applies must be 
fulfilled; and (4) the content of the provision and its legal consequences must be 
compatible with the legal system of the forum. 86 
English courts have in general rejected application or recognition of a third 
country's internationally mandatory rules because they do not form part of the proper 
80 CHAPTER 5, II, 2, C, d. 
81 See however CHAPTER 5, I, 2. 
82 See CHAPTER 5, 1, 7. 
83 CHAPTER 5, I, 1. 
84 CHAPTER 5, I, 3, 4 . 
85 CHAPTER 5, I, 3, b, C. 
86 CHAPTER 5, I, 3, f. 
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law. There are, however, two exceptions.87 Firstly, third countries' mandatory rules have 
been taken into account by reference to the English public policy rule that a contract 
opposed to British interests of state is void, particularly if it is likely to jeopardise 
friendly relations with another. The basis of this public policy rule is international 
comity.88 The second exception is the rule that a contract (whether lawful by its proper 
law or not) will not be enforced if its performance is illegal under the lex loci 
solutionis.89 As was noted, however, the juristic basis of these principles - whether they 
are principles of choice of law or English substantive law - is uncertain.90 
2 The structurally preferable solution: A special connection of internationally 
mandatory rules 
It is submitted that South African private international law should apply internationally 
mandatory rules on the basis of a special connection. A special connection constitutes 
the systematically preferable solution and can serve as a general concept for integrating 
these rules into the ordinary choice of law process. This solution does not replace the 
ordinary choice of law rules, nor is it intended to depart from the traditional allocation 
technique by substituting a policy-orientated selection process. On the contrary, a 
special connection of internationally mandatory rules supplements the ordinary choice 
of law process. 
This solution indicates under what circumstances internationally mandatory rules 
are applicable to the contract, alongside the traditional process for determining the law 
governing the contract. Internationally mandatory rules are thus connected separately by 
means of different choice of law rules that apply alongside the traditional conflict rules. 
These separate choice of law rules take into account the peculiarities of internationally 
mandatory rules, the interests of the states involved, and the interests of the contracting 
parties in the application or non-application of the relevant rules. Admittedly, they are 
very much based on policy considerations, with a focus on the content and purpose of 
87 CHAPTER 5, III, 2. 
88 CHAPTER 5, III, 2, a. 
89 CHAPTER 5, III, 2, c. 
90 CHAPTER 5, III, 2, c, d, 3. 
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the rule in question and the consequence of its application. One may therefore speak of a 
'duality of methodology' .91 
In the present author's opinion, however, this statement is inaccurate ifit is based 
on the understanding that a special connection process depends solely on an 
interpretation of the nature and purpose of the rule in question. To the contrary, I argue 
that, although this choice of law process is more result- and policy-orientated, it still 
conforms to the traditional allocation technique. Internationally mandatory rules of the 
lex fori are applied because they have an attached conflict rule indicating their territorial 
scope, while foreign internationally mandatory rules are applied because special conflict 
rules of the forum so provide. 
Therefore, it is preferable to refer to this separate connection of internationally 
mandatory rules as a necessary further development in adapting to legal changes, 
because private international law can and should develop further. 92 States are 
increasingly tending to enact mandatory laws that protect the weaker contracting party 
or regulate the economy - these are examples of such changes in law. The traditional 
choice of law process has to be further developed in order to accommodate these 
changes in law.93 
The examination and critical analysis of the different case law solutions and 
academic approaches has shown that the special connection of internationally 
mandatory rules is, as a system, better than the principle of territoriality of public law 
rules. With regard to foreign rules, it is also preferable to the principle of non-
applicability offoreign public laws,94 the Schuldstatuts theory, the Combination Theory, 
the Substantive Law Approach,95 and the approaches in England.96 
91 Cfthe articles of Drobnig, Basedow and Siehr in RabelsZ 52 (1988) 1 et seq. 
92 See Schurig Lois 55, 61 et seq, 69 et seq; RabelsZ 54 (1990) 217, 229 et seq; Voser Lois d'application 
immediate 193 et seq. 
93 For a discussion of this development, see the introductory remarks in CHAPTER 1; for the need to 
accommodate the choice of law process, also see supra CHAPTER 5, I, 3, a, e. 
94 CHAPTER 5, II, 3. 
95 CHAPTER 5, I, 7. 
96 CHAPTER 5, III , 3. 
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The most important arguments in favour of a special connection follow.97 
a Internationally mandatory rules of the lex/or; 
With regard to the internationally mandatory rules of the South African forum it is 
submitted that South African courts should apply these rules, regardless of a foreign 
proper law, on the basis of a special connection rather than by referring to the forum's 
ordre pUblic.98 
(1) Special connection of internationally mandatory rules 
A special connection is based on the understanding that internationally mandatory rules 
are not subject to the ordinary conflict rules of the forum. They contain next to their 
substantive content, a special (unilateral) conflict rule (express or implied) indicating 
their territorial scope. In other words, these rules must be accompanied by a unilateral 
conflict rule and they are applicable on the basis of their own express or implied claim 
to apply. 
A special connection offers a solution that is consistent with existing choice of law 
techniques and means that the courts need not resort to the ordre public. The ordre 
public should not be used. Firstly, a special connection is systematically preferable, 
since the application of directly applicable statutes on the basis of their own terms as 
special conflict rules forms part of the choice of law process. The reliance upon public 
policy, on the other hand, indicates that the choice of law process has already been 
completed, and its outcome will be corrected by the exclusion of foreign law or by the 
application of the forum's fundamental lois d'application immediate.99 
Secondly, it is submitted that the ordre public should be restricted to its negative 
function: the exclusion of the foreign proper law if its application leads to a result 
manifestly incompatible with the forum's ordre public. This negative function may 
97 The arguments will be discussed in the context of the submitted solutions for (a) the internationally 
mandatory rules of the lexfori, (b) the rules ofa third country and (c) the rules of the lex causae. Cfthe 
discussion and analysis in CHAPTER 4, I, 3; Chapter 5, I, 7; Il3; III, 2, b, e, 3; IV, 6. 
98 CHAPTER 4, I, 1,2,3. 
99 For this distinction, also see Forsyth Private International Law 102 Footnote 63 . 
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possibly result in an application of mandatory rules of the forum instead of the foreign 
proper law, but this is not how application of the ordre public is intended. Particularly 
in England no clear distinction has been made between application of the forum's 
mandatory rules and the public policy refusal to apply foreign law. In continental 
European countries, it has convincingly been argued that the gap that results from the 
refusal to apply foreign law should be closed by an interpretation and application of the 
foreign law, rather than application of the forum's rules. 
If the forum applies its own internationally mandatory rules because they are held 
to be manifestations of the ordre public, the latter requires a 'positive function'. This 
runs counter to the aim of a restrictive application of the ordre public and is based on an 
understanding of the ordre public that is nowadays not accepted by most scholars. 1oo 
Furthermore, internationally mandatory rules do not necessarily express such 
fundamental ethical values and policies that they can be characterised as 'crystallised 
rules' of public policy. Most of them are in fact based on economic or political policies, 
rather than on fundamental morality. 
It should be repeated that application of the forum's law despite the existence of a 
foreign proper law must be an exception. The generally well-established rule in private 
international law is that reference to a foreign legal system, either by the choice of the 
parties or by the ordinary objective conflict rules, includes the mandatory rules of the 
foreign law. Consequently, the mandatory rules of the forum, as well as the rules of the 
potentially otherwise applicable law, are in principle replaced by those of the proper 
law, and thus rendered inapplicable. Furthermore, an extensive application of the 
forum's internationally mandatory rules despite a foreign proper law runs counter to the 
aim of uniformity of result or decisional harmony. 101 Courts and academics should 
therefore exercise restraint in interpreting South African mandatory rules as 
internationally mandatory. 
100 For details, see CHAPTER 4, I, 3. 
101 The crucial point is that while the South African forum may grant South African rules an overriding 
effect in respect of a foreign law governing the contract, the same effect might not be granted to the 
South African provisions by a foreign court as forum. 
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(2) Identification of internationally mandatory rules 
Identifying these rules and distinguishing them from other mandatory laws that should 
be subject to the choice oflaw process remains a problem. The view of the present 
author is that a general all-embracing characterisation is not possible. All attempts to 
find a uniform definition have in some way failed. 102 De Boer says that: 
So far, no criterion has been found by which the ambit of priority rules can be 
delimited from those of other mandatory rules. So there is virtually no way of 
knowing when the court will shift from allocation to policy-determination and vice 
versa. to) 
It is submitted, however, that this statement is too pessimistic, and that basic principles 
and useful criteria have been established. 
If a statute stipulates its scope in an express term there is no great difficulty. The 
rule must be applied according to its own terms. If the rule or act does not contain an 
express term as to its scope of application, the judge faces the difficult task of 
interpreting it to determine whether it was intended to override the normal choice of law 
process. This policy-orientated interpretation of a statute necessarily creates some 
uncertainty. Although there are no absolute rules about the conditions for classifying a 
rule as internationally mandatory, there are guidelines. 104 
Most authors assume that, if a rule does not expressly stipulate its territorial scope, 
it can be classified as internationally mandatory provided it pursues the economic and 
political interests of the state and has no direct relation to private law. A rule is 
mandatory only in a domestic setting if it predominantly serves the interests of the 
contracting parties. 105 Rules with a 'double function' - that serve private and public 
interests - are problematic. 106 Here it is particularly difficult to find a criterion to 
102 See supra CHAPTER 3, II. 
103 De Boer RabelsZ 54 (1990) 24, 61. 
104 This question also depends on the type of mandatory rule, the policy pursued by the particular rule, 
and the facts of the individual case. See also the approach of Schurig Lois 55, 64 et seq: It must be 
detennined whether the intention of the rule is that a foreign legal system should govern the issue if the 
conditions of the rule are not fulfilled. If so, the rule is an internationally mandatory one. If the rule 
intends that other provisions of the same legal system should regulate the matter if the conditions of the 
provision are not fulfilled, it is simply mandatory. 
lOS For details, see CHAPTER 3, II. 
106 CHAPTER 3, II and CHAPTER 4, III, 2. 
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distinguish domestic from internationally mandatory rules. It is submitted that those 
rules serving mainly the fair reconciliation of conflicting interests of the contracting 
parties qualify as domestic only. 
This assumption should also prevail for those rules intending to protect the weaker 
contracting party. English authors are too ready to characterise protective laws as 
internationally mandatory for the sole reason that they intend to protect the weaker 
party. A protective rule should be classified as internationally mandatory only as an 
exception, if the rule in question pursues the public interests of the community, rather 
than private interests.IO? It is submitted, for example, that, under the appropriate 
circumstances, the South African Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 can 
reasonably be characterised as internationally mandatory, while South African courts 
should be reluctant to classify the Credit Agreements Act 75 of 1980 as internationally 
mandatory. 108 
In cases of doubt, where the intention of the legislature or the policy of the rule does 
not clearly indicate its scope of application, it is submitted that the rule should not be 
classified as internationally mandatory.l09 
107 For example, public labour law. For details, see Gamillscheg ZfA 14 (1983) 307 et seq. 
108 See Forsyth Private International Law 13, 14 referring to the Basic Conditions Employment Act 3 of 
1986. 
109 Also see Lorenz RlW 1987,569,578,581,582. 
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b Internationally mandatory rules of a third country 
The situation is different with regard to foreign internationally mandatory rules. Judges 
are not bound to apply foreign legislation unless a statutory or common law conflict rule 
so directs. In respect of third countries' internationally mandatory rules this is due to the 
general proposition of conflict of laws that, unless the forum's choice of law rules so 
direct, foreign law is not applicable. 
Statutory conflict rules indicating the application or consideration of third 
countries' internationally mandatory rules are rare. A well known example is art VIII (2) 
(b) of the IMP Agreement for foreign exchange control regulations. Article 7 (1) of the 
Rome Convention and art 19 of the Swiss IPRG are examples of a more general nature, 
since they cover all types of contracts and internationally mandatory rules. Similar rules 
can be found in art 16 ofthe Convention on the Law Applicable to Agency of 1978 110 
and art 16 (2) of the Trust Convention of 1985. 111 Apart from these statutory conflict 
rules, nearly all approaches nevertheless take third countries' internationally mandatory 
rules into account under certain circumstances, either as supposed facts within the 
substantive law, or by means of special conflict rules. 
The crucial question for South African courts is when and on what legal basis 
application of a third country's internationally mandatory rules is justified. As was seen, 
de lege lata, no special conflict rule exists in the South African conflict of law of 
contracts. The courts tend to follow English precedents. 112 It is submitted, however, that 
South African courts should now, de lege ferenda, develop special conflict rules or at 
least choice of law principles to take third countries' rules into account. In order to fmd 
conditions and criteria, they may nevertheless refer to the well-established principles of 
English and German case law. 
At the same time, South African courts should avoid repeating mistakes of the 
German and English courts, and should clarify from the outset that the process of giving 
effect to third countries' laws is a process of conflict of laws. 
110 Act, Doc La Haye 13 Sess 1976 142; RabelsZ 43 (1979) 176. 
III Act, Doc La Haye 15 Sess 1984 125-39; RabelsZ 50 (1986) 698; see Siehr RabelsZ 52 (1988) 41, 70; 
Erne Vertragsgiiltigkeit 173; Schiffer Normen 142. 
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(1) ' The structurally preferable solution 
The application or consideration of a third country's internationally mandatory rules on 
the juristic basis of a special connection is preferable to referring to the forum's ordre 
public, or to extending substantive law rules of the proper law so that they can cover the 
violation of foreign law. 113 It is not intended to repeat what was explained above, and a 
few remarks will suffice. 
International contracts are usually connected with two or more legal systems, that 
may have a reasonable interest in the application of their mandatory provisions. The 
interest might be even greater than that of the law chosen by the parties or determined 
objectively by the forum's conflict rules. This is the case, for example, if the chosen law 
is a neutral legal system with which the contract or the contracting parties have no 
objective connection, apart from the choice. 
Nowadays, private law is not only based on private interests, but is increasingly 
influenced by the interests Of the state and the community: the so-called 'double 
functionality' of the law of contracts. 
State intervention in the domestic legal sphere for purposes of redressing social and 
economic imbalances by rules that inhibit the freedom of contract cannot be ignored in 
private international law. The logical consequence is a need to accommodate provisions 
of mandatory rules of law that would not be applicable according to the traditional 
conflict approach and to adjust the ordinary choice of law process. 
In effect, all the approaches - whether Special Connection, the Combination 
Theory, the Substantive Law Approach of German case law, the Schuldstatuts-theory, or 
the English public policy-comity or the lex loci solutionis rule - take third countries' 
internationally mandatory rules into account. The Special Connection Theory, however, 
seems to be the most methodologically sound solution. Although it is argued that this 
112 See CHAPTER 6, I, 3. 
113 For details about the following arguments, see CHAPTER 5, I, 7, II, 3, III, 3, IV, 6. 
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theory would run counter to the principle of unity of the law applicable to a contract, 
this principle is of no use with regard to internationally mandatory rules. 114 
Authors who support treating foreign mandatory rules as facts within the 
substantive law of the lex causae assume an incorrect starting point. According to them, 
the recognition as supposed facts would not require a choice oflaw. It is left to the 
governing law to decide whether third countries' internationally mandatory rules can be 
considered. However, foreign rules are not facts in the true sense and often it is the rule 
itself or its normative content that is given effect. I IS In truth, the choice of law question 
about whether the rule is applicable is combined with application of substantive law 
rules and thereby hidden behind the substantive law. The substantive law, however, is 
not intended to decide choice of law questions. 
Finally, it should be kept in mind that, according to general principles in choice of 
law, the question of whether and how foreign law is to be given effect is a matter of the 
conflict of laws ofthe forum state. 116 The consideration of a third country's rules within 
a foreign lex causae would mean that this decision is in effect handed over to the foreign 
proper law. 117 The Special Connection Theory, however, leaves this decision in the 
hands of the forum state. lIS 
A few additional remarks about the English public policy-comity rule and the lex 
loci solutionis rule seem in order, since it is likely that South African courts will tend to 
adopt these solutions. The public policy-comity rule is obviously vague, but several 
issues remain unnecessarily uncertain: What types of rules are referred to? Is reference 
being made to any prohibition, or is it necessary that the foreign rule claims application 
to the situation in question? Does the public policy-comity rule require a connection 
between the situation and the foreign enacting country? Is a friendly country really any 
country with which the United Kingdom is not at war? Must the public policy rule be 
restricted to cases of conspiracy and thus not apply in cases where the parties did not 
intend to break the foreign law? 
114 CHAPTER 5, I, 7, a. 
liS See the discussion in CHAPTER 5, I, 7, b, c, e, f; II, 3, d; III, 2, b, d, 3, a. 
116 This is equally true for SA, cf Forsyth Private International Law 58. 
117 CHAPTER 5, I, 7, c. 
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A final point of criticism is that - except the public policy-comity rule - only 
illegality under the lex loci solutionis is taken into account. Illegality under other laws -
the law of the habitual residence, place of business or the lex sitae of the goods - is 
ignored. Yet these latter laws might have an even closer connection with the contract. 119 
Apart from the fact that the juristic basis of the common law principles is uncertain, 
a special connection is the preferable means of taking third countries' rules into account 
and offers a systematically superior basis for the courts' findings. The results reached by 
the courts in their application of the public policy-comity rule or the lex loci solutionis 
rule could equally be reached by means of a special connection. Furthermore, courts 
would be able to take into account the peculiarities of each individual case, since a 
special connection is not restricted to, for example, cases of conspiracy of the parties or 
the place of performance. The necessary conditions for a special connection are a close 
connection, the foreign rule's claim to apply, and further conditions regarding the policy 
of the foreign rule and the consequences of its application. 
(2) A special connection in conformity with conflict of laws 
A special connection conforms to principles of conflict of laws and leads to results that 
correspond in most cases with the outcome of the decided case law. It thus changes the 
method rather than the outcome. In order to avoid the reproach that a special connection 
would imply a methodological move towards unilateralism, it must be stated that this is 
only partly true, since the unilateral approach starts from the foreign mandatory rule's 
claim to apply. 
Most authors that advocate a special connection of foreign internationally 
mandatory rules assume that the foreign rule is applied not because it claims 
application, but because such application is required by the choice of law rules (whether 
common or statutory law rules) of the forum state. l2O The connecting factor for 
indicating the application of the foreign rule is, very broadly, a close connection, a 
118 Furthermore, choice of law considerations will take place at the level of conflict of laws and will not 
be confused with the application of a (possibly) foreign substantive law. 
119 For details, see CHAPTER 5, III, 3, b. 
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factor that is well known and widely accepted in private international law. There is thus 
no need to scrutinise every legal system for internationally mandatory rules claiming 
application to the situation. All that is required is determining whether the forum state 
has an interest in considering a violated foreign rule of a closely cormected country. 
It is, however, acknowledged that this approach departs from the traditional choice 
of law technique in so far as the latter is held to be 'neutral', indicating the applicable 
legal system without regard to the content of the foreign rules and with the exclusion of 
renvoi. A special connection of foreign internationally mandatory rules is necessarily 
more policy-and result-orientated since it controls the content of the foreign rule and the 
results of its application on the contract, and requires that the rules serve interests that 
are somehow shared with the forum state. 121 
Furthermore, it must be reiterated that the consideration of third countries' 
internationally mandatory rules serves the goal of decisional harmony, regardless of 
where the matter is heard, and this is a goal that South African private international law 
also desires. 122 Lastly, the comity of nations, a principle of considerable value in South 
African private international law, is served. 123 
(3) General guidelines for special conflict rules 
It is submitted that the following conditions may serve as general guidelines for a 
special connection of foreign internationally mandatory rules. It must be reiterated that 
the tendency has been to move away from a general conflict rule that covers all types of 
contracts and internationally mandatory rules. This type of rule is necessarily vague. 
Instead the recent trend is to develop special conflict rules for certain areas of law, 
120 CHAPTER 5, I, 7, c, f. 
121 However, court decisions where third countries' internationally mandatory rules were taken into 
account were clearly policy-orientated, for example, the consideration of foreign rules within the English 
public policy-comity rule or the notion of Gennan bani mores. Furthennore, policy considerations and a 
control of the content and effect of foreign rules have taken place ever since within the notion of the 
forum's ordre public. 
122 Compare Forsyth Private International Law 60,61. 
123 See supra CHAPTER 5, I, 7, h. For SA, see Forsyth Private International Law on pages 36 et seq. For 
a discussion of the meaning of comity as used by the Roman-Dutch authorities, see Huber De conjlictu 
legum; Yoet De Statutis, Yoet Commentarius. Also see Forsyth ibid on pages 58,59 for his personal 
conclusion on the way forward for modem Roman-Dutch law. 
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where state interests are typically involved and are pursued by means of internationally 
mandatory rules intervening in private relationships, for example, anti-trust law, import 
and export restrictions, and foreign exchange controls. 124 
The present author adheres to this view. Special rules for certain types of 
internationally mandatory rules allow for consideration of the peculiarities of the legal 
field and for the development of firm criteria indicating under what circumstances these 
rules can be reasonably applied. For example, export and import restrictions require 
different considerations in respect of a close connection and the interests of the forum 
than in the area of anti-trust law. The former restrictions require the goods either to 
come from the enacting country or be delivered there, and, if the foreign prohibition 
serves interests that are directed against the forum state or are not shared in conunon by 
the states, the forum will not give effect to the prohibition, despite a local contact. In the 
area of anti-trust law, on the other hand, the so-called 'effect principle' is usually 
appropriate to determine whether a foreign rule reasonably claims application, viz. the 
agreement that is prohibited by a certain anti-trust rule of a foreign country must have 
an effect on the market ofthat particular country. 
Nevertheless, in the present stage of development, a general clause might be useful 
in commencing the process of developing refined rules for particular fields of law. 125 
The process of refining and concretising criteria for the application of foreign rules may 
in the course of time also lead to the development of multilateral conflict rules, that are 
not restricted to indicating the applicability of foreign countries' rules, but may also 
refer to the forum's internationally mandatory rules in this field. A good example is the 
Swiss art 137 that indicates under what circumstances the foreign and the forum's anti-
trust law is applicable on the basis of the' effects principle' . 
However, in the absence of specific conflict rules, it is necessary first to establish 
general principles. The following are submitted as general guidelines for a 
consideration of foreign (third) countries' internationally mandatory rules. 
124 See CHAPTER 5, I, 3, c, d. 
125 It is submitted that it is in any event not necessary for the legislature to enact conflict rules that provide 
for the application of foreign internationally mandatory rules, as seems to be required by Forsyth Private 
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(I) Mandatory rules of a foreign country that solely or predominantly pursue the 
economic and political interests of the foreign enacting state, and not the interests 
of the contracting parties in settling disputes, or the fair reconciliation between 
them, can be given effect if the contract has a close connection with the enacting 
country and, according to the law of the foreign country, the rule claims 
application, regardless of the proper law ofthe contract (internationally mandatory 
rules). The close connection should be specified with reference to the legal 
relationship and the rule in question. (For example, in the field of anti-trust law, the 
crucial question should be whether the agreement affects the market of the country 
that enacted the internationally mandatory anti-trust regulation, while in the field of 
export restrictions, the question whether the goods have been exported from the 
enacting country should be decisive.) 
(II) In order to reach alair result in the individual case, the judge should be granted a 
broad discretion in deciding whether and how the foreign internationally mandatory 
rule is to .be recognised. The consideration of the following four aspects enables the 
court to take into account not only the interests of the forum and the foreign 
enacting state, but also the interests of the contracting parties. 
(a) In considering whether and how to give effect to the foreign rule, regard should be 
had to its nature and purpose, with reference to whether it serves interests shared in 
common with the forum state, or is in other respects reasonable from the forum's 
point of view. Categories can thus be developed to indicate under what 
circumstances it is reasonable to give effect to the foreign rule, such as: 
does the foreign rule indirectly protect the interests ofthe forum state? 
does it protect universally recognised interests? 
does it protect generally required moral values? 
does it promote comity and harmonise international relations? 
does it simply serve to co-ordinate the national economy? 
International Law 274. Because SA private intemationallaw is to a large extent based on common law, 
there is no reason why courts should not develop common law choice of law rules in this field. 
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(b) Furthennore, the court should have regard to the consequences of applying the 
foreign rule, ie its effect on the contract private relationship. At this stage the court 
should consider the interests of the contracting parties with a view to promoting a 
fair reconciliation of their interests. 
(c) In addition, the court should be free to decide how effect is given to the foreign 
rule. Strict adherence to application of the foreign rule might sometimes not be 
justified. The court could also take the foreign rule into account as a reason for 
nullity of the contract under the lex causae rules, for impossibility of perfonnance 
or frustration of the contract. Alternatively, it might be necessary to alter the legal 
consequences of the foreign rule if its application would lead to unjust results for 
the contracting parties. Thus, it might be better to assume frustration of contract 
than to nullify the contract as demanded by the third country's rule. 126 
(d) In general, the relationship between the proper law and the application of third 
countries' internationally mandatory rules should be solved by the private 
international law technique of adaptation. 127 The doctrine involves the alteration or 
modification of either the conflict rules or the relevant conflicting substantive 
laws. 128 Thus, if the proper law conflicts with the third country's rule, the judge may 
alter or adapt the substantive law rules of either, in order to avoid contradictions 
126 This process of modifying the application of laws and their consequences with a view to a fair 
outcome can also be characterised as adaptation (in a broader sense). For adaptation, see the text 
following this Footnote. 
127 See supra CHAPTER 4, I, I, CHAPTER 5, 1,3, j, IV, I, d, (2); for authors referring to the technique of 
adaptation in this particular context, see Lorenz RlW 1987, Lehmann Zwingendes Recht 229; Kreuzer 
Auslandisches Wirtschaftsrecht 95; Schiffer Normen 195 et seq; Erne Vertragsgiiltigkeit 198. 
128 On the technique of adaptation in Germany and Switzerland, see Kegel IPR 7th ed § 8; Firschinglvon 
Hoffinann IPR 213 et seq; Neuhaus Grundbegriffe 354 et seq; KellerlSiehr IPR 450 et seq. The technique 
is granted much less theoretical attention in England, which is regrettable because the problems there are 
the same as elsewhere, in that norms of different legal systems may conflict due to the choice of law 
process (viz. 'cumulation' or 'gap'). English authors refer to these situations in the context of 
'Characterization' (or 'Classification') and take a much more pragmatic view. Compare Dicey & Morris 
Conflict of Laws Vol I 34,38 et seq; Cheshire & North's Private International Law 43 et seq. Although 
the doctrine of adaptation is res nova for SA private international law, authors are much more aware of 
the problem and profound in their analysis and theoretical foundation, see Bennett 105 III (1988) SALJ 
444 et seq; Forsyth Private International Law 69 et seq. In the present study, the problem of adaptation 
does not arise in the context of characterization, but as a result of the special connection of internationally 
mandatory rules, because different (and possibly even the same) aspects of a case are governed by 
different legal systems. It has been recognised in SA law that cumulation and gap may arise in contexts 
other than characterization, cfBennett ibid and Forsyth ibid 69 Footnote 35. Also compare Lipstein Rec 
des Cours 135 (1972 II) 99, 209 for the principle of adaptation in situations where the choice of law leads 
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and to reach a fair result in accordance with the forum's viewpoint. 129 Alternatively, 
it may even be reasonable to shift or alter the scope of application of the relevant 
conflict rules or to create a new conflict rule for the situation in question. 130 
(III) The following principles should prevail in the rare case of conflicting 
internationally mandatory rules from different legal systems. (This situation is 
hypothetical, since such cases have not yet occured.)131 Firstly, the judge should 
examine whether these rules really do conflict, or whether it might be reasonable to 
apply both rules, despite their differing content and legal consequences. Thus 
different considerations might be necessary for different obligations, such as 
payment or delivery, and if these obligations have been discharged or have to be 
performed in different countries, it might well be reasonable to consider the rules of 
different countries for each obligation. 
If the internationally mandatory rules of the forum do indeed conflict with those of 
a foreign country in so far as they concern the same obligation or conduct, the rules 
of the forum state should prevail. This simply follows from the fact that the forum 
is bound by its sovereign. If there is a conflict between foreign internationally 
mandatory rules, this conflict should be solved as follows. The judge should first 
determine whether it is possible to combine the content of both rules. If this is not 
possible, he should then determine with which country the contract has the closer 
connection. If an equally close connection exists, the judge should establish which 
rule serves interests more favourably, from the forum's point of view. 
to the application of different laws to different aspects of the case; also compare Lipstein 
Characterization ss 15, 16, 17,48 et seq. 
129 Materiellrechtiche L6sung (substantive law solution). In effect the judge is permitted to modify 
substantive law and thus create new rules so that the contradictions are avoided. Which rules he alters 
depends again on a value decision of the judge. The crucial point is which law can modified without 
violating the legal system, see Kegel IPR § 8 III, 1,3. 
130 International privatrechtliche L6sung (conflict of law solution). The alteration of conflict rules or the 
creation of new principles can lead to the result that the whole legal transaction is held to be governed by 
only one legal system. Which legal system shall govern is a value-decision of the judge, see Kegel IPR § 
8 III, 1,2; Firschinglvon Hoffmann IPR 215. Although authors like Firsching/von Hoffmann prefer this 
latter 'conflict solution', the present author prefers the 'substantive law solution', because the conflict 
solution does not avoid the fact that the parties are sometimes faced with contradictory laws which may 
de/acto effect their legal transaction. Also compare Lipstein Rec des Cours 135 (1972 II) 99, 209. 
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(4) Subsidiary consideration of the factual effects on the private relationship 
According to these principles, it may not be reasonable to give effect to the foreign rule. 
It might nevertheless be reasonable to take the actual effects of the foreign rule into 
account within the applicable substantive law if the existence of the foreign rule renders 
performance de Jacto impossible. In this case it is not the foreign rule or its legal content 
that is taken into account, but only its effect on the private relationship. 
This will be the case where the foreign state has enacted a rule that has already been 
enforced, for example, confiscation of the goods that renders performance de facto 
impossible. Alternatively, performance may be sanctioned by heavy penalties so that it 
would constitute an undue hardship for the debtor to perform. Under these 
circumstances the debtor should be relieved of his obligations, in the interests of justice. 
Here we are dealing with a 'factual circumstance abroad' that can be taken into account 
by the substantive law rules applicable to the contract. However, the question of which 
contracting party has to carry the risk of (non-) performance is a separate issue. 
13\ This can also be classified as a situation covered by the doctrine of adaptation. 
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c Internationally mandatory rules of the proper law 
The crucial question about internationally mandatory rules of the proper law is whether 
they should be applicable for the sole reason that they form part of the proper law, or 
whether they should also be subject to a special connection. It is submitted that 
internationally mandatory rules that serve only the economic and political interests of 
the foreign state should not be applied as part of the proper law, but should instead be 
connected separately on the basis of special choice of law considerations. They are thus 
treated in the same way as the mandatory rules of a third legal system. This is based on 
the presumption that the ordinary choice of law rules in contract designate the law that 
will regulate the interests of the contracting parties, but these rules do not take into 
account all state enactments that intervene in private relationships, namely those that 
serve mainly state interests. 132 
Neither the parties' choice of law nor the objective allocation technique are suitable 
connecting factors to take into account state interests. The choice of a neutral law - a 
law with which the contract has no further connection, apart from the fact that the 
parties chose it - is an example. There is no justification for applying the export 
restrictions of this country, or any other rule pursuing state interests, for the sole reason 
that the rules belong to the chosen neutral law. Instead, the legislation of a country with 
which the contract has a close connection, according to special considerations of the 
nature of the rule and the type of contract, should be applied.133 
A distinction must be drawn between those rules that have no direct relationship to 
private law and that are intended to further the state's economic or political interests 
(macro function), and those rules that serve the interests of private parties. 134 While the 
latter rules are included in the reference to the foreign law and are therefore applicable if 
they belong to the proper law, the former rules fall outside the foreign legal system's 
132 See CHAPTER 5, I, 3, a, f, 7, a; Vischer Rec des Cours 232 (1992) 21,179; id RabelsZ 53 (1989) 438, 
441, Voser Lois d'application immediate 51 et seq, 69 et seq; Morscher Rechtssetzungsakte 88; Kreuzer 
Auslandisches Wirtschaftsrecht 82 et seq. 
133 Similar considerations are valid with regard to the objective allocation, cfCHAPTER 5, I, 3, e, 7, a. 
134 For the 'double functionality' of the law of contracts, regulating the interests of the private parties, as 
well as being the object and instrument of governmentally guided economy in the modem welfare state, 
see Kreuzer Auslandisches Wirtschaftsrecht 82 et seq; id SchlechtriemlLeser 89, 106; for details, see 
CHAPTER 5, I, 3, e. 
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scope of the reference. 135 Those rules that serve the interests of the state, not the fair 
reconciliation of the interests of the contracting parties, deserve special conflict 
considerations. These are in principle independent of the question whether the foreign 
rule belongs to the proper law as designated by the ordinary conflict rules, or to a third 
legal system with which the situation has a close connection. 
Often, the result of a special connection and an application of internationally 
mandatory rules as part of the proper law will be the same. This is because parties 
frequently choose a law with which the contract is most closely connected as the legal 
system to govern their transaction. Furthermore, internationally mandatory rules of the 
proper law are, according to all approaches, applied only if they claim application. Thus, 
despite the general principle of private international law in contract that renvoi is 
disregarded, the self-limitation of these rules is respected. The special connection is 
nevertheless the better solution,136 since the special reference to the foreign law is ab 
initio subject to the proviso that the foreign rule claims application. 137 If an 
internationally mandatory rule does not claim application, the rule is not given effect. 138 
If the rules of different legal systems conflict with each other, the principles mentioned 
above should be applied. 139 
135 CHAPTER 5, I, 3, e, 7. 
136 The authors who advocate that internationally mandatory rules of the proper law apply because they 
belong to the proper law either have to interpret the territorial scope of the rules as part of its material 
content instead as an attached unilateral conflict rule or they need to make exceptions from the general 
principle that renvoi is disregarded, see supra under CHAPTER 5, I, 1, 7, f; III, 3, c. 
IJ7 Thus neither comity of nations nor decisional harmony is endangered. Regardless of where litigation 
takes place, the forum would not apply its internationally mandatory rule to the transaction, nor should 
this be done by another forum applying the foreign law despite the law's self-limitation. There is no 
justification for comity in situations where the foreign state's rule does not claim application. 
138 In the field of economic legislation the problems that result from the acceptance of renvoi, particularly 
the 'negative conflict' that no law is applicable, do not arise. Cf Lipstein ICLQ 26 (1977) 884, 892 et seq. 
139 CHAPTER 6, II, 2, b. 

